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INTELLIGENCE Essays

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The fourth volume acquaints readers with the work of "legal" and illegal residencies and the biographies of prominent intelligence officers who operated during the war (1941-1945). Intelligence activities at that time were aimed at revealing the military plans of Nazi Germany, helping to deploy a partisan movement in the occupied territories. In the final period of the war, Russian intelligence kept track of the plans and intentions of the United States and Britain to reorganize the post-war world and helped overcome the US monopoly on nuclear weapons. Attached to this volume are published declassified documents from the foreign intelligence archive.

For a wide range of readers.

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## Foreword

The fourth volume of the History of Russian Foreign Intelligence covers its activities during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. These were the years of the most difficult trials ever experienced by our Motherland. The German fascist armies, relying on the military-industrial potential of Europe they conquered, together with the armies of Finland, Romania, Hungary and Italy allied to the Third Reich, invaded the expanses of the Soviet Union. Acting under the slogan of "saving world civilization from Bolshevism," the leadership of fascist Germany hoped to crush the USSR with lightning speed and, having mastered its richest resources, then turn their weapons against other countries of the world that had not yet been defeated, primarily against England, to seize the territories subject to it. territories in the Near and Middle East. This was the essence of the strategy of the German "blitzkrieg" in the East.

Early in the morning of June 22, 1941, fascist Germany threw 153 divisions against our country, manned according to the state of wartime, 3712 tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts. The ground forces were supported by 4,950 combat aircraft. They were opposed by 149 divisions of the Red Army of the four western border districts and the border detachments of the NKVD guarding the border. Of the 149 divisions, only 48 were part of the first echelon of the covering armies, which were located at a distance of 10-50 km from the state border. The main forces of the border districts were located 80-300 km from the state border!. Not all of our troops were staffed according to wartime states, there were not enough modern weapons.

The German troops, who had experience of the war in the West, had a significant military superiority over our troops in terms of numbers and weapons. This gave them the opportunity to

months of war to seize a significant territory, approach Leningrad and Moscow.

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But despite the superiority of the aggressor at the beginning of the war, the Soviet state withstood the first blow, although it suffered heavy losses, being forced to cede to the enemy a significant part of its territory, the most developed in industrial and agricultural terms.

On the battlefields, Soviet troops defended the freedom and independence of not only their country. It was also a struggle for the independence of countries captured by fascism. The liberation nature of the war was noted in his speech on the radio on July 3, 1941 by I.V. Stalin. Common goals in the fight against fascism were reflected in the creation of the anti-Hitler coalition - a military-political union of states, which included countries with different political regimes. Receiving information about the attitude of the ruling circles and the public of the countries allied with us to the German plans for the conquest of world domination, foreign intelligence contributed to the efforts of Soviet diplomacy to create and strengthen this coalition.

The calculations of the fascist leaders for the isolation of the USSR during the war, their hopes for an agreement with Western countries, did not come true. Foreign intelligence informed the government of the country about such plans of the German leadership even before the war. Beginning in 1935, the top leaders of Nazi Germany, including Hitler, held secret negotiations with the British - Foreign Ministers Simon and Halifax, Prime Minister Chamberlain and other political figures and representatives of the British business circles. The consequence of these negotiations was the rearmament of Germany in circumvention of the Treaty of Versailles, the Anschluss of Austria, the agreement in Munich on the liquidation of Czechoslovakia, and finally, the "strange war", when, having formally declared war on Germany over Poland, the British did not conduct active military operations, expecting an attack. Germany to the Soviet Union.

The last point in this policy of pushing Nazi Germany towards Drang nach Osten was, to this day, the obscure story of Hess's flight to England in May 1941 in many respects. Foreign intelligence then reported to the leadership of the country information received from our valuable source in England, Kim Philby, that the purpose of this operation was an attempt to negotiate with influential pro-German circles in Great Britain on a joint struggle against the Soviet Union.

On the eve of the war, foreign intelligence received convincing information about large-scale military preparations being carried out by Germany for an attack on the USSR. The reports gave different dates for the attack, but they all pointed to the first half of 1941. Immediately before the attack, intelligence also established its exact date - June 22, 1941.

Let's just give one example. June 17, 1941, five days before the war, I.V. Stalin was informed of a message from our source, "Sergeant", who worked at the headquarters of the German army, which said: "All military measures of Germany to prepare an armed attack against the USSR are completely completed, and a strike can be expected at any time."

Foreign intelligence had enough information on its basis to reveal the essence of the German plans for the "blitzkrieg" in the conditions of the unfinished war with England. But in the pre-war years, intelligence did not yet have an analytical unit that could complete this work, understand the intricacies of German disinformation and draw an indisputable conclusion about the specific timing of the start of the war. In those years, important messages were reported to the leadership of the country, as a rule, separately, and it itself drew conclusions. Such was the order and style of work.

It should also be taken into account that the information received reflected the hesitations of a part of the German leadership regarding the reality of Hitler's plans for a blitzkrieg against the USSR.

However, the "blitzkrieg" strategy developed with the direct participation of Hitler did not justify itself. During the first months of the war, German troops occupied the western lands of the USSR, reached Leningrad, and reached the approaches to Moscow. But this promotion was not a "blitzkrieg". The border guards stood to the death, the Soviet troops fought courageously in the encirclement, the German troops expected the most difficult battles in the future. Ahead were the defeats of the Germans near Moscow, Stalingrad, not to mention the Battle of Kursk. But it was in the first months that Germany lost the war - lost thanks to the heroic resistance of the soldiers of the Red Army, the entire Soviet people, lost, despite the outward appearance of the successes of the armies that captured vast territories of our country, and the whole severity of our losses. The lightning war strategy collapsed, a protracted struggle was ahead, and the Soviet Union and its allies, who had powerful strategic and material resources, had more chances to win in it. Many German generals understood this. In August 1941, the Chief of the German General Staff of the Land Forces, Halder, wrote in his diary: "What we are now undertaking is the last and at the same time dubious attempt to prevent the transition to trench warfare. The colossus of Russia... was underestimated by us."

The course of hostilities largely determined the role of foreign intelligence in World War II. Its main operations were aimed at securing victory. It cannot, of course, be said that there were no shortcomings, errors, and sometimes gross miscalculations in the work of intelligence, which operated at that time within the framework of state security agencies. The detrimental effect of the repressive measures that wrested from

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its ranks of experienced employees and, as a result, cast suspicion on the valuable agents they had acquired. During the war, intelligence work was negatively affected by voluntaristic measures to prohibit work with "agents recruited by enemies of the people", among which were the famous "Cambridge Five" and a number of other true friends of the Soviet Union in its fight against fascism.

Before the war, intelligence had good sources of information in the main countries of the European continent, including Germany. The war severed ties with them. Previously, it was assumed that the agents could be contacted by radio from border towns, such as Brest. The calculation was that with the beginning of the conflict, we would be able to go on the counteroffensive and fight on "foreign territory." However, not only Brest, but also Minsk and other cities close to the border were quickly occupied by the Germans. Communication options through Belgium and Denmark, which were occupied by the Germans, did not work. Switzerland and Sweden remained neutral, but, as life showed, it was difficult to establish contact with agents from there.

This was the main miscalculation of foreign intelligence on the eve of the war. Despite the fact that before the war the Center sent permanent instructions to the residencies on the development of mobilization measures in case of emergency, and the residencies, as a rule, reported on the implementation of these instructions, the main agents in the countries of the potential enemy (Germany, Italy, Hungary, Romania, Finland) turned out to be unprepared for work in wartime. Therefore, it so happened that, in particular, some valuable agents of our intelligence, having no connection with the Center, began to create anti-fascist organizations or went into resistance units in order to continue the fight against fascism in this way.

It was necessary to correct mistakes in the extreme conditions of the war, incurring considerable losses.

By the time the war began, the functions of foreign intelligence were concentrated in the First Directorate of the People's Commissariat for State Security (NKGB) of the USSR. It had eight departments, of which six were operational-territorial: German, Far East, Anglo-American, Slavic-Balkan, Romano-Scandinavian countries and the Middle East. During the war, several more subdivisions were created within the Department: informational and analytical, for work on emigration, and a number of others.

Throughout the war years, the work of foreign intelligence was led by the commissioner of state security of the 3rd rank Pavel Mikhailovich Fitin (since 1943, after the introduction of a unified system of military ranks, he was a lieutenant general).

All intelligence work abroad was carried out by foreign intelligence through "legal" and illegal residencies, specially created intelligence groups, individual intelligence officers and agents sent

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sent to countries where there were no residencies or to occupied territories. During the war, foreign intelligence residencies operated in the USA, England, Sweden, Bulgaria, China, Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Japan. In 1943-1944, residencies were established in Egypt, Italy, France, Finland, Romania and Hungary. In total, during the war years, more than 90 "legal" and illegal residencies, sub-residences and agent groups operated through foreign intelligence.

Already at the end of June 1941, the newly created State Defense Committee of the USSR considered the issue of the work of foreign intelligence and clarified its tasks. The adopted resolution stated that foreign intelligence should during the course of the war:

- to organize work to identify the military-political and other plans of fascist Germany and its allies;
- create and send behind enemy lines special operational detachments to carry out reconnaissance and sabotage operations;
- to assist the party organs in the deployment of the partisan movement behind enemy lines;
- to reveal the true plans and intentions of our allies, especially England and the USA, on the issues of warfare, attitude towards the USSR and the problems of the post-war system;
- conduct reconnaissance in neutral countries (Iran, Turkey, Sweden, etc.) in order to prevent them from going over to the side of the "axis" countries, paralyze the subversive activities of Hitler's agents in them and organize reconnaissance from their territory against Germany and her allies;
- to carry out scientific and technical intelligence in the developed capitalist countries in order to strengthen the military and economic power of the USSR.

The tasks were set extensive and responsible. Along with the extraction of information, foreign intelligence was to take a direct part in reconnaissance and sabotage work and partisan movement behind enemy lines.

In terms of fulfilling the task of deploying guerrilla warfare with the most active participation of intelligence, OMSBON (a separate motorized rifle battalion for special purposes) was created with the participation of communist internationalists from different countries, as well as famous athletes.

These actions were taken in accordance with the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of July 18, 1941 "On the organization of the struggle in the rear of the German troops." It spoke of the need to create a party underground capable of leading the struggle of the masses in the rear of enemy troops and preparing partisan detachments. "Guerrilla detachments and underground groups must be provided with weapons, ammunition, money ... equipped with radio equipment." It was proposed to select people with experience of participation in the Civil War, employees of the NKVD and the NKGB in the detachments.

With the outbreak of war, both people's commissariats (NKGB and NKVD) were again united, and a Special Group was created to lead the partisan movement. Its backbone was made up of scouts from the First Directorate. As the partisan movement expanded, the Fourth Directorate was created on the basis of the Special Group (January 1942). It selected the commanders of partisan detachments

from among the most experienced scouts. The experience of conspiracy helped them to successfully manage combat operations, establish reconnaissance behind enemy lines, and catch scouts. Many of them were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

One of the most important directions in the work of foreign intelligence during the Great Patriotic War was obtaining information about the situation in Germany and identifying the military-political plans of its leadership. Before the start of the war, foreign intelligence had several dozen agents in Germany, many of whom had good information capabilities. However, communication with almost all of them was, unfortunately, lost already in the first days of the war. Only thanks to our connections from the organization that went down in history under the name of the Red Chapel, it was possible to transmit several messages of great importance. But in August 1942, the leading core of this organization was already in the dungeons of the Gestapo.

During the war years, foreign intelligence failed to organize any systematic intelligence work directly on the territory of Germany. About a hundred illegal immigrants from Soviet citizens and foreigners were sent to Germany and the European countries occupied by it to perform certain tasks. They prepared in haste - there was a war going on. They were mostly German anti-fascists who had come over to our side. Not all of them were able to complete the tasks assigned to them. Many were captured by the German secret services and died. There were also those who got scared, took the path of betrayal. In general, this direction of work on Germany did not justify itself, although there were some successes - important contacts were established, information worthy of attention was obtained.

Much greater success was achieved by foreign intelligence, conducting work in Germany from the territory of other countries, by means of "legal" or illegal residencies, where the situation allowed it to work (Turkey, Bulgaria, Sweden). British intelligence had a good position in the work on Germany and received interesting information about the situation in the country, about the plans of the Nazi leadership, but the leadership of the Soviet Union refrained from transmitting this information. But foreign intelligence had good intelligence positions in London, including in British intelligence. Information on Germany received by our intelligence from London was extremely important for the Soviet leadership. It was from London that information was first received in 1943 about the preparation by the Germans on the Kursk

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direction of Operation Citadel. Military intelligence, partisan detachments, and the central apparatus were connected to its verification. The pre-emptive reconnaissance information was taken into account in the preparation of a rebuff to the enemy's onslaught, unprecedented in strength. The greatest battle, in which many thousands of tanks, planes, and guns took part, turned out to be a catastrophe for the Hitlerite command, from which the aggressor could no longer recover. On June 29, 1943, Field Marshal Keitel at Hitler's headquarters said: "Now I don't know what to do either."

The outcome of the war was a foregone conclusion. The orientations of foreign intelligence began to change as well. Continuing to operate successfully within the framework of the partisan movement, as described in the essays at the beginning of the volume, intelligence increasingly focuses on other tasks.

Careful monitoring of Japan's position showed that in 1943 she finally shelved plans for a "strike to the North", i.e. against the Soviet Union, which made it possible to concentrate the main military efforts on the German front.

At the end of the same year, a meeting of the heads of the governments of the USSR, the USA and England took place in Tehran. Before that, thanks to the data of Soviet and British intelligence, it was possible to eliminate the nests of fascist agents in Iran. The Allies finally announced at the conference that the second front, the opening of which they had repeatedly postponed despite promises to the Soviet Union, would nevertheless be opened in May-June 1944. The second front itself, as a result of the victories of the Soviet Union, no longer played the role that it could have had in the most difficult years. Now he was needed more by the allies themselves in order to keep the countries of Europe under their influence, and about

At the same time, foreign intelligence also received convincing documentary information revealing the intentions of the Allies at the end of the war and the post-war period.

The main thing, therefore, was the extraction of information about what the post-war plans of the United States and Britain were aimed at. Believing that the USSR would be drained of blood, they hoped to extract unilateral advantages from this. Churchill defended the "Balkan version" of ending the war with the creation of a kind of cordon on the way of Soviet troops to Central and especially Southern Europe. The United States hoped to weaken Germany as a possible competitor as much as possible by dividing it into a number of small states. Greece and Italy were considered by the allies as a zone of their predominant influence. Poland became one of the central springboards of the struggle. Churchill sought to question its borders with the Soviet Union, established in 1939. There was a tense struggle for influence in Yugoslavia.

All these issues were important at the conferences of heads of state that determined the fate of the post-war world. The Yalta Conference (February 1945) made it possible to agree on the final military effort, which was to be completed unconditionally.

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enemy capitulation. The lines of policy in relation to the future Germany, the need for allied control over it, the destruction of the forces of militarism and fascism, and the payment of reparations were outlined. It was decided to create an international organization for the maintenance of peace and security (future UN) and to adhere to the principle of unanimity among the great powers in the Security Council. It was agreed that the USSR would enter the war against Japan after the end of the war with Germany.

In Potsdam (July-August 1945), the borders of the USSR and Poland were determined with the transfer to the Soviet Union of Königsberg (Kaliningrad region of the RSFSR) and Poland - the western territory along the line of the Oder-Neisse rivers.

The external unanimity of the conference participants, demonstrated in the press, did not reflect the real picture. There was intense struggle on every issue. And the fact that the state interests of the USSR were duly taken into account by the allies can hardly be explained by their disinterestedness. Behind the interests of the Soviet Union was not only the power of the country, which ended the war victoriously, but also the accurate work of its foreign intelligence. Suffice it to say that all the preparatory documents of the US and British governments before these conferences were reported to Stalin and Molotov.

And even when Truman, who succeeded the deceased Roosevelt as President of the United States, informed Stalin in Potsdam that the United States had tested a weapon of unprecedented power, the Soviet leader did not betray his feelings in any way: he already knew not only about the explosion of an experimental atomic bomb in Los Alamos, but also about how work is going on to create our own atomic bomb.

This message, according to the plans of our allies, was supposed to open the era of "atomic diplomacy" directed against the USSR and provide the US and Britain with an advantage in the beginning of the cold war, in which "hot options" were also envisaged.

Soviet intelligence helped the USSR create a balance of strategic forces. Steps to provide the country with an "atomic shield" began at the same time, during the war years, in London, and then in Washington, where foreign intelligence managed to penetrate the main secrets of the Allied atomic projects. The story of how it was, the reader will find in the proposed volume.

Obtaining information on scientific and technical, primarily defense, issues was one of the important activities of foreign intelligence during the war years. At the beginning of the war, organizational scientific and technical intelligence (NTR) was not concentrated in one unit. In April 1941, the NTR agents were transferred to the appropriate

geographic departments. Technical intelligence as an independent line of work was preserved only in the Vanglo-American Department, where the Fourth

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department. It was a very small unit of five people, headed by L.R. Kvasnikov.

The war put before intelligence the need to obtain information about the latest achievements in the field of science and technology related to the development of new types of weapons, fundamentally new means of defense and communications. A new approach to the very organization of scientific and technological revolution was required. And despite the difficulties of wartime, such a reorganization was carried out. Scientific and technical intelligence was significantly strengthened by young, albeit with little operational experience, but energetic workers. Many of them had a technical background. In the main residencies, the positions of resident assistants for scientific and technical intelligence were introduced, and in the USA this line of work was separated in 1944 into an independent residency.

Scientific and technical intelligence achieved the greatest success in England and the USA, which was the result of properly organized, purposeful work. The agents acquired in these countries worked in the most important scientific and technical facilities. Among them were scientists and qualified engineers in atomic physics, radio electronics, aviation, chemistry and other branches of science and technology. They collaborated with Soviet intelligence, as a rule, on the basis of common interests in the fight against fascism.

During the war years, Soviet intelligence received a huge amount of valuable information on such issues as the creation of atomic weapons, radar, jet engines, aviation, non-ferrous metals and special alloys, chemistry, bacteriology, etc. The information received played a large role in the development of science and technology in the USSR in strengthening the defense potential.

The fourth volume of essays reflects the main points of this activity, for the success in which many scouts in 1995-1996 were awarded the title of Hero of Russia (L. Kvasnikov, V. Barkovsky, Leontina and Morris Coen, A. Feklisov, A. Yatskov) .

A number of essays are devoted to the work of three of the five "Cambridgeians" - Philby, Blunt and Cairncross, who provided invaluable assistance in obtaining information about the position of the United States and England on major international problems, the post-war structure of Europe, on the western borders of the USSR, on Polish problems. . The activities of the other two "Cambridgers" will be covered in subsequent volumes.

Of great interest to the leadership of the country was information about the attempts of certain representatives of the German elite, who were opposed to Hitler, to start separate negotiations with the allies of the USSR - England and the USA. At the very beginning of the war, the USSR, England and the USA agreed on the conditions under which Germany was to capitulate: the complete disarmament of the German army, the liquidation of the fascist regime and the dissolution of the National Socialist Party, the demilitarization of Germany and the liquidation of the Wehrmacht as

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a constant source of the country's aggressive aspirations, the return of all territories occupied by Germany, compensation for the damage caused by German aggression to its victims, the punishment of war criminals, the democratization of the country and the establishment of allied control over the fulfillment of the terms of surrender. These measures were supposed to prevent the possibility of a repetition of aggression on the part of Germany - the culprit of two world wars.

During the war, when the German war machine collapsed on the Eastern Front and the defeat of Germany for far-sighted, mostly opposed to Hitler, politicians, it became obvious that a number of German political and military figures, representatives of business circles made attempts to avoid complete defeat of Germany through a separate agreement with



England and USA. They offered various options for dividing spheres of influence in the world, ending the war in the West while continuing it in the East, conditions for concluding peace that were unfavorable for Moscow. It should be noted that our allies were very wary of such German initiatives, but nevertheless they made contacts and listened to the German side. The Soviet leadership knew about these contacts from foreign intelligence reports.

Foreign intelligence received information about the intensification at the beginning of 1945 of negotiations conducted by the emissaries of Goering and Himmler, as well as the heads of the fascist secret services with representatives of the political and military circles of England and the USA on the conditions of a separate peace. During the negotiations, these emissaries offered to remove Hitler from power as a payment for an honorable exit from the war. In organizing the negotiations, the apparatus of foreign policy intelligence headed by Schellenberg, which was subordinate to Himmler, was used.

Intelligence information allowed the Soviet leadership to timely warn the allies of their awareness of these "separate games". As a rule, the allies disavowed such contacts when the Soviet leadership became aware of them, although they continued them until the last day of the war.

Little is known about the fact that during the war, for the first time between the USSR, on the one hand, England, and then the United States, on the other, contacts were established through intelligence services. Their results were not particularly impressive, the parties were wary of each other. Nevertheless, the very fact of such cooperation is significant as a sign of the search for new forms of relations between the members of the anti-fascist coalition, despite the social and political differences that separated them.

Very peculiar relations developed between intelligence and the Comintern, based on a common struggle against fascism. During the war, the Comintern delegated valuable workers to the ranks of intelligence, and in practice they proved themselves well.

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One of the central issues for a long time was tracking Japan's choice of the main direction of its further aggression. The thrust of the Japanese to the north, to the Soviet Far East, would force the USSR to fight on two fronts. In addition to information from London, which contained government correspondence on this problem, information from China also helped to cover it. Intelligence had a solid position here. In addition to her usual work, she, through the resident and ambassador A. Panyushkin, made considerable efforts to provide significant military, economic and other assistance to the Kuomintang regime in its fight against Japanese aggression, to mitigate the contradictions between Chiang Kai-shek and the communists led by Mao Zedong. Collaboration was established with the Kuomintang secret services. All this made it possible to be firmly convinced that, after the strongest hesitation, Japan finally decided to direct its military expansion into the possessions of England and the USA, as well as Holland, and not to attack the Soviet Far East.

Interesting examples of the fight against the intelligence of the Axis countries in Iran and Afghanistan, as well as in Turkey, where the complex tasks of the security of the southern borders of the USSR were solved, because one of the goals of Hitler's offensive in the Caucasus was to draw the Turks into the war.

The information obtained by intelligence in the final period of the war helped the country's leadership in the best way to determine the course in relation to such countries as Finland, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, liberated from German control, to significantly help Yugoslavia in the formation of its new statehood and ensure its own security, not to mention the problems that accompanied the strengthening of the new government in Poland.

The confrontation with the Nazi secret services, experienced and well organized, permeated all the years of the war. The "Abwehr-Abroad" department, which led the intelligence activities of the German military attaches abroad, the "Ost" ("East") sub-department of the second department of the Abwehr, which was engaged in sabotage activities abroad, was actively manifesting itself.

behind the lines of troops hostile to Germany. In June 1941, the "Valley Headquarters" was created to directly manage intelligence activities on the German-Soviet front.

About 200 Abwehr schools were deployed in the occupied territory. Our agents were sent to them intensively until the end of 1943.

The end of the war did not mean the end of the struggle against the agents of the Abwehr and other secret services of the Nazi regime. By Hitler's decree of February 14, 1944, the Abwehr was divided into parts that went to different departments, mainly to the Imperial Security Main Directorate (RSHA), headed by Kaltenbrunner. The RSHA intensified surveillance of the Allies, and in March 1944 Germany unexpectedly occupied Hungary, having received information that the latter was negotiating with the United States and England about the possibility of a separate exit from the war.

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Trying to weaken the rear of the Soviet Union and hinder the advance of the Soviet army, the Nazi secret services forced the subversive operation "Zeppelin", designed to encourage the separatist actions of the Muslim peoples, as well as Georgians and Armenians. The so-called "Turkestan Legion" is being formed. In the Baltic states, the Nazis, before retreating, strengthen various paramilitary organizations, which are tasked with fighting the Soviet troops. On all these issues, intelligence received information from its sources and reported it to the State Defense Committee of the USSR.

During the war, operational games were played with the enemy in order to give the enemy an idea of the existence of anti-Soviet nationalist centers on the territory of the USSR. Many of the enemy radio operators were taken prisoner and re-recruited. Soviet intelligence, together with counterintelligence agencies, used them to promote both military and political disinformation to the enemy. Such operational combinations were called radio games. The radio stations with the help of which these operations were carried out were located in Arkhangelsk, Vologda, Leningrad, Kalinin, Yaroslavl, Gorky, Kazan, Kuibyshev, Ulyanovsk, Saratov, Stalingrad, Ivanovo, Tula, Ryazan, Tambov, Voronezh and moved to the West with the advance of our troops. The largest Chekist operative games - "Monastyr", "Berezino" - are described in essays. It is worth mentioning the radio game in Kalmykia, where the Germans landed reinforcements to help the already destroyed bandit formations. In some periods, state security officers played up to 70 games with the enemy at the same time, sent disinformation materials in agreement with the General Staff of the Soviet Army. As a result of such games, several hundred agents from among the graduates of Nazi sabotage schools, as well as staff members of German intelligence, were summoned to false safe addresses and arrested. Truly, these were battles not only of weapons, but also

intellects.

During the war years, intelligence, thus, grew stronger, acquired skills, was felt as a real force that helped to fight not by numbers, but by skill.

The Second World War ended in August 1945 in the fields of Manchuria. The swift defeat of the well-armed Kwantung Army ended with the capture of the leaders of the main anti-Soviet centers located near the Soviet Far Eastern borders. There were also "old acquaintances", such as Ataman Semyonov and the head of the "Russian fascists" Rodzaevsky and many other agents of the Japanese special services.

The defeat of militaristic Japan helped the victory of the people's revolution in China and the creation of the People's Republic of China, which significantly changed the balance of power in Asia and around the world. Decolonization, the elimination of dependence on the capitalist powers opened the way for national liberation movement.

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The preparation of essays on the activities of foreign intelligence during the Great Patriotic War was carried out on the basis of a deep study of archival material. The authors were given the opportunity to familiarize themselves with copies of messages and documents that were sent to I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov and other leaders of the State Defense Committee (formed on July 30, 1941), with operational documents of the central intelligence apparatus and its foreign points. The testimonies of participants in intelligence operations, as well as foreign sources, were studied.

The essays, of course, cannot claim to be a complete chronicle of all the affairs of foreign intelligence during the war years, not only because of the fragmentation of many documents, understandable in the conditions of military operations, but also for reasons of secrecy, which are obligatory for any intelligence service in the world. Nevertheless, in our opinion, they reflect the historically significant moments of the multifaceted activity of the USSR foreign intelligence service during the war years.

As in previous editions, some names and pseudonyms, places of action and names of institutions in these essays have been changed for security reasons. But the factual basis of the events has been preserved and documented. We hope that readers will eventually get a real idea of what foreign intelligence did in the most crucial period in the life of our state to preserve its security and independence, to win its just cause.

Documents declassified over the years from the archives of foreign intelligence, published for the first time in the appendix to the fourth volume, will help the reader to get an idea of what information was obtained by foreign intelligence during the war years, how and in what form it was reported to the country's leadership. The application does not aim to show the full documentary coverage of foreign intelligence of a particular political issue. Documents from archival files are taken selectively to enable the reader to show the breadth of coverage of information obtained by intelligence, its reliability, confirmed by time, those high-ranking circles from which it came, its importance for the country's top leadership to make decisions on cardinal issues. waging war and building a reliable post-war peace.

A significant part of the documents published in the appendix was used in writing essays. The spelling and style of the originals are preserved in the documents.

The excerpts from documents given in the fourth volume, to which there are no special references, are taken from the archival files of the SVR.

: Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. - T.I. - M.: Ed. APN, 1974. - S. 282-283.

1

Memoirs of the head of foreign intelligence P.M. Fitina!

Without pretending to complete coverage, because this requires special research, I want to talk about some issues of the multilateral activities of intelligence agencies of state security during the Great Patriotic War.

On June 17, 1941, a conversation took place with Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin. After that, I did not leave a feeling of anxiety for a single day. This worried not only me, but also other workers who were supposed to know about this meeting?.

Several days have passed. At dawn, I left the People's Commissariat. Behind a busy week. It was Sunday, a day of rest, and thoughts, thoughts, like a clock pendulum: "Is it really misinformation? And if not, then how? With these thoughts, I came home and lay down, but I couldn't fall asleep - the phone rang. It was five o'clock in the morning. In the receiver, the voice of the duty officer of the People's Commissariat: "Comrade General, the People's Commissar is urgently calling you?, The car has been sent." I immediately got dressed and went out, being firmly convinced that exactly what happened was what I.V. was talking about a few days ago. Stalin.

When I entered the waiting room of the people's commissar, there were several people there. Soon the rest of the comrades arrived. We were invited to the office. The Commissar was overwhelmed by what had happened. After a short pause, he reported that battles were going on along the entire length of the western border - from the Baltic to the Black Sea, in a number of places German troops had invaded the territory of our country. The Central Committee and the Soviet government are taking all measures to organize a rebuff to the enemy who has invaded our territory. We need to think over the action plan of the authorities, taking into account the current situation. From now on, we are all under martial law, and this must be announced in all departments and departments.

"And you," the people's commissar addressed me, "need to prepare appropriate instructions for overseas residencies. I'll call you in an hour or two.

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We parted ways with this in order to proceed with the implementation of the instructions of the people's commissar. The news was extremely unpleasant, although for me and some other leaders who were with the people's commissar, it was not such big news. In addition to the fact that the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo "axis" that had formed was directed mainly against the Soviet Union, the First Directorate received reliable information from the residencies in Berlin, Paris, London, Prague and some others about Germany's preparations for a big war. .

On June 16, 1941, an urgent message came from our Berlin residency that Hitler had made the final decision to attack the USSR on June 22, 1941. These data were immediately reported to the appropriate authorities.

Late at night from 16 to 17 June, the People's Commissar called me and said that at one o'clock in the afternoon I.V. invited him and me to his place. Stalin. Much had to be changed that night and on the morning of June 17. However, there was a certainty that this call was connected with the information of our Berlin residency, which he received. I did not doubt the veracity of the report received, as I knew the person who informed us about it well.

It has only been two years since I took over the Intelligence Directorate of the Central Office, but I got to know the intelligence workers, both young and experienced, well and trusted in their honesty and dedication. I became convinced of this by restructuring intelligence work in accordance with the decision of the Central Committee of the Party of 1938 "On improving the work of the Foreign Department (INO. - Approx. Aut.) of the NKVD."

This decision was caused by the created abnormal situation in the state security agencies, and primarily in intelligence. In the 1930s, an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion developed towards many Chekists, mainly towards senior officials, not only of the central apparatus, but also of the residencies of the Foreign Department abroad. They were accused of treason and subjected to repression. During 1938-1939, almost all residents of the INO were recalled behind the cordon to Moscow, and many of them were repressed.

The adoption of this decision by the Central Committee was also determined by the international situation that had arisen: the formation of the fascist bloc Rome-Berlin-Tokyo, the seizure of Austria by Germany, the Munich Agreement, which clearly indicated that Hitler was heading towards unleashing World War II. In addition, the double-dealing behavior of England, France and some other European states towards the USSR heated up the international situation even more.

The situation urgently required the adoption of urgent measures to restructure the entire work of foreign policy intelligence. In March 1938, the Central Co.

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The party committee mobilized about 800 communists with higher education who had experience in party and leadership work. After six months of training at the Central School of the NKVD, they were sent both to the central apparatus and to peripheral agencies. A large group of them, which included the author of these lines, was selected to work in the 5th (Foreign) Department of the NKVD of the USSR

In October 1938, I came to work in the Foreign Department as the operational commissioner of the department for the development of Trotskyists and the "rights" behind the cordon, but soon I was appointed head of this department. In January 1939, I became deputy head of the 5th department, and in May 1939 I headed the 5th department of the NKVD. He served as chief of foreign intelligence until mid-1946.

The new cadres who joined the intelligence service, together with the Chekists-intelligence officers who remained at work, formed a monolithic alloy of experience and young enthusiasm. Their task was to improve the intelligence work behind the cordon.

The leadership of the department primarily focused on the selection of heads of residencies abroad. During 1939-1940, old, experienced scouts were sent across the cordon: V.M. Zarubin, E.Yu. Zarubina, D.G. Fedichkin, B.A. Rybkin, Z.A. Rybkina, V.A. Takhchianov, M.A. Allahverdov, A.M. Korotkov, as well as young capable Chekists: G.N. Kalinin, A.K. Trenev, A.I. Leonenko, V.G. Pavlov, E.I. Kravtsov, N.M. Gorshkov and many others.

When selecting candidates for intelligence work abroad, we had to face great difficulties due to the poor knowledge of foreign languages by many comrades who had come to intelligence again, and their lack of experience in conducting intelligence behind the cordon.

As a result of the measures taken in the pre-war years, it was possible to staff about 40 residencies behind the cordon and send more than 200 intelligence officers to them, as well as bring many personnel security officers to illegal work. This immediately affected the results.

Taking into account the merits of Chekists-intelligence officers in obtaining valuable and necessary information for the Soviet state, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in May 1940 awarded a number of employees of foreign policy intelligence with orders and medals. I was also awarded a high government award as the head of the First Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR

Due to the presence of agents with great intelligence capabilities in such countries as Germany, England, the USA, Czechoslovakia (by that time - the "protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia", created by the Nazis), Bulgaria, France, and some others, since the end of 1940 Even before the German attack on the Soviet Union, the Directorate received information that indicated that Germany, having captured thirteen European countries, was preparing to attack the USSR.

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For example, our resident in Prague reported on the transfer of German military units, equipment and other military equipment to the borders of the Soviet Union. Similar information was received from other residents. Naturally, all this information was sent to the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, and the most important - to three addresses: I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, K.E. Voroshilov. Therefore, a call to I.V. Stalin on June 17, 1941 did not take us by surprise.

Despite our awareness and firm intention to defend our point of view on the materials received by the Office, we were still in a state of a certain excitement. He was the leader of the party and the country with unquestioned authority. But it could also happen that Stalin did not like something, or in some way he saw a mistake on our part, and then any of us could find ourselves in a very unenviable position.

With such thoughts, we, together with the people's commissar, arrived at Stalin's reception room in the Kremlin at one o'clock in the afternoon. After the report of the assistant about our arrival, we were invited to the office. Stalin said hello

with a nod of his head, but he did not offer to sit down, and he himself did not sit down during the entire conversation. He paced around the office, stopping to ask a question or focus on points of interest to him in the report or answer to his question.

Going up to a large table, which was located to the left of the entrance and on which numerous messages and memorandums lay in piles, and on top of one of them was our document, I.V. Stalin, without raising his head, said:

— I read your report... It turns out that Germany is going to attack the Soviet Union?

We are silent. After all, just three days ago, on June 14, the newspapers published a TASS statement stating that Germany was just as steadfastly observing the terms of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact as the Soviet Union. I.V. Stalin continued to pace around the office, occasionally puffing on his pipe. Finally, stopping in front of us, he asked:

Who is the person who provided this information?

We were ready to answer this question, and I gave a detailed description of our source. In particular, he said that he was a German, ideologically close to us, and together with other patriots, he was ready to contribute in every possible way to the fight against fascism. He works for the Air Ministry and is very knowledgeable. As soon as he became aware of the date of the German attack on the Soviet Union, he summoned our intelligence officer, who was in touch, to an extraordinary meeting and transmitted the present message. We have no reason to doubt the veracity of his information.

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After the end of my report, there was again a long pause. Stalin, coming up to his desk and turning to us, said:

- Disinformation! You can be free.

We left anxious. I had to change my mind about a lot, the state of tension did not leave for a minute. What if our agent made a mistake? But on behalf of the Foreign Intelligence Directorate, I assured I.V. Stalin that the information is beyond doubt.

Arriving at the People's Commissariat and exchanging impressions of the meeting, the People's Commissar and I immediately wrote a coded message to the Berlin residency about the immediate verification of the sent message about the German attack on the USSR, which was supposedly scheduled for June 22, 1941, but did not manage to receive an answer ... troops attacked our homeland that day. The latter was a bitter confirmation of the veracity of our agent's report.

The GRU and counterintelligence units of our bodies had similar data. This had an effect on I.V. Stalin had due influence, and on June 21 he instructed the General Staff of the Red Army to bring the frontier units into combat condition. I.V. Stalin delayed taking the most necessary military precautions, apparently for fear of giving Hitler an excuse to attack.

In the measures developed by the Directorate in the first days of the war, the main attention was paid to the selection of the most capable intelligence officers to work in operational groups who would remain in the territory temporarily occupied by the Germans after the withdrawal of the Red Army units. Our scouts were supposed to organize, lead, and train Soviet patriots to conduct a partisan war behind enemy lines and at the same time conduct reconnaissance and sabotage work against the Nazi invaders and their allies.

In the very first days of the war, dozens of Chekists-intelligence officers were trained and went first to Ukraine, and then to Belarus, Moldova and the western regions of the RSFSR. All of them adequately proved themselves, honorably fulfilling the tasks assigned to them. Chekists-intelligence officers Dmitry Medvedev, Nikolai Prokopyuk, Mikhail Prudnikov, Viktor Korolev, Nikolai Kuznetsov,

Vladimir Molodtsov, Viktor Lyagin, Ivan Kudra and many others were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for performing special tasks.

In addition to solving this primary task, it was necessary to intensify work abroad, mainly with a view to inflicting the greatest damage on Nazi Germany. Its troops, despite the stubborn resistance of the Red Army units, moved further and further into the depths of our Motherland. I had to leave the largest industrial centers of Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, the Baltic States. Under the threat of capture by the enemy were Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad.

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In this incredibly difficult period for the Motherland, Soviet intelligence sets before all Chekist intelligence officers and numerous agents the task of obtaining intelligence data about Nazi Germany and its allies, about its military and economic potential, the transfer of troops and military equipment. On the other hand, scouts do their best to help organize the resistance movement in countries occupied by the Nazis even before the attack on the USSR.

Considering that the activities of the First Directorate in creating operational groups and organizing their work behind enemy lines assumed a large scale and demanded more and more attention, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considered it expedient to divide the First Directorate into two directorates:

- Intelligence Directorate with the tasks of organizing and conducting intelligence against Germany and its allies; coverage of the US and British policy towards the Soviet Union and the Berlin-Tokyo-Rome "axis" countries, as well as the policy of other capitalist states that did not take part in the war; conducting technical reconnaissance; organization of counterintelligence work abroad;

- Management (Fourth) with the tasks of organizing operational groups behind enemy lines and directing them.

The leadership of the First Directorate was again entrusted to me, and one of my deputies became the head of the Fourth Directorate. The separation was formalized by order of the People's Commissariat. This reorganization was not slow to have an effect: the results of the work of both the First and the Fourth Directorates improved.

The first department, exercising mainly the management of the residencies behind the cordon, sought to provide them with every possible assistance in organizing intelligence and operational work in order to obtain the most valuable information. During the first two years of the war, we succeeded in obtaining a large amount of extremely important material on the policies of the states that were our allies in the war with Germany, as well as neutral countries. At the same time, important materials of a military, scientific and technical nature were obtained.

However, despite the value of the intelligence materials obtained, they still did not satisfy the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, which needed the most complete information about the military potential of Germany and the US policy towards the USSR, and especially on the issue of opening a second front.

On June 5, 1943, the State Defense Committee approved "Measures to improve the foreign work of the intelligence agencies of the USSR", which also determined the tasks of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR. The best employees of the Directorate were sent to work in overseas residencies, as well as to organize new residencies .

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A year of incredible efforts by the foreign intelligence apparatus of the state security agencies has borne fruit: the quality of political information has improved and its volume has increased. In large quantities

valuable scientific and technical information began to arrive, especially military information.

In order to expand the possibilities for sending our agents to the territory of Germany and obtaining the most complete military and economic information about Germany and its satellites, it was considered expedient to establish contacts with the intelligence services of our allies - the United States and England. In Moscow, one of my deputies maintained contact with representatives of British intelligence, and in London, our experienced intelligence officer I.A. Chichaev.

In December 1943, General William Donovan, head of the Office of Strategic Services (that was the name of American intelligence), arrived in Moscow to establish contacts with Soviet intelligence. Through the American ambassador in Moscow, Harriman, he turned to V.M. Molotov, who at that time was Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

The People's Commissar of State Security and I were invited to the Kremlin, where we were received by V.M. Molotov. He announced Donovan's arrival in Moscow and his intentions.

- How do you like it? Molotov asked. - Apparently, we should not refuse, we should meet with him and find out our plans.

It was also decided here that I should conduct negotiations with Donovan and report in detail to V.M. Molotov.

The next day, together with my deputy, we received General Donovan and had a detailed conversation with him. The results of the meeting were reported to I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov, who agreed to establish contacts.

It provided for the exchange of intelligence information, mutual consultations during active operations, assistance in sending agents behind enemy lines, the exchange of sabotage equipment, etc.

When establishing contacts with representatives of the American and British intelligence services, we did not count on their sincerity, but still believed that such contacts could be useful. It must be given credit that the exchange of intelligence information, mainly military, about Germany and its allies was useful. Most of the information that came to us was sent to the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army and, as I know, largely confirmed or supplemented the information we had. In turn, we transmitted information about German troops, their movement, weapons, especially units located in France, Belgium, Holland, since these countries were most interested in the Allied intelligence services.

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Along with the exchange of intelligence information, there was also an exchange of technical means for carrying out sabotage behind enemy lines. However, it should be said that we and our partners transferred those funds that did not represent a big secret and were not a revelation for both sides.

Attempts were made to use the capabilities of intelligence, especially British intelligence, to throw our agents into the territory of France, Czechoslovakia, Italy and Germany proper. However, these transfers did not give us any positive results, and we refused the services of British intelligence.

Six months after the establishment of contacts with American intelligence, we - as, apparently, the Americans - were convinced of the low efficiency of the joint work that was carried out at that time. Our contacts with American intelligence, as well as with British intelligence, gradually began to weaken, and soon after the opening of the second front they ceased altogether.



By this time, our intelligence had information that the Allies did not open a second front, not for military reasons, but for political ones. They counted on the weakening of the Soviet Union. And, as you know, the troops of the United States and England landed in Normandy only at the beginning of June 1944, when the fate of Nazi Germany was actually a foregone conclusion as a result of a powerful offensive by the Red Army.

In June 1944, the Soviet government awarded a large group of intelligence officers with orders and medals for the positive results of foreign intelligence activities and the selfless work of intelligence officers, and I was awarded the Order of the Red Banner among them.

After the opening of the second front, it was very important to know the plans and intentions of the US and British governments to settle after the war political issues concerning both Germany and the countries that fought on her side. This task had to be solved by our intelligence, which coped with it quite successfully.

A huge role in achieving positive results belonged to our London station, which had agents in government bodies, in particular in the Foreign Office. A significant part of Churchill's telegraph correspondence with Roosevelt, as well as the British Foreign Office with the British ambassadors in Moscow, Washington, Ankara and other cities, became the property of Soviet intelligence, and, consequently, the leaders of our state.

The great merit of foreign intelligence during this period, especially the residencies of the First Directorate in the USA, Canada, England, was the receipt of scientific and technical information in the field of atomic energy, which greatly helped to speed up the solution of the issue of creating an atomic bomb in the Soviet Union. Union.

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I often met with Igor Vasilievich Kurchatov, who expressed great gratitude for the materials received from our intelligence service on questions of atomic energy. In the postwar years, for almost five years, I had to deal with issues related to the special production and commissioning of uranium plants, and in this connection I again repeatedly met with Igor Vasilyevich, a talented scientist and a remarkable person. In conversations, he again emphasized what an invaluable service in solving the atomic problem in the USSR was played by the materials obtained by Soviet intelligence.

A large amount of materials was also mined for aircraft building, tank building, instrument making, and other issues of science and technology.

Everything that was done by the intelligence of the state security agencies during the years of the Patriotic War was a great contribution to the victory of the Soviet people over Nazi Germany, as well as to strengthening the power of the Soviet country.

Pavel Matveyevich Fitin headed the 5th department of the GUGB NKVD - the First Directorate of the NKGB from May 1939 to 1946. The material is based on memoirs written by the author in 1970 for the 50th anniversary of foreign intelligence.

June 17, 1941 I.V. Stalin summoned the People's Commissar for State Security V.N. Merkulov and intelligence chief P.M. Fitin to discuss a telegram from Berlin from the "Sergeant" and "Corsican" dated June 16, which began with the words: "All military measures in Germany to prepare an armed uprising against the USSR are completely completed, and a strike can be expected at any time." Stalin demanded verification of the information, considering it a possible disinformation.

3 V.N. Merkulov - People's Commissar for State Security.

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First hours, first days...

No matter how hard the intelligence officers tried to forestall fatal events, no matter how streams and then streams of reports from the most reliable and authoritative sources flocked to Moscow that Hitler's divisions were moving up to the borders of the Soviet Union, that plans were ready to bombard the largest centers of the country, that the attack would take place in May, no - in June, more precisely - in the middle of June, finally - on June 22, until the last moment, those who were responsible for the security of the USSR did not leave the hope that, perhaps, this time the cloud would blow past, and anxious The messages will remain threats, Hitler's blackmail, reflecting the maneuvers before the decisive thrust on England, the only major Western European country that has not yet submitted to the Germans. And then the inevitable will happen.

There was no "later". A desperate, convinced, German-like firm statement sent from Berlin came true: "All military measures by Germany in preparation for an armed uprising against the USSR have been completely completed, and a strike can be expected at any time." It was this message, which Stalin discussed with intelligence chief Fitin on June 17, that was characterized as disinformation - English, intended to set us off against the Germans. But the real disinformation, Hitler's, was the explanation that the Germans were bringing their units to the Soviet border, allegedly in order to confuse the British, and then unexpectedly launch Operation Sea Lion, landing troops and occupying England.

"Sea Lion" never took place. On the other hand, the Barbarossa plan, a plan to conquer the territories of the Soviet Union, was steadily developing, rough outlined in the Führer's book "My Struggle", and then embodied in strategic arrows and pincers, drawn on the maps by the German commander von Paulus. Directive No. 21 (plan

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Barbarossa) was approved by Hitler on December 18, 1940. The second part of it was precisely disinformation measures that were supposed to deceive the Russians. It noted: "The decisive importance must be attached to the fact that our intentions to attack are not recognized."

The plan envisaged a lightning-fast defeat of the Soviet armed forces in the very first weeks and was based on the experience of crushing France, which had a potential that was not much inferior to the forces of the Reich, in just thirty-nine days, in an equally fleeting Polish campaign, not to mention the "walks » on the small countries of Europe. Hitler knew about the devastating "purges" in the ranks of the Red Army command, that the military industry of the Soviet Union was just beginning to pick up a pace that would help to catch up with the German military machine. And although the annexation of the western Ukrainian and Belarusian lands to the Soviet territory as a result of the defeat of Poland, and then the Baltic states increased the distance that had to be covered in the throw to Moscow and Leningrad, the German military command and Hitler had no doubt that this they can do it in the shortest possible time.

Intelligence chief Fitin could not believe his ears when Nelidov, a white émigré captured on former Polish territory, who helped the Nazis work out their plans, told during interrogations that the Germans expected to enter Minsk five days after the start of the war. This is practically what happened.

It can be said that Soviet foreign intelligence hardly expected such a start of the war. Miscalculations that ruled out the capture of vast territories of our country by the enemy cost everyone dearly: both the military and intelligence officers of all the main departments - political (the First Directorate of the NKGB), military, naval ... To rectify the situation, it took incredible efforts. Low-power radio transmitters did not cover the increasing distance, and communication with valuable agents was interrupted. The state of emergency introduced everywhere by the occupiers made it difficult to use messengers, and if they crossed the front line, information was often

obsolete... But it was useless to look for those responsible for this situation, to say: we warned, and you were more looking for enemies within the country than paying attention to the obvious and most terrible enemy. This became clear to many, including those who settled personal scores during the period of repressions, glued the labels of alarmists on those who spoke the truth, put honored and selfless intelligence officers in camps...

Enormous German forces along the entire length of the borders - from the White to the Black Sea - broke down protective barriers, seized warehouses and bases, carelessly moved to the borders in the calculation (slogan) "beat the enemy on his territory", surrounded large and medium-sized

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connections. In three weeks they reached Smolensk, moved towards Moscow, towards the approaches to Leningrad, reached the outskirts of Kyiv. At the beginning of July, as foreign intelligence data showed, some German generals considered the war against the Soviet Union actually won.

Bold, intelligent steps were required, as well as precise coordination of intelligence activities in order to reinforce purely military measures to save the situation with practical deeds. And here, as well as possible, some organizational changes undertaken on the very eve of hostilities came in handy.

Less than a week before the war, L.P. Beria summoned the deputy head of intelligence, P.A. Sudoplatov and ordered to start creating a "counter-sabotage" detachment, which would be able to stop the possible provocative actions of the Nazis on the western borders. What was meant was a repetition of such actions that had taken place before Hitler's aggression against Poland. Then a group of Germans, dressed in Polish uniforms, infiltrated into Polish territory, from where they simulated an attack on a German radio station. This served as a pretext for the Nazi attack on Poland on September 1, 1939. This date marks the beginning of World War II.

Near Moscow, in the village of Ozery, an unusual detachment began to gather. Unusual, because a variety of languages sounded in its ranks - Spanish, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian, Bulgarian, German ... Experienced anti-fascists gathered here, including those who went through the Civil War in Spain. They were joined by athletes, renowned masters of sports, such as N. Korolev, S. Shcherbakov, the Znamensky brothers, L. Kulakova - boxers, shooters, skiers, graduates of the Institute. Lesgaft, the color of the Dynamo sports society... Both experts in languages and physically strong warriors were needed. 150 volunteers were sent by the Institute of Physical Culture, about 30 people - by the Moscow Institute of Philosophy, Literature and History (MIFLI).

Several days passed and the war broke out. Hitler did not bother with reasons to start hostilities. Aggression began without ultimatums or warnings. But the creation of a special detachment, which began on the eve of the war, subsequently justified itself, and reconnaissance by specific methods was able to make a significant contribution to the outcome of bloody battles.

Instructions and instructions in connection with the beginning of the war against the USSR were sent to all "legal" residencies in the very first hours. In February 1941, the NKVD was divided into two people's commissariats - the NKGB and the NKVD. Foreign intelligence belonged to the state security agencies. Through the NKGB on June 22 and 24, July 1, 4 and 5, 1941, directives were issued, which determined the main tasks (primarily the collection

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military information). In July 1941, all state security agencies were merged with the NKVD!. On July 5, a Special Group of the NKVD was created on the basis of the First (Intelligence) Directorate of the NKVD "to carry out special tasks". It was entrusted with the task of organizing the struggle behind enemy lines.

It was necessary to report to Moscow about the strategic plans of the enemy, the movements of his combat units and equipment, and the directions of the attacks being prepared. Data were required on the political situation in the countries of the Nazi bloc and in the territories they occupied. At the first stage of the Patriotic War, it was precisely these questions that remained paramount.

In Europe, residencies operated mainly along the perimeter of the Nazi bloc. Inside Germany, the groups "Sergeant" and "Corsican", "Breitenbach" remained, but with the loss of radio communications, the expulsion of Soviet personnel, contacts with them almost ceased. Only a few attempts to approach them were successful, giving pricey results. It was difficult to solve central tasks from the territory of such countries as Sweden, Bulgaria, Turkey, Iran.

A special group was instructed to combine reconnaissance and sabotage tasks with participation in the organization of the partisan movement. Here, a unit distinguished itself, called the Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade for Special Purposes (OMSBON), which carried out special tasks of the Supreme Command and the NKVD of the USSR both at the front and behind enemy lines.

At the beginning of the war, the formation of the brigade was relocated from the Lakes to the Moscow Dynamo stadium. Graduates of the Higher School of the NKVD and border guard schools, volunteers from a number of Union republics of the USSR joined the brigade, which numbered up to 10,500 people.

From the Special Group, commanders were singled out, who were to be sent to the rear of the Germans to create partisan detachments. On October 3, 1941, it was replaced by the 2nd Department of the NKVD, and from January 18, 1942, the Fourth Directorate of the NKVD was deployed on its basis. The core was made up of experienced scouts. It is characteristic that their leader P.A. Sudoplatov was at the same time Deputy Chief of Intelligence P.M. Fitina.

IN AND. Pudín, E.M. Mitskevich, N.S. Tishchenko, Z.I. Voskresenskaya-Rybkina, G.I. Mordvinov, at an accelerated pace, were engaged in the recruitment of reconnaissance and sabotage detachments. The experienced intelligence officer V.V. became the chief of staff of the OMSBON. Gridnev.

Already by June 27, four detachments of 100-200 people were formed. E. Mickiewicz's detachment consisted mainly of Spaniard political emigrants. Later, emigrants from Bulgaria and Hungary joined it. The first to go behind enemy lines in the summer of 1941 were the detachments of D. Medvedev, A. Flegontov, V. Zuenko, Ya. Kumachenko.

thirty

In October 1941, the structure of the OMSBON was determined: two regiments and headquarters units. V. Gridnev was appointed commander of the first regiment, and S. Volokitin was appointed commissar. The second regiment was commanded by S. Ivanov, and S. Stekhov became the commissar. Later he joined the detachment of D. Medvedev.

In the winter months of 1941/42, detachments under the command of N.S. Artamonova, M.K. Bazhanova, N.A. Balashova, A.I. Voropaeva, S.A. Vaupshasova, V.N. Voronova, N.S. Gorbachev, S.A. Kaminsky, I.M. Kuzina, K.S. Laznyuk, P.G. Lopatina, E.I. Mirkovsky, V.L. Neklyudova, F.F. Ozmitel, M.S. Prudnikova, P.Ya. Popova, G.M. Khvostov, P.G. Shemyakina, A.P. Shestakova and others.

She recalled the atmosphere of those days in her book "Now I Can Tell the Truth." nyh to the rear, their "legends". There are ammo boxes on the floor. Top checkers, fickford cords. Molotov cocktails.

Each of the workers of the Special Group, on the basis of which the Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of Special Purpose was created, was also preparing to head to the rear at any moment.

enemy. I prepared for this too. She was rehearsing her role as a guard at a crossing at a small railway station.

In the morning I went to the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League - we have headquarters here, then to the training shooting range in Mytishchi, to the airfield or to the wards at home. During the air raids - ace on July 22 they were every evening - in a bomb shelter. They slept in it. Under the head, instead of a pillow, a gas mask, instead of a mattress - bare boards, but fell asleep instantly. An hour or two - and again to work.

Some groups are intended for subversive work on the railways to destroy the enemy's manpower and equipment, they are parachuted into the forests, others - reconnaissance - should settle in the cities. Each group has its own legend, its own program of action. A reconnaissance group is almost always a family: grandfather, grandmother, grandson or granddaughter. "Grandfather" - the head of the group, "grandmother" - his deputy, "grandson" or "granddaughter" - a radio coder.

Grandparents ~ old Bolsheviks, in their sixties and older, with vast experience in underground work and partisan struggle during the Civil War. Due to their age and state of health, they are exempted from military service, they must go on an evacuation with their families, but flatly refused.

... The colonel of our service, Georgy Ivanovich Mordvinov, selected people from the "old guard". Mordvinov - a man of legendary courage and courage, a former commander of a large partisan co

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unity in the Amur region. He graduated from the Institute of Oriental Studies, a sinologist. Twice he was sentenced to death. The first time he was captured by the Japanese, the second time, already being a scout, he "failed" in one of the European countries. Both times he managed to slip out of the hands of enemy counterintelligence.

I worked in tandem with Georgy Ivanovich, we selected daughters, grandchildren, and others for his "old men" assistants.

One day he decided to go to his home on Begovaya Street to change his washed shirt.

By evening I returned to the Lubyanka, Georgy Ivanovich was not there. He did not come later, when the all-clear alarm sounded. I decided to go to Begovaya to find out if something had happened to him, the Nazis bombed that area.

What was my surprise when, opening the unlocked door to his house, I saw him sleeping on a couch built ... from thick checkers. I realized that at night he was engaged in unloading, and since he slept no more than two or three hours a day, then, mortally tired, fell on the explosives and fell asleep ...

... At night, when the air raid alert sounded, we escorted two groups to the rear. One was headed by Boyko-Pavlov, the other by Flegontov. Both with extensive experience in guerrilla warfare in the Far East. I accept their party cards for safekeeping."

So the first groups were formed to be sent behind the front line. Following the aforementioned 3. Voskresenskaya-Rybkina, detachments were sent by L. Gromov (Batya), who cleared a significant area in the Smolensk region of invaders and guarded it until the arrival of the Red Army, V. Karasev, N. Prokopyuk, A. Rabtsevich, many others (over the years of the war, 212 detachments and groups were sent behind enemy lines).

Partisan formations were created around these groups. They not only waged a "rail war", which caused significant damage to the communications of the invaders, not only diverted significant enemy forces, but also communicated with underground residencies in the rear.

Nazis, collected and sent to the Center valuable information about the plans and movements of the enemy.

In these actions, in the battles with the punishers, scouts and counterintelligence officers of various departments acted in close connection. They carried out many operations jointly, as well as the main tasks assigned to them during the war. The most military tasks fell on reconnaissance, and it solved them in combat, incurring considerable losses, participating with its formations in direct actions. Detachment commanders N. Vasin, N. Gorbachev died in battle, K. Laznyuk, V. Pudín were seriously wounded. 22 fighters of K. Laznyuk were posthumously awarded the Orders of Lenin, the political officer of the detachment L. Papernik, the first among the Omsbonovites, was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

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The reconnaissance groups in the partisan formations did a lot of work, sending their people to the German sabotage schools, capturing individuals from the command staff of the enemy troops. This was done in pursuance of the directive of the People's Commissariat of July 4, 1941, prepared at the suggestion of the First Directorate, which stated: "We do not know anything about what is being done in the territories occupied by the enemy, what activities the Germans are carrying out, how they relate to population, etc. I suggest that we urgently use all the possibilities at our disposal to obtain the information we need."

During the war years, out of tens of thousands of messages from partisan reconnaissance and sabotage groups, 8418 intelligence messages were selected and implemented, 2111 of them were presented to the leadership of the country and state security, 1358 - to the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, 429 - to the commanders and military councils of the fronts, 629 - to the aviation command long-range, which was able to carry out its raids especially effectively.

In October-November 1941, when a difficult situation developed directly near Moscow as a result of a broad offensive by the Germans, who concentrated more than 50 divisions here, including 13 tank divisions, and the resources of the defenders were running out, it was extremely important to block the advancing approaches to the capital. 290 people were sent to carry out protective work, which made up the combined detachment of the OMSBON. They mined highways and dirt roads in the areas of Mozhaisk, Volokolamsk, Kashira, on the Leningradskoye highway in the Khimki region and the Moscow-Volga canal, along the Setun River and near Peredelkino, west of Chertanovo on the Kiev highway, on Pyatnitskoye, Rogachevskoye, Dmitrovskoye highway. From October 23 to November 2, 1941, they installed more than 11 thousand anti-tank and 7 thousand anti-personnel mines, more than 160 powerful land mines, prepared 19 bridges and 2 pipelines for explosions.

This detachment from November 27 to December 27, 1941, at the height of the fighting near Moscow, managed to destroy 30 German tanks, 20 armored vehicles, 68 trucks, inflict heavy losses in manpower and technique.

The detachment itself lost 11 men killed and 18 wounded. It operated under bombardment, sometimes under the very noses of the Nazis, and played a significant role in organizing resistance to the main grouping of their troops advancing along the Klin-Solnechnogorsk line, near the Leningrad Highway.

The combined detachment of OMSBON participated in the parade on November 7, 1941, after which it moved to the front.

At that moment, the Germans managed to capture the bridge over the Yakhroma River and begin transporting tanks to the east bank. In the operation to capture the bridge, the Nazis used employees of the Abwehr (military intelligence), who knew the Russian language and dressed in Red Army

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form. They managed to destroy a group of 12 bombers and go to Dmitrov. The situation was saved by the appearance of armored train No. 73 of the NKVD troops under the command of Captain Malyshev, who

entered into single combat with 20 advancing tanks. The counterattack enemy was driven back beyond the Moscow-Volga canal, and two subversive groups of OMSBON managed to blow up the bridge...

In the Moscow region, 12 underground district committees were trained, 5 of which operated behind enemy lines - near Mozhaik, near Ruza, Ostashev, Vysokovo and in other places. Moscow became a front-line city. From here, urgent evacuation of enterprises, workers, government agencies was carried out. Part of the OMSBON detachment was left in Moscow in case the capital was captured by the Germans. It was decided to prepare the Moscow underground in case of a breakthrough by the Nazis. L. Beria and A. Kobulov led the operation to prepare Moscow for a possible occupation through the NKVD - intelligence and counterintelligence. Sudoplatov and Eitingon were to remain in the "Moscow underground".

Foreign intelligence and the Special Group (2nd Department) under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs placed a number of underground radio stations in Moscow that would allow establishing communication with Kuibyshev (Samara), where government offices were evacuated. One of the radio stations was located in the basement of S. Obraztsov's puppet theater, which was then under construction.

Along with operational intelligence officers and state security agencies, experienced agents were included in three independent groups under the people's commissar.

In total, 244 people were selected and enrolled in the underground, of which 47 were employees of state security and intelligence. After the need had passed, a significant part of the "underground" - 114 operatives and 77 illegal immigrants - was transferred to the occupied territories of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus and other republics.

Such scouts as S. Vaupshasov, K. Orlovsky, N. Prokopyuk, A. Rabtsevich, who received combat training in Spain, managed to lead their detachments during the years of the Great Patriotic War over thousands of kilometers of partisan lines with the least losses and the greatest useful effect. roads and trails. Retired Major General E. Teleguev, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Commission for the Affairs of Former Partisans, writes about this: "The partisan detachments and groups of OMSBON differed significantly from other detachments and brigades that arose in the occupied territories. I do not want to oppose one to the other, especially since brave people fought there too, who took up arms at the call of their hearts, but objectively they were not as prepared to fight as we are.

Every detachment in our country had radio contact with the Center from the moment they crossed the front line. Each fighter completed a full sapper course

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preparation. We had at our disposal the technical base for sabotage work (we carried it through the front line on ourselves).

The hardest memories of the initial period of stay in the rear are physical exertion and hunger. Each fighter, when leaving the front line, carried a personal weapon, 300 rounds of ammunition, 5 grenades, a Finnish knife, explosives, a spare pair of linen, a bar of soap, a ten-day supply of food, and a dozen other little things, such as a bowler hat, a flask (full), compass, etc. In total, it was a load of 25-30 kilograms. And this is on skis, in the virgin lands, often at night, in the forest.

Only physically prepared people could withstand such a load. We were exhausted to the limit, especially in the early days, when we tried to quickly move away from the front line. And all this in the absence of normal nutrition. We stretched the ten-day supply for twenty days, and then went hungry. In fact, until August we had absolutely no bread, we had no salt. And yet, the fighters carried out their tasks clearly.

The Omsbonites showed great dexterity in clearing communications, when in December January 1941-1942 the Red Army launched a counteroffensive, burying the myth of the invincibility of the fascist troops.

In April 1943, the state security agencies were again separated into the People's Commissariat of State Security of the USSR.

5

"When under the tanks of the enemy, the dear earth was buzzing ..."

In a huge arc, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, there were heavy battles. Both sides suffered heavy losses. Despite desperate resistance, the Red Army retreated. One by one, the largest cities of the country fell into the hands of the enemy. Echelons with captured food and raw materials went west, fueling the Nazi war machine and the economy of Germany's allies. Columns of prisoners and driven away followed.

The country is in grave danger. But as the invading armies moved east, the flames of a people's war flared up in their rear. The Soviet times also played a significant role in creating pockets of resistance and organizing partisan struggle. vedchiki.

Many of them died in selfless struggle. But their exploits helped to survive, to gather strength, to rouse those who were beginning to lose faith in victory, gave rise to uncertainty among the occupiers. At the same time, scouts were helping the army in the field, the leadership of the country with valuable information, intelligence.

So it was in the south, in the center, in the north ...

well well

In October 1941, after more than two months of fierce fighting on the outskirts of Odessa, the Soviet armed forces were forced to leave the city and withdraw their remaining forces to defend the Crimea.

On the night of October 16, 1941, units of the Primorsky Army boarded ships and put to sea. But the struggle against the German-Romanian invaders did not stop.

In Moscow, Kyiv and Odessa, with the participation of state security and intelligence agencies, measures were taken to create a patriotic

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fields, illegal residencies, reconnaissance and sabotage detachments and groups.

Some of the underground workers, even before the invaders arrived in Odessa, settled in the city and suburbs, in the port, at enterprises, the other went to pre-prepared bases in the Odessa catacombs, which had been empty since the Civil War. Now they have turned into a one-of-a-kind "underground partisan region". Weapons, explosives, a six-month supply of food, clothing, electric motors and fuel were brought there.

Among the brave Odessa underground, a prominent place is occupied by foreign intelligence officer Vladimir Alexandrovich Molodtsov (Badaev) and his associates. Vladimir Aleksandrovich chose the pseudonym Badaev by his wife's last name. Badaev was born on June 5, 1911 in the city of Sasovo, Ryazan Region, in the family of a railway worker. At the age of 18, at the call of the Komsomol, he began to work as a laborer in the coal basin near Moscow, then as a mechanic, a slaughterer in a mine. In November 1931 he was accepted into the ranks of the party. He became a freelance correspondent for Komsomolskaya Pravda. On October 29, 1930, he wrote in his notebook: "Struggle is the basis of life. How good it is to fight and win." And he stayed true to that motto.

After graduating from the Moscow Institute of Engineering and Economics, in 1934 Badaev was sent to work in the state security bodies, took an additional course



studied at the Central School of the NKVD of the USSR, after which he became an employee of the Main Directorate of the NKVD in Moscow and the Moscow Region.

On March 1, 1941, Vladimir Alexandrovich was assigned to work in foreign intelligence, became the head of one of the political intelligence units. With the outbreak of war, Badaev, along with other experienced foreign intelligence operatives, was included in the Special Group under the People's Commissar of State Security. He underwent additional training and at the beginning of July 1941, at the head of an operational reconnaissance and sabotage group, he was sent to Kyiv, and from there to Odessa.

Badaev's operational reconnaissance and sabotage group initially included ten operatives and special forces soldiers, then ten more people who knew Odessa and its environs well.

Badaev and his companions arrived in Odessa on July 19, 1941. Badaev and his comrades were given the task of creating an illegal residency and partisan base in the Odessa catacombs, in the event of the evacuation of Soviet troops from Odessa, to remain in the city and start reconnaissance and sabotage operations.

Upon Badaev's arrival in Odessa, local party and Soviet bodies provided workers who were well acquainted with the catacombs and the situation in the surrounding villages. Commandant of the underground garrison

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Badaev appointed Ivan Nikitovich Klimenko, foreman of the Nerubay mines. He partisans in these parts even during the Civil War and foreign intervention. Klimenko became in the detachment and chief adviser on mine-explosive business. In total, the detachment included 45 people.

The operational core of the detachment was made up of Odessa state security officers. Tamara Mezhygurskaya, a foreign intelligence operative trained in Moscow, was included in the group of signalers under the commander of the detachment. Underground work on the railway was entrusted to organize the operative Pyotr Balonin. Nikolai Shevchenko, an employee from Nikolaev, headed the top ten, which was entrusted with the implementation of especially responsible actions. In a word, each employee of the group received a specific area of activity.

Preparing to go underground, Badaev paid great attention to the organization of intelligence work on the coast. On the Big Fountain, he created a reconnaissance group, which included fishermen. On the day of the group, a significant amount of weapons, ammunition, and explosives were transported. In addition, she was equipped with a large supply of metal spikes, which the underground called "guerrilla thistles," to use against the vehicles of the occupiers.

Badaev paid special attention to the organization of reconnaissance in the city and communications with the detachment. A group was created, headed by Yakov Gordienko. The underground called this group "Yashina Ten".

By the time our troops left Odessa, Badaev's detachment consisted of 75-80 people and was divided into three groups. One of them was ground, purely reconnaissance. She took refuge in the city. The other two went into the catacombs.

Soon, in Odessa and its environs, any high-profile case that attracted attention began to be associated with the Badaev detachment.

The actions of the Badayevites showed that the city did not accept the occupation. Many patriots were drawn to the partisans, they wanted to fight the enemy in the ranks of the Badayevites. In one of the reports to the Center, Vladimir Alexandrovich reported: "There is no shortage of volunteers. This is where I feel what it means for a Chekist to rely on the masses."

Not only young people were drawn to the detachment. Ivan Yegorovich Bunyakov, who was already 56 years old, was admitted to the reconnaissance group operating in the city. He expressed his readiness to help the Badaevites, but for the convenience of movement he asked for a horse. On a horse, Bunyakov rode around the city, without arousing any particular suspicions among the invaders. He delivered weapons and explosives to the underground groups of the Badaev detachment.

With the departure of the Soviet troops, the Badayevites almost on the same day - October 16, 1941 - began hostilities. At noon, the squad's militants already had an operation to eliminate the fascist

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sky patrols. For three months in 1941 Badaev's detachment carried out six combat operations. From the bullets of the Badayevites, first of all, the police and gendarmes were hit. In early November, Ion Popov, the chief of the Odessa police, disappeared from the city. On the night of November 16, 1941, on the month anniversary of the occupation of Odessa, a deluxe train from Bucharest was derailed near the Dachnaya station. About 300 German and Romanian officials, selected for the occupation administration in the city, died under its rubble. Demolitionists on the Odessa-Razdolnaya stretch derailed four trains with troops and military equipment, resulting in the death of over 250 enemy soldiers and officers.

The scouts of the Badaevskaya ground group, with the help of the inhabitants of the city, collected important information about the location of military units and various enemy targets. Messengers regularly delivered information to the catacombs. Every evening, the detachment's walkie-talkie sent this information to the Center.

Based on these reports, Soviet long-range aviation carried out bombing strikes. Thus, large fuel depots near Pervomaisk were destroyed, a motorcade was destroyed, and accumulations of military equipment and troops were destroyed.

The hunt began for the radio. But day after day it went on the air according to the schedule. Information was transmitted to the Center about the military situation in the Odessa area and its environs, about the coastal and air defense of the city, the movements of troops heading to the front, about the location of weapons, ammunition and food depots, about the deployment of individual units, about the city administration and enemy agents. There were also reports of built bridges across the Dnieper.

The other part of the information was implemented on the spot. The combat groups of the detachment smashed gendarmerie posts, set fire to and undermined military facilities and warehouses, cut off communications, destroyed highways, and caused damage to vehicles. A serious act of retaliation was the operation to blow up the military commandant's office at the time of the meeting of officers taking place there. Under the rubble of the building, 140 fascists died, among them the commandant of the city of Gloguyan, the prefect of police, General Davilu, and other military and police officials.

In addition to hostilities, the Badayevites distributed anti-fascist leaflets and reports from the Soviet Information Bureau.

Organizing the work of the detachment, Vladimir Alexandrovich developed contacts with other resistance units that operated in Odessa and its environs. Moscow oriented Badaev to establish contact with the Kyiv Chekists - employees of the residency of I.D. Curls (Maxima). For this purpose, in February 1942, a business trip to Kyiv of two Badayevites was planned under the pretext of searching for raw materials for a brewery. But it turned out to be too late. I.D. Curly has already been arrested.

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The actions of the reconnaissance and sabotage detachment of Badaev acquired an ever wider scope.

Here is how this activity was assessed in one of the documents of the Romanian royal intelligence, published in the book "Front without a front line" published by Moskovsky Rabochiy in 1975: "Numerous, with well-chosen personnel and well-equipped organizations - those abandoned by the NKVD... Badaev's organization is connected by a system of catacombs stretching for tens of kilometers with other organizations... The damage inflicted on us by Badaev's organization cannot be counted... - fief territories ... They are actively operating in order to fulfill the tasks with which they are left ... "

During the period from October 1941 to June 1942, the Badayevites and other underground workers sometimes chained up to 16 thousand enemy soldiers, among whom were, in addition to the gendarmerie, parts of the SS.

Not only Romanian intelligence and counterintelligence believed that many partisans and underground fighters took refuge in the catacombs, who deprived the enemy of a peaceful life. Hitler's General Tippelskirch, after many years carefully studying the phenomenon of Odessa resistance in a calm atmosphere, wrote in his book "History of the Second World War":

"Leaving Odessa in the autumn of 1941, the Russians created in the city a reliable partisan nucleus full of the greatest fanaticism. The partisans settled in the catacombs... It was a real underground fortress with headquarters located underground, shelters, rear institutions of all kinds, up to their own bakery and printing house, which printed leaflets... When the Russian troops on April 10 In 1944, they entered the city... of the 10,000 Soviet partisans who came out to meet their troops, more than half were equipped with weapons of German and Romanian production..."

The occupiers took enhanced measures to destroy the underground workers. Romanian sappers walled up the exits from the catacombs, but the partisans, with the support of local residents, dismantled the rubble or opened new exits. Then the Nazis took extreme, criminal measures - they began to pump poisonous asphyxiating and tear gases into the walled-up catacombs. All the inhabitants of the underground - both partisans and women with children - were in mortal danger. But the underground scouts and partisans found ways to move to safe mines, learned how to divert gases into empty ADILS.

The Gestapo, Siguranta and Romanian intelligence intensified repression against the inhabitants of Odessa. But this led to the expansion of retaliatory actions, although the underground suffered heavy losses. Then the punisher

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The organs of the occupiers began to introduce their agents more widely into the underground groups, and in the end they succeeded in identifying several underground workers.

In the winter of 1942, failures began in Badaev's underground groups. One of the traitors, in particular, managed to find out the address of the Badayev's safe house. On the evening of February 9, the Romanian secret police raided this apartment when Badaev was there. Underground members Mezhighurskaya and Chikov, Yakov and Aleksey Gordienko were arrested together with him.

Alarmed by the absence of the commander, the detachment headquarters decided to send a second liaison, Tamara Shestakova, to search for Badaev. Not seeing the identification marks, Shestakova did not enter the apartment, but the ambush spotted her. Careful monitoring of her allowed the German authorities to identify the addresses and arrest several more underground workers. The arrests of members of the Odessa groups of the Badaev detachment continued throughout February and March 1942.

Part of the detachment that had taken refuge in the catacombs, having lost its leader, continued to act. And for Vladimir Alexandrovich and his comrades-in-arms, a new, most difficult and painful stage of the struggle against the enemy began.

Those arrested were subjected to torture, including with electricity. Badaev and the patriots arrested with him were silent. In a duel with the investigators, Badaev managed to figure out the traitor, because of which the failure occurred. Vladimir Alexandrovich told his associates about this, and they agreed to use every opportunity to pass this information on to the will.

The first to do this was intelligence officer Milan, whom the Nazis, without getting a word out of him, sentenced to death to intimidate other Badaevites. Milan handed over linen to his relatives, in which there was a tattered handkerchief. Scrawled in blood on the edges of the handkerchief: "Our Boikov is gone." This news reached the underground, who continued to fight the enemy.

The second succeeded Badaev himself. On June 27, 1942, the Nazis took him and his closest associates to execution. To intimidate the inhabitants of Odessa, they led them around the city. On one street, a woman jumped out of the crowd and ran up to a tall man, on whose chest a sign with the inscription "Badaev" hung. She hung a bunch of bagels on his shackled hands. Before the gendarmes could do anything, the woman disappeared into the crowd. It was the wife of one of the members of the Badaev detachment, Ekaterina Vasina. She hurried to convey to her comrades in the struggle the words of Vladimir Alexandrovich, which he managed to whisper: "Boikov betrayed us."

Boykov-Fyodorovich, during the retreat of the Nazis from Odessa, tried to escape, but was captured and suffered a well-deserved punishment.

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Among the documents that the Gestapo and employees of the Romanian Sigurans failed to take out during the retreat from Odessa was the "Case of Badaev and his organization." It shows that the enemies learned the true name of the staunch patriot only a year after his execution. It follows from the materials of the case that Vladimir Aleksandrovich was silent for three months. Neither beatings nor sophisticated torture forced him to speak. Only when he saw that everything was coming to an end, which the occupiers decided to arrange in the form of a comedy of the court, did he speak. But he spoke with the sole purpose of taking everything upon himself and, if possible, mitigating the fate of his comrades. Regarding the associates arrested with him, he stated: "I did not participate in the operations. In the detachment, he was engaged in ancillary work."

The fortitude shown by Badaev and his associates struck even the enemy. Boyarchuk, an agent from the Sigurans, was placed in a cell with the Badayevites, posing as an underground worker. He reported to his chief: "Mostly at night, the prisoners gather in the cell around Badaev. It strengthens their hope for the imminent arrival of the Red Army and the liberation of Ukraine. Everyone believes him, because they see that he keeps steadfastly, does not confess to anything. (By the way, this provocateur was also caught and sentenced to death by a tribunal.)"

The verdict on the underground workers was announced on May 29, 1942 in the courtyard of the prison, where all the prisoners were taken. After the announcement of the verdict, the prosecutor announced that the convicts could apply for pardon in Bucharest to the Queen of Romania. Badaev stepped forward and declared loudly: "We have only one court - the Soviet one, only one government - in Moscow. We are Russians, and on our land we do not ask for pardon from our enemies!"

Tamara Mezhygurskaya, head of the group of communications and radio operators, foreign intelligence officer from Moscow, wrote in her suicide letter to her relatives: "We will soon be shot. Don't be upset. We are ready for anything. And we will go to death with our heads held high."

Underground scout Gordienko wrote in a letter to his parents and friends: "Cheer up, ours will take anyway. There will still be time and they will pay off all the bastards. Our cause will win anyway... I'm not afraid of death. I will die as befits a patriot of the Motherland."

The news of the heroic steadfastness of the Soviet patriots, the inflexible Badayevites, spread throughout the city.

For the exemplary performance of special tasks behind enemy lines and the courage and heroism shown at the same time, Vladimir Alexandrovich Badaev was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of November 5, 1944. The scouts and fighters of his detachment were awarded military orders.

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well well

At the end of March 1944, the Red Army drove the Nazis out of Nikolaev. The Chekist group, created by the regional department of the NKVD, did a tremendous job in order to recreate bit by bit the heroic picture of the struggle of brave patriots against the Nazis during the occupation period.

Later, writers and journalists were engaged in the study of the military affairs of the Nikolaev underground. In 1965, Vasily Ardamatsky's story "Grant Calls Moscow" was published in Moscow, and in 1982 Gennady Lisov's publication "The Right to Immortality" appeared in Leningrad, where the authors told about the exploits of Soviet patriots in Nikolaev.

According to the headquarters of the partisan movement of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, the organizers of the underground movement in the Nikolaev region were members of a reconnaissance and sabotage group headed by Viktor Alexandrovich Kornev, who arrived from Moscow. It is curious to note that in the conclusion of this headquarters it was noted that "the real name of the leader of the Nikolaev underground has not been established."

And Kornev was actually a foreign intelligence officer, Viktor Alexandrovich Lyagin, who in July 1941 was sent to Nikolaev to organize a reconnaissance and sabotage group after the city was captured by the enemy.

Viktor Alexandrovich Lyagin was born in 1908 in the village of Seltso, Bryansk Region, in the family of a railway worker. Later, the family moved to Leningrad, where Viktor graduated from high school and was sent to work in the district committee of the Komsomol, and a year later he began to study at the Leningrad Polytechnic Institute.

Soon his father died, and Victor had to take care of his mother and younger sister. He combined his studies at the institute with work. Despite the very intense rhythm, Victor found time for both sports and social affairs. Viktor Lyagin had enough time, energy and enthusiasm for everything.

In 1934 he graduated from the Institute and received the qualification of a mechanical engineer. Working at the machine-tool plant named after Ilyich, Lyagin was formed as a mature production commander. At the plant, he was known as a good production worker, and an active athlete, and the leader of the youth. In 1938, Viktor Alexandrovich joined the party, and in the same year he was sent to work in the state security agencies.

After completing a monthly course of NKVD operatives in August 1938, Lyagin was assigned to work in foreign intelligence and became deputy head of the department that dealt with the problems of scientific and technical intelligence. Victor

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Alexandrovich treated the development of the assigned area of work with interest and a sense of high responsibility. A year later, Lyagin was regarded as an experienced worker and in July 1939 he was sent on a long-term business trip to the USA. After two years of hard work in the residency just before the war, Viktor Aleksandrovich returned to Moscow.

As soon as Lyagin was going on vacation after a business trip, the war broke out. All his thoughts were directed to how to get to the front. But the management decided to send Lyagin

to Nikolaev to prepare a reconnaissance and sabotage group in case the city surrenders the Germans.

The core of Lyagin's group were the Leningrad Chekists. It included: Alexander Petrovich Sidorchuk, deputy head of the group; Grigory Tarasovich Gavrilenko, Lyagin's liaison; Alexander Nikolaevich Nikolaev, liaison with the Nikolaev city underground; Petr Platonovich Lutsenko, demolition worker, miner (miraculously survived in the heat of the war and told a lot about the affairs of the group); Alexander Vasilievich Sokolov, a specialist in undermining railways; Demyan Andreevich Svidersky.

Already in Nikolaev, the radio operator Boris Ivanovich Molchanov and employees of the NKVD department Ivan Yegorovich Solomin and Petr Andreevich Shapoval were seconded to Lyagin's group.

Selected Chekists headed by Lyagin left Moscow at the end of July. Through the difficult roads of the war, overcoming incredible difficulties, the Chekists made their way to the southern city, where they had to prepare for a duel with the enemy.

In Nikolaev, local Chekists, in agreement with Moscow, carried out the necessary preparatory work. So, in the first days of August, Emilia Iosifovna Duckert, the widow of a well-known neuropathologist in the city, was invited to the NKVD department. Major Sokolov, who spoke with her, asked her, on behalf of the Soviet authorities, to stay in the city for the period of occupation and to assist engineer Kornev Viktor Aleksandrovich, who was soon to arrive in Nikolaev.

Emilia Iosifovna gave her consent, since she, like her late husband Ivan Yakovlevich Duckert, were undividedly devoted to the ideals of the revolution. There was only one thing that worried her. Her daughter, Magda, a student at the Leningrad Conservatory, was supposed to appear in Nikolaev any day now and, as she announced in a letter, she was going to take her mother out of the city. And so it happened. Magda arrived and began to rush her mother to leave.

Emilia Iosifovna was tormented, she did not say anything to her daughter about the offer of the Chekists to stay in the city, she pretended to be collecting things, but she dragged and dragged on. And then Lyagin came to the rescue. He showed up in the evening, rang at the door and the hostess who let him in

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introduced himself as an engineer Viktor Alexandrovich Kornev, who was recommended to rent an apartment in this house. As Duckert later recalled, Lyagin appeared before her as an imposing, interesting man with a suitcase in one hand and a light brown leather coat in the other. Emilia Iosifovna showed him his room, and Magda made a fuss about what kind of lodgers there might be at such a time. Lyagin calmly settled down in the room allotted to him and lay down to rest. Apparently, the ordeals on the road pretty much exhausted the leader of the group.

In the evening, Viktor Alexandrovich decided to get acquainted with the city and invited Magda to accompany him. When returning from a walk, Emilia Iosifovna did not recognize her daughter. There was nothing left of her grouchiness and hurriedness with her departure from Nikolaev. Apparently, Lyagin found the right words, and Magda turned into his faithful assistant.

Before the arrival of the Germans in the city, Viktor Aleksandrovich managed to work out the necessary issues with the Nikolaev security officers, meet with members of his group and set tasks for them in the near future, check the preparation and reliable shelter of communications, weapons, documents, explosives.

On August 10, Lyagin took the last opportunity to scribble a note to his wife. Here she is, this a note:

"August 10, 1941.

Dear Zinochka and son!

The moment of our break in the postal service is coming. Friends are already in cars and are waiting for me to write you these farewell lines...

I love you endlessly! Always with you!

Zina! Take care of Viktorchik and raise him as a faithful son of our great Bolshevik Party.

Forgive me for a lot - after all, in the main thing, in my love for you, you never doubted ...

Wait two years for me. I won't be back, so...

I kiss you hard. Kiss Vitka, Tatka for me! and all of ours."

On August 16, 1941, the Nazi troops entered Nikolaev. According to the memoirs of Emilia Iosifovna Duckert, that day she and her daughter and their lodger were at home. Everyone was gripped by a nervous expectation of the unknown. Viktor Alexandrovich outwardly seemed imperturbable, but from the way he, walking around the apartment, looked out the windows, it was felt that he, too, was under stress.

Finally, motorcyclists rushed down the street past the house, and then a passenger car appeared. Viktor Aleksandrovich opened the windows wide and told Magda to sit down at the piano. "Play! And louder! But nothing Russian. Better than Wagner - he is their most popular composer!

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Magda began to play, and Lyagin put bottles of wine and canned food on the table. The sound of music attracted the attention of the officers who were in a passing black Mercedes. The car stopped, and soon the door, which had remained unlocked in the morning, swung open, and six Nazi officers entered the apartment.

"Who are they?" - asked, apparently, the eldest of those who entered. Lyagin, as it seemed to Emilia Iosifovna, answered very calmly in good German that he was engineer Kornev from the Baltic Plant from Leningrad. Arrived on a business trip, but did not have time to leave. And he introduced his mother's daughter as his relatives - the descendants of the German colonists.

The Nazis were impressed by Lyagin's calmness, and the German origin of the Duckerts interested them. The eldest of the group of German officers, and it turned out to be Major Hoffmann, appointed commandant of Nikolaev, accepted Lyagin's invitation to celebrate the entry of the Germans into the city with a glass of wine. The first glass was followed by a second and a third.

About two hours later, the rather tipsy commandant succumbed to Lyagin's persuasion to rest and made it clear to the officers accompanying him that they could leave. Victor Aleksandrovich "cajoled" Hoffmann so that he agreed to stay in the Duckerts' apartment and even promised to recommend Magda as a secretary to Admiral von Bodecker, the head of the Black Sea shipyards.

So successfully was the first "operation" carried out by engineer Kornev. In the next few days, by order of the commandant of the city, Viktor Aleksandrovich and the Duckerts settled in the part of the one-story mansion allotted to them on Chernomorskaya Street.

Hoffmann kept his word, and soon Magda began working as Admiral von Bodecker's secretary-translator. On her recommendation, after some time, the admiral invited engineer Kornev to his place and offered the position of supervising the repair of warships. This allowed Lyagin to subsequently establish contacts with patriots from the Nikolaev underground and organize several ingenious acts of sabotage, which led to the delay of the work planned by the Germans on

ship repair. There were also high-profile cases, as happened, for example, during sea trials of the repaired Lola transport, when it blew up and sank with the entire engine crew, which consisted of Germans alone.

Before the members of the reconnaissance and sabotage group, Lyagin set the task for the first two or three months - to get a job, legalize and get used to the situation. But by the November holidays, Viktor Alexandrovich got a font and organized the distribution of leaflets in the city that carried the truth about the struggle of Soviet people against the Nazi invaders and called for resistance.

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resistance to the invaders. The leaflets refuted the assertion of Hitler's propaganda about the defeat of the Red Army and the fall of Moscow.

At the end of November 1941, the Lyagins struck the first blow against the invaders. As an object of sabotage, a military warehouse and a motor depot, arranged by the Germans almost in the center of the city, in the park named after Petrovsky, were chosen. In terms of its significance, this object, perhaps, was not of great strategic importance, although it served the Ingulinsk airfield, but this sabotage had a huge effect.

The warehouse and motor depot were securely guarded, all approaches to the park were blocked, and the fact that there were daredevils who managed to get into the park and carry a fair amount of explosives showed that a well-organized military underground was operating in the city.

The first sabotage was carried out by the Leningrad Chekists Alexander Sidorchuk, Alexander Sokolov and the local underground Fyodor Vorobyov. The Nazis then lost 15 vehicles with equipment and machinery, 20 tons of fuel and several dozen soldiers and officers. But just a couple of days before the sabotage, speaking in Berlin on the radio, Rosenberg called Nikolaev "one of the pearls of the Russian Black Sea region, where German soldiers feel like at a resort."

In January 1942, the Lyagins again carried out sabotage in the Petrovsky park, proving that enhanced security measures do not save the occupiers from patriot retribution. This time, the Nazis missed 20 vehicles with military equipment and large reserves of fuel.

The onset of cold forced the German command to bring stocks of warm uniforms for the troops to Nikolaev. Having learned about this on the railway, where Alexander Sokolov operated, the Chekists decided to destroy the warehouse where warm clothes were stored. Throwing bottles of flammable liquid at the warehouse with uniforms and causing a fire, the Lyagin residents prudently blocked all access roads for fire engines with spiked obstacles, and the warehouse burned down.

to the ground.

The sabotage carried out in the city caused a huge resonance among the population. And although the occupants hoped to intimidate the inhabitants of the city with punitive measures, the actions of the underground workers inspired confidence that the Germans were not masters in a foreign land.

The myth of the invincibility of the Nazi army was dispelled by the defeat of the Germans near Moscow. Strikes against the enemy deep in the rear instilled in the Soviet people confidence in victory over the uninvited invaders.

The reconnaissance and sabotage group under the leadership of Lyagin was listed in the Center as the station "Routers". Difficult conditions in which reconnaissance and sabotage groups operated

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py behind enemy lines, especially in the first period of the war, affected the provision of uninterrupted communications with the Center. Unfortunately, some residencies quickly lost contact. This one has not passed



fate and residency "Routers". The broken radio did not allow communication with the Center. This greatly complicated the position of the residency.

Lyagin's reconnaissance and sabotage group strengthened its ties with the city underground. Viktor Alexandrovich entered the leading core of the Nikolaev underground, but, observing secrecy, maintained contacts only with a limited circle of people.

Many more acts of sabotage were committed by the fighters of the Lyagin group. Hitler's warehouses were destroyed in the city, three echelons with soldiers and military equipment were derailed. At a small airfield near the village of Shirokaya Balka, two aircraft and 4 tons of aviation fuel were burned.

Each operation was carefully prepared and controlled by the head of the group, and therefore managed without losses. But the stocks of explosives that had been placed in caches before the retreat of the Soviet troops from Nikolaev quickly melted away. There were no new arrivals of explosives and weapons. An attempt to contact the partisans was unsuccessful. And Lyagin decided to send one of the members of his group across the front line. The resident chose Petr Platonovich Lutsenko.

On April 6, 1942, Lutsenko, with a report along the route planned by Viktor Aleksandrovich, set off. Pyotr Platonovich miraculously survived in the heat of the war, and later told a lot to the journalist Lisov, who was collecting material about the heroes of the Nikolaev underground.

Let's just say that Lutsenko managed to get to his own. The message he delivered went to the Center. But then the unit, which the brave security officer contacted, was surrounded, and Lutsenko went through all the torments of the hell of a fascist concentration camp. Nevertheless, he managed to escape from Hitler's captivity and overcome incredible difficulties on the way to Nikolaev, where he decided to return at any cost. Only the help of the Soviet people, languishing in fascist captivity, and indomitable will allowed Pyotr Platonovich on December 18, 1942 to report to the head of the group about his return to the city.

Lutsenko joined the group and continued to fight the enemy until the liberation of Nikolaev by the Red Army. This was not the end of the combat epic of the Leningrad Chekist. On September 7, 1944, a new task led him as a commissar of a special reconnaissance and sabotage detachment to the lands of Czechoslovakia, where in seven months the detachment, constantly replenished with Slovak patriots, provided invaluable assistance to the Slovak People's Uprising.

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The lack of communication with the Center and the inability to count on outside help forced Lyagin to look for opportunities to replenish the melting stocks of explosives and weapons. There was only one way out - to be supplied at the expense of the enemy. And no matter how difficult it was, the Lyagins literally worked miracles.

The reconnaissance officers of the "Masters" residency noted that the German troops fighting at the front receive significant support from the aviation unit based at the Ingulinsk airfield near Nikolaev. It was decided to try to find approaches to the airfield for sabotage.

The main task of finding a way to the airfield was entrusted to Alexander Petrovich Sidorchuk, the deputy head of the group. On the advice of Lyagin, Sidorchuk got a job in an apartment with a "Russian German woman". The hostess turned out to be Galina Adolfovna Kelem from a family of German colonists. Brought up in the Soviet spirit, Galina dreamed of aviation and before the war received a Komsomol ticket to the Nikolaev flight school.

Soon Sidorchuk found a common language with the owner of the apartment, and after a while they got married. Galina Adolfovna forced her husband to intensively study German, and this helped in many ways to solve the problem of the Ingulinsk airfield.

Galina Adolfovna managed to get a job as a waitress in the officers' canteen of the German 4th Air Army. Having established contacts with the officers of the flight unit based at the Ingulin airfield, Kelem managed to gain confidence in them. Time passed, and Galina Adolfovna recommended that the officers of the airfield service take her husband to work. Having learned that Sidorchuk spoke German tolerably, the airfield administration hired a Soviet Chekist as a fireman. So the first part of the problem was solved, the initial access to the airfield was provided. Now it was necessary to covertly deliver and stockpile explosives in sufficient quantities. Through the efforts of the members of the group, it was possible at first to concentrate stocks of explosives in a ravine near the airfield, and then Sidorchuk managed to drag the dangerous cargo onto the territory of the airfield.

Mines and fuses were made by Lutsenko, and his caring wife Galina Adolfovna delivered them to Sidorchuk's boiler room. The first mine, as she later recalled, she put in a pot of soup, and then laid on the bottom of the basket for food. The sentries got used to it and searched did not annoy.

Considering that the stoker helped aviation technicians to heat up the oil in cold weather, Sidorchuk got the opportunity to move freely around the airfield.

Having prepared everything and calculated with Lyagin according to the developed scheme, the plan for mining aircraft, Alexander Petrovich said he was sick and did not go to work for several days. On the night of March 10, 1942,

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when a shift was on duty in the boiler room, Sidorchuk made his way to the airfield and set to work. He laid mines in drainage wells near the runways and connected them with electrical wires. Just before dawn, Alexander Petrovich finished the hard work that required great precision. After setting the clock mechanism to the estimated time and making sure that the entire circuit is closed, the brave professional left the airfield.

Exactly at noon, a strong explosion shook the air. Hangars with planes were burning, fuel tanks were exploding, shells were exploding. After a while, only one memory remained of the airfield.

Grateful residents of Nikolaev erected a huge stone after the war in memory of the heroism of Sidorchuk. The inscription on the stone reads: "At this place on March 10, 1942, Chekist-intelligence officer Alexander Sidorchuk committed one of the largest acts of sabotage against the German occupiers."

Despite the alibi, the Gestapo seized Sidorchuk, but without knocking anything out of him, they were forced to release him.

He got a job as a watchman at the fuel depots in the port of Nikolaev. On the eve of the 25th anniversary of October, it was decided to destroy these warehouses. On the night of November 5, 1942, Alexander Petrovich, throwing Molotov cocktails at the gas storage, ran to the storage facilities. And then an absurd accident interfered: Sidorchuk stumbled, and a makeshift mine exploded from the push. So the brave and courageous Chekist died, who sacredly fulfilled HIS DUTY.

The Nikolaev resistance seriously worried Berlin. The Gestapo flooded the city with agents. Attempts were made to contact Lyagin's group under the guise of messengers from underground organizations. But the check brought the provocateurs to clean water, Lyagin and members of his group acted professionally and promptly competently.

How much more effective would the work of the Lyagin group be if there was a connection with Moscow! But even operating in complete isolation, relying only on the patriots of the underground and the support of honest people, the Marshrutniki residence bravely fought against the invaders.

Meanwhile, the ring around the heroes of the underground was shrinking more and more. The Germans began to resort more often to the method of raids, as a result of which young people were caught along the way to be sent to Germany.

Once, at the beginning of March 1943, Grisha Gavrilenko, Lyagin's liaison, almost fell into one of these raids. He worked as a chauffeur-mechanic in the city fire station. Noticing that a chain of punishers was going to check the depot, Grisha, apparently, was frightened and made a mistake: he escaped from the Germans through an emergency exit.

Having thought better, Gavrilenko realized that he somehow needed to explain his absence from the workplace during the raid, and applied for

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assistance to the group leader. Viktor Alexandrovich decided that Grisha should be provided with a medical certificate. This could have been done by the phthisiatrician of the local hospital, Maria Lyubchenko, who agreed to stay in the city for the period of occupation and help the underground. Lyagin turned to her for help. Lyubchenko agreed to examine Gavrilenko and issue him a certificate. But Lyagin did not know that Lyubchenko was arrested by the Gestapo in the summer of 1942, and two weeks later she was released for agreeing to help the Germans. And on February 5, 1943, early in the morning, Gavrilenko came to the doctor Lyubchenko in the hospital, having made a second mistake. He had a pistol hidden in his overcoat. As he undressed, the gun fell to the floor. The Gestapo broke into the noise from the ambush and twisted Grisha. An hour later, Lyagin was also arrested at the entrance of the Southern Port. So one mistake made by the liaison officer led to a major failure of the "Routers" residency.

For Lyagin, a new stage of confrontation with the enemy began. At first, he thought that Grisha betrayed him, unable to withstand the torture. But he soon realized that Lyubchenko committed the betrayal. Viktor Alexandrovich managed to inform the underground about the true face of the traitor.

The Gestapo did not knock anything out of Lyagin and his contact. The courage and fortitude that Viktor Aleksandrovich showed in the Nazi dungeons amazed the prisoners.

The underground made an attempt to organize Lyagin's escape. They even managed to give him a pistol with cartridges, which Viktor Aleksandrovich had buried on the banks of the Ingul, where the prisoners were taken out for earthworks. The escape was scheduled for April 17, 1943. But here too an absurd incident intervened. The day before, some criminal escaped, and the prisoners were no longer taken to work. So the well-prepared plan for Lyagin's escape from captivity fell through.

July 17 Viktor Alexandrovich Lyagin was shot. The exact place of execution and burial of the hero is still unknown. But his heroic deeds are known. They were mentioned in the certificate attached to Lyagin's nomination for the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. It also stated that "despite the terrible, unimaginable torments, Viktor Lyagin held himself heroically, courageously and steadfastly. He never lost his presence of mind and thus provided great moral support to his fellow prisoners.

As it turned out during the investigation, the sabotage and reconnaissance group led by him caused damage to the invaders, estimated at 45 million marks. This amount was presented to V.A. Lyagin before the announcement of the death sentence..."

After the expulsion of the Nazis from Nikolaev, the security officers of the regional department of the NKVD began to work. They had to work hard to clear the city of Hitler's accomplices. The fascist agent, doctor Lyubchenko, was also exposed, the betrayal of

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which led to the death of V.A. Lyagin. She tried to escape to Germany, but was captured in Lvov and taken to Nikolaev. The court sentenced her to be shot.

For the exemplary performance of special tasks behind enemy lines and the courage and heroism shown at the same time, Viktor Aleksandrovich Lyagin was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of November 5, 1944.

A sea vessel built at the Nikolaev shipyard in 1965 was named after Lyagin. Memorial plaques with the name of the Hero are installed on the buildings with which his life in Leningrad and Nikolaev was connected.

In the Cabinet of History of the SVR, the name of Viktor Alexandrovich Lyagin is immortalized on a memorial plaque.

well well

On the eve of the 20th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of May 8, 1965, the title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded (posthumously) to Ivan Danilovich Kudrya.

For twenty years, the name of the brave patriot, head of the illegal reconnaissance and sabotage residency in Kyiv, remained unknown. It took two decades for the feat of the Hero to take its rightful place in the history of the Great Patriotic War. A lot of things became known to the Kyiv security officers immediately after the liberation of Kyiv from the Nazi invaders, but it took a long time to figure out the details of the struggle of the brave underground workers with the enemy. Bit by bit, a general picture of the intense activity of the Kiev residency in those severe years.

Kudrya was born in 1912 in Ukraine in the village of Salkovo, Kyiv region. He grew up without a father, worked as a laborer, went to school, worked as a mechanic at MTS. After graduating from pedagogical courses, he led a rural school. When Ivan Danilovich was called up to serve in the army, he was sent to the border troops. He carried out the border guard service at one of the outposts of the country's western borders. Having established himself as a courageous border guard, Kudrya was sent to study at the Military-Political School of the NKVD.

Ivan Danilovich studied diligently and proved to be a capable and competent cadet. At the school, Kudrya joined the party, and after successfully completing his studies in 1938, he was recommended to work in the foreign intelligence apparatus. In March 1941, Kudrya was sent to Kyiv, where he headed one of the departments of the NKVD of Ukraine.

When the war began, Kudrya was invited by one of the leaders of the NKVD of Ukraine, Colonel Sergei Romanovich Savchenko, and

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he proposed to head a reconnaissance and sabotage group in case the Nazis arrived in Kyiv. Ivan Danilovich immediately set about forming a reconnaissance and sabotage group. He stopped going to work, took off his uniform, began to wear a Ukrainian shirt and hat, let go of his mustache. A legend was developed for Kudrya, according to which he acted as the son of a repressed priest. According to the documents, he was listed as a teacher of the Ukrainian language and literature in a secondary school. In the circle of the underground, Ivan Danilovich was known as Maxim.

Back in August, Kudrya rented an apartment on Institutska Street from M.I. Gruzdeva. The archive materials of the FSB contain scarce information about a brave patriot who agreed to help the state security agencies in case Kyiv was occupied by the enemy.

Maria Ilyinichna Gruzdeva was born in 1914 in the Kyiv region, she taught Ukrainian at a secondary school. Her apartment became not only a shelter for the resident, but also a place to store the means of communication between the residency and the Center, weapons, money, and documents.

On September 19, 1941, Soviet troops left Kyiv. Crossing over to the left bank of the Dnieper, the sappers blew up all the crossings. The Darnitsky bridge was the last to collapse, and powerless reigned in Kyiv. All sorts of evil spirits crawled out into the streets, robberies began in the city.

Hot weekdays began for Maxim's residency. The resident himself walked along the streets of the capital of Ukraine, looked at the reaction of the city residents, who reacted far from the same to the entry of German troops into the city. Not without the fact that a small group of festively dressed townspeople went out to the Bessarabian market and greeted the Germans entering Kiev. These renegades greeted the enemy and expressed their commitment to the "new order". But Maksim noted with the sharp look of a Chekist-intelligence officer that it was not this miserable rabble of traitors that determined the mood of the people of Kiev. The gloomy faces and heavy gaze of the working people who took to the streets of the city testified that the occupiers were not waiting for a quiet life in Kyiv.

Maxim returned home and compiled the text of the first radiogram, which went to the Center the same evening and reported on the situation in the city.

It seemed that Coudra managed to do a lot with the support of the leadership of the NKVD of Ukraine to prepare for the military operations of the residency under the conditions of enemy occupation. But truly inscrutable are the ways of the fierce struggle.

Maxim's residency had just delivered the first tangible blows against the enemy, which showed not only the Nazis, but also the inhabitants of the city that a well-organized underground was operating in Kiev, how the residency itself suffered irreparable damage. Occupants under

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in the form of fighting fires, many houses were blown up in the city. Thus, the house in which Ivan Danilovich Kudrya lived in the apartment of Maria Ilyinichna was also liquidated. Residents were previously removed from the building. But Maxim lost everything that he had prepared in advance. The ciphers, money, weapons, and documents hidden in hiding places perished. It was a serious blow, but the resident continued to work and lead the reconnaissance and sabotage group.

In addition to his closest assistant Gruzdova, Maxim skillfully used the opportunities of the opera singer Raisa Okipnaya, who established extensive contacts and won the trust of the highest ranks of the police and army officers.

Maxim's residency also included Zhenya Bremer, a "Russian German", who not only skillfully collected intelligence information, but also ensured regular reception of radio broadcasts from Moscow. She wrote down the Informburo reports, on the basis of which Maxim compiled the texts of the leaflets. Zhenya copied leaflets on a typewriter and, through her assistants, distributed them in the city. And although the possibilities of residency were limited, the truth about the situation at the front reached the people of Kiev.

Subversive groups were actively operating, which, as archival information testifies, were formed by Maxim in a short time. Of the largest acts of sabotage committed by the Kudrintsy, which literally stunned the Nazis, the following are noted. On May 1, 1942, one of the groups committed sabotage on the Kyiv-Zhmerinka stretch, as a result of which a train with ammunition and German troops was derailed. A major sabotage action was carried out at the Darnitsa railway station. With a shortage of explosives, the Kudrintsy managed to ruin the brakes of a tram carrying Nazi officers, which developed a furious speed, descending to Podol, and fell down a slope, burying the invaders in gray-green uniforms under the rubble.

The lack of contact with the Center tormented Maxim, but, continuing to operate behind enemy lines, he believed that Moscow would try to restore contact with him. The Center indeed made a decision to restore communication with Maxim. In April 1942, a plane took off from an airfield near Moscow and headed for Kyiv with a radio operator and two signalmen for Kudri.

Obviously, everything was planned correctly. And the scouts who were sent to communicate with Maxim were determined. So, in any case, it can be judged from the stories of two

surviving participants in this operation.

But the war in its own way changed the plans of the headquarters. In Moscow, they planned to drop scouts by parachute in the Kyiv region, but the head of the operation, after saying goodbye to the young dare

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chaks flying on a mission, upon returning to headquarters, received a radiogram in which the pilot reported that in the area of Belaya Tserkov he was met with heavy fire and was forced to throw out scouts near Mogilev-Podolsk, far from Kiev.

As the surviving participants of the operation later said, they had to overcome many hardships. Anatoly Trusov left the plane first and landed on the outskirts of the village of Politanok, Mogilev-Podolsky district, Kamianets-Podilsky region. And it was necessary for this to happen - he ended up in the courtyard of the house on a wire to which the dog was tied. Of course, she raised a loud bark at the sight of the messenger from heaven. This could have ended Anatoly's battle epic, but, fortunately, the hosts who jumped out of the house at the noise, apparently, correctly realized what kind of "guest" he had come to them, helped him cope with a parachute caught on a poplar, and Anatoly - got out of the village.

Trusov made his way to Kyiv for almost three weeks. This path was hard. Several times he miraculously eluded the raids and eventually got to the right address.

The circumstances with the landing of Lydia Rosnovskaya and her partner Alexei were even more difficult. They reached land far from Trusov. Upon landing, Lydia twisted her leg, and Alexei lost his shoes and walked barefoot. Many trials fell to their lot. Alexei had to help Lydia move around, on his shoulders was a walkie-talkie and the rest of the load. More than once Alexei had to hide the walkie-talkie and other luggage in different places, return for them and move on. The position of the scouts became more complicated when, unable to withstand damp nights and numerous crossings through water barriers, Lydia fell ill. And yet she reached Kyiv, and Alexei died.

Rosnovskaya came to Kudra a few days after Trusov's arrival. Ivan Danilovich was unspeakably glad for the arrival of the envoys from Moscow. He hid them from Kapitolina Vasilievna Ritvo, a distant relative of Zhenya Bremer. Sick, exhausted, scouts sent to contact Maxim needed rest and care. And Kapitolina Vasilievna in two weeks put them on legs.

Having not received a walkie-talkie, but after talking with the envoys of the Center, Ivan Danilovich decided to send Lidia Rosnovskaya and Anatoly Trusov across the front line to Moscow. He prepared the most important messages for the Center and saw off the scouts.

The hope of receiving a walkie-talkie and establishing communication with Moscow did not materialize, but this did not discourage Maxim. The residency continued to operate. Kudrya and members of his group actively fought against the enemy, committing sabotage, posting leaflets around the city calling for a rebuff to the occupiers. The actions of Maxim's residency merged

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with the activities of other underground groups and blows to the Nazis multiplied, testifying to the insubordination of Kyiv.

The scout, acting in the camp of the enemy, is not immune from accidents. As you know, no one plans them, and they always happen suddenly. Then the intelligence officer is required to display the highest degree of self-control, resourcefulness and courage.

Once such an accident happened on the streets of Kyiv with Ivan Danilovich Kudrya. Even at the very beginning of the deployment of the residency, at the end of September 1941, he walked along the streets of Kyiv and carefully looked at the situation in the city. Suddenly Kudrya noticed that he was intently examining him and, having recognized him, a stocky, mustachioed man, walking towards him, begins to smile joyfully. Ivan Danilovich immediately remembered him. And he couldn't smile anymore.

Literally before the war, Kudrya was conducting a case against a Petliurist nicknamed "Mustache". It was "Mustache" who was on the way of the scout when such a meeting was least of all desirable. Ivan Danilovich understood that only endurance and iron will could allow him to win a tough duel with Usatii. And the sharpness of the duel was also explained by the fact that, as it turned out, "Mustache" worked as an interpreter for a special team of the Gestapo.

In this case, self-control and the will to win turned out to be stronger in Kudrya. He, not for a moment showing confusion, skillfully led a conversation with "Mustache". He trembled and agreed to assist Soviet intelligence. And "Mustache" knew a lot. In the very first message, he gave Coudra the names of German agents who were transferred to the rear of the Red Army with assignments in Moscow and Chelyabinsk. Ivan Danilovich managed to transfer data to this agency to Moscow before the termination of communication with the Center.

"Usaty" also informed Kudrya that an Abwehr reconnaissance post was deployed in Kyiv. This was important information, and the task was to collect information about the activities of this important facility.

On the instructions of Kudrya, Maria Ilyinichna Gruzdeva got a job as a manager of house No. 4/6 on Kuznechnaya Street, which housed the Abwehr reconnaissance post, which worked for the General Staff of the German Army. She managed to win the confidence of the head of the intelligence center Mayer, aka Miller, aka Anton Ivanovich Milchevsky, a major German intelligence officer who worked in Ukraine for a long time before the war. Maria Ilyinichna got the opportunity to monitor the employees of the reconnaissance point and identify enemy agents.

Information about the fascist agents Ivan Danilovich carefully entered into a specially created notebook, where 87 names of Nazi agents were entered with various data on them.

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From "Usaty", and possibly also through other sources, Coudra learned that the Germans were building some important military facility in the Vinnitsa region, at the same time constructing airfields and bringing roads to them. The construction of the object was carried out in the forest. From the railway station Vinnitsa, a branch was laid into the forest, along which trains ran, and a good highway. All work on the construction of the object itself and the means of communication were carried out in strict secrecy, and the Nazis took enhanced measures to protect the construction. Selected troops appeared in Vinnitsa itself. The city was flooded with the Gestapo and the gendarmerie.

All this interested Ivan Danilovich, and the resident began to think about who could be entrusted with collecting information on Vinnitsa and what was happening in the region of this city. Curly's choice fell on Raisa Okipnaya.

The actress of the Kyiv Opera Theater was from Vinnitsa. The daughter of the priest Kopshuchenko, a singer known to Nazi officers who visited the opera house, in the opinion of the resident, could count on receiving a pass to Vinnitsa, her hometown.

If Curly had a connection with the Center, perhaps everything would have gone differently. The Center received information from reconnaissance detachments operating behind enemy lines. Information was also received on Vinnitsa. After all, Hitler's headquarters was created there. It is possible that Coudray would not be advised to take an interest in this area. But this can only be guessed at.

And then Ivan Danilovich had no connection with Moscow, and he made an independent decision. His assignment to Raisa Okipnaya to try to get a pass to Vinnitsa was the beginning of a failure.

Maxim's residency.

Indeed, everything that was then connected with Vinnitsa was the subject of special attention of the Nazi security service. Therefore, as soon as the actress turned to the chief of the theater and hinted that she would like to give a concert in her hometown, the leadership of the security service immediately became aware of this. One of the leaders of the SD instructed an experienced service agent to get close to Raisa Okipna.

The SD agent "Nanetta" was carefully instructed and pretended to be a countrywoman of the actress. "Nanette" - Natalya Frantsevna Grunvald - managed to gain confidence in Raisa.

Maxim knew that enemy agents were prowling the city in an effort to find the underground, and there were already cases when it was possible to successfully get rid of spies. But when the resident found out that fellow countrywoman Raisa Okipnaya was a doctor, and besides, she was in charge of the laboratory of the city polyclinic, Ivan Danilovich became interested in her.

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Necessity pushed the resident to risk. To forge documents, the underground workers needed chemicals, and Raisa's new acquaintance could get them. The resident gave Okipnaya the task of taking a closer look at the countrywoman. However, it was already too late to start checking the doctor who was in the field of view of the residency. Through Raisa Okipnaya, Ivan Danilovich Kudrya had already been noticed by the Gestapo. And although "Nanette" did not find out the address of Kudrya, the Gestapo was instructed to act. The SD agent did the main thing - she established a connection between Raisa Okipna and Ivan Kudrey, whom the actress gave out to her countrywoman as a medical student Ivan Kondratyuk and asked to get a medical certificate for him about his release from classes.

The Gestapo managed to get close to Maxim's residency, and in the first days of July 1942, Ivan Kudrya, Raisa Okipnaya, Zhenya Bremer and some other members of the group were arrested. They steadfastly held out during interrogations, despite severe torture, and the Gestapo, not having obtained the desired information from them, dealt with them. This is how Ivan Danilovich Kudrya died, a brave Soviet intelligence officer, who in 1942 was only thirty years old. (The widow of Ivan Danilovich, Kapitolina Ivanovna Kudrya, at a meeting with scouts, said that in fact her husband was born not in 1912, but in 1914. He added a couple of years to himself in order, as Kapitolina Ivanovna said, to speed up terms of conscription into the Red Army.)

Be that as it may, Curly died indeed in his prime. How much more could he have done in the name of the freedom and independence of his Motherland!

And what happened to the notebook in which the resident Maxim entered data on the Nazi agents?

In the summer of 1942, Ivan Danilovich prudently handed over the notebook and some other documents to a member of his group, M.V. Dry. When Kudrya was arrested, Maria Vasilievna handed over a package with a notebook and documents to Dmitry Sobolev, Ivan Danilovich's closest assistant. Unfortunately, Sobolev died, and the notebook ended up in the hands of the Gestapo.

Under the onslaught of the Soviet Army, the front rolled westward. The Nazis planned to leave Kyiv on November 15, 1943 and were going to blow up the city. But with a swift blow from the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Kyiv was already liberated on November 6th. In a panic, the Germans were unable to take out even the archives of the Gestapo. In one of the rooms where the Gestapo was located, Maxim's notebook was found. On the cover of the notebook, there is an inscription made by Dmitry Sobolev: "To all those who found these notes. I ask Soviet patriots to keep these records and in the event of my death at the hands of the enemies of my Motherland - the German fascists, with the advent of the Red Army, transfer them to the appropriate authorities. For which I and our Motherland will be grateful to you."

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It remains to be said that the traitor Grunwald, the Gestapo agent "Nanette", was hiding from justice for a long time, but through the efforts of the state security agencies she was exposed and brought to trial. Other traitors of the Soviet people mentioned in Maxim's notebook did not escape retribution.

well well

Sergei Ivanovich Volokitin made his first steps in his life on the land of Tver, where he was born on October 1, 1912 in a working-class family. But he remembered himself already in Moscow. The young man received the initial life lessons from his father, who came home tired after hard work at the steel plant, but always found time to talk with his son about life and work, talked about the situation at the plant, comradely relations in the work team.

Sergei graduated from high school and, going to work at a factory, soon became a qualified turner. Lively, sociable, business-like, he was the leader of the youth. Volokitin was going to continue his education, but fate decreed otherwise. In 1932, he was sent to work in the state security agencies.

But then the war broke out. From the very first days, Senior Lieutenant Volokitin strives to the front. When in October 1941 the Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of Special Purpose of the NKVD Troops was formed as part of two regiments, Sergei Ivanovich was appointed Commissar of the First Motorized Rifle Regiment. The brigade took an active part in the defense of Moscow.

Like other Chekists, he was eager to fight, asked to be sent behind enemy lines. In 1942, Sergei Ivanovich's request was granted. At the head of a small detachment, he was thrown into the rear of the enemy. Volokitin's detachment committed major acts of sabotage, disorganizing military transportation.

Having completed the task, Sergei Ivanovich returned to Moscow. Soon he began to prepare a new operation. This time he was instructed to form a reconnaissance and sabotage detachment, which was to operate in Belarus, Lithuania, on the borders of Poland and Germany. In early February 1944, Volokitin with a group of scouts, which consisted of five Spaniards, two Poles, two Lithuanians and two Russians, was abandoned in Belarus.

In Moscow, it was decided that the Gradov detachment (that was the name of Stanislav Alekseevich Vaupshasov), which had successfully operated in the Belarusian forests, would provide Volokitin with two scouts, Germans by nationality, and a group of fighters.

The front line was also crossed by a detachment of sappers (120 fighters) under the command of Captain Voronin. He advanced to the area with

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finishing, where Volokitin was waiting for him. More than 700 km across the occupied territory the detachment overcame and on May 13, 1944 arrived at their destination. He was given the name "Guard". At the end of May, political instructor Nikolaev brought a group of scouts from the Gradov detachment from near Minsk. When everyone got together, the "Small Center" was formed in the reconnaissance and sabotage detachment of Volokitin. It included the detachments "Guard", "Guadalajara", "Druzhina", "Litter" ("Revenge") and several small groups. In the detachment, Volokitin was known as Major Sergo. Under this name, he went with the "Small Center" his military path.

Having received the task, the scouts disappeared into the Narochanskaya and Rudnenskaya forests, crossed over to Poland, into the Augustow forests, and reached the borders of East Prussia. They operated in Vilnius, Kaunas, Warsaw, Krakow. At times they were separated from Major Sergo up to 500 km. But the connection was worked out clearly.

The scouts acted boldly and assertively. True, there were complications. For example, scouts from the Guadalajara detachment, the Spaniards Sergio and Alejandro, went to Vilnius and Kaunas in uniform

Franco's Blue Division. But it turned out that the Spanish division and its hospital had been transferred to another sector of the front. The "Small Center" was not aware of this. Scouts were rescued by the fact that in the summer of 1944 a motley German army accumulated in the Baltic States and the soldiers of the Blue Division were simply ignored.

Intelligence data was sent to Moscow, and part of the information was reported to the front headquarters. Some data was used by aviation for enemy bombing.

Major Sergo's detachment carried out sabotage on German communications and their military installations. 20 echelons with ammunition, military equipment and manpower of the enemy were derailed, 2 large warehouses were burned, 11 tanks and armored vehicles were destroyed.

This episode deserves attention. Major Sergo instructed the scouts of the Guadalajara detachment to infiltrate the headquarters of the German military unit, which the day before had carried out a punitive operation against the Lithuanian partisan detachment. Under the guise of representatives of the imperial commissar of Lithuania, the scouts, among whom were Germans by nationality, showed up at the headquarters and scolded the commander of the punishers for delaying the report on the operation. The confused captain began to make excuses that the documents were ready to be sent on command. Declaring that the imperial commissar could not wait for the package of documents to go the bureaucratic route, the scouts caught fear in the captain, and he handed them the package prepared for dispatch, after which they left the headquarters. And in the package were lists of partisan personnel from

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a row with indication of messengers, addresses of underground workers and partisan families. If the scouts had not intercepted these lists, many patriots would have died at the hands of the Nazis.

There is one more episode worth mentioning. The detachment received information that the Germans had data on the location of the "Small Center" and prepared an operation to capture and destroy the base. Volokitin decided to get ahead of the Nazis and act in an unusual role.

On a clear summer day, a "punitive detachment" appeared on a farm located on the outskirts of the Narochinskaya Pushcha. A column of Germans moved ahead, and a group of bound partisans led behind it. The officer ordered the residents to be gathered and offered to point out Major Sergo among the prisoners. The person who identified was promised a cow as a reward. The farmers, hanging their heads, were silent, and the headman, pointing his finger at one of the partisans, muttered that he seemed to resemble Sergo. The officer - and Major Sergo himself was in this role - ordered the non-commissioned officer to sort it out. The column moved on, and the non-commissioned officer, having caught the headman of deceit, shot the Nazi accomplice.

The detachment settled down for a halt on the estate of an elderly German landowner, who joyfully met the "punishers" and invited the officers to the house. He said that this estate was a gift from his son, who serves in Barcelona and received this land for services to Germany. Leaving, Sergo ordered the cattle of the newly-minted latifundist to be requisitioned in favor of the "German army".

The detachment passed through the surrounding farms, identifying the accomplices of the Germans and cracking down on them. The Nazis had to figure out for a long time what kind of "punishers" appeared in this region.

On July 2, the groups of Major Sergo's detachment received instructions from the Center to proceed to the area of Suwalki Avgustov-Grodno. At this time, the Soviet troops were rapidly moving forward, and on July 15, 1944, behind the Neman, in the Augustow forests, near the border with East Prussia, Volokitin's detachment met with the advancing units of the Red Army. The situation changed, the detachment received an order to arrive in Minsk.

Thus ended the partisan military affairs of Major Sergo, but the military path of the Chekist did not end. In 1945, he was sent to Czechoslovakia, where he solved complex tasks through foreign intelligence. Returning to Moscow, Sergei Ivanovich worked in the central apparatus of foreign intelligence, and then went on a long-term business trip abroad.

On the eve of his 60th birthday, Volokitin retired.

In the May days of 1977, the Dynamo society organized a celebration in honor of Victory Day. Columns of veterans of the Great Patriotic War passed along the racetracks of the stadium. Applause present

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The soldiers met the battle flags of the Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of Special Purpose. The newspaper "Soviet Sport" published a brief report on this sports festival. The picture shows a column of veterans. In the foreground was a retired colonel, former Major Sergo.

Sergey Ivanovich Volokitin died on March 17, 1987 and was buried in Moscow at the Kuzminsky cemetery.

Tatyana is a daughter from her first marriage. Lyagin's first wife, Olga Afonina, died of typhoid fever in 1935. The daughter was brought up in the family of Lyagin's sister in Leningrad.

4

"Winners" and their commander D.N. Medvedev

When rumors spread in Rovno in the summer of 1942 that Soviet tanks had appeared in the vicinity of Zhytomyr, panic broke out in the city.

Not only the traitors who stained themselves with cooperation with the occupiers, but also the German officials, who had already managed to bring their wives from Germany to the occupied city, were in a hurry to evacuate so as not to fall into the hands of the Red Army. To get a car, they were ready to pay drivers any money. But there weren't enough cars. The Rovno railway station was so overcrowded that the field gendarmerie was forced to cordon it off and not let anyone in except German officers.

An old horse harnessed to a cab is slowly trudging along the street towards the railway station in Rovno. Two guys in civilian clothes are carrying a large and apparently heavy suitcase. They overtake the civilians and the military. Here the cab caught up with the German chief lieutenant. Exhausted from fatigue, he drags two huge suitcases to the station.

"Mr. Lieutenant," one of the drivers politely addressed the German officer, "let me drive you to the station."

"Danke Schön, Danke Schön," the German thanked.

Both German suitcases were instantly stowed in the cab, and the wagon, with the glamor of which the old horse was only capable, drove up to the station.

Without letting the officer come to his senses, the helpful guys grabbed the officer's suitcases, and at the same time their own, and carried them to the station building. The gendarme standing at the door tried to stop them, but the chief lieutenant ordered that they be let through.

The officer's suitcases and the "suitcase-mine" were brought into the hall, overflowing with passengers who were taking the loot to Germany. A few hours later there was a strong explosion, one  
hall wall

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1st class collapsed, ceiling collapsed. About a hundred German officers and soldiers were killed.

This is one of the episodes of the activities of the Pobediteli partisan detachment commanded by Dmitry Nikolaevich Medvedev.

well well

From the archive of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation:

"Medvedev Dmitry Nikolayevich was born on August 22, 1898 in Bezhitsy, near Bryansk. He was enrolled in the state security bodies in May 1920, and worked for many years in territorial divisions.

In 1936, after completing courses for senior officers, he was sent to work in foreign intelligence. For two years he was on intelligence work abroad.

During the Great Patriotic War, D.N. Medvedev was twice withdrawn to the rear of the Nazi troops. In 1941-1942, he headed a partisan detachment that carried out operations in the Smolensk, Bryansk and Mogilev regions. From June 1942 to September 1944 he commanded the Pobediteli partisan detachment operating in the Rivne and Lvov regions. The detachment conducted more than 120 major battles, in which up to 2000 German soldiers and officers were eliminated, including 11 generals and senior government officials of Nazi Germany. 81 echelons with manpower and equipment were blown up.

For exemplary performance of command assignments behind enemy lines, Dmitry Nikolaevich Medvedev was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of November 5, 1944, with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal. In addition, D.N. Medvedev was awarded three Orders of Lenin, the Order of the Red Banner and many medals."

well well

In the 1920s, numerous White Guard and nationalist gangs were rampaging in Ukraine. The Chekists were tasked with eliminating the bandit movement and ensuring a peaceful life for the population.

To participate in solving this problem, the young Chekist Medvedev was sent to Ukraine. Initially, he worked in the city of Bakhmach, and then was the chairman of the Cheka in the city of Starobelsk. From Starobelsk, Medvedev was transferred to work in the Shakhtinsky district of the Rostov region, where he had to make a lot of effort to stop sabotage and sabotage in the mines. Dmitry Nikolayevich worked here until the middle of 1922, and then was transferred to work in Odessa.

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Arriving in the southern city, Medvedev, taking advantage of the opportunity to get an education, entered the Faculty of Physics and Mathematics of the Odessa Institute of Public Education. He greedily pounced on textbooks and at first regularly attended lectures. But at that time, opponents of the new government were active in Odessa, and the Chekists had to carry out very hard work to identify and suppress their activities.

While still chairman of the Cheka in Starobelsk, Medvedev once met the Makhnovist Leva Zadov, whose name inspired fear in the inhabitants of the surrounding villages. He was distinguished by cruelty and great physical strength. This acquaintance was useful to Medvedev during one delicate operation, when he was already working in Odessa.

The fact is that Nestor Makhno, who had fled abroad, intended to return the treasure he had hidden on Soviet territory, which became known to the Chekists. On a dark night, a boat with Makhnovist emissaries quietly set sail from the Romanian coast. In the right place, the Chekists met them, said the agreed password and took them to the farm. Among the four Makhnovists, the leader stood out for his enormous stature and powerful figure. Medvedev, he seemed familiar. This and in

actually was Zadov. When the group entered the large shed, Medvedev called him aside. Zadov peered intently at Medvedev, clutching a pistol in his hand. There were only two Chekists, and in the event of a fight for its outcome, it was difficult to guarantee. Medvedev declared that he had been following Lyova Zadov for a long time and knew that he did not share Makhno's actions in everything and that the time had come to put an end to the past. Zadov turned to the wall of the barn and looked through the crack at the steppe waking up at dawn. He hesitated. Finally, Dmitry Nikolaevich touched his hand and quietly said that he had to hand over his weapons. And Zadov made up his mind. He commanded the bandits to obey, and he himself was the first to drop the gun. Later, he helped find Makhno's treasure, and the wealth was handed over to the authorities. The former blast furnace worker and former bandit Zadov then changed his last name and began a new life.

For the successful conduct of military operations, Medvedev was repeatedly awarded: in 1921 - a gold watch, in 1927 - a nominal weapon, in 1929 he was again awarded a nominal weapon.

Medvedev miraculously survived the whirlwind of Yezhovism. And yet in 1938 he was summoned to the NKVD in Kyiv, where, without convincing motives, they announced his dismissal from the state security agencies. However, colleagues who knew him well sided with the Chekist, and Medvedev continued his service.

Hard work, which constantly required the mobilization of all physical and spiritual forces, affected Medvedev's health. The bruise of the back, which had once been received, began to affect  
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regressed to a serious disease of the spine. At the end of 1939, Dmitry Nikolaevich retired for health reasons and settled in Tomilino near Moscow. Medvedev was then only 41 years old.

The exacerbation of the disease forced Dmitry Nikolayevich to treat the spine. But the war interrupted the treatment, and Medvedev offered his knowledge and experience to the People's Commissariat of State Security, where they were already creating combat groups and KGB detachments for operations behind enemy lines. Among the first was the reconnaissance and sabotage group of D.N. Medvedev, originally called the Mitya detachment. Before being sent behind enemy lines, Medvedev's detachment helped create 18 operational reconnaissance and sabotage detachments and groups in Moscow.

Medvedev's group went behind enemy lines twice. For the first time, from August 1941 to January 1942, it operated in the areas of the Bryansk and Smolensk regions as part of 34 fighters and a group of radio operators.

In one of the reports D.N. Medvedev reported to the Center: "After crossing the front line, we found that all the villages and even small farms and forestries of the Kletnyansky district of the Smolensk region were saturated with German units.

The population addressed by our scouts was disoriented and frightened. There were no rumors about the presence, and even more so about any actions of partisan groups and detachments. It seemed that the occupiers had become full masters of the territory they occupied, and the local population had completely come to terms with IT.

It was necessary to "make some noise" in order to evoke an appropriate response.

To this end, on September 15, 1941, near the village of Salnikovo, Kletnyansky district, we raided and completely destroyed a small enemy column. One general was among those killed.

The next day, the German command gave the order to shoot all the accomplices of the partisans. Searches, arrests and other repressions began in all nearby settlements.

Activists - party members, Komsomol members, as well as fighters and commanders of the Red Army, who settled in the villages after their formations and units fell apart, found themselves surrounded by Germans, began to flee from the villages to the forests.

Due to these human resources, the operational group has tripled in 10-15 days.

Continuing to carry out new and new operations on highways and dirt roads, we ensured that the rumor about the activity of our task force spread hundreds of kilometers, and representatives of various local partisan groups began to come to us for communication.

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Operational group D.N. Medvedev, during his stay behind enemy lines from September 1941 to January 1942, managed to organize, strengthen and intensify the work of a number of armed groups in the Mglinsky, Ordzhonikidzevgradsky, Dyatkovsky, Lyudinovsky and Zhizdrinsky districts of the Oryol and Bryansk regions, in the Kostyunovichsky and Khotimsky districts Mogilev region of Belarus, as well as to create new partisan detachments in these areas.

In the Bryansk forests, Medvedev and his group laid the foundation for the deployment of the so-called Bryansk partisan region with centers in the cities of Zhizdra and Dyatkovo. Of the 27 partisan detachments operating in this region, 7 detachments were created with active assistance from medvedevtsev.

The enemy was rushing towards Moscow. Our troops were significantly inferior to the enemy in manpower and equipment. Medvedev and his commissar Georgy Nikolaevich Kulakov made a lot of efforts to explain to each commander, to each fighter their goals and tasks, so that people would not expose themselves needlessly to a blow.

Dmitry Nikolayevich himself wrote in one of his reports:

"... In September 1941, the detachment began collecting intelligence data on the construction of fortifications by the Germans, on the places where enemy troops and equipment were concentrated. This information was immediately transmitted by the detachment's radio operator A. Shmarinov to the Center for a report to the military command.

Soon the size of our detachment grew tenfold. We owed a lot to the people who surrounded us with love and care and provided all possible assistance. The peasant woman Mamaeva once led a detachment between the fascist units, risking not only her life, but also the well-being of the whole family.

In the second half of December 1941, the detachment received information that the enemy command was preparing a new offensive against Moscow... Intelligence confirmed them: echelons with manpower and equipment of the enemy were heading east every 15-20 minutes.

After sabotage on the railways, traffic jams arose, on which Soviet aviation, starting from December 27, 1941, bombed for several days in a row. Dozens of echelons of the enemy turned into piles of scrap that cluttered the railway tracks.

During the second raid, from mid-May 1942 to March 1944, the operational reconnaissance and sabotage group D.N. Medvedev was staffed up to 100 people. The vast majority - 85 people - were OMSBON fighters.

Medvedev's group, which became known as the "Winners" detachment, was tasked with settling in the Rovno region, conducting reconnaissance in the city and its environs, and engaging in the liquidation of the leaders of the German administration.

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The group was parachuted into the territory occupied by the Germans. The first group of the "Pobediteli" detachment was mistakenly dropped south of Zhitomir, almost 300 km from the target, instead of the Polesye forests. The terrain turned out to be treeless, it was difficult to hide there, and almost the entire group died, except for two fighters, who were sheltered by the peasants.

The second group was also dropped 200 km north of the intended location. But this group managed to move to the assembly area and began preparing to receive the next group of paratroopers. Unfortunately, the pilots did not manage to understand the signals, and two more groups were thrown out not in the places intended for collection.

Finally, Medvedev decided to fly himself. On June 20, 1942, he jumped with a parachute along with a group of fighters, which included the intelligence chief of the Lukin detachment and several Spaniards of anti-fascists, among whom was the radio operator Patria (Maria de las Heras Africa). This brave Spaniard traveled a glorious path with the Victors squad from June 1942 to February 1944. The landing was successful this time, but the commander of the detachment himself, upon landing, again bruised his sore spine.

Night landings of paratroopers, however, did not go unnoticed. The Germans threw punishers on Medvedev's detachment. During the first week, the detachment had to fight and change the location of the camp. The detachment moved to the north of Belarus, to the forests near Sarny. The main thing was to create a reliable basis for reconnaissance.

Gradually, a scheme of reconnaissance activities of the detachment took shape. The scouts of the detachment established contact with the local underground, and the underground members were involved in solving top-priority reconnaissance tasks. Information for the command of the Red Army was transmitted daily to Moscow by radio.

Residencies were organized in the cities of Rivne, Zdolbunov, Sarny and Lutsk. The residence in Rovno was the largest, numbering several dozen scouts and local residents. A lot of work was done by an underground organization headed by Terenty Fedorovich Novak. In 1965 he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The residencies in Zdolbuniv, Sarny and Lutsk were numerically smaller, but also active.

Particular attention was paid to the organization of intelligence in Rovno, since the Nazis turned this city into the "capital of the occupied Ukraine". Here was the residence of the governor of Ukraine, Gauleiter Erich Koch. Large military headquarters and the so-called All-Ukrainian Gestapo were also located there.

Nikolai Ivanovich Kuznetsov, whose heroic deeds are well known, were selected to work in Rovno, scouts of the detachment N.A. Gnedyuk, M.M. Shevchuk, N.T. Prikhodko, Jan Kaminsky, M. Stefansky and others.

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And on the territory of Ukraine, in addition to the detachment of Medvedev, there were numerous partisan detachments of such famous leaders as Kovpak, Fedorov, Vershigora, Prokopyuk, Karasev and many others.

The Germans intensified their search for scouts in Rovno and increasingly sent punitive detachments against Medvedev's partisans. The Nazis persistently looked for ways to send their agents to the detachment. But each new person who appeared in the detachment was subjected to a thorough check. In addition, over 100 agents recruited by the detachment's scouts operated in the German special services and various institutions of the occupying forces. However, in 1944, a provocateur was nevertheless enrolled in the detachment under the guise of a circle. After a few days of being in the detachment, he disappeared.

It was an embarrassing moment. He undoubtedly caused some damage to the detachment. An underground worker was arrested, who, on a farm on the outskirts of Rovno, completed groups of encircled people and transported them to a detachment. I had to change the stronghold, because the farm also had

place of arrest. But the German agent failed to identify other intelligence officers and open the system connections with them.

The intelligence information that the Center received daily from the Pobediteli Detachment continued to flow uninterrupted.

Through the efforts of Nikolai Ivanovich Kuznetsov, who operated in Rovno, information of strategic importance was obtained. For example, he received information about the organization by the Germans near Vinnitsa of Hitler's secret headquarters.

The volume of intelligence information was so significant that the detachment's walkie-talkies conducted 3-4 communication sessions with the Center per day. The political and economic situation on the territory of Western Ukraine was regularly covered. The mood in the officer corps of the German army was studied in detail. Finally, on the basis of assessments made by prominent officials of the occupation institutions in Rovno, the situation in Nazi Germany was covered.

When the Soviet Army began to liberate Ukraine from the Nazi invaders, D.N. Medvedev decided to go in the direction of Lvov in order to smash the Nazis and help the advancing Soviet troops.

In early February 1944, he received an order to withdraw a detachment from the rear of the Red Army. On February 5, 1944, the detachment crossed the front line. Thus ended the path of the reconnaissance and sabotage detachment ~ the "Pobediteli" formation.

An unsuccessful landing with a parachute in June 1942 stirred up an old injury, but the detachment commander courageously suppressed the pain and hid it from his comrades-in-arms. And yet, it became unbearable to do this, and Medvedev made the last way to his people already lying in a wagon. Upon returning, Dmitry Nikolaevich Medvedev wrote in his report:

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"Operational group "Winners" during its stay in the enemy rear did a lot of work to help the Red Army.

Carrying out tasks for the development of the partisan movement and the organization of active resistance of the population of the occupied western regions of the Ukrainian SSR to the Nazi invaders, the task force daily carried out tremendous intelligence work, and all the intelligence data obtained by it was reported by radio to the command.

By May 1943, the reconnaissance work of the operational group covered the cities of Rovno, Zdolbunov, Lutsk, Kovel, Sarny, Rakitnoye, Kostopol, Ludvipol, Berezhnoye and many others.

Later, from October 1943, the reconnaissance of the task force also covered the city of Vinnitsa, and in January 1944, the city of Lvov.

Much has been written about the affairs of Dmitry Nikolaevich Medvedev's detachment. Part of what was written belongs to the pen of the detachment commander himself. His most famous books are "It was near Rovno" and "Strong in spirit".

Died D.N. Medvedev in December 1954.

5

Who are you, Paul Siebert?

Year 1942. The second year of the Great Patriotic War. Smooth. A small, verdant town in the central part of Western Ukraine, small one-story houses, in the center there are two- and even three-story buildings. Nevertheless, the German occupiers turned



this particular city to the "capital" of Ukraine. Here was the residence of the Hitler-appointed Reichskommissar for Ukraine, Erich Koch, who at the same time was the Gauleiter of East Prussia. All the major military headquarters and the so-called All-Ukrainian Gestapo were also located there. In addition, Police General Pritzman, Senate President of Justice Dr. Funk, whom the Germans called the Supreme Judge of Ukraine, Commander of the Special Forces, General Ilgen, and many others were stationed in Rivne.

October. A fresh wind sweeps dust from the streets of Rovno along with fallen leaves. A slender, thin, taller than average man in the uniform of a German officer is walking along the central street of the city. Light brown hair poked out from under the cap. Gray-blue eyes and a straight nose speak of his Aryan origin. A military patrol met him - an officer with the rank of captain and a soldier with a machine gun on his chest. The officer, in whose gait one can guess a regular military man, calmly greets the oncoming officer, but the patrol suddenly stops him and asks him to show his documents. Just as calmly, he presents the documents in the name of Lieutenant Paul Siebert, who, after the hospital, was sent by the economic department as an extraordinary commissioner for the use of material resources of the occupied regions of the USSR in the interests of the Wehrmacht.

The patrol officer took Siebert's papers, looked at him attentively, and began to read slowly... And in Siebert's head, or rather,

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in the head of a man with documents in his name and in the German uniform of an ober-lieutenant, the thought flashed like lightning: for several months we had been preparing so carefully, and now - the first exit into the city, only a few hundred steps ... what did we not take into account ... ?!

The patrol officer returned the documents to Siebert, once again looked, as it seemed to Paul, at his head and slowly asked:

Why are you breaking the dress code?

Kuznetsov-Siebert was silent, recalling all the front-line photographs of Paul Siebert, and could not find a mistake. Interpreting, apparently, in his own way this silence, the patrolman said just as slowly:

- Caps... - he once again looked at the head of Kuznetsov-Siebert, - they are worn only at the front or in the front line, and we, - the captain paused, - fortunately, far from it.

Kuznetsov-Siebert slapped his greatcoat in annoyance:

- Herr Hauptmann, I am from the front. Just today I arrived in Rovno after the hospital, I'm just going to buy a cap. Can you tell me where this can be done?

... The officers greeted each other and dispersed. Kuznetsov really went to buy a cap, thinking to himself: "How many times have I told Fyodor Ivanovich that every little thing is important in our business. And here is such a puncture!

And Fedor Ivanovich Bakin, who in Moscow prepared Nikolai Ivanovich Kuznetsov and other comrades for work behind enemy lines, later wrote about Nikolai Kuznetsov: "Special attention to N.I. Kuznetsov devoted himself to working out the legend-biography. At the same time, he showed not only zeal, but unusual perseverance. He often said: if we don't foresee some trifle - that's a failure.

The task was not easy, he had to compose his own biography, as close as possible to the life of the German Paul Siebert, who was not personally known to him. This meant building a picture of childhood, youth, studies, and finally, a family tree and many details of "one's own" life. And all this had to be created within the four walls of a secret apartment on Markhlevsky Street.

Nikolai Ivanovich was busy with documents and literary work from morning until late in the evening, sometimes forgetting to have a bite to eat on time. He literally tormented me with a mass of demands: to get city plans, photo postcards, reference books, newspapers, posters, samples of travel documents, lists of members of local governments and other things from the past, which would help him really look like a native of East Prussia. .

Not all of his requests were fulfilled. He worried, cursed, but searched and found some exits.

This work of Nikolai Ivanovich was not in vain. Subsequently, when communicating in the German environment, no one ever arose

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doubts that Siebert is not who he claims to be. He had brilliant linguistic abilities. He knew the German language impeccably, as a real intelligent German understood dialects, he knew the letter in the Gothic script.

I remember Nikolai Ivanovich as a model of discipline, purposefulness, as a simple Russian guy and a great patriot."

Initially, the legend for Nikolai Ivanovich Kuznetsov was that he was an officer in the German Air Force ("Luftwaffe"), but not a pilot, but a representative of the engineering and technical staff. However, it was difficult to support this legend with relevant documents, and, in addition, to perform operational tasks, it was better to act as an officer of the ground forces, who is on a business trip and serves in some separate military unit of the Wehrmacht. Therefore, the selection of more reliable options continued.

Soon the Center received the personal files of Wehrmacht officers captured by the Red Army as trophies in the battles near Moscow, which were transferred directly to the special intelligence department for study and possible use for operational purposes. Among the personal files, the case of Lieutenant Paul Wilhelm Siebert, who died in battle, was selected.

Based on the study of the materials available in the Siebert case, the special documentation department, together with the Fourth (sabotage and reconnaissance) department, decided to create a biography legend for N.I. Kuznetsova. Siebert and Kuznetsov were almost the same age (the difference was only two years) and had an outward resemblance. The presence of original documents of Paul Siebert was also invaluable.

Nikolai Kuznetsov had previously rejected more than one legend. When he was shown the Siebert case and the prepared biography legend, he exclaimed: "This, comrades, is what I need!"

F.I. Bakin recalled: "Nikolai Kuznetsov worked 14-16 hours a day, "swallowed" a mountain of books on German philosophy, history, art, and the works of German military thinkers." When Bakin asked Kuznetsov if he was overloading himself, Nikolai Ivanovich said that any knowledge could be useful, life among enemies could bring a lot of accidents.

After completing the training, on August 25, 1942, Nikolai Kuznetsov was transferred by plane to the Sarny forests of the Rovno region to a special forces detachment under the command of D.N. Medvedev. Here he was under the name of Nikolai Vasilyevich Grachev. And at the end of 1942, he first appeared on the streets of the city of Rivne.

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Who is he, scout Nikolai Kuznetsov?

Nikolai Ivanovich Kuznetsov was born on July 27, 1911 in the village of Zyryanka, Talitsky District, Sverdlovsk Region, into a family of a middle peasant. After graduating from a seven-year school, Kuznetsov

He entered the forest technical school in the regional center of Talitsk, but was expelled from the 3rd year due to the "doubtful social origin" of his father, who was classified as a kulak.

After leaving the technical school, Nikolai Kuznetsov got a job at the Sverdles trust. In 1932, N. Kuznetsov worked in the forest management party in Kudymkar. At this time, his bosses were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment for some theft. N. Kuznetsov himself was also sentenced to a year of corrective labor at the place of service for "admitted negligence". This verdict was canceled "due to lack of corpus delicti" only after the war.

While still at school, Nikolai showed exceptional ability to learn the German language. This happened under the influence of communication with a teacher of labor, a German by nationality, and with peers, children of German colonists who lived in the neighboring village.

In 1932, Kuznetsov was involved by counterintelligence agencies in secret cooperation under the pseudonym "Colonist", and in the middle of 1938, People's Commissar of the NKVD of the Komi ASSR M.I. Zhuravlev called in Moscow the head of the department of counterintelligence L.F. Raikhman and offered to take the Colonist to Moscow:

"A very gifted person," said Zhuravlev. – I am convinced that it is necessary to work with him at the Center, he simply has nothing to do with us.

In Moscow, Kuznetsov was registered as a top-secret special agent with a salary at the rate of a personnel detective of the central office. The case is simply unique in the practice of counterintelligence agencies.

Soon Kuznetsov, with virtuoso skill, learned how to make acquaintances with the Germans coming to the USSR. His main weapon - the German language - was excellent, knew several dialects. In addition to German, he knew Esperanto and POLISH.

There are widely known photographs of Nikolai Kuznetsov in the uniform of a military pilot with three head over heels in his buttonholes. Because of them, the opinion arose that Nikolai Ivanovich had the rank of senior lieutenant in the Red Army. In fact, he never served in the army and did not have a military rank, even in the reserve. He used the form in those cases when it was required by official necessity.

By the beginning of the war, he successfully completed a number of important assignments. Nikolai Kuznetsov worked especially effectively under the guidance of

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the chief counterintelligence officer Viktor Nikolaevich Ilyin, responsible for working with the creative intelligentsia. Thanks to Ilyin, Kuznetsov quickly "overgrown" with connections in theatrical, in particular ballet, Moscow. This was important as many diplomats, including established German intelligence officers, gravitated towards actresses, especially ballerinas.

Kuznetsov had several friends, ballerinas from the Bolshoi Theater, who willingly helped him make promising acquaintances with German citizens coming to Moscow, including "diplomats" from intelligence. Vasily Stepanovich Ryasnoy played a major role in Kuznetsov's work on the Germans. In the prewar years, he headed the department in counterintelligence, which "patronized" the embassies of Germany and its then ally Slovakia in Moscow.

The staff of the German embassy reached 200 people. Only under the command of the military attache, Major General Erich Koestring, there were about 20 employees. Almost all of them were engaged in espionage. The representative of the German secret services was the embassy adviser, the head of its consular department, Gerhard von Walter.

To complete the assignments, Kuznetsov was given a cover story designed primarily for the German contingent. According to legend, Nikolai Ivanovich turned into an ethnic German, Rudolf Wilhelmovich Schmidt (which means Kuznetsov in translation). Rudolf Schmidt was born allegedly in the city of Saarbrücken. When the boy was two years old, his parents moved to Russia, where he grew up. R. Schmidt was made a test engineer at Aviation Plant No. 22 by the famous designer S. Ilyushin on Khoroshevskoye Shosse in Moscow (hence the flight uniform of a senior lieutenant, which was mentioned). For this name, Kuznetsov was issued a passport, and later - a certificate of exemption for health reasons from military service.

The last meeting of N.I. Kuznetsov with his teachers, guardians and colleagues took place in July 1941, since he was transferred from counterintelligence with the outbreak of war to the Fourth (sabotage and reconnaissance) department of the NKGB of the USSR

well well

Carts drawn by well-fed horses have been moving along the Rovno-Kostopol highway for three hours now. A "German officer" sat on the first cart, and next to him was a hefty "policeman" with a trident on his cap. On other carts people with police bands on their sleeves were talking.

The road went through deserted fields. A light car appeared ahead. The "officer" gave a sign, and the "policeman" sitting with him jumped off the cart, threw a grenade, and the car overturned.

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The passengers were intact. The detainees were taken to the camp of Medvedev's detachment. One of them turned out to be a major, Count Hahan, head of a section of the Reichskommissariat. The second was the imperial communications adviser Rice, who arrived from Berlin. The prisoners expressed indignation that a German officer was working for the Russians. By this they confirmed that Kuznetsov got used to the role of Paul Siebert well.

But the main thing was that Major Hahan and the Berlin envoy gave detailed explanations in connection with the designations on the topographic map found among their secret documents. And on the map were marked ways of communication and means of communication not only in the territory of the occupied Ukraine and Poland, but also in Germany itself. In particular, the map showed a clearly defined line from Berlin to a point located between the villages of Yakushintsy and Strizhevka, ten kilometers from Vinnitsa. It was an underground armored cable connecting Berlin with Hitler's headquarters, equipped near Vinnitsa.

The first intelligence message was sent to Moscow from Kuznetsov signed by Timofei (Medvedev's pseudonym).

The moment came when it was time for the scout to "settle" in Rovno. For Medvedev, it was necessary that the chief intelligence officer of his detachment had the opportunity to be in the city regularly to collect information and to carry out retaliation actions. Communication with the detachment would be carried out through an established system of messengers. For this purpose, Kuznetsov and Nikolai Vladimirovich Strutinsky, who brought the whole family to the detachment - father, mother and three brothers - went to the city: Kuznetsov in the form of a German officer, and Strutinsky as a German officer's coachman. Kuznetsov and Strutinsky left the wagon near Rovno. They entered the city separately.

Nikolai Ivanovich increasingly began to travel to the city, sometimes accompanied by Nikolai Prikhodko, whose brother and wife lived in Rovno. "Settle down" among the German officers. In November 1942, safe houses appeared in the city, selected by Prikhodko and Strutinsky. Nikolai Ivanovich got the opportunity to stay in the city, and not to return to the detachment every time. The owners of the first safe house were Nikolai Prikhodko's elder brother Ivan Tarasovich and his wife Sophia, they had Volksdeutsche documents.

The mistress of the second secret apartment was Maria Titovna Levitskaya. Scouts reached her with the help of prisoners of war who had fled from the Germans. They said that the Germans took a group of prisoners of war to work outside the city. There they were usually met by two women who brought food. They also suggested how to escape. So they took refuge with a resident of Rovno, Maria Titovna Levitskaya. The prisoners of war were then sent to the forest to the partisans, where they performed well. Having discussed the issue of Levitskaya with co

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Missar of the detachment A.A. Lukin, the scouts received the "go-ahead" to get to know her. Maria Titovna agreed without hesitation.

A reconnaissance group was formed around Nikolai Kuznetsov, in the center of which was himself, Lieutenant Paul Siebert, and his friends partisans-scouts played the corresponding roles: Nikolai Prikhodko - his coachman, Nikolai Gnedyuk - translator, Vladimir Strutinsky ( father) and Mikhail Shevchuk were in the service of the "German officer". The survivability of this group was ensured by the support base created by Medvedev and Lukin in the city of Rovno, without which it would be impossible for the scouts to operate.

In early April 1943, Nikolai Gnedyuk was called to the detachment. Medvedev introduced him to a fragile girl and said that she should be placed in Kuznetsov's group. It was Valya Dovger. Her father, Konstantin Efimovich Dovger, working in the forestry, from the very beginning of the detachment's operations in the Sarnensky forests, provided great assistance to Medvedev's detachment. In the winter of the same year, the Germans, suspecting Dovger and his group of having links with the partisans, arrested them, tortured them and brutally dealt with them: they were lowered alive under the ice into the river. Shortly before his death, Konstantin Efimovich gave his daughter an order: if something happens, Valentina should go to the detachment.

In Rovno, Valya settled in an apartment with Maria Kurilchuk (Kozlovskaya). Valya had friends with whom she studied at school. Some of them were friends with the Nazis. Through one such "girlfriend" she managed to get acquainted with the Gestapo officer Leo Metko, the personal translator of the police chief of Ukraine. Having learned from Valya that her father had allegedly collaborated with the Germans and was killed by partisans for this, Leo Metko helped her draw up a paper that certified this version and helped her get a job in a store.

Valya introduced Leo Metko to her "fiance" Paul Siebert, who made an irresistible impression on him. Leo Metko brought Siebert together with some members of the Gestapo and the Reich Missariat. Now Kuznetsov's capabilities have expanded significantly, and another safe house has appeared in Rovno. It was convenient in that it had a separate, independent entrance from the hostess. This apartment was used by Kuznetsov as a "groom" and the whole group of scouts.

One day, Nikolai Ivanovich sent a message to the commander about the preparation of the Germans for holding a military parade in Rovno on April 20, 1943, timed to coincide with Hitler's birthday. Nikolai Ivanovich asked him to be allowed to "command the parade", that is, to carry out an action of retaliation, since it was assumed that Erich Koch would be present at the parade.

Medvedev understood that in a situation where there were Nazis around, an act of retribution was possible only at the cost of self-sacrifice. And the scout was ready to go for it. To Medvedev with a similar request

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other scouts who were in Rovno also turned. The commander of the detachment answered everyone: "I categorically forbid it. This way we can disrupt our work. The time will come, and we will pay off the executioners. I give permission to be at the parade in the crowd. In the event that someone other than us will act, support with weapons?"

Medvedev allowed Kuznetsov, if Erich Koch appears on the podium, to act. It was assumed that Nikolai Ivanovich would stand with Valya at the very podium among the guests.

The parade took place, but Erich Koch did not appear on the podium.

Looking ahead, it must be said that neither Kuznetsov nor other members of the Medvedev detachment were able to carry out an action of retribution against the Nazi satrap. Koch was rarely in Rovno, because at the same time he was the Gauleiter of East Prussia. In addition, he knew that not just a partisan detachment was operating in the Sarnensky forests and in the city of Rovno, but a special detachment of the NKGB of the USSR, which naturally forced Erich Koch to take special precautions. Later, the action of retribution against Koch was carried out by Polish patriots.

Shortly before the parade, Valya told Kuznetsov that she had met a local acquaintance in the city. It was Yan Kazimirovich Kaminsky, with whom Nikolai Ivanovich decided to meet. Kaminsky spoke about himself and said that, wanting to fight the Germans, he joined an organization created by local Poles - the Union of Armed Struggle. This organization, as it turned out, was associated with the Warsaw Center and London. According to Jan, however, she was engaged in chatter, but did not move on to action.

Nikolai Ivanovich liked Kaminsky, and he decided to involve him in the work of his group. Yang agreed to cooperate and signed the partisan oath. From that moment on, Kaminsky joined the intelligence group.

Once a familiar German officer introduced Kuznetsov to his colleague Gestapo Sturmbannführer von Ortel. Kuznetsov invited von Ortel to the company that was going to Valya. Gradually, the Gestapo man, looking closely at Paul Siebert, began to tell something about himself. Nikolai Ivanovich did not skimp on the treats of the Nazis, especially since the funds were German: the combat groups of the Medvedev detachment, conducting operations, delivered large sums of German marks to the detachment.

When their relationship was sufficiently strengthened, Kuznetsov invited the Sturmbannführer to a restaurant. They sat at a table and talked. Suddenly, noticing a man in civilian clothes, von Ortel waved him over and spoke to him in perfect Russian. The conversation did not contain anything special, but lasted about ten minutes. Nikolai Ivanovich listened attentively and considered whether the Gestapo man was checking him. When the man walked away from their table, Kuznetsov asked

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von Ortel, from where he knows Russian. The Hitlerite replied that he had been studying Russian for a long time and asked if Siebert had understood anything from the conversation. Upon learning that Paul Siebert could make out only a few words, as far as the set from a military phrasebook allowed, von Ortel told Nikolai Ivanovich that before the war he had worked in Moscow for two years and "managed to do something in favor of Germany."

This information went to the Center. Later, Kuznetsov began to receive more valuable information from conversations with von Ortel. Von Ortel made unflattering assessments of the German leaders. Goebbels and Rosenberg, and Goering, and Koch got it too.

Von Ortel once remarked in a conversation with Kuznetsov that he does not provoke anyone and at the same time does not play the hypocrite, as others do. Before Kuznetsov, the essence of a cynic man was revealed, who did not trust anyone and strove to do only what was beneficial to him.

Von Ortel was imbued with sympathy for Paul Siebert, appreciated his personal qualities and felt that he could be trusted. He invited Nikolai Ivanovich "to participate in one important matter." From the hints of the Gestapo, he understood that it was about some kind of conference in Tehran, which was to be held there in November 1943, and von Ortel suggested that he go there.

Nikolai Ivanovich arrived at the detachment and told Medvedev and Lukin about the conversation with the Sturmbannführer. At the suggestion of Medvedev, he joined in the development of a plan to seize

von Ortel in order to obtain more specific data. However, when he returned to Rovno, Kuznetsov learned that von Ortel had left.

Nevertheless, Medvedev sent a telegram to the Center that the Germans were starting some kind of action in Tehran. Together with other intelligence data, it became clear that the Germans were planning hostile actions in connection with the November 1943 meeting in Tehran of the "Big Three" - Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill. The Soviet security agencies took appropriate measures to frustrate the plans of the Nazi secret services, and the conference in Tehran passed without incident.

In May 1943, Valya Dovger received a summons that she was being sent to work in Germany. At the request of Nikolai Ivanovich, she wrote a statement to Gauleiter Koch with a request to leave her, as a German, in Rovno. Kuznetsov decided to accompany his "bride" to the Reich Missariat. Having Medvedev's permission to carry out a retaliatory action against Koch, Kuznetsov considered it most convenient to use the upcoming visit to the Reichskommissariat for this.

Several officers sat silently in the waiting room, waiting for a call. When the turn came to Kuznetsov with his companion, the adjutant turned to Valya:

"I'm asking you to the Reichskommissar's office, and I'll ask you, Herr Oberleutnant, to wait.

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Valya's head went round. Will she give herself away? Will Kuznetsov be called later? Will he shoot Koch?

The adjutant opened the office door, let Valya through, and remained in the waiting room himself.

Valya barely took a step forward when a huge shepherd dog jumped up to her. Valya shuddered in fright.

- To the place! came a loud shout in German.

The dog walked away. The same voice suggested to Valya:

- Please sit down.

Sitting at the table was a tall, stocky man with a Hitler-like mustache and red eyelashes. Before Valya was Erich Koch.

Another long table adjoined Koch's table perpendicularly. Valya was invited to sit here. Guards sat between her and Koch on both sides, and another one at a table at a distance. At the feet of Koch lay a sheepdog.

"God, what protection!" - Valya had time to think.

Why don't you want to go to Germany? asked Koch, looking not at Valya, but at the statement lying in front of him. - You are a girl of German blood and would be very useful in Germany. To defeat the Bolsheviks, everyone must work.

Koch looked up at the girl and, during the further conversation, looked at her point-blank.

"My mother is seriously ill, and my sisters are small," Valya began to explain, overpowering her excitement. - After the death of my beloved father, I have to earn money for the whole family. I ask you to allow me to stay in Rovno. I know German, Russian, Ukrainian, and here I can be of benefit to Germany.

— And where did you meet Mr. Siebert?

I met by chance on the train. Then he often called on us on the way from the front. We are engaged to him," Valya added embarrassedly.

Koch talked with Valya for several minutes. He asked what other German officers she knew. When Valya named among her acquaintances employees not only of the Reichskommissariat, but also of the Gestapo, Koch was apparently satisfied.

"All right, go," Koch said and, turning to the guard, ordered in a sharp voice to call Ober-Lieutenant Siebert.

Paul Siebert stayed in the Gauleiter's office for quite a long time and left with a statement from his "bride", on which was written: "Leave in Rovno. Provide work in the Reichskommissariat.

As they were returning along the alleys of the park, Valya asked Nikolai Ivanovich why he had not fired. He said that it was impossible to shoot, and death only when trying to get a gun does not honor the scout.

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Opinions in the detachment about whether Kuznetsov did the right thing, having missed a rare chance to commit a terrorist act against the German satrap, were divided. But the majority, including the commander of the detachment, considered the act of Nikolai Ivanovich correct.

Koch, speaking with his "countryman from East Prussia, Paul Siebert, who fought near Kursk," incidentally told him that the German command intended to take revenge for the defeat at Stalingrad. For this purpose, troops are being assembled on the Kursk front. A cipher signed by Timofey again went to Moscow: for the command of the Red Army, this was additional information that the Germans were preparing an offensive in the Kursk direction.

As already mentioned, the Imperial Commissar of Ukraine and Gauleiter of East Prussia, Erich Koch, was absent from Rovno for the most part. But his henchmen were constantly in the city. One of them was Paul Dargel, Erich Koch's first deputy for political affairs. He also interacted with the nationalists, periodically flew to Kyiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Nikolaev and other cities of Ukraine, but mostly stayed in Rovno.

In agreement with Moscow, Medvedev allowed Kuznetsov to liquidate Dargel. Valya Dovger, working in the Reichskommissariat, studied Dargel's work schedule and knew that at exactly 14.30 he went to his mansion for dinner. He is usually accompanied by an adjutant in the rank of major with a red folder under his arm.

On September 20, 1943, a passenger car stopped in a lane next to the street where Dargel lived, N. Strutinsky was driving in the uniform of a German soldier, and Nikolai Ivanovich was next to him. Exactly at 2.30 pm, a respectable type came out of the entrance of the Reichskommissariat, accompanied by an adjutant, and went to his mansion. Under the arm of the adjutant was a red briefcase. Strutinsky touched the car, and when he caught up with the Nazis, Kuznetsov jumped out of the car and fired point-blank at Dargel and the adjutant.

On the same day, the scouts went to the detachment, where they expected a reaction to the assassination attempt. For several days there was no news from the city. Apparently, the situation in the city was tense, and it was difficult for the messengers to get into the detachment. Finally, two messengers arrived at the camp. They brought German and Ukrainian newspapers, which reported that the imperial adviser to finance, Dr. Hans Gehl, and his adjutant had been killed in Rovno.

Nikolai Ivanovich was discouraged. He was fully convinced that he had eliminated Dargel. True, he saw him only once at the April parade.



As it turned out later, Hans Gehl had a resemblance to Paul Dargel. In addition, Dargel placed Gel in his mansion. edinst

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The only difference was that Dargel's adjutant carried a red folder under his arm, while Gel's adjutant had a red briefcase.

Medvedev's reaction was at first rather harsh, since the Center was informed about the destruction of Dargel, but then he calmed down and noted that everything was not so bad, especially in the newspapers it was said that the "murderer" was in the form of a German officer, but it is not known who he is.

Nikolai Ivanovich decided to correct the mistake. And on September 30, 1943, when the turmoil began to subside in the city in connection with the murder of Gel, Kuznetsov at the same place threw a grenade at Dargel and his adjutant. Both Nazis fell. A small fragment landed in the left hand of Nikolai Ivanovich. In the circumstances, it was difficult for the wounded Kuznetsov and Strutinsky, who was driving, to cover their tracks and hide unnoticed. The "pickup truck" that was on duty at the house, where Dargel's guards were sitting, after some confusion, rushed in pursuit of the scouts' car. Rescued the case. Ahead was the same type of car of the same color. Strutinsky seized the moment and turned into a side street, and the chase rushed after another car, in which there was an unsuspecting major of the German army.

The scouts returned safely to the detachment. The next day, a messenger arrived at the detachment, delivering a letter from Valya Dovger, who watched the whole picture from the window of her office. A grenade exploded at the edge of the sidewalk, and the blast wave hit the opposite side of the street, where a lieutenant colonel was killed. Dargel was wounded and was flown to Berlin.

The dissatisfaction of the Berlin authorities led to the removal of the leaders of the Gestapo and Feldgendarmarie in Rovno. In their place came people from Berlin.

Soon after the assassination attempt on Dargel, Kuznetsov carried out an act of retaliation against another representative of the Nazi elite in Rovno. Koch had General Herman Knut as deputy imperial commissar of the Ukraine. He headed the office "Packetauction", which was engaged in taking property from Soviet citizens and sending it to Germany. Fat Knut himself did not disdain robbery. The most valuable things were sent to his personal warehouse.

Once, at the end of a working day, a passenger car drove up to the "Packetauction" office and stopped not far from the entrance. Exactly at six o'clock in the evening on November 10, 1943, General Knut left the office, squeezed into the car with difficulty, and it immediately drove off. As soon as the car with Knut caught up with the scouts' car, Yan Kaminsky threw a grenade at it, and Kuznetsov and Strutinsky opened fire from machine guns. After making sure that Knut and his driver were killed, the scouts quickly left the scene of the assassination.

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It is characteristic that if the funeral of Gel in Rovno was very magnificent, the newspapers made a lot of noise about the severe wound of Dargel, then the Nazis decided to keep silent about Knut. But in Rovno and its environs, the news spread that a group of people's avengers had appeared in the city, who were traveling around towns and villages and openly destroying the Nazis. So human rumor responded to acts of retribution.

An interesting episode is the liquidation of the commander of the special troops, General Ilgen. Kuznetsov proposed a plan not just to liquidate the general, but to capture him and deliver him to the detachment. The implementation of this plan, in addition to Kuznetsov, was entrusted to Strutinsky, Kaminsky and Valya Dovger.

General von Ilgen occupied a solid house in Rovno, which was constantly guarded. The moment for the operation to capture Ilgen was well chosen. Four German soldiers, who permanently lived in the general's house and guarded him, were sent to Berlin, where the general sent along with them suitcases with stolen goods. The house was guarded by local policemen.

On the scheduled day, Valya went to Ilgen's house with a package in her hands. The orderly suggested that Valya wait for the general, but she said that she would come later. It became clear that von Ilgen was not at home. Soon Kuznetsov, Strutinsky and Kaminsky appeared there. They quickly eliminated the guards, and the chief lieutenant explained to the batman that if he wants to live, he must help them. Batman

agreed.

Nikolai Ivanovich and Strutinsky selected documents of interest in von Ilgen's office, folded and packed them together with the weapons found in a bundle. Forty minutes later von Ilgen drove up to the house. When he took off his overcoat, Kuznetsov came out of the next room and said that in front of him were Soviet partisans.

The general was forty-two years old, healthy and strong, he did not want to obey the commands of the scout. I had to deal with him. When the general was "packed", it turned out that officers were coming to the house. Nikolai Ivanovich went out to meet them. There were four of them. The intelligence officer's mind worked feverishly: what to do with them? Interrupt? Can. But there will be noise. And then Kuznetsov remembered the Gestapo token, which he had been given back in Moscow. He never hitherto

enjoyed.

Nikolai Ivanovich took out a token and, showing it to the German officers, said that a bandit in a German uniform had been detained here and therefore asked to see documents. After carefully reviewing them, he asked three of them to follow their path, and invited the fourth to enter the house as a witness. It turned out to be Erich Koch's personal chauffeur.

Thus, along with General von Ilgen, officer Granau, the Gauleiter's personal chauffeur, was brought to the detachment.

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After the liquidation of Gel and Knut, the incapacitation of Dargel in Rivne, of the deputies of the Imperial Commissioner of Ukraine Erich Koch, only the Supreme Judge of the occupied Ukraine, Oberführer SS Alfred Funk, survived. Before Ukraine, he was the chief judge in German-occupied Czechoslovakia and brutally cracked down on anti-fascists. In the Ukraine, Funk raged even more furiously. Having barely buried Gel and Knut, sending Dargel to Berlin, Funk ordered the execution of all the prisoners of the Rovno prison. It was then that the decision was made to liquidate it.

The operation began to be prepared immediately after the abduction of von Ilgen, in order to prevent the Nazis from come to your senses.

SS-Oberführer Alfred Funk every morning, ten minutes before work began, went to the hairdresser's for a shave, located near the premises of the main court. Yan Kaminsky, preparing this operation, managed to attract a hairdresser from among the local residents to cooperate with the scouts. The barber agreed to give the prearranged signal as soon as Funk entered the barbershop.

On November 17, 1943, when a search was going on in Rovno for the partisans who had kidnapped von Ilgen, Nikolai Ivanovich went into the building of the main court and settled down in an armchair in the waiting room of Alfred Funk. Chatting with his secretary, Kuznetsov glanced out the window at Yan Kaminsky, who was strolling down the street. Taking into account the situation in the city, Kaminsky could not play the role of a walking idler for a long time, and therefore he anxiously waited for a signal from the hairdresser he had recruited, in order to, in turn, give a signal to Nikolai Ivanovich. German pedantry came to the rescue. At the appointed time, Funk took a chair in the barbershop, on the window of which the curtain was immediately drawn back. Kaminsky, in turn, gave a prearranged signal to Kuznetsov.

Nikolai Ivanovich received him and asked his secretary to bring him some water. Funk's office was on the second floor, and the secretary went to fetch water from the floor below. When she returned, the chief lieutenant, who chatted nicely with her and was thirsty, was not in the waiting room. Almost at the same time, a clean-shaven Funk entered the waiting room. Barely nodding to his secretary, he went into the office.

The SS Oberführer hung up his cloak on a hanger, put down his cap, and went to his desk, intending to sit down in a chair. At that moment, Kuznetsov fired twice point-blank at the executioner.

The scout managed to collect the papers lying there from the table and left the office. He passed the terrified secretary, went down to the first floor and went out into the street. At the very entrance were two cars with Nazi soldiers. Apparently, they just arrived. Everyone stared dumbfounded at the windows of the second floor. Nikolai Ivanovich stopped and also looked up. Then Kuznetsov calmly left, and, going around the corner of the house into the courtyard, jumped over the fence and went out into the alley, where Strutinsky was waiting for him with a car.

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Thus, justice was done to the executioner of the Czechoslovak and Ukrainian peoples. As for another executioner, Police General Pritzman, he died from a partisan bullet during one of the punitive expeditions, which he personally led.

The direction of the actions of N. Kuznetsov and other people's avengers was a response to the brutality of the invaders, mass executions, massacres of civilians, the deportation of many thousands of people into slavery in Germany, the robbery and devastation of Soviet land, which was under the yoke of the Nazis. Hence the support and growth of the partisan movement, which were characteristic of the entire period of the Great Patriotic War, the approval of actions to destroy the most ruthless representatives of the occupation authorities.

well well

Under the onslaught of the advancing Soviet troops, Erich Koch on December 15, 1943 (Kyiv had already been taken by Soviet troops on November 6) ordered the evacuation of all German institutions from Rivne. The command of the special detachment decided to move west along with the Nazi troops in order to collect and transmit information about the movement of German troops to the Center for the Soviet Army, as well as to disrupt the communications of the Nazis.

Kuznetsov, in January 1944, decided that it was expedient to move to Lvov, where the German institutions leaving Rovno were sent. Ivan Belov, a Red Army soldier who had escaped from captivity, who had made a good showing in the detachment over the years, left as the driver of the car with Nikolai Ivanovich. And under the guise of a speculator who fled from Rovno, Kuznetsov was accompanied by Yan Kaminsky, who had numerous relatives in Lvov and

many acquaintances.

To ensure the activities of the Kuznetsov group, a reconnaissance detachment headed by Lieutenant Krutikov headed to the Lvov region. Nikolai Ivanovich was asked to join this detachment equipped with a walkie-talkie, and if necessary, he was allowed to leave Lvov, independently cross the front line and go out to the advancing troops.

The scouts who were instructed to escort Kuznetsov reported that the car successfully wedged into the German column along the highway and moved towards Lvov in the general stream. From that moment on, the position of Kuznetsov and his associates became more complicated, since communication with him and with the Krutikov detachment was lost. As it turned out later, Krutikov and his fighters had to fight the nationalists.

It is hardly appropriate here to analyze the varieties of nationalist manifestations, regardless of the experience of the Patriotic War, especially its final phase, when direct

military and sabotage actions against the Soviet Army by formations with nationalist signs in Ukraine and the Baltic region.

One of the main leaders of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and its organizer was Stepan Bandera. He was considered not only the ideologist of this organization, but also the creator of its military formations. Thanks to the efforts of the leaders of the OUN, on the eve of the war, the Wehrmacht was replenished with two notorious units - "Roland" and "Nachtigal", which became part of the invading army. Later, with the help of nationalists, the SS division "Galicia" was created. On account of these formations, thousands and thousands of lives of Soviet people.

As soon as the war began, S. Bandera ordered his people to "do everything possible and impossible to take part in the struggle together with the German troops." Actually, Bandera's supporters to this day do not hide the facts of cooperation with the Wehrmacht.

In one of the skirmishes with Bandera, a radio operator was killed, Krutikov's radio was broken. Krutikov was wounded in the leg, but continued to move towards Lvov together with the detachment. He sent scouts to the city - Pastukhov and Kabilisky, and a few days later two more. The first two weeks later returned to the detachment and reported on the situation. And raids and mass repressions began in the city in connection with the fact that the vice-governor of Galicia, Otto Bauer, was killed. As it turned out, Nikolai Ivanovich and his fighting friends managed to settle in Lvov, and he managed to carry out another act of retribution.

Kuznetsov learned that a meeting of the German administration of Galicia was being held in the city theater. He drove up in a car to the theater. At that moment, Krutikov's scouts, who were the first to be sent to the city, noticed him and were happy for him - it means that things were going according to plan. Nikolai Ivanovich managed to enter the theater, but he did not manage to get close to the presidium in order to eliminate the governor. He followed the departure of the Nazi leaders from the theater and followed one of the cars. It turned out that it was Lieutenant Governor Otto Bauer. So his mansion was established.

The next day, Kuznetsov's car was next to the mansion. When a comfortable car approached the entrance, Nikolai Ivanovich approached the house, from which two representative Nazis came out. He fired at point-blank range several times at one and the other. Belov and Kaminsky fired machine guns at a sentry standing outside the mansion and a car that had arrived for Bauer. Sitting in the car, Nikolai Ivanovich gave the command to Belov to get out of the city. Eighteen kilometers from Lvov, the car was stopped by a picket of the Feljandarmerie. The major, who took the documents from Kuznetsov, examined them for a long time, and then asked to see any additional documents. Kuznetsov realized that the major

Dimo, received a warning and, perhaps, it is him who is being searched. The decision came instantly. Nikolai Ivanovich grabbed his machine gun and shot down the major and four gendarmes in a burst.

Belov started the engine, but Kuznetsov said that he had to go into the forest. Wandering through the forest, they stumbled upon partisans commanded by one of the scouts of the Krutikov detachment. He wanted to keep Kuznetsov at home, but Nikolai Ivanovich announced that he wanted to go out to Medvedev's detachment.

He did not know that Medvedev's detachment fought on February 5, 1944, its last battle with the Nazis and, on the orders of the Center, crossed the front line. Nor did Kuznetsov know that the German newspaper in Ukrainian, Gazeta Lvivska, had published an obituary signed by the Governor of Galicia Wächter, which read: "On February 9, 1944, Vice Governor Dr. Galicia, fell victim to the Bolshevik attack. Together with him, his closest collaborator, the experienced and honored head of the Chancellery of the Presidium of the Governorate of the District of Galicia Landgerichtsrat, Dr. Heinrich Schneider, died. They died for the Führer and the Empire?"

After resting with the partisans and taking with them a supply of food, Kuznetsov, Belov and Kaminsky again set off. They expected to cross the front line.

Fate decreed otherwise. On the night of March 8, 1944, Kuznetsov's group came across Bandera, dressed in the uniform of Soviet Army soldiers. This happened in the village of Boryatin, Brody district, Lviv region. Having withstood the battle with them, the brave trio moved on. On March 9, 1944, the scouts stopped at Golubovich's hut. The bandits surrounded the house and opened fire. Nikolai Kuznetsov, Ivan Belov and Yan Kaminsky fought an unequal battle. When the cartridges ran out and the bandits broke into the hut, Kuznetsov blew himself and his comrades up with a grenade.

well well

Immediately after the war, directly from the hospital, Hero of the Soviet Union Dmitry Nikolaevich Medvedev went to Lvov to find out what had happened to Kuznetsov and his comrades. He hoped that information about the fate of the brave intelligence officer and his friends could be contained in the documents of the Nazis who fled from Lvov. And indeed, in a pile of papers thrown in the Gestapo building, documents were found that testified that Kuznetsov and his comrades died at the hands of Ukrainian nationalists. These are, in particular, a telegram addressed to the SS Gruppenführer and Police Lieutenant General Müller from the Chief of the Security Police for the Galician District, Dr. Vitiska, and other German documents that are stored in the archives of the FSB and the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation.

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As for the fate of Valentina Konstantinovna Dovger, after parting with Kuznetsov, who went to Lvov by car, she was going to be evacuated to the same city together with the Reich Commissariat of the city of Rovno. Valya and Nikolai, who sympathized with each other, agreed to meet in Lvov at the apartment of one partisan. No sooner had Kuznetsov reached Lvov than Valya Dovger was arrested by the Gestapo.

The Germans demanded that she reveal the whereabouts of Paul Siebert, the addresses of safe houses, and the names of her comrades. [The Gestapo tortured her, locked her in a cellar, in which the corpses of Soviet people killed by the Germans floated in blood. It's scary to die at nineteen. But Valya endured everything and said nothing. Hoping to get some information from her, the Gestapo sent her to Lvov, and from there to Germany.]

Victory Day found her in one of the concentration camps in Germany, from where she returned to her homeland. In 1946, Valya visited Dmitry Nikolayevich Medvedev in Moscow and told him about it herself. At the suggestion of Medvedev, she was awarded the Order of Lenin. For the following years, she lived in Voronezh, where she died in 1984.

Nikolai Vladimirovich Strutinsky died in 2003. Every year on May 9, he came to Moscow to meet with veterans of the OMSBON ~ Separate Special Purpose Motorized Rifle Brigade, in the depths of which a special purpose detachment under the command of Colonel D.N. Medvedev, who later received the name "Winners". N.V. Strutinsky organized the transportation of the monument to Nikolai Ivanovich Kuznetsov from Lviv, where Ukrainian nationalists became more active, to his homeland in the city of Talitsk.

On November 5, 1944, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was published on awarding the title of Hero of the Soviet Union to employees of the special forces of the NKGB of the USSR operating behind enemy lines. In the list of those awarded, along with the name of Dmitry Nikolaevich Medvedev, was the name of Nikolai Ivanovich Kuznetsov - posthumously.

! Volksdeutsche - ethnic Germans, i.e. Germans not residing in Germany. This term was especially widespread during the period of Nazism and sounded like "Reichsdeutsch".

2 Medvedev D. It was near Rovno. - M.: "Pravda", 1987. - S. 120.

3 SVR archive.

6

Hero of the Soviet Union S.A. Vaupshasov

Young people at the Academy of Foreign Intelligence of the Russian Federation stand in front of the stand "Chekists – Heroes of the Soviet Union". On the stand, the Chekists are depicted by the artist in a color graphic manner. All of them are in tunics with a turn-down collar with buttonholes, but with different military ranks. All have the Golden Star of a Hero on their chests.

Their task was to organize reconnaissance and sabotage work in the rear of the Nazi troops. The commissar and the chief of staff were needed so that in the future small detachments in the territory occupied by the enemy would gradually turn into large partisan brigades and even formations.

Many of them are widely known in our country and abroad: D.N. Medvedev, N.I. Kuznetsov, K.P. Orlovsky, M.S. Prudnikov, S.A. Vaupshasov... In total - 24 people.

Volozhinov, Malinovsky, Comrade Alfred, Lieutenant Colonel Gradov... All these and other surnames and pseudonyms belong to one person - Stanislav Alekseevich Vaupshasov. All his life he was a volunteer. As a volunteer, he appeared in the necessary, hottest places without calls and agendas. And during the years of the Civil War, and in underground work in Western Belarus, when it was occupied by bourgeois-landlord Poland, and in distant sultry Spain, and in the snowdrifts of the Karelian Isthmus, and in the Great Patriotic War.

In 1914, a Moscow police officer issued a passport in the name of a boy from Lithuania, Stanislav Vaupshasov. To the bewildered question of the guy: how is it, he is also Stas Vaupshas, and the parents of Vaupshasa, the police officer threatened and ordered to get out before he changed his mind.

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And so the son of a Lithuanian laborer and the laborer himself, Stanislav Vaupshasov, appeared on Moscow soil. Having passed his first universities from childhood in a landowner's estate in his native town of Gruzdziai, Shaulyai district, Kovels province, having drunk a lot in the field and cowsheds, Stas decided to try his luck in Moscow, where he became a digger, then a fitter at the Provodnik plant, then migrated to the Vyksa factories in Lithuania, but soon returned to Moscow.

The return to Moscow was forced. Stanislav could not stand the bullying of the factory administration. One day, Stanislav and his friend Maxim Bortashuk grabbed two factory officials, squeezed them into a wheelbarrow and took them to a garbage dump.

This is how Stanislav Vaupshasov began his journey into the revolution, into battles and campaigns. He had the share of a Red Guard, a soldier of the Red Army, a partisan during the Civil War, an underground worker, a Chekist, an underground worker again and a partisan commander.

From 1920 to 1925 S.A. Vaupshasov was at underground work in the Western regions of Belarus and Ukraine, occupied by the Poles.

After that, he spent two years studying for commanders in Moscow. In 1930, Vaupshasov was transferred from the cadres of the Red Army to the state security agencies. And then - life in combat conditions in Spain, where he, as an adviser in the Republican army, led reconnaissance and sabotage operations.

well well

Spain. 1937 Battles under the Ebro...

"We're all here dancing the tango of death."

This spectacular phrase was uttered by a black-haired Spaniard with a small mustache, sitting on a table in one of the headquarters dugouts of the Republican army. After the fight, he usually took the guitar and played dance tunes, most often tango. Hence, apparently, this phrase was born from him.

"And what do you think, Comrade Alfred?" - He turned to a short, stocky man, neatly dressed in a khaki jacket and loose-fitting trousers.

Alfred touched the soundboard of the guitar with his palm - let him be silent for a minute - and in a deaf, cold voice answered:

- There is no time for waltzes and tango. As for death, let the Nazis think about it.

Noticing the smile on the black-haired man's lips, Alfred added:

We must think not about death, but about life. And fight!

"Even if that's us?"

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- Undoubtedly!

The black-haired man plucked the strings of the guitar and exclaimed:

- That's all you are, Russians.

"Soviet," Alfred corrected gently.

The 14th partisan corps fought against Mussolini's blackshirts on the Catalan and other fronts. That is why the corps was called partisan because it carried out unusual tasks: it penetrated into the rear of the Nazis.

The partisan experience of senior adviser Vaupshasov (aka Comrade Alfred) came in handy here to the fullest extent. He taught detachment commanders to find passages between enemy units, suddenly attack them, demoralize them and ... disappear.

The corps commander Ungrii, a short, slender Spaniard, a communist, a former miner, shaking hands with his adviser, thanked him warmly, trying to repeat the Russian word he knew:

- Thank you.

But Vaupshasov was also an experienced scout. When it became known that the German resident Otto Kirchner, posing as the Swedish businessman Kobard, was active in Madrid, it was he, Comrade Alfred, who was instructed to "outplay" the Nazi resident.

Kobard-Kirchner lived in the Sevilla Hotel in Madrid with an assistant who played the role of his wife. He was humble and reserved. It was almost impossible to establish contact with him, and even to obtain valuable information.

After studying the situation, Alfred developed a plan of operation. He took the Republican Sanchez Ortiz as his assistant, who, in a cunning combination, turned into the Pole Kazimir Kobetsky.

So one day the porter at the Sevilla Hotel informed Kobard that a certain Kazimir Kobetsky, a traveling salesman and dealer in antique jewels, was looking for a buyer for a collection of paintings from the Flemish SCHOOL.

— Kazimir Kobetsky? Must be Polish. Kobard frowned.

“Apparently so,” the porter confirmed and hastened to add that the Pole was in need, and one could make good money on paintings.

Mr. Kobard pondered the proposal for several minutes, and finally, to the satisfaction of the receptionist, nodded:

- Well, let him come tomorrow and, of course, bring the goods. Just do not rubbish.

The next morning, Ortis-Kobetsky came to the hotel to see Kobard-Kirchner. Needless to say, how Alfred-Vaupshasov, the author of this agent-operational combination, experienced, although he was sure that the German resident Otto Kirchner would certainly take advantage of the opportunity of a Pole who had “family” ties in Argentina.

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Everything went well. The very first phrases that Kobard exchanged with Kobetsky confirmed that, playing a connoisseur of painting, Kobard was looking for the “neutral” courier he needed. After Kobard examined the brought picture and inquired how many more paintings Pan Kobetsky had, the imaginary Pole explained that he was going to take his entire collection to Buenos Aires, and he was ready to sell a few paintings, as there were difficulties with money. Passport and exit visa are ready, here they are, if you want to take a look.

From the way Kobard carefully studied his passport and visa, it was clear that they interested him much more than the paintings of the Flemish school. He perked up noticeably, invited Kobetsky to his room (they met in the lobby). The German said that his wife was Argentine, although the scouts knew that she was a full-blooded German.

Over a cup of coffee, Kobard declared that he would gladly buy the painting he had brought, but asked that it be handed over to his relative in Buenos Aires. By morning he will have packed the painting, prepared a letter to his relative and informed him to meet Kobetsky at the airfield.

In the early morning of the next day, a messenger delivered the packaged painting to Pan Kobetsky's apartment... and he delivered it to a special department. When Comrade Alfred and his collaborators unpacked the picture and carefully examined it, everything turned out as they expected. Encrypted reports and microfilm ended up in a stretcher. This was enough to neutralize the German resident Otto Kirchner, his partner Elsa Tumm and a large group of spies, consisting of Germans and Francoist Spaniards.

well well

Before the Great Patriotic S.A. Vaupshasov managed to visit the Soviet-Finnish war. The summer of 1941 found him in Moscow.

“It’s time for you to rest, Stanislav Alekseevich,” his boss cautiously hinted, “after all, age (Vaupshasov was born in 1899).

“Age is not a hindrance,” Vaupshasov firmly objected, “there is still gunpowder in the flasks!”

What about home, family?

- She's not used to it. Bathrobe and house slippers are not for me.

- I thought so, - the chief was delighted, - well then decide where to go: to Ukraine or to Belarus?



Vaupshasov knew Belarus well. I got used to its swamps and forests, sniffed gunpowder there. Although there was a danger of being recognized. But still...

— To Belarus.

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"Be it right," the chief decided. - Become Gradov. You will lead a special task force. You will get to Minsk and start... The task is continuous reconnaissance and assistance in the deployment of the partisan movement. We hope for you.

Two bosses entered the office, hearing the end of the conversation. One of them turned to Vaupshasov and said:

- Bring a detachment to Minsk - we will consider it a hero.

Vaupshasov said he was counting on success.

Only at the end of April 1942, the detachment reached the suburbs of Minsk, where the invaders were in charge. Vaupshasov kept the detachment. Almost under the very noses of the Germans, in the Knyazhy Klyuch tract, on the former estate of Prince Radziwill, about 50 km from the capital of Belarus, Vaupshasov and settled with his detachment. It was convenient in all respects: firstly, not far from the city where the underground network was to be deployed, and secondly, of all the nearby forests, Knyazhy Klyuch was the most dense and convenient for covert maneuvers.

The soldiers equipped dugouts with windows and emergency exits, prepared trenches - genuine and false, mined the approaches.

Not much time passed, and the detachment became a link between the various detachments, which until now had been operating separately. From Vaupshasov's detachment, liaison officers, scouts, and demolition instructors moved to the settlements and partisan bases. The actions of groups and detachments acquired a purposeful character. People felt a single hand, and this affected their combat capability.

Having studied the tactics of guerrilla warfare and the psychology of people who broke away from the usual army or civilian team, Vaupshasov did not rely on the power of orders alone. Of course, as in the army, here the order is the law. But besides the order, something more is needed: to ensure that the partisans themselves own the initiative.

This is how the idea of convening a conference of representatives of partisan detachments was born. At the first such conference, the Military Council of the partisan movement of the north-eastern part of the Minsk region was created. It included: the chairman - the commander of the special purpose detachment "Local" Gradov, he is Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Alekseevich Vaupshasov; Deputy Chairman - Commander of the "Avenger" detachment Major Vasily Trofimovich Voronyansky and members of the council: Commissioner of the "Avenger" Ivan Matveyevich Timchuk, who later became, like Vaupshasov, a Hero of the Soviet Union; the commander of the "Struggle" detachment, Lieutenant Sergei Nikanorovich Dolganov, as well as the commissar of this detachment, the former secretary of the Smolensk District Party Committee, Ivan Iosifovich Yasinovich. The conference delegates approved the text of the partisan oath and solemnly accepted it.

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The increasing frequency of explosions, arson, raids on punitive detachments testified that the forest conference had borne fruit.

From 1942 to 1944, the local partisan detachment alone derailed 187 echelons and committed 52 major acts of sabotage at important targets.

About a month later, on July 13, 1942, a second conference was held. This time there were representatives of 28 detachments from the northern part of the Minsk region. They estimated the total strength of the partisans: the figure turned out to be three and a half thousand people.

"For a cadre army," said Vaupshasov, "this figure may be small, something like a rifle regiment or a little more. But for us, partisans, this is a good shock backbone.

At the same conference, Vaupshasov announced the creation of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement under the Headquarters of the Supreme Command.

On July 19, when the partisans were finishing the conference, the head of the reconnaissance detachment galloped into the camp on a horse and reported that many cars with punishers had accumulated in the village of Valentinovo. They were moving towards the partisan "airfield" - a landing site where planes landed from the mainland.

- Have you calculated? Vaupshasov quickly asked.

"About a thousand," the scout replied.

It became clear that a tough battle was ahead, since it would not be possible to secretly leave the camp. Another squad arrived. There were about 300 people in total.

"Not enough, of course," Vaupshasov thought, "but do the Germans know our exact location and available forces? If they know, then we will have a bad time.

The SS men moved in two columns. The most convenient way was to meet them on the outskirts of the landing site. The guerrillas broke up into combat crews and took up all-round defense.

"Everyone was ready for a fierce battle," recalled Vaupshasov, "to be honest, in those moments I felt with all my being how wonderful life is, how cheerfully the birds chirped flying from tree to tree, and even felt how heart beats fast.

Approaching the airfield, the punishers suddenly lay down and moved further along the bellies.

And here is the silence after Vaupshasov's exclamation "Fire!" exploded. A smoky-gray band of gunpowder burning separated partisans and fascists. And when a light breeze scattered this band, the partisans saw how the surviving Nazis were crawling into the bushes.

The Nazis, having recovered from the first blow, went on the attack again, firing on the run, pressing the butt of the machine gun to their stomach, clearing the way with a fan of bullets. Guerrilla machine guns, machine guns started working, two gasped

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partisan mortars. This battle cost the enemy about 200 wounded and killed. The detachment with minimal losses left the ring.

Intelligence data coming from Vaupshasov's detachment to the Center has always been of great value to the Headquarters of the High Command.

Intelligence data... Behind every fact, every figure hid the risky work of intelligence officers, underground workers and liaisons. Vaupshasov went on the air three times daily and reported to Moscow on the deployment of Nazi troops and reserves, the placement of ammunition depots, the political and economic situation of the fascist administration, the movement of military echelons to and from the front.

The command of the Red Army highly appreciated the intelligence work of the KGB partisans. During the preparation of the Belorussian operation, K. Rokossovsky, who commanded the 1st Belorussian Front, transferred two staff officers with walkie-talkies to the Gradov detachment to directly transmit intelligence information to the front headquarters.

It was easier to fight in the summer. Still, the partisans beat the enemy even in winter. Several bold raids on enemy garrisons in January 1943 gave rise to panic rumors among the Nazi command that a large Soviet landing force of 15 thousand people with artillery and tanks had landed in the forests near Minsk. As a result, the Germans bombed forests for several days in a row, and then, having grouped significant forces of infantry, artillery and tanks, they tried to block the partisans. The task of the partisans was to get out of the blockaded area in a timely manner without accepting an open battle. It was decided to retreat to the Voronicheskie swamps, then to the sandy islands near the village of Voronichi. Falling waist-deep into the swamp, the partisans emerged from the encirclement with minimal losses.

The enemy special services knew that a Chekist Lieutenant Colonel Gradov was operating near Minsk, and they diligently hunted for him. The head of the investigative department of the SD, Krol, who was later taken prisoner, told how much work the German punitive authorities had spent searching for traces of Gradov. But Vaupshasov maneuvered, often changed bases and "leaked" through Hitler's traps and barriers.

When Krol, being in captivity, finally saw Gradov - a short, slightly round-shouldered partisan commander - the fascist officer jumped up from his chair and stretched his arms at his sides.

The detachment of Vaupshasov, who was behind enemy lines for 28 months, personified the friendship and brotherhood of peoples. The partisans said: "We are a complete international!" Indeed, Russians, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Czechs, Armenians, Poles, Lithuanians, and Jews fought shoulder to shoulder in the detachment. There were even one Austrian and one German. All of them are composed

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vili combat team, which wrote many glorious pages in the history of the partisan struggle against the fascist invaders.

On July 15, 1944, partisans S.A. Vaupshasov united with units of the regular Red Army, and on November 5 of the same year he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Has died down. The Second World War, the Nuremberg Tribunal prepared retribution for the main fascist criminals, but the restless Stanislav Alekseevich hurries to the East - to finish off the bandit gangs who have taken refuge in Manchuria.

In 1954 S.A. Vaupshasov retired with the rank of colonel and took up literary work. In his memoirs, he again went through his combat, extraordinary life path. The following books belong to his pen: "On the Angry Land", "Partisan Chronicle", "At the Troubled Crossroads".

Being retired, during the days of the Suez crisis, or rather the joint Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956, when the world was threatened, already completely gray-haired, but still strong Stanislav Vaupshasov submits a report in which he writes :

"Soviet people have never been and never will be passive spectators of international robbery.

I consider it my duty as a communist to take a direct part in this struggle.

Stanislav Alekseevich Vaupshasov died in Moscow on November 19, 1976.

There were many people at his funeral, and among them were those who, in their youth, followed their commander through the forests and swamps, despising death. Among them were those who live in the capital of Belarus on

street named after Stanislav Vaupshasov. And in front of the coffin they carried scarlet pillows with the Golden Star of the Hero, with four orders of Lenin, the Order of the Red Banner, the Order of the Patriotic War of the 1st and 2nd degrees and many medals.

Soldiers - children or grandchildren of those who during the Great Patriotic War forged victory over the enemy at the front, in the rear or in a partisan detachment - raised their carbines, and a three-fold military salute sounded.

7

Bomb for Gauleiter

Two women approached the police post with baskets of lingonberries. There was nothing special to profit from here, except perhaps a glass or two of juicy berries. So, for the sake of order, the policeman looked at the baskets, showed off a little and lazily threw:

- Okay, go ahead.

The policeman would have known that a big award had slipped out of his hands and that women were not carrying lingonberries in their baskets, but death to the Gauleiter of Belarus, Wilhelm von Cuba.

On June 28, 1941, on the seventh day of the Great Patriotic War, the advanced units of the German tank armies broke into Minsk. For 1100 days the fascist regime raged in the capital of Soviet Belarus. Its essence was precisely defined by Goering: "In the interests of a long-term economic policy, all newly occupied territories in the East will be exploited as colonies and with the help of colonial methods."

The fascist German military garrison in Minsk numbered up to 5 thousand soldiers and officers. More than 100 different military organizations and units were located in the city: the headquarters of the corps for the protection of the rear of the army group "Center", the military intelligence department (Abwehr), the security police and SD department, the military commandant's office, the headquarters for combating the partisan movement, numerous SS units, security police, gendarmerie. In addition, there were military units in the city that arrived from the front or went to the front, the number of which sometimes reached 50 thousand people. The "general commissariat" of Belarus, headed by Gauleiter Wilhelm von Kube, was also located here.

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All this huge machine of violence and robbery was aimed at the enslavement and destruction of the Soviet people, the plunder of Belarus. The invaders themselves testify to this. In early July 1941, a concentration camp was set up on the outskirts of Minsk, where the Nazis rounded up more than 140,000 prisoners of war and men from the local population included in them. Reporting on the situation in this death camp to Minister Rosenberg, adviser Dorsch wrote on July 10, 1941: The most possible language of the guard, who carries out permanent service for days, is a firearm, which she mercilessly uses..."

The same bloody deeds were going on in the Jewish ghetto created by the occupiers, where up to 80 thousand people were kept. In total, the invaders killed about 400,000 Soviet citizens in Minsk and its environs. And every time the extermination of the Soviet people was accompanied by monstrous savagery. The Nazis burned living people at the stake, tortured the doomed before execution. Thousands of city residents were driven away to hard labor in Germany. "People are crying, and we are laughing at tears," Chief Corporal Johann Herder wrote home.

The fascist regime for the majority of the population was personified by the General Commissar of Belarus, Gauleiter Wilhelm von Kube. He was a member of the German Reichstag, a prominent figure in the National Socialist Party, but most importantly, the direct organizer

what happened in Belarus. He was not a simple executor of someone's "evil will", but a fanatical tyrant, executioner and sadist. Tens of thousands of people, including women, children, the elderly, were destroyed on his personal instructions. Once, in a circle of officers, Kube said:

"It is necessary that only one mention of my name should tremble every Russian and Belarusian, so that their brains freeze when they hear "Wilhelm Kube".

Therefore, the numerous demands of peasant gatherings in the villages liberated by the partisans, the decisions of the courts of the partisan detachments and resistance groups in the cities about the need to punish Cuba were not accidental. In 1942, both in Moscow and in Belarus, a decision was made to liquidate it.

By this time, a mass struggle of patriots against enemy forces had unfolded throughout the occupied territory. Hundreds of partisan detachments and underground organizations operated in Belarus. Some of them arose spontaneously: workers, employees, peasants, students, schoolchildren, "encircled" and prisoners of war who fled from the camps themselves united in resistance groups. A number of squads

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was created by party and Komsomol organizations. And finally, it was widely practiced to send groups behind enemy lines, which included specialists in reconnaissance, sabotage, mine blasting, and radio communications.

Among those sent to the rear were the ORDF - operational reconnaissance and sabotage groups. One of the tasks assigned to them was the liquidation of Gauleiter Kube.

This operation was considered important not only because it was an act of retribution. It was necessary to show the Nazis who the true master of the Belarusian land was.

In March 1942, the "Local" group was transferred to the Minsk region, led by intelligence officer Lieutenant Colonel Vaupshasov. The group did not have such a name by chance. During the stay of Western Belarus as part of pre-war Poland, the Polish authorities called the Belarusians "local". This name, apparently, was taken by Vaupshasov for his group, which included many Belarusians, who at one time took an active part in the movement of the Belarusian Resistance in Poland.

The initial information received by intelligence was disappointing: Kube has a reliable guard, he is extremely vigilant and cautious, constantly changing routes and times movement of the car, may not appear or be very late for the appointed event, avoids being shown in public places.

At the same time, it turned out that Cuba is prone to luxury and contains a truly "royal court", it is served by almost a hundred local residents - maids, cooks, cooks, chauffeurs, gardeners and others. He also had at his disposal a unit of the so-called "self-defense corps", recruited from among local volunteers.

It was among his entourage that it was required to look for and find those who are ready to participate in the act of retribution.

Scouts began to study the situation and select the alleged participants in the action. It was possible to find out the location of the General Commissariat, establish the place of residence of Kube, the persons who had access to the building of the General Secretariat and Kube's apartment, and establish initial contacts with many of them. Along the way, an interesting detail came to light - with all their vigilance, the Gestapo did not attach due importance to the fact that some of the service personnel had close relatives from among employees of the party and law enforcement agencies. Others themselves worked in them in technical positions, and in addition, there were those who had personal scores with the invaders: their relatives fell victims of fascist reprisals.

The active work of intelligence officers in the environment of Cuba led to the fact that they soon acquired more than fifty (!) agents in this environment.

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Among them were Kube's maid and two of his housekeepers, the librarian of his personal library and a cook, Kube's adjutant's typist and his deputy Kaiser's housekeeper, the driver of the regional commissariat and the commander of the "self-defense corps" unit, managing houses located in the immediate proximity to the General Commissariat, and an employee of the Minsk City Council, who had extensive connections in the General and Regional Commissariats of Belarus, an employee of the SD canteen and others.

Now that the beast was overlaid, it seemed that the hunt could begin. Active measures to eliminate Cuba began in February 1943. And at the same time, a disappointing series of failures of scouts and amazing luck of Cuba began - "lucky Cuba", as he was called behind his back.

Colleagues.

On February 17, the task force of lieutenant colonel Kirill Orlovsky received information that Kube, together with a company of high-ranking officers of the commissariat, was going to hunt in the Lyakhovichi Forest. An ambush was organized on the road to the forest. The scouts were waiting tensely for the approach of the hunting cortege. Finally, the observer's signal: "They're coming!"

A flurry of fire hit the German vehicles from both sides of the road. Figures in officer uniforms and hunting suits jumped out of them and immediately fell down, struck down by automatic bursts.

The group returned without losses to the base, where it was greeted with joy and were already preparing to give a telegram about the successful completion of the task, when suddenly the news came: Cuba was not among those who arrived to hunt! Before reaching three kilometers to the Lyakhovichi forest, he unexpectedly ordered the driver to turn the car around and returned to Minsk. And although high ranks were killed as a result of the operation - the commissioner of the city of Baranovichi Friedrich Fench, the regional commissar Friedrich Stür, Obergruppenführer Ferdinand Zasorias, the guards and several Gestapo officers were destroyed, this was little consolation.

A month later, an agent of the "Locals" group, the commander of the "self-defense corps" unit Kulikovsky, volunteered to deal with Cuba on his own. To the questions of the chief of intelligence, does Kulikovsky understand what he is getting into, he replied: "I know that I will not be able to return alive. But

me my scores with the Germans.

On March 20, using his official pass, he entered the building of the General Commissariat and took a place from where he could shoot Kube, who was passing along the corridor. But something in Kulikovsky's behavior seemed suspicious to the guards, and they surrounded him. In the ensuing fight, Kulikovsky killed two Gestapo officers and shot himself.

Some time later, information was received that Kube intended to visit a factory where tanks smashed at the front were being repaired.

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The scouts prepared everything for the explosion of the main workshop, where the "distinguished guest" was invited, and they were waiting for this moment in great tension, since the explosive devices were not sufficiently camouflaged, and they could be detected at any moment. The minutes of waiting dragged on. An hour has passed. One and a half. Cuba didn't show up. Finally, some noise came from the crowd of authorities, and she began to disperse. There was a command to prepare the workshop for normal work. This meant that Cuba would not come. But it also meant that explosive devices would be discovered at the start of work. And then I had to put them into action. So another assassination attempt failed. True, the plant was out of order for a long time.

Kube, together with his deputy Kaiser, was going on an inspection trip to Baranovichi. As usual, he had to go by car, accompanied by enhanced security.

Cuba managed to plant a time bomb in the car. A mine explosion thundered in Baranovichi at the appointed hour. But... The expected result did not give: Kaiser got out of the car a few minutes before the explosion. And Cuba, true to himself, changed his mind at the last moment before leaving and stayed in Minsk.

The efforts of military intelligence officers in the "hunt" in Cuba have also remained in vain so far. Although the successes were, and not bad. For example, at the beginning of June 1943, information was received that a group of senior officials was going to leave Minsk in the direction of Slutsk. It was not excluded that Cuba could be among them.

An ambush was set up along the way. On July 2, 1943, Pravda published the following report on its results: "Stockholm, July 1 (TASS). Hitler's newspaper "Minsker Zeitung" reports that on June 10, Belarusian partisans killed the German "regional commissar" Ludwig Ehrenleiter, government inspector Heinrich Klose, head of the regional gendarmerie, Ober-Lieutenant Karl Kalla ..." Further, the report cited a list of other many exterminated gendarmes and Hitlerite "economic leaders". And this time Cuba was not among them.

At the beginning of September 1943, the intelligence officers learned that a banquet would be held in the officers' canteen of the Directorate of the Security Police and the SD, for which Cuba was to be an honored guest.

Hans Schmidt, the captain of the 52nd German infantry division, who went over to the side of the Red Army, spoke about how the banquet ended:

"At the end of August, together with a group of officers from the reserve, I was sent to the Eastern Front. For reasons beyond my control, I stayed for a few days in Minsk. On September 6, unidentified persons blew up the officers' canteen-casino. After the explosion, I personally examined the destruction that had taken place. From under the ruins was from

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involved 30 killed and 50 seriously wounded German officers. Many officers received contusions and minor wounds."

But Cuba and this time escaped retribution - he did not appear at the banquet.

And yet another "ceremonial event" was used to assassinate Cuba. A message was received from the agents that the German authorities were preparing a meeting for the command staff who had arrived from the front, and that Cuba should also be among those meeting. The local task force organized an explosion in the station building. There were many dead and wounded among the command staff and participants in the meeting, but since Kube arrived at the station late, the operation again did not achieve its goal.

Meanwhile, another operation was being prepared, which in the end was crowned with success. It made full use of the capabilities of female personnel from the service staff to Cuba. Its peculiarity was that it was the result of the activities of two intelligence services - foreign and military. In addition, only a happy accident, or rather the secrecy and conscientiousness of its participants, saved the operation from failure.

And that's how it evolved.

Among others, partisan intelligence officer N.V. Troyan was given the task of looking for approaches to Cuba. To do this, she, in particular, used an agent of the same group, a former servant of Kube, who said that after her Mazanik Galina began to work for Kube (her real name

Elena, but her friends called her that). She described her as a patriotic woman who was tired of serving with the Germans.

Intelligence had information that Mazanik had previously worked in a canteen, and her husband Terletsky had been a driver at an NKVD motor depot, and that by that time he was in Moscow.

Trojan was instructed to speak frankly with Mazanik. Of course, no one could guarantee success. Who knew what were the real moods of Elena, an interesting young woman "ascended" into the sphere of Cuba's inner circle? Even if she is an honest person, will she not consider Nadezhda Troyan a provocateur, or will she simply not be afraid to do what she will be entrusted with?

Full of anxious thoughts, but confident that everything will end successfully, Nadezhda went to the first meeting. It was intended as an introduction. But at this meeting, Elena was very cautious, she knew that the Gestapo was watching her. Fearing a provocation, she evaded a direct answer to Trojan's question about whether she could take on the dangerous task.

After the meeting, Nadezhda reported to the head of intelligence of the task force that, in her opinion, it was possible to have a serious conversation with Mazanik, and received permission to do the "I". The girls met several times, but only at the last meeting,

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On August 18, 1943, Nadezhda put before Elena the question of the need to liquidate Cuba.

At the same time, other partisan intelligence officers were also looking for ways to approach the encirclement of Cuba, including Maria Osipova, a former employee of the Minsk Law Institute. She was associated with the reconnaissance and sabotage detachment of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army "Dima". The operational work in it, and then the detachment itself, was headed by Major Nikolai Fedorov, Hero of the Soviet Union.

Having received the task to go to the inner circle of Cuba, Osipova began to look for connections with Mazanik. Elena Mazanik came to the meeting with her sister Valentina Shutskaya.

"We walked slowly down the street and talked almost in a whisper," M. Osipova recalled. "I felt: Mazanik doesn't believe me, so I directly asked what needs to be done to make her believe."

"I want to meet someone from the command," said Mazanik.

But it's in the forest.

- Then let your sister go with you into the forest.

The next day I took Valya to the forest - to Uncle Dima's brigade ...

After the return of her sister, Elena Mazanik gave Osipova her consent to participate in the action against Cuba.

From the memoirs of Maria Osipova:

"...at a new meeting with Elena, I explained to her that there are small magnetic delayed-action mines, and she can carry such a mine in a small handbag. When she agreed, I advised her to pretend now that she had a toothache. This is to make it easier to get permission from the hostess to leave the house at the right time.



The next morning, I again went to Uncle Dima's brigade. A friend went with me.

The mines were placed at the bottom of the basket, crimson lingonberries were poured on top.

The roads around the capital were carefully guarded... They began to approach the road. Suddenly four policemen appeared from behind the bushes. The friend came up to them first and, bowing low, greeted them: "Good day, ladies." She was thoroughly searched and her documents checked.

- You can go! - the big policeman, who was searching her, threw to her, and turned to me:

- Now you show what you are carrying, but quickly! Why did you stop?

My feet are cold. I sat down over the basket, and I myself decide what to do so that they don't look at the basket. My slowness brought the policeman out of patience.

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"Listen, hurry up! he shouted. - Not like I'll give you a basket, I'll suppress everything.

"Why would you do that?" I said as calmly as possible. "You will only inflict a loss on me, but you will not receive any benefit for yourself."

On the way, the scouts were stopped twice more, but the deadly cargo was safely delivered to Minsk.

Osipova was impatiently waiting for Elena at the appointed place, but neither she nor Valentina appeared. Observing caution, Osipova did not return to her home, but went to a safe house. In the evening, the messenger Drozd ran there.

"Your apartment was searched," she said. "The neighbor was beaten up. They left an ambush there. You were seen in the city and now, apparently, they want to arrest you. Tomorrow will be the one you need.

And at that time, as agreed, the evacuation of the Mazanik family from the village of Masyukovshchina to the partisan detachment began. I had to hurry.

The operation to eliminate Cuba has begun. It was September 21, 1943.

From the memoirs of Elena Mazanik:

"...Maria Osipova was supposed to meet with me on Tuesday. But it turned out that Kube left the city and will return only on Thursday. My heart was immediately relieved: we still have three whole days at our disposal!

On Thursday afternoon, Maria Osipova came to my house, as if by chance she found out that I wanted to sell shoes, and immediately began to haggle loudly about the price - so loudly that every word was heard by the neighbor police officer behind the thin wall. I demanded two hundred marks for the shoes, Maria offered at first one hundred, then one hundred and twenty, and at that time she showed me how to wind the clock mechanism of the mine and how to put it between the springs of the mattress. We even planted a mine in my mattress and both sat on it, checking to see if it sticks out of any of its corners. But everything was fine. The "customer", having paid for the shoes, slowly left the apartment.

A minute later, a neighbor knocked on the door.

- What kind of noisy person did you have? he asked, suspiciously searching the room.  
eyes...

After midnight, I took out a mine and at two in the morning put it on a combat platoon: the deed is done, exactly in a day there will be an explosion ...

Valentina and I never closed our eyes for the remainder of this incredibly long night.

Six o'clock in the morning... Valya began to get ready for work... I decided to warn her:

"If the Gestapo appears there, it means that they captured me. What should be done in such a case?

you know yourself...

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Saying goodbye, perhaps forever, we silently kissed, and the door quietly closed behind my sister. And I began to put linen, a washcloth, a towel into my briefcase, as I always did when I was going to wash in the shower. Then she lowered the mine into her bag and covered it with an embroidered handkerchief. Only for a moment it became scary: they would lift the scarf - and they would see!

But the realization that otherwise the mine could not be carried into the mansion anyway, drove away fear and last hesitation: we must go ...

Near the gates of the mansion, an elderly soldier was on duty, who seemed not as vicious as everyone else, for which I often gave him cigarettes and cigars taken out of the Gauleiter's rooms. He sometimes let me into the yard without searching me. But now one of the security officers was standing next to the soldier, and at his sign I obediently opened the briefcase. The soldier began, not very willingly, to pull out and shake things up.

- What's in the bag? the officer asked.

In the bag... I started fiddling with the lock, as if I couldn't cope with it: if only a little more, if only to delay the last minute in my life! The officer looked impatiently through the crack, saw the handkerchief and pulled it towards him...

- Wow! Beautiful!..

- You like? I snapped the lock of my purse and curtsied with a smile. - I embroidered myself ... If you permit, mister officer, tomorrow I will bring you several of these, completely new. Sorry, but this is not the first freshness.

- Okay, bring it. You can go, - the officer gave me a handkerchief.

And now the first post, with the inevitable verification, was left behind. But ahead, on the porch, the second post and the second, no less thorough, check. Instead of going to the porch, I took off my coat, put it, my briefcase, and my bag on the ground, and started sweeping the yard. The sentry on the porch kept looking in my direction. This went on for about half an hour, until a guard dog barked in the back of the yard. The sentry rushed to her - to calm her down so that she would not wake up Mr. Gauleiter, and I picked up my things from the ground and instantly flew up to the porch: it seemed that it had blown over!

Now it was necessary to act, and to act accurately, for sure. I quickly went down to the basement, tied a mine on the body below the chest and on top, without tying the ribbon, put on a working apron so that the mine became completely invisible. The Germans usually did not talk to the servants, did not pay any attention to them, and I calmly, without interference, worked all morning, cleaning the stairs and corridors of the mansion. At nine o'clock the house came to life: Madame Kube woke up, and Mr. Gauleiter deigned to get up. He met me on the stairs and, looking from head to toe, asked:

- Why are you so pale?

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I made a pitiful grimace, pressed my hand to my cheek:

"I didn't sleep all night, Mr. General. Tooth..."

"Tell Vilenstein to take you to the dentist."

"And if he pulls out a tooth, can I not come back today?" I'll do everything, then I'll go.

- Okay, you don't have to come back.

Only now I noticed what a wonderful September morning flared up outside the windows of the mansion, and my soul became sunny and warm. That's just pallor noticed Cuba. Others may notice. I quickly went down to the basement, took a large colored scarf and wrapped my head so that only my eyes and nose were visible. In the meantime, the Gauleiter had breakfast and went off to work in a cheerful mood. His adjutant Vilenshtein also left with him.

For us, the servants, there was a rare respite in this house, when everyone could do what she wanted. The maid Stefa went to have breakfast with her friend, the cook Domna, in the kitchen. Yanina wanted to immediately call her boyfriend, and I advised her to go up to the third floor, to Kube's office, where the telephone was located. She herself followed Yanina, hoping to sneak into the bedroom unnoticed.

And here everything almost fell apart: the most captious of the security officers, who openly and fiercely hated the Russians, turned out to be on duty on the floor. It was also known about him that this vigilant guard ... is greedy for food. I don't know whether the overexcited state or the hopelessness of the situation pushed me to desperate courage, but as if nothing had happened, I approached the officer and suggested in the most innocent voice:

- Would you like some hot coffee? The blast furnace has already cooked it. If the phone rings, I will call you.

The officer hesitated, looked at his watch, at the phone, at me. But still he stomped down the stairs. I listened: Yanina's voice was still coming from the office, the officer's footsteps had faded. It seems that there was no one left upstairs except Janina and me. I rushed through the rooms, then, snatching out children's knitted pants from under the scarf, wrapped mine in them and ~ into the bedroom!

How right, how well we did, that just last night, at my place, we learned how to lay a mine between the springs of the mattress. Now it took me no more than two or three minutes, and even managed to feel out if she was speaking. And only then she heard hurried steps in the corridor, and after them she saw the face of an officer, twisted with rage, frozen in the doorway.

- You, Russian pig! - the German darted around the room, looking under the bed, under the pillow, in the wardrobe. How dare you come in here?

"But the Frau told me to mend these pants!" I tried to look offended. I was just looking for threads and...

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- Won! he stomped. - Go away!..

I jumped out of the bedroom like a bullet and down into the basement. She put on her overcoat, grabbed a briefcase with linen and a washcloth, and, shouting loudly, so that the officer above could hear: "I'm going to the dentist!" She slammed the front door behind her. This time, neither one nor the second sentinel began to detain me, and the next minute the gates of the mansion were left behind.

Exactly at the appointed time, a member of the group, Nikolai Furts, drove up in a truck with a pass to leave the city to the building of the Drama Theater. Osipova, agitated, walked around the Central Square, peering intently at the passers-by. Germans and policemen were passing by, there were almost no civilians. As time went. All the scheduled dates passed, but neither Elena nor Valentina appeared. Anxiety more and more seized Mary.

And suddenly she saw Elena almost running to the appointed place. Their eyes met, and Elena nodded slightly. Osipova understood everything without words. Valentina also arrived at this time. The women, tired and exhausted, went to the car.

Nikolai drove the women in a truck about sixteen kilometers from Minsk in the direction of Lagoisk, said goodbye and turned back.

And the women, waving the purses prepared by Mary, walked on. By midnight, not feeling their legs under them from fatigue, they reached the village of Yanushkovichi, where they were met by partisans.

From the memoirs of Elena Mazanik:

"... That's when a strange numbness that fettered my whole body fell on me, which was obviously the result of what I had experienced during the day. I heard how they were talking in the hut, how they asked me about something and I answered something, but I almost did not understand who was asking and about what. Only one question was answered firmly:

Yes, I did everything right.

And then - into a dream, as into a dark abyss ...

And through a dream, or maybe in reality, a quiet conversation between two men:

"Do you know how happy it is? The partisans killed Gauleiter Kube!

- Where did you get it?

- I listened to Moscow on the radio at night. That's what they said: the executioner of the Belarusian people was killed...

- Oh, I wish I knew who killed him! I would kiss a hero!"

Kube returned home at one in the morning, and twenty minutes later there was an explosion. Gauleiter was literally torn to pieces. A fire started. Security rushed into the bedroom, but the massive door was locked from the inside. The door was broken. Smoke billowed from the room.

The Gestapo rushed to look for Elena Mazanik. A large sum of money was promised for her capture. The local newspaper reported her signs. But at that time, Maria Borisovna Osipova, Nadezhda Viktorovna Troyan and Elena Grigorievna Mazanik were already flying on an airplane.

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to Moscow. On October 29, 1943, they were awarded the Gold Stars of the Hero of the Soviet Union.

The Nazis responded to the assassination of Cuba with brutal repression.

From the testimony at the trial in the case of the atrocities committed by the Nazi invaders in Belarus, the defendant Eberhard Herf, Major General of Police and Brigadier Fuhrer of the SS:

"... On the night of the murder of Cuba, I was summoned to Gotteberg, who told me that he was taking over the functions of the general commissar, about which he radioed Himmler that for the life of Cuba he would ruthlessly deal with the Russian population and the head of the SS who was there and police

Galtermann, SD officers and I were ordered to raid and shoot mercilessly... In these raids, 2,000 people were captured and shot, and a much larger number were imprisoned in a concentration camp..."

At the same trial, some of the criminals tried to justify themselves: they say, if the partisans had not killed Cuba, then we would not have killed 2,000 Minsk residents in a few days. To this, the prosecutor asked a reasonable question:

— Well, what about the Magic Flute operation, during which 52,000 Minsk residents were arrested and most of them were destroyed... After all, you carried it out before the assassination of Kube! And what about the plan of Dr. Wetzel, head of the colonization department of the 1st Main Political Directorate for the Occupied Eastern Regions, drawn up before the war, and which you began to implement from the first day of the war? ..

The answer was silence...

The murder of such a person as a Gauleiter caused a great political resonance all over the world... This just act of retribution demonstrated the fragility of the Nazis' power in the occupied Soviet territories and confirmed the fact of the existence of mass organized resistance in the rear of the Nazis, organized so well, that the Nazi war machine with numerous punitive organs was powerless before him.

And for the fighters fighting behind enemy lines, the operation to eliminate Cuba inspired confidence that nothing is impossible for them.

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## Operation Monastery

Early 1942. German troops are thrown back from Moscow. February 17. Lull. A snow drift is walking between the German and Soviet positions. The Nazis occasionally fire flares. It's getting light. A man on skis jumped out of the bushes into the neutral zone and ran towards the German positions. The Germans opened fire, but immediately stopped it with shouts of: "On! Mipep!" But the skier had already reached the German trenches.

Thus began Operation Monastery. Initially, its organizers set themselves only the goal of infiltrating the Abwehr intelligence network operating on the territory of the Soviet Union. But then it grew into something more.

But first things first. The man who defected to the Germans on 17 February 1942 was an agent of the state security organs "Heine". His real name is Alexander Petrovich Demyanov. He belonged to a noble family. His great-grandfather - Anton Golovaty - was the first ataman of the Kuban Cossacks. His father, an officer in the tsarist army, died in 1915 from wounds received at the front in the First World War. The younger brother of his father was the head of counterintelligence for the Whites in the North Caucasus. After the capture of Anapa by the Red Army, he was arrested by the Chekists and sent to Moscow, but died of typhus on the way.

Mother "Heine" was known in the noble circles of St. Petersburg. She graduated from the Bestuzhev courses at the Smolny Institute for Noble Maidens. This beautiful woman was fluent in French and German. She was received in the homes of the St. Petersburg nobility. During the Civil War, she ended up with her young son Alexander in Anapa. She was offered to emigrate to France. She refused.

Demyanov stayed on this side at a time when his uncle was fighting with units of the Red Army under the command of General Ulagay.

Due to his noble origin, Alexander could not get a higher education and, having moved with his mother in 1920 to Petrograd, he began working as an electrician.

In 1929, he was arrested by the GPU on charges of illegal possession of weapons (the pistol was planted). As a result, Alexander was forced into tacit cooperation, where he received his pseudonym. It was aimed at developing connections between the nobles who remained in the USSR and foreign emigration.

Soon he was transferred to Moscow, where he began working at Glavkinoprokat and was acquainted with many famous actors. He often went to the races, kept his horse in the Manege. In a word, he became a man widely known in Moscow.

He was lucky that upon arrival in Moscow, experienced and creative NKVD operatives Viktor Ilyin and Mikhail Maklyarsky began to work with him. They did not aim "Heine" at petty denunciation, but prepared from him a skilled and devoted employee of the state security organs. Initially, forced cooperation gradually grew into his life's work.

Why did the choice fall on Heine in Operation Monastery? First, by that time he was a reliable, capable and absolutely honest worker in relations with the state security agencies. He learned to concentrate his will, was distinguished by an active perception of life, the ability to penetrate deeply into psychology. An excellent memory, lightning-fast reaction, the ability to make decisions independently - all these qualities were inherent in Alexander Demyanov - "Heine". And - boundless love for the Motherland. Secondly, the biographical data of "Heine". He came from a family of hereditary military men. There was not a single civilian in the family.

According to archival data, even before the start of the war, "Heine" got in touch with a representative of the German trade mission in Moscow, and in a conversation he named a number of names of Russian emigrants who maintained relations with the "Heine" family before the revolution. This contact showed that German intelligence was interested in him and was looking for approaches to recruit. At this stage, he received the nickname "Max" in the Abwehr file cabinet in Berlin.

The biographical data of "Heine" - "Max" served as a good basis for developing the legend of the Soviet intelligence officer, scheduled to be thrown to the Germans across the front line. An active study of the operation began.

At that time, some representatives of the Russian aristocracy were in the field of view of the state security organs - the former leader of the Nobility Assembly of Nizhny Novgorod Glebov, the poet Sadovsky, a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences Sidorov and some others. At one time they studied in Germany and, according to available information, were known to the German secret services.

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They lived in Moscow on the territory of the Novodevichy Convent, where the descendants of the once eminent nobles found refuge.

The former court poet Sadovsky and his concubine, the former maid of honor of the Empress, attracted special attention of the state security agencies. They were visited by the wives of some members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (for example, the wife of A.I. Mikoyan) and other senior officials. When visiting the monastery, the wives of leading workers were engaged in spiritualism, guessing on the cards. With their help, Sadovsky was attached to the Union of Writers of the USSR for food supply. As a poet, Sadovsky was not published in the Soviet Union, although he wrote a lot; knew.

In July 1941, from these and other persons, with the help of agents, the pro-German underground church-monarchist organization Throne was created. She was somewhat reminiscent

the well-known legendary organization of the 1920s "Trust". Heine was out of this organization, and the operation itself was called the "Monastery".

"Heine" himself wrote about crossing the border as follows: "I was taken to the front for Mozhaisk. Military intelligence determined the safest route and escorted me to the neutral zone. (It was here that a mistake was made, which only by a lucky chance did not cost Alexander Petrovich his life - the neutral zone was mined by the Germans.) I lay down, as the Germans fired tracer bullets over my head and illuminated the area with illuminating rockets. As soon as it began to get light, I got on my skis and went to the Germans. The Germans opened fire, but soon stopped. Shouting "Don't shoot!" I ran towards them, waving a white towel. At that moment, the ski pole slid over the metal... I realized that it was a mine and didn't use the poles again. When I reached the parapet, the Germans helped me get over, and one of them, taking me to the shelter, asked in Russian to wait a bit. Skis and poles were taken somewhere.

A series of continuous interrogations followed, day and night. I was under constant surveillance. I was taken to the dugout to the major. He asked me in Russian why I had betrayed my Motherland. His gaze, full of cold contempt, was sharply cut by the gaze of a regular officer, a typical Teuton, proud of his superiority. He defiantly got up from the table when the captain sat me down to drink tea, squeamishly threw the remark "traitor to the Motherland" and left. Then they took me to the headquarters, which was located in a large hut.

"Heine" told the Germans about the existence in Moscow of a monarchist organization associated with persons hostile to the Soviet government, conducting anti-Soviet activities and willing

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mi to carry out work on the instructions of the German command. Further, "Heine" wrote: "During the secondary interrogation, which was attended by many officers of different ranks, they bombarded me with questions: who sent it, who are the members of the organization, how did I get there, when do trains run to Mozhaisk, who is my wife, father, their addresses. (Here it should be added that before leaving for the assignment, "Heine" went to his father-in-law to warn him how to behave if someone came from him. The father-in-law was a professor of medicine practicing at home. Saying goodbye, the father-in-law took out the cross of his wife "Heine" and, despite Alexander's resistance, put it around his neck, saying: "The cross will save you." He blessed, hugged him goodbye like a son.) I argued the version that the ideological opponents of the Soviet government were united in the Throne organization. Their goal is to fight communism. I was given an ultimatum: if I tell the truth, I will save my life and will be in a concentration camp until the end of the war. They gave me half an hour to think. Threatened with "third degree" torture. I was taken to another room, where there were several beds, weapons hung on the walls."

Half an hour passed. What was he thinking about in anticipation of torture? No, there was no fear. There was one thought - to endure, to complete the task. The ticking of clocks echoed in my temples. Wouldn't break. A weapon hung overhead. So, another check. You can commit suicide without expecting torture. But it will derail the operation. Another half hour passed. The clock continued to run, but it seemed that time had stopped. He lay down and fell asleep with faith in his lucky star. I woke up with the sound of boots and the blows of rifle butts. Three soldiers with rifles led him out onto the porch into the yard and placed him against the wall of the barn. It was a quiet overcast evening. Searchlights cut through the sky and flares flared.

In anticipation of the execution, "Heine" did not think about death, but about fulfilling his duty to the end. "Several officers appeared on the porch, who were talking animatedly. One, grinning, drew the prosecutor's attention to the cross on my chest," Alexander Petrovich said. - I was asked if I would speak, to which I replied: "I told the truth." The officer gave the command - shots rang out from several rifles, and a fan of chips fell on me. Understood: still alive. The Germans laughed. (My wife's father was right—the cross saved me.)

I was taken to the same room where they interrogated me. The table was laid and served there. The senior officer cordially invited: "Mr. Alexander, cognac, vodka. For success. Let's work together. You will have to stay in Smolensk for some time, where we will send you tomorrow. The instruction has begun. It had an effect on me like spurs on a horse. So the game started."

Despite the "solemn" promise to work together, the Germans continued to check. The next day, as promised, he was sent by car to Smolensk. In Smolensk they were placed in a concentration camp together

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with traitors. Behind the wall, prisoners of war were tortured, watching his reaction. "It was a difficult moral test," Heine recalled, "to overcome disgust and hatred for traitors, to endure silent curses in the eyes of prisoners of war and the cold contempt of German army officers for a traitor to the Motherland, a coward." This psychological struggle was harder for him than the physical one.

Again and again interrogations were repeated in the camp administration. Abwehr officers were constantly interested in the history of his passage through the minefield. Tested knowledge in the field of radio and electrical engineering.

After some time, "Heine" was transferred to a city apartment in Smolensk, where two special instructors were engaged in special training with him. All three were given lunch and a bottle of schnapps. After class, one of the instructors took him back to the camp. Studied cryptography, cipher and radio business. As "Heine" later recalled, during classes it was most difficult for him to hide that he knew how to work fluently on the telegraph key.

From time to time, the head of the camp, Giss, visited the "Heine" safe house. He was sympathetic to "Heine" and through the soldiers passed him canned food and cigarettes. Heine, in turn, shared these presentations with his instructors. They became more frank with him and treated him more respectfully, seeing such an attitude of the boss. During classes, they even left him alone for a while, and in the evenings, before leaving for the camp, they played cards with him.

A few weeks later, "Heine" met with a high representative of the Abwehr, at which he was informed that he would soon be sent back to Moscow with a task of subversive work in the capital. We clarified some details, the time for communication and agreed that the "couriers" arriving in Moscow would come to his father-in-law, and he would connect them with "Heine".

After that, the "Heine", accompanied by a German officer, was transported to Minsk, from where it was supposed to take off by plane across the front line, jump with a parachute, and then get to Moscow. In Minsk, he was settled in a private apartment, where several neighbors lived, and left alone. This was also an element of verification, because for three days no one bothered him, and people were driven under the windows, severely beating them at the same time. Neighbors explained that another group of partisans was being led to the execution, closely following his reaction and talking about other cases of Nazi barbarity. Undoubtedly, during this time, a thorough check of the biographical data of "Heine" and other information received from him was carried out according to the files of the German special services. In particular, whether before the war he was involved in intelligence operations conducted by the OGPU-NKVD through Russian emigrants.

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Finally, a car came for him and he was taken to the airfield. They gave money to the Throne organization and put me on a plane. There was already a Russian, dressed in the uniform of a Soviet soldier. "Heine" was told that this was his partner by the name of Krasnov and that he would jump first. (It must be understood that the Germans were insuring themselves until the very last moment.) However, on the plane



Krasnov was seasick and the Heine was the first to jump through the hatch, landing in the forest near the regional center of Arefino, Yaroslavl region.

It was March 15, 1942. Here is how Heine himself describes his return to his native land:

"... in Arefino, I gave my pseudonym and said that at night I was dropped from a German plane and that the traitor Krasnov was supposed to be dropped after me, described his signs. He asked me to immediately report this to Moscow. I was ordered from Moscow to immediately take me to Yaroslavl after medical assistance was provided (I had an injured knee). I was warmly welcomed in Yaroslavl.

I felt an incredible surge of energy and impatience to enter into a new stage of the struggle with the enemy. The thread has started, but its strength still needs to be checked. Accompanied by state security officers, I went to Moscow by car. A few days later I learned that Krasnov had been detained."

Returning to Moscow, "eine" wrote a report for the first two weeks and did not leave the house, since it was possible that the Germans could check when he returned. Returning too quickly could arouse suspicion.

Two weeks later, "Heine" went on the air. Communication with the Germans took place. In agreement with the state security agencies and the General Staff of the Red Army, he gave them the first disinformation.

For the first four months, the state security organs deliberately refused to put any questions to the Germans. It was only in August 1942 that the Germans were informed that the organization's transmitter had fallen into disrepair and needed to be replaced. The couriers were not long in coming. On August 24, 1942, as agreed, they came to the father-in-law "Heine", and then came to him. They turned out to be traitors Stankevich and Shakurov. They brought a new walkie-talkie, batteries, notepads for encryption and money. Their goal was to carry out sabotage work in Moscow, collect the necessary information, and establish useful contacts. They were dressed in Soviet military uniforms, equipped with a walkie-talkie, weapons and proper documents.

By evening, the order was given to put the couriers to sleep. While they were sleeping, they were photographed, searched, and the cartridges in their revolvers were replaced with blanks. In the morning they were given the opportunity to walk around Moscow under surveillance, and then one was arrested at the station when he tried to

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count the passing trains, and the second - from the woman with whom he managed to

yyyyyyyyyyyyyy.

In order to further obtain German intelligence agents, "Heine" informed the Germans by radio that Stankevich and Shakurov arrived safely, but the radio was not delivered, as it was damaged upon landing.

On October 7, 1942, two more couriers of German intelligence came to Moscow. They were also secretly arrested by the state security organs, and the Germans were informed that they had arrived safely and had begun their mission. Subsequently, the disinformation of the Germans was carried out along two lines. On the one hand, on the Heine radio station on behalf of the monarchist organization Throne, and on the other hand, on behalf of the saboteurs who arrived on October 7, 1942, who were recruited to cooperate to misinform the Germans without being released from custody. The saboteur Shakurov, who arrived earlier, during this time managed to attract four people from the anti-Soviet environment, previously known to him, who were arrested, to espionage work.

Given that agents Stankevich and Shakurov, who arrived first, were instructed to return back to the Germans, the NKVD officers decided to compromise one of them. For this

"Heine" informed the Germans that Shakurov "does not want to do anything, is a coward, drinks a lot" and asked for instructions. In response, the Germans sent the following radio message: "Shakurov is becoming dangerous for us. To destroy it without sentimentality by all means. Let me know how you got on with it." The Germans were told: "Shakurov has been destroyed."

On October 12, 1942, the Germans offered "Heine" to inform them about the place of work of the members of the Throne organization. While sending "Heine" back behind the front line of the Red Army, the German intelligence officers recommended and insisted that the "Throne" and its cells should propagate National Socialism, and in essence Nazi-type fascism. After Heine replied that there were members of the organization not only in Moscow, but also in some other cities of the USSR, the Germans demanded that they be given addresses and passwords to send couriers to the cities of Yaroslavl, Murom or Ryazan.

In order not to arouse suspicion, and also in order to deprive German intelligence of the opportunity to send its agents to areas of interest to it, the Germans were informed that the organization did not have people in the cities they named, but it had the ability to receive couriers in the city of Gorky. The Germans replied that this city satisfies them, and asked for the password and address of the safe house. The game with the Abwehr expanded.

The Germans highly appreciated the work of "Heine". On December 18, 1942, they transmitted a radiogram about awarding him and Stankevich with the Order of Swords for bravery. In response, "Heine" and Stankevich conveyed gratitude and a promise to "work even harder and better for victory."

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The radio play continued. The monarchist organization "acquired" another safe house where an NKVD worker lived. Two "illegal" radio stations ("Heine" and Stankevich) worked for the Germans, which transmitted "important strategic" information to the German command. German intelligence couriers increasingly arrived in the Soviet Union. They were met not only in Moscow, but also in other cities. One of them was even allowed to come back to tell that the underground organization "Throne" lives and operates.

Operational game "Monastery" was carried out on a wide scale. The legendary underground organization Throne, based in Moscow, had its own strongholds created by state security agencies in other cities of the Soviet Union. They were secure and secret apartments with specially trained agents. The deployment of these points was of unconditional interest to German intelligence, since they were organized in a number of large industrial centers of the Soviet Union (the cities of Gorky, Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk, Novosibirsk). A network of agents-informers was created, including in the People's Commissariat of Railways, which ensured the "credibility" of the information transmitted to the Germans. The painstaking and careful study of all the details of the operation "Monastery" made it possible to ensure the secret work of the organization without failures.

During the operational game, which continued with German intelligence until the end of the Great Patriotic War, more than 50 enemy agents were captured by state security agencies, 7 accomplices of spies were arrested and several million rubles were received from the Germans.

A special role was played by a large work on disinformation. The significance of this line of work can be seen from the assessment of the "information" that she was given in the Abwehr and the General Staff of the Wehrmacht.

The former head of the Abwehr reconnaissance point in Sofia and Budapest, Richard Klatt, who was captured by American intelligence services in the summer of 1945, said that the valuable source "Max" had been transmitting his reports by radio since 1942, and directly from Moscow. Abwehr received them in Sofia and Budapest. Among the reports were information about the most important decisions of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of the Soviet Armed Forces, information about the judgments of Marshal Boris Shaposhnikov and other military leaders. The reports were highly valued in the "Foreign Armies of the East" department of the General Staff of the German Land Forces. Moreover, the German top military leaders did not

made their decisions until they received Max's reports from the Canaris service. In post-war memoirs, General Gehlen, who after the war became the head of the German intelligence service, spoke highly of the reports of the Abwehr source from Moscow as a great

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achievement of German military intelligence. Apparently, he meant "Max", which was for the Germans almost the only direct source of information from Moscow.

Despite the skepticism of some Abwehr employees about the authenticity of the reports that came to Klatt, on the whole they agreed that "Max" was trustworthy. However, Walter Schellenberg, who headed the joint foreign service of the RSHA - the Main Directorate of Imperial Security, had doubts about the reliability of the information he received from the Soviet Union. Since he was reluctant to make unambiguous decisions on his own, he decided to visit the chief of the general staff of the ground forces, Colonel General Guderian, who was familiar with Klatt's information, and asked if the German military leadership could refuse Klatt's materials. Guderian formally replied to Schellenberg that it would be foolhardy to abandon this line, since the material, especially concerning the Soviet air force, is unique. And there are no other possibilities even close to this source.

It is interesting to note that the "information" of "Heine", transmitted to the Germans, ironically returned to the state security organs from sources from the Abwehr and British intelligence. So, in 1942, intelligence managed to establish a short, but very productive cooperation with one of the leaders of the Abwehr cipher service, Colonel Schmitt. Before his failure, he managed to transfer to us in one of the countries occupied by the Germans a number of valuable intelligence materials of the Abwehr received from Moscow and sent as orientation to this country. When analyzing these materials, it was found that they are "disinformation" by "Heine". Schmitt was also associated with British intelligence. Therefore, through Schmitt, the British received a number of Heine messages, which the Germans made out in the form of orientations of the Wehrmacht headquarters.

Information containing data transmitted through the "Heine" to the Germans, the USSR state security agencies received "back" three times. For the first time ~ in February 1943, from Schmitt. The second time, in March of the same year, Anthony Blunt, who worked in the British intelligence service during the war years (one of our five valuable sources in England), told Resident Gorsky in London that the Germans had an important source of information in Moscow in the military sphere. And finally, in April 1943, through the communication mission of our intelligence in London, a statement of the Heine message transmitted by the British to Berlin arrived, allegedly intercepted by British intelligence. In reality, the British had this information on the basis of deciphering work. (Being allied with us, they did not tell us that they were reading German ciphers.)

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Thus, the presence of a "valuable" source of the German Abwehr directly in Moscow became known to the British secret services, which, like their opponents in the war, failed to reveal the secret of "Heine". In 1943, W. Churchill even informed Stalin that there was a German agent at the Red Army headquarters.

It should be told how the preparation of disinformation materials for transmission via the Heine radio took place. Code telegrams were prepared on the basis of the materials of the General Staff of the Red Army, its recommendations, as well as on the basis of information from other departments involved in this operational game, in particular, the People's Commissariat of Railways.

The Germans were subjected to careful study of radiograms, and it was not an easy task to pass off disinformation material as plausible. We had to think over our moves a few steps ahead, put ourselves in the opponent's place, try to uncover his logic. Naturally, the content of the transmitted telegrams was linked to those known to the Germans.

specific possibilities of Heine. In particular, he was arranged by the state security agencies under a different name for the position of junior communications officer in the General Staff of the Red Army.

The "Heine" telegrams, laconic in content, dealt mainly with the rail transportation of military units, military equipment, ammunition, and equipment. It is clear that this made it possible to calculate the offensive operations planned by our troops.

However, the state security authorities assumed in advance that someone unknown to us was also monitoring the railway. Therefore, the military echelons were camouflaged, and false trains, where under the tarpaulin instead of guns, tanks and other equipment there were logs, boxes and other elements of disguise, followed the routes indicated in the telegrams of Heine. He, having instructions from the Germans to conduct sabotage work, periodically informed the Abwehr about the results of this "work". In order to confirm acts of sabotage and strengthen the reputation of "Heine", the NKVD organized reports in the press about sabotage on railway transport, in particular on the railway near the city of Gorky.

In some cases, when it was necessary and beneficial for the command of the Red Army, the German Abwehr received from "Heine" plausible information for a very specific purpose. In order for the disinformation materials transmitted to "Heine" to become even more convincing, according to the plan of the head of the operational department of the General Staff, General S.M. Shtemenko, some important operations of the Red Army at the front were actually carried out where "Heine" predicted them, but they had a distracting,

auxiliary  
meaning.

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Characteristic in this regard were the disinformation measures carried out through "Heine" on the eve of the Stalingrad and Oryol-Kursk operations.

The High Command of the Wehrmacht was misled by the "information" of "Heine" about the actions of the Soviet troops during the development and preparation of the Stalingrad cauldron. In particular, it was reported to Berlin that offensive actions of our troops were being prepared in the Rzhev region and in the North Caucasus. The Germans were expecting our attacks there and repelled them. But the environment of the Paulus group came as a complete surprise to them.

Regarding the summer campaign of 1943, "Heine" informed the Germans that the Soviet troops had large reserves in the south and east of Kursk, but these reserves were not sufficiently maneuverable, and therefore their use was difficult. He also informed that the Soviet command planned to carry out military operations north of Kursk and on the southern front. The transition of Soviet troops in the area of Kursk and Orel to strategic defense, and then to the offensive

came as a surprise to the Germans.

The volume of encrypted correspondence between "Heine" and the Abwehr, which included, in addition to "informational" materials, many requests and answers on organizational and operational issues, amounted to three voluminous, now archival volumes.

For successful assistance to the strategic operations of the Red Army, some employees of the state security agencies were awarded orders and medals. The head of the operation "Monastery" Lieutenant General P.A. Sudoplatov and his deputy Major General N.I. Eitingon were awarded the Orders of Suvorov, which was the only time in the system of state security agencies. "Heine" himself - Alexander Petrovich Demyanov - received the Order of the Red Star, his wife, Tatyana Georgievna Berezantseva, and her father - medals "For Military Merit".

The year 1944 has come. The war was coming to an end. The Red Army was approaching the state border of the USSR. One of the most successful wartime state security intelligence operations was also coming to an end.

However, the task of the "Monastery" undercover development – to introduce our man into the German intelligence agencies with his subsequent promotion to the central office in Berlin – was not solved. The idea of sending a coordinator from the "Throne" to the Germans was discussed. The issue of a second voyage of "Heine" to its "owners" in German intelligence was worked out. "Heine" himself came up with a proposal - a report addressed to Maklyarsky, in which he wrote that in order to strengthen the trust and position of the "Throne" organization in the eyes of German intelligence, it would be advisable to send an envoy, whom they had been waiting for a long time.

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"Heine" proposed to inform the Germans in advance that one of the active members of the "Throne" organization was drafted into the Red Army and sent as an interpreter to the camp of German prisoners of war. Then, with the help of this interpreter, organize the escape of several German officers and, with this group of prisoners of war, bring him – "Heine" – to the Germans.

This proposal was prepared on August 1, 1944. And a few days later, Heine was included in a new big game with the German command, which was carried out by the USSR NKGB under the code name Berezino.

"Heine" informed German intelligence that he had been transferred from the communications group of the Red Army General Staff to technical units with the rank of engineer-captain. In this regard, another radio was required to continue communication from Moscow, where his functions would be performed by another radio operator trained by the Throne organization. He takes his walkie-talkie with him and will contact them from those places where he will be on duty.

Thus, communication with the Abwehr did not stop and the second part of the operational game of the state security agencies with the German special services was quickly prepared - the operation "Berezino".

But this is the next page of our history.

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#### Operational game "Berezino"

On April 4, 1944, Chairman of the State Defense Committee and Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin summoned to the Kremlin Commissar of State Security Merkulov, head of military counterintelligence SMERSH Abakumov, head of the GRU of the General Staff of the Red Army Kuznetsov, and head of the sabotage and intelligence department of the NKGB Sudoplatov. The meeting took place before the beginning of the summer offensive of the Soviet troops in Belarus, and in this regard, the command of the Red Army was interested in continuing the operational game with German intelligence under the code name "Monastery". Opinions were expressed to look at this game from the point of view of achieving strategic goals at the final stage of the Patriotic War.

- Who has an idea about this? Stalin asked.

The head of the GRU, General Kuznetsov, suggested using the same channel to plant information to the Germans through "Heine", a representative of the organization we are legending about (among the Germans he was known as "Max"), about an allegedly planned offensive operation in Ukraine, since Stavka actually discussed this option before. There were other suggestions as well. We settled on the fact that this time it would be better to mislead the German command, creating the impression that the remnants of German troops, who were surrounded during our offensive, were operating behind the rear of the Red Army. The idea was to force the Germans to commit their resources to supporting these units and encourage them to make a serious attempt to break through the encirclement. The task went beyond the traditional forms of disinformation activities carried out so far. Therefore, active measures were taken to clarify the position of German troops on the Belarusian sector of the front and, in particular, about the possible presence

there units surrounded by the Red Army. It was established that the remnants of the defeated German units were indeed

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marched on the Minsk and other highways, laid down their arms and waited to be taken prisoner.

On August 18, 1944, through the Moscow radio station of the legendary church-monarchist organization Throne, the Germans were informed that in the area of the Berezina River (BSSR) a large German military unit of more than 2,000 people was allegedly hiding, having lost contact with its command and the Spanish - in need of food, medicines and ammunition. Thus began Operation Berezino ~ continuation of Operation Monastery.

On August 20, 1944, a plan was approved for "measures to organize a false base supposedly operating in our rear of a German military unit and to ensure the reception of cargo, couriers, radio operators, which should be sent by German intelligence to this base." In accordance with this plan, a special group of employees of the Fourth Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR was created, which was sent to the Berezino region.

She was instructed to select a suitable location from among the bases in which partisan detachments operated and where the legendary German unit was allegedly hiding. It was necessary to prepare sites for receiving cargo and paratroopers and in case of a possible landing German aircraft.

The task force was to ensure the meeting of German paratroopers, including radio operators, to receive cargo dropped by the Germans and to carry out other activities related to the implementation of this combination.

One of the points of this plan provided: "For the possible legend of the presence of a German military unit in the designated area, as well as in case it is necessary to organize" meetings "" in the dark "with the arriving German agents, the operational group is given a prisoner of war of the German army, Lieutenant Colonel Sherhorn, who appears in our messages to the enemy as the commander of a legendary unit, who is kept at the base under appropriate control. (The lieutenant colonel was aware of the matter, since he had been recruited before that.) "The group included German agents, former prisoners of war, dressed in the uniform of the German army: "Georg" (for negotiations on behalf of the German military unit with the arriving German agents), "Walter" and "Jacques".

For camouflage purposes, German-made products were allocated to the head of the task force as NZ. And finally, 20 submachine gunners of a separate motorized rifle brigade for special purposes of the NKGB of the USSR were assigned to a special group.

From the archive of the Foreign Intelligence Service:

"Reference. POW Lieutenant Colonel Sherhorn Heinrich. Personnel officer, administrator of the communal im- munity

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creatures. He was taken prisoner on July 9, 1944 in the Minsk region, a member of the NSDAP since 1933. Is pessimistic. He does not believe in the victory of Germany.

Lieutenant Colonel Heinrich Sherhorn was recruited by the state security agencies, and he was given the pseudonym "Shubin". Interesting details related to this. Why did the choice fall on Sherhorn for the role of the commander of this unit?

A young intelligence officer, Igor Aleksandrovich Shchors, who directly handled this case, recalls that in a prisoner of war camp in Krasnogorsk near Moscow, he selected

Sherhorn was among the other candidates only for the reason that they both spoke French. It was military time, there were not enough translators. And Shchors took on the duties of a translator. He himself transported Sherhorn from Krasnogorsk to Moscow to the internal prison on Lubyanka without an escort, for which he received a scolding from his superiors. But how convenient it was when a recruiting conversation was held with Sherhorn! According to I.A. Shchors, he was recruited by the head of the sabotage and reconnaissance Fourth Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR, Lieutenant General Sudoplatov in his office.

On the eastern shore of Lake Pesochnoe, near the village of Glukhoye, Chervensky district, Minsk region, the operational group at the former partisan base imitated the location of the German unit led by Sherhorn. Moscow was waiting for an answer to the telegram "Heine" dated August 18 about the presence of a combat-ready German military unit in the rear of the Soviet troops. There was no answer for a long time. Apparently, the Germans checked the identity of the commander, Lieutenant Colonel Heinrich Sherhorn, through their accounts and channels. On August 25, 1944, the following reply came: "Thank you for your messages. Please contact this German unit. We intend to drop various cargoes for them. We could also send a radio operator who could contact the authorities here from there. To do this, we must know the location of this part so that our radio operator can find it, and a place suitable for dropping luggage.

This unit should have been informed of the arrival of a radio operator, so that he would not be detained by this unit, since the radio operator would come in the uniform of the Red Army.

The password will be Hannover.

Hello".

And Alexander Demyanov - aka "Heine" and "Max" - began to act. For the Germans, he was recently "seconded" to the 51st separate road construction detachment, located in the town of Berezino, which is 100 km west of the city of Mogilev. "Heine" - "Max" managed to contact Sherhorn-Shubin. On September 7, the location of the site of this unit was transmitted to the Germans by radio and the password "Hannover" was confirmed, by which people from them can contact the commander. In the area of Lake Pesochnoe, a convenient

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The main platform for dropping cargo and landing aircraft is a former partisan airfield, which the Germans knew about during the occupation of Belarus. They built dugouts nearby and pitched several tents. They were constantly occupied by a task force for "meeting guests", dressed in German uniforms. The group consisted of 10 reliable agents from among the Germans, who were supposed to accept paratroopers as soldiers of Sherhorn's "unit". The approaches to the airfield site were carefully guarded by military patrols, and not far from it, in case of any complications, several anti-aircraft and machine-gun installations were disguised.

On the night of September 15-16, 1944, the Germans threw out three radio operators at the indicated coordinates. They were accepted and taken to Sherhorn. In a conversation with Scherhorn, the senior group of arrived radio operators, Kurt Kibert, said that a few days before he was thrown out, part of Scherhorn was reported to Hitler and Goering. They told Sherhorn to be told that everything possible would be done to save his unit. According to Kibert, the German command decided to send a doctor and an officer of the aviation unit to Sherhorn, who would have to prepare a landing site for aircraft of the Arado type!, on which it was planned to deliver weapons, ammunition, uniforms and food. According to Kibert, the German command intends to take out the wounded by plane, so that the "unit" of Sherhorn, equipped with everything necessary, can move west, to join the German army.

The German radio operators had the task the very next day after landing to report on their walkie-talkie and conditional code confirmation whether there really is a Sherhorn military unit and that they are in this particular unit. German radio operators Kurt Kybert and Friedrich Schmete were recruited and were included in the radio game with the German

command under the control of the task force. The third Abwehr radio operator was reported to have been seriously wounded upon landing and was being treated. Having received confirmation of a military unit under the command of Scherhorn that really existed in the forests of Belarus, the German command ceased to doubt and began to prepare for the delivery of cargo and people.

Due to the fact that the size of the operation began to develop more and more, the head of the Fourth Directorate of the NKGB Sudoplatov sent experienced employees to Berezino: Maklyarsky, Mordvinov and Fischer, the same one who in the sixties in America became the legendary Rudolf Abel (on litigation, he took the name of his early deceased friend). Major-General N.I. Sudoplatov's deputy, Major General N.I. Eitingon.

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People's Commissar for State Security V.N. Merkulov approved additionally developed measures, including the following:

“- in the course of the radio game, achieve the opening by the German command of one of the sections of the front for the passage of a “part” of Scherhorn and introduce into the passage under this pretext a previously prepared and suitably equipped formation of the Red Army to break through the German front;

— taking into account the enemy's interest in organizing reconnaissance work behind the lines of the Red Army, get one major intelligence officer through the game and start misinforming the German command through him.”

As the German radio operator Kurt Kiebert said, on October 27, 1944, the Germans threw two more paratroopers onto the platform of Scherhorn's "unit" - doctor Jeschke and aviation non-commissioned officer Harry Wild. Jeschke and Wild were also received by Scherhorn in the above order, to whom they handed over a letter dated October 26 of the same year from the commander of the German Army Group "Center" Colonel General Reinhard and a letter dated October 23 from the head of the "Abwehrkommando-103" von Barenfeld, a well-known under the pseudonym Rudolf. In his letter, Reinhard wrote the following: “I heartily thank you, all your officers and soldiers for expressing their best wishes to me. I assure you that all my best wishes are always with you.

Soon in the new year, your perseverance will find its rewards in joining us. I proudly follow the path of movement and will always continue to do everything to help you. Let your password be: "Germany above all." Heil Hitler.

Reinhard"

In addition, Wild and Jeschke reported that Goering had ordered four Arado transport aircraft to be sent to Scherhorn's “parts” camp to deliver cargo and evacuate the wounded, and Non-commissioned officer Wild was instructed to prepare a site for these aircraft, for which he was provided with special instructions.

Arrested Eschke and Wild during interrogations showed that they had to inform the German command by conventional phrases about their safe or unfavorable arrival by radios of previously sent German radio operators. (The Germans continued to check.) Since Wild's testimony and his behavior were not in doubt, he was recruited and his conditional phrase about a safe arrival went on the air to the German command, and in relation to Jeschke it was reported that he crashed on landing, although in reality, things were somewhat different. Jeschke fanatically believed in the victory of Germany and did not want to accept an offer of cooperation.

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stve. It was decided in the morning to send him to a camp for prisoners of war, and at night he was placed in a dugout, guarded by guards. However, Eshka managed to kill the sentry, but, realizing the hopelessness of his situation, he shot himself from the sentry's weapon. The death of the sentry was the only loss on our part during the entire period of the Berezino operation.

The Germans continued to throw their cargo of medicines, food and equipment onto the airfield site, and on December 21, to reinforce the "part" of Sherhorn, they dropped two more German radio operators and four Belarusian intelligence officers who graduated from the intelligence school in Instenburg (East Prussia). German radio operators Troops and Sauter were also recruited and used in the ongoing game.

As early as December 12, the German command offered Sherhorn to break his "unit" into groups and lead them independently to the front line. In this regard, in order to develop the radio game, the NKGB of the USSR legitimized the division of Sherhorn's "unit" into several groups, informing the Germans as their leaders of the names of recruited officers of the German army, including Gert Schiffer, who was dropped by the Germans on the site of the "unit" Sherhorn in the Berezino region on November 11, 1944, and Willi-Albert Eckardt, a lieutenant colonel of the German army, who was taken prisoner in July 1944 in the Bobruisk region. With regard to the first, the Germans later informed Scherhorn by radiogram that Schiffer had been awarded the "Iron Cross 1st Class" by Hitler's order; with regard to the second, one of the Abwehrs transferred to the Scherhorn forest base insisted on a meeting with Lieutenant Colonel Eckardt, as he was instructed to clarify whether Sherhorn is capable of continuing to lead the entire detachment due to the state of his health. Perhaps the Germans wanted to bet on a younger and more energetic officer.

All groups set off. The main group was still led by Sherhorn. Measures were taken so that from the air the movement of the "Germans" looked natural and in camouflage, since they were "in the rear" of the Red Army. After these groups moved along the route proposed by the German command, already on the way they received a significant amount of cargo from German aircraft. The food cargo dropped from the planes (chocolate, biscuits, canned food, glucose, which we didn't have at all in the army) underwent a laboratory test right there on the spot, then it was given to dogs and after that it was consumed by people. The Germans were informed, however, that the delays were due to lack of food and ammunition.

Sometimes reports were also transmitted about "sabotage" in the rear of the Red Army, which were written by Eitingon, Maklyarsky and Mordvinov.

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In November-December 1944 and in January-February 1945, the High Command of the German Army periodically sent congratulatory telegrams to Scherhorn personally, as well as to the soldiers and officers of his "unit", with gratitude for their service, wishes of success and promises to do everything possible and necessary for the withdrawal "parts" for the front line. Once, with a load of ammunition, "iron crosses" were sent to reward the most distinguished. According to eyewitnesses, Colonel G.I. Mordvinov, a Chekist since 1919, twice sentenced to death by the White Guards and the Japanese in the fight against them in the Far East, a courageous and witty man, one day after another briefing of a large group of soldiers, grinning, said that we were really doing a good job, since even the Germans thank us. Laughing, he handed out "crosses" and commanded: "Circle! Now put them in the back." This scene was seen by Willy Fischer (later Rudolf Abel), grinning in his mustache. In Scherhorn's "part", he, as a radio specialist, supervised the work of German radio operators.

From the end of October 1944, the German command began to demand more and more insistently from Scherhorn the preparation of conditions for the landing of aircraft. Based on the fact that this could lead to failure, the NKGB of the USSR took all measures to drag out the operational game, and then, under the pretext of pursuing a "part" of Sherhorn by the Red Army, declare to the Germans that it was impossible to accept aircraft.

The People's Commissariat for State Security prepared a memorandum to the State Defense Committee outlining the options for the development of the Berezino operation and proposed to delay the landing of aircraft. Stalin and Beria agreed on the phone, and Molotov imposed a resolution on the memo: "In my opinion, the second option (pull further) is better."

On March 28, 1945, Scherhorn received a radiogram signed by the Chief of the German General Staff, who congratulated him on being promoted to colonel and awarded the Knight's Cross, 1st Class. He was ordered to break through with "his unit" through the front line and then follow to Poland and East Prussia.

Acting in accordance with the approved plan, which provided for the possibility of luring "one major intelligence officer through the game," the Chekists periodically threw information to the Nazis that it was possible to launch subversive work and create for this a "Belarusian underground center" from among German accomplices. For this reason, the operational group involved in the operation "Berezino" became aware, thanks to radio interception, that the head of the "Abwehrkommando-103", known in the literature as "Saturn", Lieutenant Rudolf von Barenfeld several times personally flew to the rear of the Red Army for reconnaissance of a possible

aircraft landing

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in the area of the Sherhorn forest base. Unfortunately, this plan could not be fully implemented. The plane, on board of which Barenfeld was, came under fire from our anti-aircraft guns on the way back and caught fire. Upon landing, Barenfeld tried to jump out of the burning Arado, got hit by a propeller and died. Sherhorn's "unit" learned about this from the detained agents of the paratroopers.

The troops of the Red Army were rapidly advancing to the West, and the "part" of Sherhorn could not "catch up" with them in any way - the battles were already going on in Germany. On May 1, 1945, the Germans informed Sherhorn that Hitler had died, and on May 5, the Germans transmitted the last telegram over all the radio stations that participated in the game with the enemy in the Berezino case: "The superiority of the enemy forces defeated Germany. Ready-to-ship air fleet supplies cannot be delivered. It is with a heavy heart that we have to stop helping you. Due to the current situation, we can also no longer maintain radio contact with you. Whatever the future brings us, our thoughts will always be with you, who in such a difficult moment have to be disappointed in their hopes.

It was the end of the game. Soviet intelligence brilliantly outplayed the intelligence of Nazi Germany.

Game results? A certificate from the archive of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation dated March 8, 1947 on this undercover case gives an idea about them.

"The Berezino intelligence file was opened in September 1944 for the purpose of a radio game with German intelligence agencies and the German army high command about the presence of allegedly large units of Nazi troops in the Berezino region of the Byelorussian SSR.

To maintain the morale and fighting spirit of its soldiers and officers in the Soviet rear, the German high command systematically transferred its agents and various cargoes to the indicated area from aircraft.

So, according to archival data, from September 1944 to May 1945, the Germans carried out 39 sorties in the Soviet rear and dropped 22 German reconnaissance officers who were arrested by the Fourth Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR 13 radio stations, 255 places of cargo with weapons, ammunition, uniforms, medicines, food and 1,777,000 rubles of Soviet money.

The undercover case of Berezino consists of 117 volumes and two albums, which contain materials related to this case.

In the early 1950s, Heinrich Scherhorn and his group of German prisoners of war were released and left to work and live in the GDR. There is no information about their further fate.

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As for Alexander Petrovich Demyanov, he still lived in Moscow and, as before the war, was associated with artistic circles and cinema figures. He died in 1978 and is buried in the German Cemetery.

'Arado-332 is an amphibious transport monoplane. Specially designed for the Abwehr on the instructions of the Main Directorate of Imperial Security. It had a high ceiling and a short takeoff run, which was achieved by an all-terrain chassis assembled from 20 gutta-percha wheels. Could take on board 250 people. He entered service with the Wehrmacht in 1943.

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"Red Chapel" in the fire of war

The term "Red Chapel" became synonymous with various forces that opposed the Nazis, among which the Schulze-Boysen-Harnack anti-fascist organization was the most numerous and active, although without any formal signs of a clear structure. In order to obscure the distinctive anti-Hitler orientation in the activities of this group, the General Directorate of Reich Security (RSHA) mixed all the groups into one, uniting them in the operational development under the general name "Rote Kapelle", attributing to them "international espionage". According to the fascists, this was a lesser evil than to admit the existence of anti-fascist resistance in the Third Reich at the time of the sharpest battle with the USSR. Contrary to the wishes of the Nazis, this name went down in history as a symbol of the courage of people, personifying the steadfastness of resistance to German fascism.

The Deputy Chief of the Gestapo Müller, Chairman of the Special Commission of the Red Chapel, SS Oberführer F. Pannzinger, who was taken prisoner by the Soviet Army, spoke about how the name "Red Chapel" came into being. During interrogations at SMERSH on February 1, 1947 and June 29, 1951 at the Lubyanka, he testified that the monitoring of the activities of anti-fascists began as a result of radio interception of encrypted messages by radio specialists (in counterintelligence jargon, radio operators were called "musicians", "pianists"). The chirping of the Morse code was heard on the air, not from one radio transmitter, but from many. In Germany and in the occupied countries of Europe, a whole "orchestra", or in German "chapel" worked. The German radio espionage service determined that the "musicians" oriented their broadcasts to Moscow. Therefore, the "chapel" received the appropriate "red" color.

Pannzinger's team put a disparaging connotation into the naming of their opponents. The Nazis wanted the memory

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about the members of the "Red Chapel" disappeared forever. But fate decreed otherwise. Almost no one remembers the Sonderkommando Rote Kapelle. The names of Harro Schulze-Boysen ("Foreman") and Arvid Harnak ("Corsican"), their like-minded friends are known in the world as the names of courageous people who, in the difficult time of Nazi terror, managed to discern the inevitable collapse of German fascism and fight for the construction of a new, peace-loving and democratic Germany.

The "Red Chapel" included numerous, often unrelated anti-fascist resistance groups. They worked either independently or in contact with Soviet foreign intelligence, and some of them were under the direct supervision of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Red Army General Staff.

well well

The war, although it was expected from day to day, was unexpected for the head of the Berlin "legal" residency, Zakhar (A. Kobulov). He had only a rough idea of the state of Soviet-German relations, of the means and forms of intelligence activity, its goals and tasks. Kobulov worked for a long time in the security agencies of the Transcaucasus, until, under the patronage of Beria, he was appointed to the post of Deputy People's Commissar of State Security of Ukraine, but was immediately sent to Berlin. As a confidant of Beria, he enjoyed his special patronage. According to the recollections of one of the employees of the residency, the news of the German attack on the Soviet Union literally shocked Kobulov: in his underwear and slippers on his bare feet, he left the apartment and sat on the porch, clasping his head in his hands.

An urgent encrypted message was received from Moscow with a demand to destroy secret documents and establish contact with valuable agents.

In order to provide the agents with a radio communication system, the residency decided that V.M. Berezhkov, the 1st secretary of the USSR embassy in Germany, agreed with the SS officer guarding the embassy on a joint trip to the city with his embassy friend under the pretext of the latter saying goodbye to his beloved German girl, promising for this a solid sum in stamps in cash. A.M. was such a "friend". Korotkov is a residency officer in Berlin. He had a radio transmitter camouflaged as a travel suitcase.

On June 24, 1941, on the third day of the war, the gates of the embassy were opened by an SS man on duty, and the embassy's Opel Olympia left for Unter den Linden. Berezhkov was driving, SS Obersturmführer to his right, in the back seat was a "friend", operational officer A.M. Korotkov. He looked like a man in love

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the war separated him from his girlfriend, to whom he was going to say goodbye, perhaps forever.

Getting off at the metro station, Korotkov slowly went downstairs and boarded an approaching train. Having changed several routes, Korotkov at one of the subway stations met with Elisabeth Schumacher, an active and reliable anti-fascist of the Berlin underground. She answered the questions put by the operative, he handed over 20 thousand marks.

- The time is unpredictable, you may need funds for travel, the purchase of equipment, paper, and you never know what else. I understand that this is not enough, but we will try to transfer additional funds as soon as possible. Now, Elizabeth, listen carefully and remember. It is necessary to hand over this suitcase to Arvid Harnak and tell him that the initial number for recoding the letters is 19405. Remember?

The embassy workers, and with them the residencies, were taken out by the Germans from Berlin on July 2, 1941 and arrived through Turkey to Leninakan on the Armenian-Turkish border on July 18 of the same year. Exit A.M. Korotkov to the city on June 24 was the last personal meeting of the Soviet intelligence officer with the Berlin anti-fascists.

The Center did not inform A. Harnack of the wavelength of its own radio transmissions, without which radio communication with the Berliners would take on a one-way character. In Berlin, with all their desire, they could not accept and decipher Moscow's instructions, even if they had followed them. The receiving station for A. Harnack, equipped in the Brest region, ceased to exist in the very first days of the war. There was no other reception point for foreign intelligence.

However, one had only to look at a map of Europe to notice that the distance from Stockholm or London to Berlin was much shorter than from Minsk or Moscow, not to mention the Urals. This prompted the intelligence leadership to think about using the radio stations of its residencies in Great Britain and Sweden. Beria personally gave instructions. to resume listening to the radio of Arvid Harnak from Stockholm and London.

The residency radio station in Stockholm did not pick up a single radio signal. London also reported that the residency receiver once recorded weak radio signals from Harnack's walkie-talkie, but in the future they did not repeat.

The leadership of the German department of Soviet foreign intelligence reported to the chief of intelligence their assessment of the current situation: the lack of complete clarity on the reasons for the silence of A. Harnack's radio makes it imperative to send a reliable courier-communicator to Berlin.

The draft telegram to the residency, prepared by the department and stored in the SVR archive, said:

"Find out the reasons for the lack of radio broadcasts. Find out also the position of our close friends. Let them cook kvar

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shooting galleries for receiving guests who arrive to them. It is desirable that the Berlin friends urgently leave for a personal meeting with the trade representative in Istanbul or with the consul in Stockholm. In both cases, the password was Shtralman.

Among the people well known to intelligence was the radio operator K. Schulze. A native of a large poor family, Kurt Schulze was drafted into the navy during the First World War, acquired the specialty of a radiotelegraph operator and served as a flight radio operator on a cruiser. After demobilization, he worked as a driver, and most recently as a courier at the post office. In 1920, Schulze joined the KKE, and she brought him up as a staunch proletarian internationalist. In 1929, he agreed to conduct intelligence activities through the Comintern in favor of the Soviet Union, which embodied in his eyes the ideals of social progress, peace and social justice.

When Hitler attacked the USSR, K. Schulze expected that with the beginning of the war he would be called upon and he would turn out to be a useful fighter on the invisible front. But days and weeks passed, and no one came to see him. But one day, his longtime friend and party comrade Walter Huzemann turned to him, who asked Kurt on behalf of the Comintern to help the Schulze-Boysen-Harnack organization to establish regular communication with Moscow. Kurt Schulze may have thought that this was the very assignment he had been waiting for so long, and he got involved in the activities of the organization, using his experience and knowledge.

The very first contacts of Kurt Schulze with Harro Schulze-Boysen convinced the radio operator that he really was helping the Soviet Union in its fight against fascism. Information of a military-political nature, which Harro reported for transmission to Moscow, was difficult to underestimate.

For example, Schulze-Boysen told Kurt the plans of the German command for 1942. They, in particular, envisaged combat actions of German troops in the direction of the oil-bearing regions of the Caucasus, primarily Maikop. According to Harro, this was dictated by an acute shortage of fuel for the Air Force and military equipment. According to German experts, Germany's own gasoline accumulated should have been enough until March 1942. In the future, the inevitable stop of vehicles and military equipment would follow. Therefore, Hitler aimed at the Caucasus, which, according to his calculations, was closest to the German armies. The restoration of oil wells in the territory occupied by the Germans required, according to preliminary calculations, from six to nine months. The German command intended to strengthen the group of German troops near Moscow and Leningrad, in particular, at the expense of soldiers and officers of the airborne forces who participated in the battles for Crete. The German command, according to Harro, was not going to attack Leningrad. It wanted to strangle the city in a ring of tight blockade.

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In his information, Harro pointed out that during the first months of the war, the German Air Force suffered significant losses on the Eastern Front. The replenishment of new aircraft lagged behind the needs of combat aviation. Most aircraft factories in German-occupied Europe lay in ruins. At the same time, Germany and its armed forces had great opportunities to start a chemical WAR.

Harro reported the location of Hitler's headquarters and indicated that Marshal Goering was stationed there with his headquarters. For security reasons, the location of the Fuhrer's headquarters

often changed.

Further, Schulze-Boysen noted that the Germans had seized the Soviet diplomatic code in Petsamo (Finland). German intelligence defeated the British intelligence network in the Balkans and recruited several radio operators, with the help of which they organized a radio game with London. Admiral Canaris, head of the Abwehr, allegedly enlisted the intelligence chief of the Fighting France Committee, which was headed by General de Gaulle in London.

However, the intelligence information transmitted by radio to Moscow was not heard by the addressee. Nevertheless, this most valuable information was reported to the Center through illegal intelligence channels. They were reported to I.V. Stalin and received his high praise.

But regular communication could not be established. "What's the matter, why is Berlin silent?" - did not understand in foreign intelligence. After reviewing the relevant documentation, the radio operator-expert stated: "There is nothing surprising in this. The radio of the Berlin anti-fascists is low-power. With all their efforts, they are unlikely to be able to contact the radio communication system in Kuibyshev, where the main intelligence services have moved.

The situation that arose forced intelligence to look for new opportunities to restore contact with the Berliners. After a thorough check, two experienced agents were selected. It was decided to speed up their training and at the end of 1941 to be transferred by air from Great Britain to the European continent. By agreement with the British special services, with whom there was a special agreement, the agents "Wahe" and "Brigadier", already having the skills to work behind enemy lines, practiced parachute jumps. However, during one of the training sessions at the British training ground, Wahe was seriously injured and was hospitalized. The business trip of "Wahe" and "Brigadier" to Berlin fell through before it even started.

Foreign intelligence demanded that the Stockholm residency make more active use of agents, who themselves were instructed to select a courier-communicator to be sent to Berlin. In January 1942, Resident Keen (B.A. Rybkin) went to Stockholm to find a reliable person as soon as possible to send him to contact the Schulze-Boysen and Harnack group.

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The order puzzled Kin and his deputy Irina (Z.I. Rybkina-Voskresenskaya), but they found a way out, and the Center was forced to agree to their proposal to transfer to "Adam", the director of one of the Swedish firms, the conditions for appearing to the members of the Schulze group - Boysen--Harnack.

Only in June 1942, six months after the assignment was received by the Stockholm residency, "Adam" flew to Berlin. Here he met with the group's radio operator Kurt Schulze, who informed Adam that he lacked radio components and anode batteries to establish radio contact with Moscow.

The consequences of "Adam's" visit to Berlin had an unexpected effect in the fall of 1942. In a telegram to Kinu, signed by Beria, it was stated that "Adam" turned out to be a provocateur. The appearances that were given to him when visiting Berlin failed, and our intelligence sources in Berlin were arrested. In fact, there was no evidence of Adam's involvement in the failed turnouts and arrests of group members in the intelligence archives.

Meanwhile, foreign intelligence stubbornly continued to search for ways to restore contact with the Berlin anti-fascists. On the evening of August 4, 1942, cars drove up to a small airfield near Moscow, from which two paratroopers got out - "Franz" (Albert Hessler) and "Beck" (Robert Barth), ready to be thrown into the rear of the Germans.

Hessler took the path of fighting fascism long ago. The second was a POW, Private Robert Barth, born in 1910, who declared his affiliation with the KKE. At the request of Fitin, Bart was taken from the camp of German prisoners of war to the inner prison in Lubyanka. During the interrogations, Bart gave information about himself, which was confirmed during the check.

"Enough, fought for the Fuhrer," he said. – It is necessary to convince the German soldiers that Hitler and Germany are different concepts.

- Are you ready to contribute to this?

Yes, if the opportunity presents itself.

So Albert Hessler and Robert Barth ended up in the intelligence school, where they were trained according to a special program.

There was also such a possibility as the work of "Franz" and "Beck" on the radio under the control of German counterintelligence. The paratroopers could pretend that they agreed with the demands, but at the same time they had to sound the alarm. Over his choice, foreign intelligence officers racked their brains for more than one day. We settled on the fact that the radio operator's hand would "involuntarily" tremble and he would go astray, and then repeat the text. The alarm thus had to look like a repetition of several separate groups of ciphertext.

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A task was prepared for Albert Hessler, which provided for his penetration into Berlin under the guise of an ordinary Wehrmacht and establishing a password with members of the Schulze-Boysen-Harnack organization. In the future, he had to organize a stable radio connection with the Center, using his code. If for some reason this did not succeed, then one could resort to the services of Robert Bart, who had an independent walkie-talkie and his own cipher. But this was intended only as a last resort.

The task plan for Robert Barth was approved by Beria. Head of the Fourth Directorate of the NKVD P.A. Sudoplatov believed that work with a prisoner of war intended for being thrown into the German rear was within his competence. At worst, this operation should have been carried out jointly by the First and Fourth Directorates of the NKVD. Therefore, the task plan prepared with the active participation of Sudoplatov was reported to the People's Commissar signed by Fitin and Sudoplatov.

In early August 1942, A. Hessler walked through the streets of Berlin, where he had been absent for almost ten years. At this time, on the Volga near Stalingrad, an unprecedented battle in history unfolded, the outcome of which meant a turning point in the course of World War II. Hessler, an experienced journalist and propagandist, caught that the German radio at the word "Stalingrad" involuntarily strayed from his usual major tone. As agreed, Albert immediately began looking for connections with Moscow.

In mid-September, his walkie-talkie was finally heard in the Center, but it was not possible to establish two-way communication with him. On September 9, Robert Barth managed to inform Moscow that he had arrived at his destination. But soon, as it turned out later, both paratroopers ended up in the hands of the Gestapo. And after a pause in mid-October, communication with them, as if by magic, resumed. Nothing significant was received from Berlin, and the radio messages contained hints that the Berlin anti-fascists were experiencing difficulties, and some members of the group were arrested.

On October 14, 1942, Bart transmitted a radiogram to the Center, which was especially unusual for his manner of working on a radio key and which they could not decipher. Soon a radiogram arrived from Hessler. Its content also could not be deciphered. None of those who were directly involved in receiving and reporting telegrams paid attention to the unusual nature of the messages from Berlin. Moreover, after some time, Robert Bart, who reported on the disappearance of Hessler, was given appearances to valuable connections. Apparently, the Center considered that in these circumstances it should have taken on the role of group leader of the sources of information remaining in Berlin.

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However, instead of valuable information, confusing explanations came from Bart, from which one thing followed: all appearances failed for some reason.

Subsequent analysis in early 1943 showed that the Gestapo was working with the Center on Hessler's behalf. Checking the suspicions that arose confirmed the worst assumptions. According to experts, on October 14, Bart worked on the air uncertainly, did not announce the ciphertext groups and, when they were repeated, gave other groups of characters. It can be assumed that he thus warned the Center, as agreed, that he worked on the radio under the control of German counterintelligence.

However, Bart's radio signal did not attract due attention. The employees of the radio center, in response to a request from foreign intelligence, replied that, in their opinion, the alarm signal given by the correspondent was "unsuccessful", especially in view of its poor audibility. The radio operators could not say with certainty whether Barth's confusing telegram was the result of his deliberate actions or bad weather conditions and considerable remoteness.

At the same time, it is not known whether foreign intelligence warned the radio center to record cases of receipt of radiograms with any deviations from the accepted parameters.

Albert Hessler, realizing that his alarms did not reach Moscow, flatly refused the role of a decoy offered to him by the Gestapo. He was taken to death row and shot in early 1943.

Bart was destined for no less tragic fate. He met the end of the war in American captivity. According to the information of the Anglo-American allies, Barth told them that he participated in the radio game of the German counterintelligence with the British. The radio operator was handed over to the Soviet side at their request and taken to Lubyanka. It turned out that Bart failed because they were looking for him. From the captured German document captured by the Red Army after his departure on a mission, it was clear that the missing and deserters were registered and included in the lists sent to Berlin and the Wehrmacht in order to control their possible appearance at the front or at the place of residence. - testimonials. Violating the instructions, Bart came to his wife, who was prudently placed in the hospital by the Gestapo, and then he was detained by the German counterintelligence.

During interrogation, he confessed to having told the Germans after his capture about his connection with Soviet intelligence and to the Gestapo all the information about Hessler. On the basis of these testimonies, Robert Bart was found guilty of treason by a special meeting of the NKVD of the USSR, sentenced to capital punishment and shot.

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The search ring of the German counterintelligence was tightening ever tighter around the Red Chapel. Hundreds of meters have accumulated in the decryption department with recordings of "concerts" of invisible



"pianists". A year has passed since the day when the first radio signal was recorded and the tapes were almost burned, but they realized it and began to work even more persistently on deciphering them.

It was clear that it was necessary to seize at least one "pianist" first, but his trail in Berlin was not easy to find. The Gestapo was helped by a mobile direction finder installed on the car, which led the "hunters" to the desired target far from Berlin, in the suburbs of Brussels. The Gestapo also had other operational data, the comparison of which, taken together, led to the exit on Schulze-Boysen. The decoding of the tapes with radio signals and the information knocked out by the Gestapo from Barth after his arrest - and this approximately coincided in time - were the culmination in the analysis of the information accumulated by the Gestapo about the activities of the Red Chapel. And after the arrest of Harro Schulze-Boysen, its liquidation began.

As early as mid-1942, the Gestapo established surveillance of Harro Schulze-Boysen and began listening to his telephone, organized the collection of data on persons associated with him. Counterintelligence hoped to obtain additional evidence and identify all members of the Resistance. But this plan of the Sonderkommando "Rote Kapelle" was unexpectedly thwarted by Horst Heilmann, an employee of the radio interception service. The young man literally idolized Harro Schulze-Boysen, under his influence he moved away from Nazi views and was ready to help in the fight against the Nazis for a future democratic Germany. Heilmann informed Schulze Boysen that a multi-volume file of the "Rote Capelle" had been opened at the service, and the codebreakers had been struggling for a long time to establish who was hiding under pseudonyms, and it seems that they succeeded.

— Could you take a look at these documents? Harro asked his young friend.

- It's not easy, the papers are in another department. But I know someone there. I think I will be able to find out what the decoders managed to achieve.

Do your best, Horst. A lot depends on this.

Heilman fulfilled the request of a friend, obtained the necessary information. There was no doubt: the Sonderkommando established that Schulze-Boysen was hiding under the pseudonym "Horo". It was necessary to immediately warn him and other like-minded friends about the terrible danger. On August 31, 1942, Schulze-Boysen was arrested in an office at the Ministry of Aviation, and a Gestapo man was placed at his desk, answering telephone calls and asking

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who called and what he intended to tell the chief lieutenant. The Gestapo wanted to keep the arrest of the anti-fascist secret as long as possible. But Heilmann, surprised by the appearance of an unknown person in his friend's office, guessed what was behind this and warned Schulze-Boysen's wife about trouble and the need to urgently hide. He hid personal papers and some of the papers of his arrested friend. But Heilman didn't have time for more. On September 5, he showed up for work and was arrested. The Gestapo carried out mass arrests in mid-September.

At the end of September 1942, the number of those arrested in Berlin alone amounted to about seventy people, at the end of November - already more than a hundred.

Hitler, listening to Himmler's report on the case of the "Red Chapel", became furious and shouted:

- If not for the Russian spies, we would have defeated their army long ago and the Reich would have triumphed! These conspirators will pay dearly for stabbing the Wehrmacht in the back.

By order of the leadership of the RSHA, the case of the Red Chapel was given one of the highest secrecy stamps - "Secret Command Matter": the fact that a group of German patriots opposed the Nazi regime could only be known to the limit by a limited circle of people.

Interrogations of the arrested were carried out by the investigators in a special regime, guided by the Reich directive of June 12, 1942 "On the more severe conduct of interrogations" in relation to communists, Marxists, priests, saboteurs, terrorists, members of the Resistance movement, parachutists, vagrants, and also persons of Soviet and Polish nationalities. Ruthless beating, any torture was considered acceptable.

Harro Schulze-Boysen, like other anti-fascists, behaved courageously in the dungeons of the Gestapo. In the mornings, he did physical exercises, which pissed off his tormentors.

"Listen, Harro," they yelled at him, "you won't live to see the next Olympics in Berlin!"

From the point of view of the usual conduct of the investigation, it was impossible to meet the deadline set by Hitler for its completion - until the end of December 1942. Therefore, the German tribunal went for a cunning trick: all the participants in the case were divided into groups of six people and their inquiry was conducted in parallel. There were many accused, and there were practically no witnesses. In this connection, the testimonies of some of the detainees were used in a number of cases as charges against other detainees.

In their last words, the defendants stated that they acted knowingly in the interests of Germany, seeking to prevent the inevitable

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another heavy defeat in the war. They associated the future of the country with true democracy, social justice, a peaceful policy and its international authority, which could be gained by relying primarily on the USSR, while the Union with Western countries, in their opinion, promised Germany a new humiliation, worse than Versailles. peace treaty signed by Germany after the First World War. They also spoke about the own way of development of post-war Germany. In letters to relatives that have come down to us, the convicts spoke of great love for their loved ones, for life, for their homeland, about the correctness of the path they had chosen to fight, expressed the opinion that their memory would not fade and would be bright.

In a memorandum to Himmler, Gestapo chief Müller wrote: "As it is clear from the interrogation protocols, the defendants fought not only against National Socialism. In their worldview, they so departed from the ideology of the West, which they considered hopelessly ill, that they saw the salvation of mankind only in the East.

When Himmler came to Hitler with the verdict of the imperial military court in the case of the first twelve convicts, including Harro and Libertas Schulze-Boysen, Arvid and Mildred Harnack and others, in which all were sentenced to death, except Mildred Harnack, sentenced to six years in prison, and Countess Erika von Brockdorf, who received ten years in prison, Hitler went berserk.

- And this is the verdict of the tribunal to people unworthy of being called Germans ?! No, for their deeds - only death!

Hitler called the stenographer and dictated to her the order: to approve all death sentences - men to be executed on the gallows, women - on the guillotine. The cases of M. Harnack and von Brockdorf should be sent for review to a new court-martial (both courageous women were beheaded in 1943).

From the day of the first execution until October 1943, thirty-one men were executed on the gallows and eighteen women were beheaded on the guillotine. Seven people committed suicide during the investigation, seven were sent to concentration camps, twenty-five - to hard labor with various terms of punishment, eight - to the front, several people were shot.

If the leaders of the Nazi regime believed that the arrest of the leading members of the "Red Chapel" put an end to the German Resistance, then they were gravely mistaken. Subsequent events

confirmed this. As the head of the political intelligence of the Nazi Reich, Schellenberg, admitted in his memoirs, the Nazis did not manage to achieve a complete cessation of the struggle of the Red Chapel.

The feat of anti-fascists was highly noted in the USSR. By the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of October 1969, "the group

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German citizens for their active participation in the struggle against fascism, assistance to the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War and the courage, initiative and stamina shown at the same time" was awarded combat Soviet orders. 32 people received high awards, 29 of them posthumously. About half of them are members of the organization "Foremen" ~ "Corsican".

elevan

A life dedicated to exploration

Even before dawn on June 22, 1941, the Soviet embassy in Berlin was surrounded by a detachment of SS men. The war, the approach of which has been felt especially sharply in recent days, has become a reality. Now no one was let out either into the embassy building or out of the building. The SS officer Heinemann commanded the detachment. The only person who could leave the embassy was the first secretary V.M. Berezhkov. But he could only follow a strictly defined route and always accompanied by Heineman. Berezhkov was assigned to communicate with the German Foreign Ministry and, upon a call from this ministry, he left for negotiations, which concerned mainly the issues of the procedure for exchanging embassies.

On one of these anxious days, an Opel-Olympia car was brought from the embassy garage to the front entrance. It was the only one of the entire fleet of machines that was purchased in Germany, all other machines were Soviet-made.

Berezhkov got behind the wheel, Heineman sat next to him, as usual, and a third passenger was in the back seat.

The car started off, the SS men standing at the gate parted, saluted the boss, and the Opel drove along the route. But this time the road did not lie on the Wilhelmstrasse, today the Soviet representative was not summoned to the Foreign Ministry, and so the car drove through the city and stopped at a large department store. The passenger quickly got out and, in response to Heineman's wish for a "happy date", waved his hand in a friendly manner. The car started and disappeared around the corner.

The man who got out of the car was about 30 years old, athletic, brown-haired, his facial features spoke of a strong-willed, resolute character.

It was Alexander Mikhailovich Korotkov, deputy resident of the Soviet foreign intelligence in Berlin. He leisurely walked through the store, mingled with the crowd of customers, took the elevator to the

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first floor and five minutes later found himself at the exit of the store, which led him to another street. In those minutes, he walked a short but very reliable test route inside the store, which he had used before, and, finding nothing suspicious, boarded a tram that had come to a stop. After passing four stops, I got off, climbed up the sparsely populated lane. There were no visible signs of surveillance. Then he turned the corner, crossed the passage yard and entered the entrance of a five-story residential building. He needed to make sure once again that he was not being followed. Through the glass of the door, the exit from the courtyard was clearly visible, and if there had been a tail, then in this situation it would certainly have revealed itself.

About an hour later, the Opel Olympia pulled up to the department store. The scout was already there. He slowly approached the car and a minute later took his former place in the back seat.

- Well, how did you meet? Heineman asked, turning around.

- Yes, everything is fine, she was very happy. Thank you, you may never have to see my Gretchen again.

"What can you do, war," the German sighed.

The car drove into the courtyard of the embassy. Heineman left.

"As agreed, I'm waiting for you for dinner," Berezhevskiy reminded him.

"Now I'll check my team and I'll come," the officer said quietly and went to the gate, where three tall soldiers in black uniforms were standing with machine guns.

Korotkov's foray into the city gave a lot. She allowed the intelligence officer to instruct one of the leaders of the anti-fascist organization "Red Chapel" in relation to its actions and maintaining communications in war conditions.

This trip was preceded by serious preparatory work. The station staff noticed that the SS officer Heinemann, no longer a young man, was friendly towards the embassy staff. Berezhevskiy, with whom he constantly communicated, told family news, complained about the difficulties due to his wife's illness, expressed concern for the fate of his son, who was finishing a military school, spoke about financial difficulties in connection with the treatment of his wife and the purchase of equipment for his son. , which, according to German laws, was acquired by the graduate himself - NIKOM.

The embassy was interested in establishing good relations with the head of security. This made it easier to resolve many issues, including those related to food supply. The residency was also of particular interest. Therefore, Berezhevskiy was recommended by the embassy leadership to show heightened signs of attention to Heineman and, in particular, invite him to coffee, lunch, etc. So work was carried out to prepare the departure of the operative worker to the city.

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Heineman was a sociable person, and soon he and Berezhevskiy had breakfast, lunch, and sometimes dinner. According to the order established by the Germans, the chief of security was located in the vestibule of the embassy, while the soldiers carried out external service. Therefore, they could not see what their boss was doing. The table was served in a room adjoining the vestibule, and if necessary, the officer could take his post on time. The cook worked with might and main, and there were always good food and drinks on the table. Heineman was pleased with the attitude of the embassy towards him and, for his part, tried not to create any particular inconvenience for his staff.

The residency came to the conclusion that the German could be given money, since he was in dire need of them.

In one of the conversations, when money was discussed and Heinemann was lamenting about the upcoming expenses, Berezhevskiy offered him Reichsmarks.

"I would be glad to help you, Mr. Heinemann," Berezhevskiy remarked casually. — I have been working in Berlin for quite some time and have been saving money to buy a big radiogram. But now it does not make sense and the money will still be lost. We were not allowed to take anything out, except for one suitcase with personal belongings and a small amount of pocket money. I am embarrassed to make such an offer, but if you like, I can give you a thousand marks.

"I am very grateful for this offer," Heineman said after a pause. But how can I take a large amount of money so easily?

It didn't take long to persuade the German. Soon the money was in his pocket. At the end of the conversation, Heineman once again thanked Berezhkov and said:

"I would be glad if I could be of some help to you...

"I personally don't need anything," Berezhkov replied, "you just like me and I'm glad you help.

The next day, the Obersturmführer returned to the conversation about money and again thanked the diplomat, expressing regret that he could not thank him.

"You see, Mr. Heineman, as I said, I don't need anything myself. But one of the embassy workers, my friend, asked for one favor. This is purely a personal matter.

Berezhkov told a story invented by the residency about the friendship of his friend with a German girl. But in view of the fact that the war began suddenly, the friend could not say goodbye and wanted to escape to her at least for an hour. The German thought for a moment, then suggested the option of leaving the embassy? (as described above).

A couple of days later, Berezhkov agreed with Heineman on another trip of his friend to the city. In two hours, Alexander Mikhailovich met with another head of the Red Chapel, about

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instructed him on work during the war, conveyed the conditions of communication with the Center, provided him with money and appearances in other countries.

If Heineman had turned out to be a provocateur, then there can be no doubt that the Nazis would have deprived the participants of the operation of their diplomatic immunity on their first trip and arrested them, and the Soviet embassy would have been placed in extremely difficult conditions.

However, Korotkov, who closely followed Heinemann's behavior, being a sober analyst and a shrewd person, felt that the German would not go for a provocation, and firmly decided to act. This made it possible, it would seem, under unthinkable difficult conditions, to find a way out and solve the most difficult reconnaissance task.

According to comrades who knew him well, Alexander Mikhailovich was one of the most talented employees of foreign intelligence, as they say, an intelligence officer with a divine spark. Even before the war, he successfully worked abroad, including in illegal conditions. In the last days of the war, he led the operational group in Berlin, which, in addition to reconnaissance functions, was entrusted with the organization of work on the acceptance by the allied representatives of the surrender from the German high command.

Immediately after the end of the war, Korotkov was appointed the first resident of Soviet foreign intelligence in Germany. In the future, he repeatedly traveled abroad, mainly to countries with crisis situations.

A.M. Korotkov rose from an ordinary operative to deputy chief of foreign intelligence.

And it all started prosaically simply. In the fall of 1928, nineteen-year-old Sasha Korotkov was hired by the OGPU as ... an electrician. Prior to that, he lived with his mother Anna Pavlovna in Moscow, in the Meshchansky streets area, grew up without a father, went to school, graduated from the nine-year school, worked as a student, then as an electrician at MOGES. In his free time he went in for sports, played football, was fond of tennis.

The OGPU noticed a capable young man, helped him and gave him the opportunity to become an educated person in a short time, master the basics of intelligence and operational activities and switch to operational work. A year later, he became an assistant to the operational commissioner, and then the operational commissioner of the INO OGPU.

He diligently studied French and German. He mastered German to such an extent that he was able to go abroad under the guise of a foreigner. The wife was fluent in German and other foreign languages. Therefore, the appearance of an "Austrian" family in Switzerland did not arouse suspicion in anyone.

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Two months later the Korotkovs moved to France. Alexander Mikhailovich joined the illegal residency, which was collecting data related to military-strategic issues. Hitler's coming to power in Germany had a serious impact on the military-political situation in Europe. The Soviet leadership closely followed the development of the situation in major European countries, including France. Particular attention was paid to military issues. The station was faced with the task of obtaining information about the assessment of the combat capabilities of the French army and its ability to withstand the growing power of the German armed forces, about the emerging military-political groupings on the European continent, as well as the characteristics of new types of weapons.

Alexander Mikhailovich went to study at the Paris Institute of Radio Engineering, which made it possible not only to expand general education and special training, but also to provide a reliable legal basis for intelligence work.

About a year later, having completed the task, Korotkov returned to Moscow. In 1937, he went on a business trip abroad on a "legal" line to Berlin under the guise of a trainee in the Soviet embassy. I worked there successfully, acquired a source in one important facility in the country.

In the summer of 1938, at the direction of the Center, the intelligence officer interrupted his work in Berlin and left for a reconnaissance mission in France. This trip was carried out through an illegal channel using foreign documents. After completing the assignment in the same year, he returned to Moscow.

Ten years have passed since Alexander Korotkov first crossed the threshold of the OGPU building on Dzerzhinsky Street. Work abroad taught me a lot, revealed such qualities as courage, purposefulness, determination, conscientiousness. And here's the surprise...

January 1, 1939 A.M. Korotkov was notified that he had been dismissed from the state security agencies. This decision was preceded by a conversation with People's Commissar of Internal Affairs L. Beria.

According to one of the veterans of intelligence, who worked at that time in the department together with Korotkov, a group of employees of the department was called to Beria. Beria began by asking everyone who he works for, how things are going, if there are any difficulties. At the same time, he asked questions about his biography. When it was Korotkov's turn, he asked him if he had been abroad. Alexander Mikhailovich began to tell in detail when and in what countries he worked. However, Beria interrupted him and said:

- Since you were abroad, it means that you were recruited there.

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Korotkov turned pale and began to prove that no one could recruit him, since he is a patriot of his Motherland and is ready to give his life for it. However, Beria repeated that Korotkov would no longer work in intelligence. The employees present tried to defend their colleague, but

nothing happened.

A couple of days later, an order appeared to dismiss A.M. Korotkov from intelligence. However, the Komsomol members of the department did not agree with the decision. A meeting was held at which it was decided to apply to the party committee of the people's commissariat for support. The delegation met with the secretary of the party committee and expressed its opinion on the decision and raised the issue of its revision. The Komsomol members declared that they vouched for the loyalty of their colleague and completely trusted him.

Alexander Mikhailovich himself wrote a report in which he outlined his thoughts on the dismissal. In particular, he wrote: "... I believed that I was doing a useful thing, and did not hesitate for a minute, exposing myself to the risk of paying for it with my head... I clearly understand the need for preventive measures, but... I did not deserve mistrust... I do not see any actions behind me that could be the reason for depriving me of the honor of working in the authorities. To be in such a position is extremely difficult and insulting.

The appeal to the party committee of young employees and the report of Alexander Mikhailovich played a role. Korotkov was reinstated in his POSITION, and was soon sent to work abroad. The case for those times is rare, but quite eloquent. Before the cohesive actions of the team, even Beria gave in. In the second half of 1940, Korotkov arrived in Germany as a deputy resident of the "legal" residency.

One of his main tasks was to check the valuable sources of the residency, to meet with them personally, to understand and evaluate the position, moods and opportunities of each of them. If Korotkov had a positive impression of the contact, he arranged for further meetings, which he went to himself or sent one of the young operatives who had recently arrived to replenish the residency. Korotkov visited three of our good assistant friends who had long since lost contact with the Center. Conversation with A.M. Korotkov inspired them and convinced them that they were not fighting alone, on their side - the Soviet Union and the peoples of other countries.

Youth and energy helped Korotkov cope with the huge amount of work that fell to his lot: several meetings a day with agents, reports on conversations that took place, preparation of telegrams and operational letters to Moscow, and much more. In some cases, it was necessary to travel to meetings with valuable agents outside of Berlin. And, as always, Alexander Mikhailovich carefully prepared for each such task.

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One day, an acute situation arose that called into question Korotkov's further stay in Berlin. An experienced agent of the Chervonnaya Center was ambushed by the Gestapo. There was a fear that a failed agent could put the Gestapo on the trail of a scout. He was ordered to stop meeting with agents and urgently leave for Moscow for a detailed examination of the current situation. The stay at the Center was used for additional briefing and clarification of the line of further work. The deputy chief of intelligence wanted to introduce Korotkov to Beria, but the latter did not want to see him. Apparently, direct, courageous people, protecting their dignity, were not honored by the people's commissar.

"Let's not bother Beria," said the Commissar of State Security. Everything you need, you already know. Instructions agreed with him.

— I read them.

- Great. Now here, - the deputy head of intelligence pointed to the bottom of the page, - put your signature. Do you see what you are signing up for? "I read, learned and accepted for execution."

- Understood.

When are you going to leave for Berlin?

- I can't do it today. So tomorrow. I can imagine how many things have accumulated there.

Upon arrival in Berlin, Korotkov was among the first to meet with the head of the underground anti-fascist Resistance group "Corsican" – Arvid Harnack, government adviser to the Ministry of Economics.

"The question of Germany's action against the USSR is a settled matter," said the Corsican, barely exchanging greetings and shaking hands with Korotkov.

Information about the accelerated preparation of Germany for a war against the USSR came from Berlin to the Center in a continuous stream, but Moscow did not react to this in any noticeable way.

On March 20, 1941, Alexander Mikhailovich, worried about the situation, sent a personal letter to L.P. Beria.

Below is the text of the letter.

"Tov. Paul" - personally.

In the process of working with Corsican, a number of data were obtained from him, indicating that the Germans were preparing a military action against the Soviet Union for the spring of this year. Analysis of these data gives the following picture.

In October 1940, K. said: "In the near future there will be a military occupation by the Germans of Romania. This occupation will be a preliminary step against the USSR, the purpose of which is to seize from the Soviet Union the territory to the west of the Leningrad—

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The Black Sea, the creation of a completely German government on it. In the rest of the Soviet Union, a government friendly to Germany should be formed.

This information is known from T., one of the leaders of the Leiser firm, who is a member of the Corsican group. T. got them from a conversation with his friend, who works in the high command of the German army. The latter learned about it from his boss.

"X", an employee of the Four Year Plan Committee under Goering, told "Corsican" that he had received the task of preparing calculations on the economic effect of the occupation of Soviet territory by the Germans. At the same time, the opinion of the chief of the general staff of the land army, Halder, was cited about the inability of the Red Army to offer long-term resistance, about the possibility of occupying Ukraine in an extremely short time with a lightning strike and even taking Baku.

An acquaintance of the "Corsican", Prince Z., who has connections in military circles, told him that the preparation of a strike against the USSR had become obvious. This is evidenced by the location of the German troops concentrated on our border. The Germans are very interested in the Lvov-Odessa railway, which has a Western European gauge. Another sub-source of The Corsican, Ts., who is familiar with people from the Ribbentrop bureau and the SS security service, referring to his conversation with two field marshals, said that Germany would oppose the USSR in May.

L., the head of the statistical institute working on instructions from the military command, also told the Corsican about the impending attack on the USSR.

From other persons "Corsican" received similar data. For example, the Germans are preparing maps of the location of our industrial regions; persons who know the Russian language received notifications that, in the event of mobilization, they would be used as interpreters at military tribunals; The cousin of the Corsican said that in the process of probing the ground about the attitude of the military leadership towards Hitler, they also got the impression that they were preparing a war against the USSR. A conversation was held with the representative of the "Forschungsamta" (service



Goering's eavesdropping). He expressed his personal opinion that operations against the British Isles had been postponed, and operations in the Mediterranean area would follow first, then against the USSR, and only then against England. As The Corsican now reports, the general opinion prevails that operations against England have been postponed...

As early as last year, Lesovod received information from an employee of the German command group that Germany would begin military operations against the USSR. Indirect information also came at the same time from Kuznetsov and Breitenbach.

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Further, Korotkov asked the people's commissar to instruct the relevant department to analyze all the information available on this issue and evaluate the development of events in Germany. He asked to report the results of the analysis and the decision of the leadership to the residency by telegraph, emphasizing that time does not endure.

However, the residency never received an answer. Korotkov's letter did not receive a deserving assessment from the leadership of the NKVD and was written off in his personal file.

In March 1941, Alexander Mikhailovich, on the instructions of the Center, established contact with the "Starshina", who was part of the "Corsican" group. This was done to verify the Corsican's information. The "foreman" - Harro Schulze-Boysen - turned out to be an exceptionally informed person in military-political issues and a staunch opponent of Nazism. He worked in the 5th department of the Research Institute, which served as intelligence in the Ministry of Aviation.

Harro Schulze-Boysen made a good impression on Alexander Mikhailovich. He was a purposeful, resolute officer who made contact with Soviet representatives on political grounds, realizing that the fight against fascism cannot be won alone.

A significant number of materials were received from the "Sergeant" confirming the previously reported information of the "Corsican" about the active preparation of Germany for a war against the USSR.

Based on the information received from the Corsican and the Sergeant Major, as well as using materials from other sources, foreign intelligence regularly informed the country's top leadership about the military threat looming over the country, the development of plans for military operations and the timing of the German offensive. The latter became more and more specific. However, the Kremlin did not show an adequate reaction. To a large extent, this was facilitated by the fact that the fascist special services carried out a lot of work to disinform the USSR using agents and technical means in order to mislead the Soviet leadership and the command of the Red Army. Unfortunately, they managed to do it.

Intelligence, however, took a number of measures to prepare the network of agents in Germany for work in wartime conditions. In March-April 1941, an instruction from the leadership of foreign intelligence was sent to the Berlin residency to organize direct radio communications of valuable agents with the Center. This instruction, in particular, said: "The current situation requires the adoption of urgent measures to transfer the main, most valuable agents to direct contact with us, i.e. the creation of several illegal residencies that could communicate with Moscow by radio.

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However, there was not enough time to create illegal foreign intelligence units, train its personnel to work on the radio, and consolidate these skills.

July 2, 1941 A.M. Korotkov, together with the interned staff of the embassy, left Germany. In the Turkish city of Edirne, Soviet employees were handed over by the Germans

representatives of the Turkish authorities and employees of the Soviet embassy in Turkey. A few days later, Alexander Mikhailovich Korotkov was already in Moscow.

In August 1941, Korotkov was appointed deputy head of the German department of the GUGB NKVD. In November, he already became the head of the department, which during the war was entrusted with conducting intelligence work on the territory of Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Greece.

Korotkov's position as head of the department was extremely difficult. Communication with many sources in Germany was lost with the outbreak of war. The war with Germany made it impossible for "legal" residencies to remain in those countries that were Hitler's allies against the USSR (except Bulgaria). As a result of the repressions of 1937-1938, illegal intelligence agents were withdrawn from Germany and other European countries. Many of them were repressed.

A.M. Under these conditions, Korotkov had to make great efforts in order to essentially recreate the undercover and illegal apparatus, solve the complex problems that arose, establish interaction with the relevant units of the NKVD, and, in some necessary cases, with the Intelligence Industry of the Red Army. He personally participated in the selection of people, especially when it came to important operations, controlled their preparation, conducted separate classes, gave orders to provide the cadets with the relevant documents, and then ensured their transfer to the rear of the enemy. All this was done in a short time, which now seems fantastic.

Quite a few intelligence groups, trained under the leadership of Alexander Mikhailovich, successfully completed missions behind enemy lines.

For the transfer of intelligence officers to Germany and neighboring countries, the method of introducing agents into the environment of the able-bodied population, exported to Germany from the occupied Soviet territories, was also used. To do this, through the capabilities of the operational reconnaissance detachments operating behind enemy lines, reliable people with working specialties were selected, underwent short special training in the detachments, and then were recruited for work in Germany.

A number of measures for the transfer and documentation of illegal immigrants were carried out in contact with the British special services. Prepared by A.M. Short section illegals  
become

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arrive in England in early 1942. Here they were placed in safe houses, provided with appropriate equipment, documents, and then transferred to the territory of Germany and to the European countries occupied by it. During the war, about twenty scouts were thrown into enemy territory in this way. However, it should be noted that, despite the enormous work to engage this contingent, no positive results were obtained. The scouts abandoned behind enemy lines disappeared without a trace, it was not possible to establish their fate.

Korotkov often visited the front, where he solved acute operational problems on the spot.

After the liberation of Romania, Poland and Yugoslavia, Korotkov traveled to these countries in order to understand in detail the emerging military-political situation on the spot and organize constant information coverage of the difficult political situation in these states.

By the end of the war, several operational groups were already operating in Germany, which supplied information to the country's leadership and the command of the Red Army. At the end of the war, the operational groups operating in Germany were united. IN

As a result, the first post-war foreign intelligence station was created under the cover of the Office of the Political Advisor under the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany. Alexander Mikhailovich Korotkov was appointed the first resident of the Berlin residency in October 1945.

That's what happens sometimes in life. Here, in Berlin, as a deputy resident, Alexander Mikhailovich met the anxious days of the beginning of the 1941 war. He firmly believed then that we would win, but he also understood that there were difficult, bloody years of struggle ahead. Now, after the victory, he is again in Berlin and in the same residency, but already as its resident. Mixed feelings overcame him. On the one hand, the joy of victory, and on the other, a heavy burden on the heart, the bitterness of the loss of combat friends, the unknown fate of many whom I knew and who performed combat missions behind the front line. And how many anxieties Korotkov had to go through when a scout abandoned behind enemy lines did not get in touch for a long time. There were many cases when these brave guys did not make themselves felt.

According to the official cover position, Alexander Mikhailovich was a deputy political adviser. The position allowed him to often communicate with Marshal G.K. Zhukov. Marshal almost always received Colonel Korotkov out of turn, although there were always many visitors in the waiting room, because he was sure that he would hear important news from Alexander Mikhailovich, which he reported daily to the Commander-in-Chief. The information was indeed extremely important, and sometimes very urgent.

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Zhukov respected Korotkov for his accuracy, smartness, awareness, reliability and reliability of the information received from him. Sometimes the data came from such areas that one day the marshal could not resist and asked:

- How did you manage to get there?

"But what to do, Comrade Marshal," Alexander Mikhailovich answered with deliberate seriousness, "the legs feed the wolf."

Zhukov chuckled and said:

- That's right, the legs feed the wolf, but the scout, as I understand it, also needs a good head for the legs. Am I right?

"Quite right, Comrade Marshal.

And they both laughed.

Alexander Mikhailovich worked in Berlin until the end of 1946. During this time, the work of the residency was established, and vigorous activity was launched on the territory of the Soviet and Western occupation zones. Contacts with some sources of the pre-war period were restored, and a significant number of new ones were acquired.

The residency carried out a number of responsible operations to search for and seize secret documents of the Nazi special services, technical documentation of design bureaus and factories involved in the development and production of the latest weapons, obtaining samples of new equipment and information about modern technologies.

Upon his return to Moscow, Korotkov was appointed head of one of the foreign intelligence units. He paid much attention to the organization of intelligence work from illegal positions. The war showed how important it is to have a reliable network of illegal immigrants. Alexander Mikhailovich was in a hurry to turn this invaluable experience into reality. During this period, signs of the deployment of the Cold War began to appear more and more clearly. Up to

documents that testified to the presence in the West of plans for a direct military attack on the Soviet Union.

Alexander Mikhailovich clearly understood that during the period of hostilities or large-scale crisis situations, intelligence work can be effectively carried out only from illegal positions. During this period, a significant step was taken both in terms of theoretical developments and on the ways of wider practical application of illegal forms of work. The merit of A.M. Korotkova is huge in this.

In the summer of 1957, Major General Korotkov was appointed KGB plenipotentiary under the Council of Ministers of the USSR for coordination and communication with the MGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the GDR. On his shoulders lay the leadership of the largest Soviet intelligence unit abroad, focused on conducting active intelligence work for NATO. In addition, the apparatus cooperated with the security agencies of the GDR, provided direct assistance to the Soviet military intelligence services operating from the territory of the GDR.

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A capable organizer, a creatively thinking leader, Korotkov did a great deal of work on the structural improvement of the apparatus, increasing the efficiency of its work, and strengthening the staff.

Alexander Mikhailovich was extremely conscientious in the performance of his official duty, he never considered the time, and often personally participated in acute operational intelligence activities.

Nikolai Alekseevich Korznikov, one of the leaders of illegal intelligence, who worked with him for a long time, spoke very interestingly about the style of his work.

"When developing important operations," said Korznikov, "Korotkov always invited direct executors to his place. He used to close for half a day with them in his office and work out the upcoming event in detail. They could be found without their jackets, with their sleeves rolled up, crawling over the cards on the floor."

He tried to transfer his experience and knowledge directly to the performers. At the same time, he readily picked up their fresh ideas, and sometimes extraordinary approaches to solving complex reconnaissance problems.

Korotkov was available to ordinary employees and communicated with them regularly. At the same time, he was a very demanding boss, sometimes even tough, especially in relation to those who tried to work at half strength, were lazy, and were insincere. With employees who worked creatively and conscientiously, he always communicated as with comrades, was attentive to their affairs, official and personal.

At the end of June 1961, Alexander Mikhailovich arrived in Moscow for a meeting of senior officials of the KGB. At the same time, he visited a number of government institutions to solve the current problems of the work of the Berlin apparatus. On the morning of June 27, he visited the department of the Central Committee on Staraya Square. He came out gloomy, dissatisfied with the conversation. Apparently, not everyone found mutual understanding. I walked from the building of the Central Committee to Dzerzhinsky Square, I wanted to unwind a little. Here he got into the car and went to the Dynamo stadium. In the morning he phoned Ivan Alexandrovich Serov, the former chairman of the KGB, and agreed to play with him in tennis.

Sports, driving a car, playing tennis or chess always helped A.M. Korotkov to maintain peace of mind and calm down after frequent unrest. He hoped that this time the game would help him regain vigor and cheer him up. During the game, he bent over the ball - and a sharp pain pierced his heart. Korotkov lost consciousness. After a few minutes, his heart stopped beating.

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One of the employees who knew Korotkov closely, having heard about the accident, said: "Intelligence has lost one of its most talented and extraordinary professionals."

The military path of Alexander Mikhailovich Korotkov was marked by many state awards: the Order of Lenin, six Orders of the Red Banner, the Order of the Patriotic War [degree, two Orders of the Red Star, many medals, the badge "Honorary State Security Officer". He was also awarded foreign orders. In 1946, the government of Yugoslavia awarded him the Order of the Partisan Star [degrees], and in 1958 the government of the GDR - the Order of Merit for the Fatherland in gold.

This episode with the use of Heineman to take A. Korotkov outside the embassy was described by V.M. Berezhkov in his book How I Became Stalin's Translator. ~ M.: "DEM", 1993.

Berezhkov V.M. Pages of diplomatic history. - M.: "International Relations", 1987. - S. 66-69.

Some stylistic corrections have been made to the text of the letter, and it has been shortened somewhat.

4 Pseudonym of Beria.

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Resident and diplomat

The Second World War was on. Hungary, Italy, Romania and Finland fought on the side of Nazi Germany. By September 1941, the enemy had come close to Moscow. At that time, Soviet diplomacy was making every effort to prevent an attack by states that had so far maintained neutrality - Japan, Turkey, Iran and others. This required considerable skill, for many "neutrals" could not be relied upon.

In September 1941, an experienced intelligence worker, Boris Arkadyevich Rybkin (pseudonym Kin), was sent to Stockholm as an adviser to the USSR embassy to lead the residency.

Sweden, a state in Northern Europe, on the Scandinavian Peninsula, remained neutral for several centuries, despite the wars that took place in Europe. Sweden maintained its traditional neutrality during the Second World War, although in the first months it was very close to a military alliance with Nazi Germany. Its neighbor - Finland - took a direct part in the war against the Soviet Union on the side of Nazi Germany.

In Sweden, since 1930, first the envoy and then the ambassador of the Soviet Union was A.M. Kollontai, who made every effort to keep Sweden in a position of neutrality. Soviet intelligence also provided active assistance to diplomacy.

B.A. Rybkin was born in Ukraine in 1899 into a family of a craftsman. After graduating from four classes of a rural school, he moved to Yekaterinoslav, where he spent eight years working in a printing house, first as a student and then as a typesetter. After serving in the Red Army, he entered the Mining Institute, but studied there for only three months. On July 30, 1921, the Gubkom sent him to work in the Cheka in Ekaterinoslav. From 1921 to 1930 Rybkin was engaged in counterintelligence.

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solid work. Then he was transferred to work in the intelligence line, and in 1931 he became the representative of the INO OGPU in Central Asia with a location in Tashkent. From December 1931

From 1934 to 1934, he worked in the city of Mashhad in Persia (Iran), performing undercover duties of a vice-consul.

Returning to Moscow in 1934, Rybkin worked for some time in the Central Office of the INO OGPU, and was soon sent as a resident to Finland under the cover of the 2nd Secretary of the Embassy.

Here is how intelligence officer and writer Zoya Ivanovna Voskresenskaya Rybkina writes in her memoirs: "By this time I had already been in Finland for six or seven months, I managed to get acquainted with the country and our residency. The former resident was recalled to Moscow, and consul Yartsev, aka Rybkin, arrived instead. Came alone, without family. Very formal, fit, demanding.

At first, we didn't get along. We argued about everything. I decided that we would not work together and asked the Center to recall me. In response, I was ordered to help the new resident get up to speed, and then return to this issue. But... there was no need to return. Six months later, we asked the Center to let us get married. I was a deputy resident, and we were afraid that the Center would not allow such "nepotism". Moscow gave the go-ahead.

At the beginning of April 1938, Rybkin was unexpectedly summoned to Moscow. And on April 7, to the great surprise of Boris Arkadyevich, he was received by I.V. Stalin. In the presence of Molotov and Voroshilov, he talked with Rybkin for almost two hours, interested in the details of the political and economic life of Finland, while showing good knowledge about this country. The essence of the call was that on behalf of the Soviet government he was instructed to conduct probing negotiations with the government of Finland. In archival materials of foreign intelligence, these negotiations are referred to as negotiations on the April 7 case.

In his memoirs, Z.I. Voskresenskaya describes this scene in the following way in a conversation between Rybkin and the Soviet Ambassador to Sweden Alexandra Mikhailovna Kollontai in 1943:

A.M. What questions did Molotov and Voroshilov ask you?

Kin. While Stalin questioned me, they were silent. Finally, Joseph Vissarionovich, turning to them, asked: "Well, what is your opinion, will we instruct him?" Both nodded their heads in agreement. "So, dear comrade, comrade ..." Stalin hesitated. "Rybkin," I prompted. Stalin laughed: "You intelligence officers always have so many names and professions that you probably got confused in them yourself ... We decided to authorize you to conduct strictly secret negotiations with the government of Finland." Molotov inserted: "We have recalled Plenipotentiary Asmus, and you will be temporary chargé d'affaires. Before arrival

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new ambassador." "Have you decided," Stalin asked Molotov, "to send this director of the power plant there, like him? Woody? Wooden?..." "Derevyansky," Molotov clarified. "Not a single soul should know about these negotiations," Stalin warned. – We are talking about our desire to conclude a bilateral treaty with Finland in case Germany intends to attack the Soviet Union through the territory of Finland. The USSR, for its part, will give guarantees of its peaceful intentions towards Finland and ensure the country's independence.

A.M. Defensive Treaty, - as if weighing, said Alexandra Mikhailovna. - That would be what you need.

Rybkin's negotiations with the Finns lasted for more than six months and did not bring any concrete practical results. During this period, Rybkin repeatedly met with Finnish Foreign Minister Holsti, a high-ranking figure in the Finnish cabinet Tanner, and Prime Minister Cajander. The Soviet side, conducting these negotiations,

intended to move the state border with Finland beyond Vyborg, since modern artillery is capable of shelling Leningrad from the Karelian Isthmus, in exchange for a region of Karelia rich in Karelian birch and mast forest. But the government of Cajander was not capable of taking any steps in which Nazi Germany was not interested.

In 1973, Finnish President W.K. Kekkonen, speaking of the breakdown of the 1938 negotiations, said that "negotiations were interrupted due to the fact that Finland showed no interest in them." He explained: "On April 14, 1938, the plenipotentiary representative of the Soviet government contacted Foreign Minister Holsti. This representative suggested that Finland conclude a bilateral defense agreement in case Germany attacked the Soviet Union through Finnish territory. However, it was supposed to ask the Finns to outline the contours of the treaty...

The negotiations, in which Prime Minister Kajander and Ministers Holsti, Tanner and Erkkö participated on the Finnish side, were conducted in such secrecy that the Foreign Affairs Commission had nothing to say about them. dont know".

Some Finnish historians and modern political scientists, for example, Professor Seppo Kientt, explain the failure of Rybkin's mission primarily by the fact that the Finnish government, represented by its representatives, allegedly did not believe that the 2nd secretary of the USSR Embassy in Helsinki, Yartsev, was endowed with the Soviet government with such powers. They place the blame for the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, which began after unsuccessful negotiations, on the then government of Finland.

But back to Sweden. Gathering intelligence information, actively recruiting, maintaining contacts with participants

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anti-fascist resistance in a number of European countries - this is basically the range of issues that the residency in Sweden had to solve. During Rybkin's residency in Sweden from 1941 to 1943, the residency in Stockholm managed to acquire agents in various circles of Swedish society. However, the difficult conditions in the country made it difficult to acquire valuable agents. The work of the residency (and the embassy) was aimed at maintaining Sweden's neutrality and friendly relations with the Soviet Union, counteracting the persistent pro-fascist propaganda carried out by right-wing forces.

Soviet diplomacy and Soviet intelligence, working in unison, managed not only to keep Sweden at the level of its traditional neutrality, but also to ensure that neighboring Finland broke off its alliance with Nazi Germany and signed an armistice with the Soviet Union on September 19, 1944. The world community regarded this act as a humane and generous attitude of the Soviet Union towards its northern neighbor.

That is why A.M. Kollontai, at the height of hostilities, asked Rybkin for the content of his conversation with Stalin in April 1938, knowing that before the war Rybkin had headed the residency in Helsinki and had reliable and good connections.

While in Sweden, B.A. Rybkin maintained contacts with representatives of the famous Wallenberg financial and banking clan in the history of Europe. Representatives of this large clan took a fairly active part in the political life of the country and, naturally, influenced the political life of other Scandinavian states. One of the representatives of the industrial-banking house of Wallenberg - K.A. Wallenberg - during the war of 1914-1918 he was even the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden. In February 1944, with the assistance of the Swedish banker and industrialist Markus Wallenberg, an informal meeting was held between A.M. Kollontai and the representative of the Finnish government, Paasikivi, who arrived in Stockholm. Then, through the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February-March of the same year, there was a further exchange of views between Helsinki and Moscow. The Swedish press favorably commented on the Soviet terms of the armistice, and

Swedish diplomats and politicians exerted certain pressure on Finnish politicians, as a result of which, as already mentioned, on September 19, 1944, the Soviet-Finnish truce was concluded, and Finland withdrew from the war.

At the beginning of 1942, Rybkin, a resident in Sweden, was instructed by the Center to find a suitable person who was supposed to restore contact with members of the Red Capella organization.

At the same time, the residency in London received the same instruction.

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Rybkin, in the shortest possible time, managed to establish agent relations with "Adam", the director of one of the Swedish firms that maintained business relations with Germany. Therefore, "Adam" had the opportunity to visit Berlin. Nevertheless, he was able to fly to Berlin only six months after receiving the assignment from the Stockholm residency. Job he

performed not quite accurately.

And soon a message came from the Center that the Red Chapel had failed. Suspicion fell on Adam. And only after the end of the war it was established that the "Red Chapel" failed another agent. "Adam" was rehabilitated, and a serious charge was dropped from Colonel Rybkin.

B.A. Rybkin was recalled from Sweden in July 1943. After returning from Sweden, according to archival documents, on August 10, 1943, Colonel Rybkin was transferred to the reserve as deputy head of the department of the Fourth Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR. In February 1945, he took part in the preparation and security of the heads of state of the anti-Hitler coalition on Yalta Conference (February 4-11). At the conference, Rybkin maintained the necessary contacts with representatives of the US and British intelligence services. Through illegal intelligence, Rybkin was repeatedly sent on short-term business trips to foreign countries, including to carry out acute operational tasks. On one of these business trips to Czechoslovakia, B.A. Rybkin died on November 27, 1947 in a car accident.

The coffin with the body was brought to Moscow, installed on the Lubyanka, and after military honors were given, they were buried at the Novodevichy cemetery of the capital.

The story of Rybkin, a Chekist and a diplomat, had many memorable moments. One of them, without a doubt, is the diplomatic mission of Rybkin-Yartsev to Finland, which, although it did not achieve the desired results due to objective reasons, nevertheless became one of the first examples of the participation of intelligence officers in secret negotiations at the highest level. This mission was a contribution to the formation of that chain of soundings, negotiations, symposiums and conferences that eventually led the European countries to the famous Helsinki Accords, which determined the contours of peaceful coexistence in Europe.

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Without taking a breath

Ivan Andreevich and Ksenia Mitrofanovna Chichaev got from Stockholm to Moscow on Saturday, June 21, 1941. Their next long-term business trip abroad has come to an end, this time to Sweden. One and a half years in Stockholm flew by very quickly. At that time, officially neutral Sweden looked like a disturbed beehive. Diplomats, political and public figures unanimously predicted further serious changes in Europe, of course, on the "initiative" of Hitler's Germany and with its indispensable participation. Almost no one doubted the inevitability and inevitability of an armed clash between Germany and the Soviet Union. So the resident of the Soviet foreign intelligence, I.A. Chichaev had enough worries and anxieties. I recalled with gratitude the close and fruitful interaction with the plenipotentiary ~ Alexandra Mikhailovna Kollontai. One of her aphorisms was especially fond of:



"The results of a diplomat's work are judged not by the heap of papers that he has produced, but by the number of true friends of his country, whom he leaves before leaving for his homeland."

Ivan Andreevich, not without reason, believed that if we apply this criterion to assess the results of his work as an intelligence officer and diplomat, then things were not bad for him. Important political information came from the residency to the Center. There was no shortage of valuable sources of intelligence information. Moscow was pleased with them. He was returning to accept the post of chief of the Anglo-American section of the central intelligence apparatus.

As expected, upon arrival immediately called the service. The duty officer advised me to take a break from the road and report to the authorities on Monday, that is, June 23. But Ivan Andreevich, like all the employees of the People's Commissariat, turned up at Lubyanka the next morning. Thus began the Great Patriotic War for him.

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In the very first days, he, along with many comrades, was enrolled in a special group under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR for organizing reconnaissance and sabotage work behind enemy lines and began accelerated training for the duties of a resident in the northwestern regions of the USSR occupied by the Nazis. But on the eve of his transfer to the front line, he was unexpectedly summoned by the people's commissar and, without going into explanations, he ordered the evacuation of employees of the central intelligence apparatus and their families to Novosibirsk.

— How is your English? asked the commissar, among other things.

"Before I forget," Chichaev answered, and to himself he marveled a good deal at such a seemingly inappropriate question.

About a month later, several hundred people with government property and personal luggage were transported and settled in Novosibirsk, Kemerovo and Prokopyevsk. And the authorities gave Ivan Andreevich one hour to get ready and sent him from Novosibirsk back to Moscow on a plane specially sent for him. It was here that it became clear why a little earlier there was interest in his knowledge of the English language.

The British government officially addressed the leadership of the USSR through its ambassador in Moscow with a proposal to establish cooperation between British and Soviet intelligence in the fight against a common enemy - Nazi Germany. Colonel Guinness arrived in Moscow to negotiate this issue. From our intelligence were delegated Vasily Mikhailovich Zarubini Ivan Andreevich Chichaev. The painstaking and delicate work with the British lasted almost two weeks. As a result, an agreement was signed under which the parties undertook to exchange intelligence information about Germany, to conduct joint sabotage and reconnaissance operations on its territory and in the states occupied by it, to cooperate when agents were brought into these areas and to provide with it radio and other special communications. For these purposes liaison missions of both sides were established in Moscow and London, respectively. In September 1941, the representative of the Soviet foreign intelligence I.A. Chichaev arrived in London with a group of employees. Joint daily work began with the British colleagues, led by Colonel Gaitskell. In Moscow, the mission of the British special services was led by Colonel Hill (the same one who conducted intelligence work in Russia in 1917-1918 and "became famous" as one of the participants in the failed "Lockhart conspiracy").

Soon our agents began to arrive in England, trained by the Center to be sent to Germany, Austria, France and Holland. They were delivered by planes and ships in groups of two to four people. The British placed them in safe houses.

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Each of them underwent additional, strictly individual training, which included, in particular, training parachute jumps, orienteering on German maps, and so on. The duties of the British side also included the appropriate equipment of our people, supplying them with food, German ration cards, items of sabotage equipment.

In accordance with the terms of the agreement concluded, Ivan Andreevich and his collaborators thoroughly familiarized themselves with how the British organized the organization of sabotage behind enemy lines. And we must give them their due: this aspect of interaction aroused the approval and complete satisfaction of the Soviet side. On the territory of England, a strictly classified center for the development and training of special operations was created, which employed more than three thousand British specialists and instructors. They were led by the highly experienced and punctual General Goebens. This center also had several more deeply hidden bases at its disposal. According to individual requests, chemical preparations, including poisons, and special weapons were produced. Major British scientists, gifted engineers, and workers of the highest qualifications were attracted to cooperation. The service for the production of cover documents for agents, according to which they were to live in enemy territory, functioned clearly and smoothly. In necessary cases, some of them underwent plastic surgery - of course, with their consent and with the approval of the Soviet side. Unfortunately, not a single action was brought to an end. Agents-performers, sent to the front line, disappeared without a trace, without letting anyone know about themselves in accordance with the conditions of communication. The fate of these brave people was tragic. Most of them are still unknown.

On the whole, Ivan Andreevich and his assistants had a strong impression of their English colleagues as partners who always and in everything did not for a moment forget about their own interests and extract purely their own benefit from cooperation. For example, several cases were recorded when British intelligence officers offered Soviet intelligence agents who were in training to go under their banners and, instead of our tasks, carry out their instructions behind enemy lines. The conversations of our agents among themselves were systematically eavesdropped on at a high professional level. Sometimes he organized "accidental acquaintances" with "jolly girlfriends", who sometimes behaved too seriously and politicized, bravely defending the interests of the British crown. Chichayev became aware of these "petty allied pranks" in various ways. And he had to tactfully, but unequivocally, carry out the appropriate "educational" work with the British. I have to admit

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that they most often skillfully found for themselves worthy options for "saving face", and the Soviet side demonstrated "proper understanding" and restraint.

In the field of intelligence exchange, cooperation with British colleagues was also carried out to the mutual satisfaction of the parties, however, in the opinion of the Soviet partners, its effectiveness could have been higher.

The British colleagues behaved like true gentlemen towards the Soviet reconnaissance mission, but they still allowed "certain rough edges" in their behavior. So, about a month after arriving in London, Chichayev found clear traces of "thieves" in his office. They didn't take anything with them, but they turned over the contents of the desk drawers quite a lot. Apparently, they did not have time to open the safe, as they were "frightened off" by the sudden, unplanned return of Ivan Andreevich to his office for a "forgotten book". Scotland Yard, of course, was powerless to find the burglars and bring them to justice. Then such "visits" to the premises of the mission and the apartments of its employees were occasionally repeated, but "performed" at a very high professional level.

What Ivan Andreevich could not get used to during the entire period of his life in England was the calm, without soul-stirring emotions perception of the desire of the British at all costs, in any

circumstances to preserve the established rules of behavior and way of life for centuries. In the first years of the war, the country was actually in a state of siege. London and other cities were constantly bombed by German aircraft. Sometimes the air raid alert was announced up to twenty times a day. But the British continued to work imperturbably strictly "from" and "to", sacredly observing their weekend. Every morning the milkman left half a liter of milk at the doorstep, and there was no case that any intruder stole the bottle. And if the population was ordered due to the shortage of paper to hand over used bus tickets, then it never occurred to anyone to evade this. People died in the bombings. They were mourned and buried. And right there, with military honors, the bodies of German pilots, whose planes were shot down in the British sky, were interred. True, the Nazis did not remain in debt. One day Ivan Andreevich read in local newspapers that in one of the prisoner of war camps, Wehrmacht generals in full dress uniforms greeted and congratulated an English colonel on the occasion of his awarding the highest military order of the United Kingdom. One can imagine the feelings that overwhelmed our people working in England when reading reports of such "chivalrous ceremonies." After all, they, like the British, were well aware of the atrocities committed by the same "civilized Aryans" against Soviet prisoners of war and civilians in the occupied territory of the Soviet Union.

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It is not so widely known that during the war years two ambassadors of the Soviet Union were in London at the same time. One of them (I.M. Maisky) was accredited to the British crown, and the other (A.E. Bogomolov), with the consent of the British, maintained relations with the emigrant governments of Belgium, Holland, Greece, Norway, Poland, France, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Chichaev was seconded to Bogomolov's embassy and was officially listed as his adviser. And from the pines of 1944 to May 1945, in addition to his main, that is, intelligence work, he acted as Charge d'Affaires of the USSR under the above-mentioned governments in exile. Strictly speaking, such a high official position required an appropriate official diplomatic rank, but due to his natural modesty and habit of attaching importance to the essence of the matter rather than the form, Ivan Andreevich did not think about it. They realized this in Moscow - on April 15, 1945, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, he was awarded the rank of Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the 2nd class. The news of this came at a time when Chichaev had been regularly maintaining business contacts with the heads and members of the leadership of the allied countries for more than six months and at the same time closely interacting with representatives of their special services. His interlocutors and partners were such well-known figures of that time as E. Beneš!, the Yugoslav King Peter, Mikolajczyk?, Trygve Liz, General Charles de Gaulle. The latter attached great importance to the joint struggle of the Soviet and French intelligence services against the Nazis and did everything in his power to develop and improve their interaction. However, the head of the French intelligence service, without openly contradicting his leader, constantly sought to nullify his efforts in this area and kept relations with the Soviet intelligence mission within the framework of a coldish official courtesy, devoid to a large extent of concrete mutually beneficial content. The leaders of the Czechoslovak, Polish, Yugoslav, Greek, Norwegian and Belgian intelligence behaved quite differently. They provided important intelligence information, the implementation of which contributed to the approach of victory over the Nazis. For example, from these partners were received information about the experiments of the Germans with "heavy water"? at one of the secret factories in Norway. Later this object was razed to the ground by British bombers. Working with emigre circles, Ivan Andreevich and his collaborators constantly felt the "eye" of British counterintelligence on themselves. Naturally, we had to reckon with this and somehow put up with it. In practice, in everyday life, they learned the meaning and content of the now widely known thesis: in our world there are no friendly intelligence agencies, there is interaction between the intelligence agencies of friendly states.

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In May 1945, the long-awaited victory came. Chichaev fulfilled his mission and, having been assigned to Finland, he left on a steamer across the Mediterranean Sea to his homeland. While getting to Moscow, the situation has changed. The People's Commissariat announced to him that he would go as a resident not to Helsinki, but to Prague. And at the same time immediately. As an encouragement for active and fruitful work in England during the war, Ivan Andreevich received a week's leave, which he used to visit his mother in his native village of Usklyai in Mordovia.

Already on May 25, Chichaev was driving through the streets of the Czechoslovak capital, which kept traces of recent battles. The rhythm of his work and life remained the same, military. Understanding the essence of the complex internal political processes of this country, he continually found out that behind the back of a number of local parties and groups were Western intelligence services, including his recent partners in London. Especially often came across the "traces" of the Americans, who, as a rule, relied on agents from among the citizens of the United States of Czech and Slovak origin, who, after the end of the war, rushed to their historical homeland and applied for high government posts. At the same time, US intelligence services lured prominent local specialists overseas and conducted a real hunt for the art treasures of Czechoslovakia and the archives of the Nazis. Under such conditions, the Soviet intelligence officers and their chief had to provide all possible assistance to the leaders of the Czechoslovak security agencies that were being created, many of whom Ivan Andreevich knew and collaborated with back in London. At that time, he did not leave the feeling that the war had not yet ended for him. It was only moving into a qualitatively new stage, which was later called the Cold War, and the former allies in the anti-Hitler coalition turned into opponents.

At the end of 1947, Chichaev returned to Moscow and worked for about three years in the central intelligence apparatus. He then headed a special task force in Berlin to work with defectors from the Western occupation zones. Six months flew by like one day. And for the first time in his life, Ivan Andreevich ended up in a hospital bed. Many years of nervous tension and wear and tear have affected. The heart couldn't take it. Accompanied by a doctor, he is sent on a ride to Moscow. Doctors wondered whether it would be possible to deliver the patient to the hospital alive. But everything went well.

The suffered heart attack led Chichaev to the idea that after his recovery he would most likely have to retire, and not another reconnaissance mission. The experienced intelligence officer changed his mind about many things during the time when, in his words, he "scrambled out of the next world." They say that time flies quickly if it is filled with events. It is, of course, true, but Ivan Andreevich never had to take special care of it. Whether the era went to him like this, then

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whether such a character, but he was always in the midst of important and interesting events, and from the many cases and problems he always chose the most urgent and urgent for solving.

...Vanya Chichaev was born in 1896 in the village of Usklyay, which at that time was one of the "bear corners" in Mordovia. His grandfather was a serf and at the end of his life he managed to tell his grandson a lot about his dashing fate. The father worked. The mother constantly puzzled over how to feed and what to dress her children. She gave birth to fifteen of their souls, but only a few managed to save and go out. Throughout his life, Vanya carried a grateful memory of the warmth and tenderness of motherly love, the uniqueness of childhood joys and sorrows, the charms of his native nature and the cruelty of the orders that reigned around him. Very early, the little swirling, freckled shepherd felt from his own experience that hard and honest work does not always bring prosperity and a decent human life. A sharp and bitter resentment burned his impressionable soul at the ridicule and mockery of the well-fed and well-groomed barchuks.

He learned to read and write at a parochial school. And since then, with one spirit, he "swallowed" all the books that he could get. He was irresistibly drawn to distant cities and unknown countries, where, as it seemed to him, dreams of travel, hearty food and decent clothes would come true. When Ivan turned 15, with the consent of his parents, he left for Moscow, where his "universities" began.

He worked as a messenger, a loader, and a bookseller. He saved every penny to buy books and gallery tickets to the Art and Bolshoi Theaters. With bated breath I watched Gorky's play "At the Bottom", listened to F. Chaliapin, L. Sobinov, A. Nezhdanova.

Carried away by the dream of cheap apples, eternal warmth and "heavenly life", he visited distant Tashkent, returned disappointed: and in Central Asia he saw the same poverty, lack of rights, downtroddenness and arbitrariness.

In 1916, Chichaev was drafted into the army. He received his baptism of fire on the Southwestern Front. After the October Revolution, he willingly joined political and social activities, was elected a member of the soldiers' committee in his regiment. After returning to his native land in 1919-1922, he worked in the bodies of the Cheka in the city of Ruzaevka and at the Alatyr station. During these turbulent years, he met "the best girl in all of Russia" - blue-eyed Ksenia Teplova, who became his faithful friend.

In the spring of 1923, Chichaev was transferred to the capital as an employee of the GPU department on the Moscow Railway. In December of the same year, he traveled to Mongolia through foreign counterintelligence under the guise of the head of the consular department of the USSR embassy. Ivan Andreevich himself considered the most striking page of that period to be the work to provide the Soviet delegation with reliable intelligence information that contributed to the success of negotiations between

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the leader of the Mongolian revolution Kh. Choibalsan and the commander of the Soviet troops in the Far East I.P. Uborevich.

In the summer of 1924, I.A. Chichaev was transferred to the Foreign Department of the OGPU and was soon sent to the capital of the Tuva Republic, the city of Kyzyl, as a consul of the USSR while simultaneously performing the duties of a foreign intelligence resident. One and a half years I had to work in difficult everyday and difficult political conditions for two departments at once. And then, like in a kaleidoscope, one foreign business trip was replaced by another: Korea (1927-1930), Finland (1932-1934), Estonia (1934-1938), Latvia (1938-1940), Sweden (1940-1941). Between them, he worked in the central intelligence apparatus. Several times he tried to let the authorities let him go to study in order to receive a systematic education. He dreamed of graduating from the Institute of Oriental Studies, but managed to master the program of only the evening courses of the Higher Party School under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks without leaving the service. And the rest of the vast stock of knowledge is the result of constant persistent self-education, comprehension and assimilation of the richest life experience.

Ivan Andreevich was highly valued as an efficient scout and thoughtful analyst. It was he who organized and directly participated in one of the operations that ended with the acquisition by Soviet intelligence of such an important document as the well-known Tanakib memorandum. In the period of preparation for the next trip abroad, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs G.V. Chicherin invited him to work as a personal assistant for Japan. In 1934, S.M. Kirov. And only the murder of Sergei Mironovich prevented their agreed meeting on this issue. In 1940, Chichaev personally reported on the situation in Latvia to I.V. Stalin and other members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks ...

After retiring in 1952, life without his favorite job at first seemed to Ivan Andreevich insipid, boring, almost meaningless. His wife, work comrades, and numerous friends helped overcome such moods. He was unspeakably rich in them. In particular, the playwright V. Vishnevsky, the poet V. Lebedev-Kumach, the writers A. Fadeev, P. Zamoisky, V. Stavsky, V. Latsis persuaded him to take up the pen and believe in his literary and journalistic abilities. So the former intelligence officer became the author of three books ("Unforgettable Years", "Pages of Past Days", "Ruzaevka at the Dawn of October"), many articles and essays. However, in those years, in these publications, he could not say a single word about those events and deeds that constituted the main content of his life and work, that is, about intelligence

activities and comrades on the "invisible front". For this, there was only one opportunity - to generously share with young scouts their unique experience, which

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which is quite deservedly an integral and integral part of the treasury of Soviet foreign intelligence.

Ivan Andreevich Chichaev died on November 15, 1984 in his small apartment in a house on Serpukhov Val in Moscow. Behind the coffin of the deceased, on scarlet pillows, they carried his state awards - the Order of Lenin, two orders of the Red Banner, the Order of the Red Star and the Badge of Honor, medals. But I would like to end the story about him not on this sad note, but with the words from his book Unforgettable Years:

"A lot of trials, hardships and hardships fell to our lot, but they only tempered us ... This was also facilitated by the fact that at that time, in the words of the poet,

We were young, not thrifty,

In hunger, cold Still happy.

Eduard Beneš (1884-1948) Czechoslovak statesman.

In October 1938 he emigrated to the USA, then to England. In 1940 with

founded the Czechoslovak "National Council" in London, transformed

soon to the government of Czechoslovakia in exile. Led it to

1945. In 1946-1948. was the president of Czechoslovakia.

2 Stanisław Mikolajczyk (1901-1966) – statesman and politician of Poland. In 1940-1943 was Deputy Prime Minister, and in 1943-1944. - Prime Minister of the Polish government in exile in London.

3 Trygve Halvdan Lie (1896-1968) - Norwegian state and political

tic activity. In 1940-1945. - foreign minister

of Norway in exile in London. In 1946-1953. was the Secretary General of the United Nations.

General Charles de Gaulle (1890-1970) - an outstanding French state

gift, military and political figure. In 1940 he founded

London Free French Movement. In 1941-1943. led

French National Committee, and in 1943-1944. - French co

National Liberation Committee. September 26, 1941 recognized as the right

government of the Soviet Union as "leader of all free French, wherever they were."

5 A compound of deuterium (a stable isotope of hydrogen) with oxygen used in nuclear power engineering.

6 "Memorandum on the Fundamentals of Positive Policy in Manchuria and Mongo-

lii "- a document that first outlined Japan's plans for

war of world domination. Presented on 25 July 1927 to the Emperor of Japan by the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan

Baron Giichi Tanaka (1863-1929).

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Goal achieved

At the beginning of June 1940, Kim Philby, accredited to the headquarters of the British troops in France as a correspondent for The Times, left Brest for England with the last units. Whilst away time among the military, Kim drew attention to a pretty lady who, when meeting him, introduced herself as a correspondent for the Daily Express newspaper in Belgium and Luxembourg, Hester Marsden Smidley. In the ensuing conversation, Hester was interested in Kim's opinion on the political and military prospects for developments in Europe. Philby, referring to his experience in Spain and more recently in France, declared that, in his personal opinion, the position of England had become extremely dangerous. Hester directly asked Philby what he intended to do, to which Kim replied that at any moment he could be drafted into the army. After that, she deliberately, as it seemed to Philby, changed the subject of conversation. This hated acquaintance would not have deserved attention if it had not played a very important role later on in Kim Philby's admission to work in British intelligence (SIS). As it turned out later, Hester was a staff member of the SIS and, under the guise of a correspondent, carried out assignments in Belgium and Luxembourg in the line of section "D", which was engaged in organizing sabotage and sabotage, and conducting propaganda to decompose the rear of the enemy. On her arrival in London, Hester recommended to the head of the political line of the D section, who also handled the selection of personnel, Miss Marjorie Maxey, to consider Kim Philby as a candidate for a job in the D section. Meanwhile, Kim, unaware of Hester's initiative, made an unsuccessful attempt, on the advice of Guy Burgess, to get a job at the government school of coding and cryptography in Bletchley Park, which was engaged in the disclosure of enemy codes. He was in real danger.

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call to the army, as he had already received a summons and passed the medical examination. However, Marjorie Maxey, in turn, wasted no time in making initial inquiries about Philby and, through Captain Leslie Sheridan of the War Department, a former journalist, arranged a personal meeting with Philby. During the conversation, Maxi asked in detail about his biographical data, how deeply Kim understands political problems, and how he sees the possibility of conducting counter-propaganda against the Nazi regime. Apparently, Kim's answers made a favorable impression on her, and she made an appointment with him again. Due to the fact that during the conversation Kim said that he had graduated from Cambridge, Maxi did not fail to inquire about him from Guy Burgess, who worked in Section D, who graduated from the same university, unaware of them not only friendly relations, but also joint work for Soviet intelligence. Having received the most flattering reference from Guy, she invited him to a second meeting with Kim Philby. Quickly orienting themselves in the situation, friends, and especially Burgess, during the second interview, without saying a word, played such a "performance" that at the end of the conversation, Maxi offered Kim a job in section "D" SISi asked Burgess to take part in organizing a school to train the personnel they need. The school was supposed to train saboteurs selected for the transfer to the territories occupied by the Germans, and was located in the former Brickendonbury Hall, near Hartford. Philby trained agents in the elementary skills of conducting an underground struggle, illegal propaganda and agitation, distributing literature, and much more. Among the teachers were specialists in sabotage, explosives, etc. Kim soon realized that as a school teacher, he was as far removed from SIS as he had been as a correspondent for The Times. But the earlier intelligence training under Deutsch and Mulley did not

passed in vain. Kim, having no connection with the Center, began to actively make acquaintances with teachers, among whom was a former associate of Bruce Lockhart in post-revolutionary Russia, George Hill, who, after the German attack on the USSR, was appointed official representative of the Office of Special Operations (OSO) and SIS in Moscow. Kim developed a particularly warm friendship with Tommy Harris, a well-known businessman who traded in works of art and antiques before the war. By expanding the circle of acquaintances among teachers, Kim pursued the goal of gaining access to intelligence information and creating conditions for transferring to work in the operational units of the SIS. In the fall, section "D", together with the school, due to the lack of practical results of the work, was transferred from the SIS to the jurisdiction of the Ministry for Economic Warfare and subordinated to the created Directorate

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social operations. Thus, on the basis of section "D" intelligence of economic warfare was created. Most of the employees were fired and among them were Guy Burgess and Tommy Harris. Burgess got a job in the Ministry of Information, and Harris moved to counterintelligence (MI5) and soon became one of the leading employees. Philby was among the few retained to work at the newly organized Bewley School as a political instructor for the SO-2 training center (sabotage and sabotage department). The school became known as "Station 17" and was located in Hampshire.

On December 24, 1940, returning to London as a resident of Soviet intelligence, A.V. Gorsky re-established contact with Kim Philby, who spoke in detail about the changes that had taken place in his life, the nature of his work at the school, and the acquaintances he had made among the staff members of the SIS, MI-5, and SOD. Summing up his story, Kim expressed the opinion that his intelligence capabilities are very limited and, in general, he has the impression that he got into an organization that is very far from intelligence. The resident listened attentively to Kim and could not but agree with him that his work at the school was of little interest to us. At the same time, in order to cheer up Kim, he noted his efforts to establish new contacts among intelligence officers, which in the future can play a positive role in his career. The resident drew Kim's special attention to the need to consolidate and deepen the friendly relations he is developing with Tommy Harris. Parting, Gorsky asked Kim for the next meeting to prepare detailed information about the organization of the British sabotage work on the continent, the structure and senior staff of the Special Operations Directorate, the personnel of Station 17, and carefully collect data on agents thrown by the British into enemy territory.

Given that the duration of the meeting did not allow them to discuss in detail the emerging military-political situation, the resident asked Kim, knowing his analytical skills, to prepare information on this issue with his own assessments. The Center agreed with the Resident's suggestion that Kim should look for a more interesting intelligence job, but approach this in a balanced way and be careful not to end up out of work altogether. At the next meeting, Kim handed over the prepared information and continued to discuss the issue of his future work. Gorsky told Kim the opinion of the Center on this issue, and they decided to use the opportunities of Harris, who by this time was thoroughly entrenched in MI5. The practical steps taken by Kim, through Harris, to move to work in the SIS were not in vain. By 1941, the contradictions between the SIS and MI5 intensified over the scope of tasks and competence.

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SIS counterintelligence department, which was responsible for all counterintelligence work abroad. In order to moderate the appetites and claims of MI5 for its participation in this matter, the SIS decided to expand the apparatus of the counterintelligence department and, in particular, increase the staff of the Spanish sector. Tommy Harris, who worked in the Spanish branch of MI5 in June 1941, proposed Philby as a specialist in Spain who had experience in this country, on



position of head of the Spanish sector in SIS. At the same time, Harris mentioned that Kim's father is a friend of Valentin Vivian, SIS deputy director for foreign counterintelligence. Having learned from Felix Cowgill, head of the 5th counterintelligence department, that Kim Philby was recommended for them, Vivian wished to meet him personally. During the conversation, Kim made a good impression on him, and in the future, Vivian closely followed his work and contributed to his career growth. In July 1941, Cowgill offered Philby the job. With the consent of the Center, Kim accepted the proposal and headed the sector that conducted counterintelligence work in Spain, Portugal and partly in the French North African possessions in terms of preventing the penetration of foreign intelligence from the territory of these countries into ENGLAND.

At the next meeting with Gorsky, Philby said that applying for a job in the SIS is preceded by a verification of the candidate for SIS and MI-5 records. Philby was aware that there was little material on him in counterintelligence that in 1930 he was a member of the socialist society of Cambridge University, was a subscriber to the Worker's Monthly, his wife was anti-fascist, and that his father held extreme views. Since Philby was hired, apparently, these materials were not given any importance at that time, confining themselves to a routine and purely formal check on the records.

Kim was actively involved in the fight against German agents in the Iberian Peninsula and gained access to information important for Soviet intelligence, including the telegrams of the German Abwehr decrypted by the British. It was then that Kim managed to obtain the first information about the mutual desire to establish contacts between British intelligence and the head of the Abwehr, Admiral Canaris, and to draw the attention of the Center to this issue. Later, in 1944, information about separate negotiations between the Americans and

English with Germans.

Diligence, diligence, the ability to find non-standard solutions based on in-depth study and analysis of the current situation, to bring the set goals to the end contributed to Kim's promotion through the ranks. Philby also proved himself to be a good colleague. So, in one of Vivian's conversations

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stated that Philby is the only person in the intelligence apparatus who has no enemies and is respected by everyone.

After the transition to the SIS, Philby's information return sharply increased. Soviet intelligence began to receive regular documentary information on various issues of the activities of British intelligence, on its structure and personnel, including residencies, on individual agents, especially the 5th counterintelligence department.

Since 1942, the deputy resident continued to work with Philby, and after leaving in 1943 for the Gorsky Union, resident B.M. Kreshin. Meetings with him were held, as a rule, once every 10-12 days in various places in London, mainly in the evening.

To obtain the information necessary for Soviet intelligence, Philby used not only his official position, but also personal contacts with MI5, the Foreign Ministry, and representatives of American intelligence. So, at the end of November 1941, he managed to get acquainted with the contents of the deciphered telegram of the German ambassador in Tokyo, addressed to Ribbentrop, that Japan would launch an offensive against Singapore in 10 days. On instructions from the Center, he constantly monitored the situation around the opening of a second front.

In 1944, he reported that in a conversation with one of the senior American officers from the US Office of Strategic Services (OSS), he managed to find out that the Americans, together with the British, were creating a uranium bomb.

In mid-August 1943, Philby received a personal letter from Cowgill asking him if he would like to devote himself to work in the counterintelligence department of the SIS after the end of the war. On our recommendation, Philby gave a positive answer.

On August 31, 1943, by order of the counterintelligence department, Philby was appointed a member of the secretariat under the head of the department. His duties included, as a freelance assistant to the head of the department, the management of the following areas:

- a) a branch serving the Iberian Peninsula (Spain, Portugal and their colonies);
- 6) a department that is developing (from a counterintelligence point of view) German intelligence in Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia;
- c) maintaining contact with Polish counterintelligence in London.

In addition, Philby's duties included counterintelligence support for all Allied military operations conducted by Eisenhower, and maintaining communications between the SIS counterintelligence department and the British Foreign Office. Philby became directly subordinate to Cowgill and his deputy Fergusson.

On August 25, 1944, at one of the meetings in the SIS, where intelligence director Menzies was present, Cowgill put forward a proposal

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on the appointment of Philby after the end of the war in Europe as a resident of the SIS counterintelligence department in Berlin. Vivian, on the other hand, suggested that Philby be appointed head of the 9th section (department) for the fight against communism instead of Curry, who was leaving for work in counterintelligence.

According to Cowgill, Philby's job in Berlin would have been to eliminate the illegal organizations of the German Nazis, which would have taken about two years.

With two offers, Menzies decided to get Philby's own opinion.

At a meeting with Kreshin, Philby, talking about the current situation, said that it would be better for him to work instead of Curry, but he fears that this could ruin his relationship with Cowgill, who patronizes him. Vivian's proposal was preferable because, according to Cowgill, 15 ciphers from the SIS school had already been working on the interception of diplomatic telegrams from the USSR and communist organizations, and in the near future Menzies intends to allocate even more workers for this business. The Center recommended that Philby try to get a job in the 9th department, especially since this coincided with the desire of Philby himself.

In September 1944, the final decision was made to appoint Philby as head of the 9th Division. Philby started working in the 9th department only in November 1944, since before that Curry was on a business trip and Philby could not take over from him earlier.

The 9th department is separated into an independent unit, but in work it must maintain close contact with the counterintelligence department and use its intelligence and operational opportunities.

Philby, as head of the 9th department, began to report directly to Vivian. On certain issues, he received the right to report directly to Menzies. For a short period of time, in connection with the departure of Cowgill on a business trip, Philby acted as head of the counterintelligence department and gained access to his safe.

At a meeting with Kreshin on October 16, 1944, Philby was in a good mood and very optimistically set out his intelligence capabilities in our interests for the future.

And against the backdrop of the exhausting work of Kim Philby in obtaining important and much-needed information for the USSR State Defense Committee and Soviet intelligence in the Center in 1942, distrust of Philby and the entire "Cambridge Five" arose again.

In February 1940, at the direction of L.P. Beria, the London residency was closed on the grounds that all agents, including the "Cambridge Five", were known to former intelligence officers exposed as "foreign spies", and therefore the post

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The information that came from her should be regarded only as a disinformation action by the British. And again, as in 1940, Gorsky, now together with Kreshin, had to prove the groundlessness and absurdity of the suspicions of the Center.

The absence in Philby's information of materials characterizing the activities of the SIS in our country was considered in the Center in 1942 as a suspicious understatement by him of the work of British intelligence against us.

These conclusions were made with complete disregard for Philby's service capabilities. Thus, in a letter from the Center to the residency dated August 26, 1942, it was stated: "We draw your attention to new signals from Philby, which must be taken with great attention. This is a new statement by Philby in a conversation with Kreshin (our resident in London. - Approx. Author) about the weak work of the SIS against the USSR. The suspicion of this statement is aggravated by the fact that Philby did not even try to refer to ignorance in this matter, but convincingly proved this obvious absurdity, apparently doing it quite deliberately.

In a letter to the residency dated October 25, 1943, the Center draws the attention of the resident to the fact that "after a thorough analysis of the work with a group of sources (all five are listed. - Approx. Aut.), We came to the conclusion that they are known to the SIS and counterintelligence, they work on their instructions and these knowledge. There is reason to believe that even before contacting us, they were sent by counterintelligence to work among left-wing students in Cambridge, and this is precisely what explains their stay in the English Communist Party, their leftist moods, etc. It is also certain that counterintelligence was aware of Edith and Stephen's connections among young English aristocrats. It is also impossible to admit that the SIS and counterintelligence could entrust such responsible work and in such responsible areas to persons involved in the past in party and left-wing activities, if this activity was not carried out with the knowledge of these bodies."

Having expressed such political distrust to this entire group of sources, the Center suggested that the residency restructure the nature of work with these sources in the direction of giving them full initiative in presenting information to us, without showing them our interest in certain issues. And at the end of the letter there is a very "smart" summary: "Our task is to figure out what kind of disinformation British intelligence is slipping on us."

People's Commissar for State Security Merkulov warned against such a hasty conclusion, saying that the question of this group of sources has not yet been fully clarified.

The subsequent materials of these sources, as well as information received through other channels, convinced thinkers and disassemblers

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Xia in the operational work of the staff of the Center in the sincerity of the work of these sources with us.

A number of Philby's materials, handed over to us in 1944-1945, completely ruled out the assumption that British intelligence was interested in transferring such materials to us.

At the same time, data received through other channels confirmed Philby's information about the insignificant activity and possibilities of British intelligence in work against the USSR. A number of telegrams from the British Foreign Office to its ambassador in Washington on various topical issues, transmitted to us by Philby, were confirmed by information from MacLean, who was in Washington.

The authenticity of materials provided to us by Philby in the Intelligence Service intelligence and observation case on communications and cooperation between British and Soviet intelligence services was confirmed by documentary materials obtained through other operational and technical and intelligence capabilities of intelligence and other departments of the state security of the USSR. In July 1944, Kim Philby was commended on behalf of the Minister of State Security for his fruitful work and especially for the transfer of the SIS case to us. These and a number of additional, including documentary, evidence of the sincerity of the work of Philby and the entire group of these sources forced a radical change in attitude towards them.

Given the invaluable assistance provided to Soviet intelligence by this group of sources, especially in the period 1943-1945, it was decided to establish a lifetime pension for each of them (in 1945).

To ensure greater security, the residency was instructed by the Center to minimize Philby's assignments for the extraction of bulky documentary materials and limit the frequency of meetings to once every two weeks.

In March 1945, Philby went on short business trips to France and Italy to check the work of residencies and create bases for work against local communist parties and Soviet intelligence.

On April 7, 1945, an additional instruction was sent to the residency - meetings with Philby should be held no more than once a month. In essence, the meetings began to be purely technical in nature: receiving materials from Philby and transferring the next task of the Center to him. Have conversations with Philby about once every three months on general political topics, on international issues, and on personal topics, as he has repeatedly expressed his dissatisfaction with the lack of such conversations.

So, Kim Philby achieved the goal set for him at the beginning of his intelligence career - he became not just a personnel officer, but also the head of one of the most important units of the British intelligence SIS. His experience as a Soviet intelligence officer

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helped him in solving professional problems and as an employee of the SIS, which, combined with his personal qualities, contributed to his rapid advancement through the ranks.

It will not be difficult for even a person not experienced in intelligence matters to understand how valuable the information received from Philby during the Great Patriotic War was for state security and the government of the USSR. Kim Philby made a significant contribution to the victory over Nazi Germany. Ahead of Kim Philby were waiting for new things.

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#### Secrets of the decryption service

On February 6, 1934, a fascist demonstration took place on the Place de la Concorde in Paris, ending in bloodshed. The French fascists acted in the manner of their German mentors, staged pogroms, started fights, as a result of which a dozen and a half people were killed and hundreds were wounded.

The turbulent events in France were closely followed by an English student, Cairncross, who studied at the Sorbonne. His sympathies were on the side of the anti-fascist forces.

The growth of fascist sentiments in Germany and Italy, the calls for world domination, and the behavior of pro-fascist extremist organizations in France, alarmed the French. They also worried John Cairncross. Since then, he began to closely follow the development of the situation in Europe and became more and more convinced that the ruling circles of England and France underestimated the threat posed by fascism and in many respects pandered to the fascist regimes.

In the autumn of 1934, Cairncross returned to England and, on the recommendation of professors from the University of Glasgow, entered Trinity College, Cambridge University. The poor Scotsman managed to get into this privileged college thanks to his brilliant knowledge and intellect.

John Cairncross was born in 1913 in Scotland in the family of a small shopkeeper. The family was large, did not live well, but all the children received a good education. Two older brothers, having graduated from higher educational institutions, worked at the universities of Glasgow and Cambridge. Later they moved to the public service. The sisters became teachers. John was the youngest. Until the age of 15, he studied at a local school, then studied for two years at the Hamilton Academy (an educational institution like a college), in 1930 he entered the University of Glasgow, where he studied political economy, German and French. In 1932 he went to France to study at the Sorbonne.

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Studying at Trinity College, where left-wing sentiments were quite strong, he brought him together with left-wing students and members of the Cambridge organization of the Communist Party of England. The ideas and political views of these people had a great influence on the worldview of Cairncross, and after a while he became a member of the Communist Party.

After graduating from Cambridge in 1936, Cairncross successfully passed the diplomatic and civil service examinations and was hired by the Foreign Office. There were no complications with hiring in this institution, since the environment did not know about his membership in the party, and he himself did not tell outsiders about it.

During this period, Cairncross connected his fate with Soviet foreign intelligence. He became a valuable source and rendered great help to our country during the Great Patriotic War, saving the lives of tens of thousands of soldiers of the Red Army. The information obtained by him was reported to the leadership of the country and the armed forces, including directly I.V. Stalin.

Anthony Blunt, who was already collaborating with our intelligence, played a big role in getting Cairncross to work in foreign intelligence. He studied with John in the same college, but several years older, was at one time his educational director and maintained friendly relations with him.

Blunt recommended Cairncross to Deitch, an employee of the London illegal residency, as a promising candidate capable of obtaining intelligence information of interest to the Center. However, the illegal residency was in no hurry to establish contact with him, since there were conflicting data about his political views and views on life. Some believed that, having made his way from the bottom to the state apparatus, Cairncross would faithfully abide by the rules prescribed by civil servants.

Somewhat later, the residency came to the conclusion that Kerncross could be a useful source, and in this regard, decided, in agreement with the Center, to ask one of the student activists with whom she maintained occasional contacts to sort out this person and give your opinion about it. The opinion was positive, and the residency raised the question of establishing direct contact with Cairncross before the Center.

At the direction of the intelligence leadership, work with Cairncross was entrusted to Deutsch. We proceeded from the fact that Deutsch is the most prepared person to realistically assess the possibilities

a new source, his personal qualities, as well as to use meetings to carry out the necessary educational work and teach the rules and techniques of intelligence work.

Already the first contacts with Cairncross convinced Deutsch that he was dealing with a person close in ideology, a friend of the Soviet

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Union. Cairncross actively took up the work from the first days. Deutsch, however, acted like a seasoned educator. He restrained the zeal of the young worker, tried to give him feasible assignments, and when he did not succeed, he tried to encourage him, never making remarks that could cause disappointment or annoyance. Gradually, Cairncross learned the rules and techniques of undercover work, conspiracy, and began to extract valuable secret materials. Deutsch also advised him to move away from the Communist Party and not to maintain contact with its members.

In characterizing Cairncross, Deutsch wrote: "Molière" (source's pseudonym – author's note) comes from a Scottish petty-bourgeois family. The Scots are a religious people. Since their life is hard, they are very hardworking and thrifty. The Scots don't like the English. "Molière" inherited some of these traits. He is a pedantic, efficient, diligent and thrifty person. He is modest and simple. He is very educated, serious and convinced communist. He immediately expressed his willingness to work with us and treats our business very responsibly. He is interested in all our party, practical and theoretical questions and understands them quite well. Very inquisitive. He is a simple, sometimes naive and a little provincial person. Very trusting and can hardly disguise himself. Outwardly very simple and nice. Normal for women. Disciplined and careful. He trusts us completely, and we are a great authority for him."

At the Foreign Office, Cairncross worked in the American and Central European departments and had access to classified and top secret material. In the process of working with Deutsch, he began to supply him with documentary information, mainly on German topics. The information was highly appreciated by the Center.

At the end of 1937, Deutsch was recalled to Moscow for security reasons, and Gorsky, a resident of the "legal" residency, began to maintain contact with Cairncross. At the end of 1938, the agent conditions of the source changed dramatically. He was transferred from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Finance, where the ability to obtain classified materials was much weaker.

Regarding the transfer of Cairncross from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Resident Gorsky wrote to the Center: "Regarding the dismissal of "List" (the source's new pseudonym. - Approx. Aut.) from "Zakoulak" (as the Foreign Office was called in operational correspondence) allegedly for my poor work it's very hard to say anything right now. He himself claims that he was fired from there only because he did not graduate from the Public School, and this is in the Back Street - the stronghold of reaction and snobbery ~ is considered a stain that can ruin the career of a beginner, even with the most brilliant abilities. "Stuart" (pseudonym of another source, working

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she at the Foreign Ministry. - Approx. auth.) once told me that "List" was fired from "Zakoulak" only because he stood out against the background of a mediocre, but titled mass and did not fit the court. I believe that this explanation can be fully trusted.

Despite the fact that in the Ministry of Finance Cairncross worked at a site where materials of interest to the residency were not often encountered, nevertheless, he handed over a number of important documents.

From February to December 1940, contact with Cairncross was not maintained due to the recall of operational workers to Moscow. But then work resumed. In mid-1940, John was appointed private secretary to Lord Hankey.

In Chamberlain's cabinet, this man served as a minister without a portfolio, and when Churchill headed the government, he worked in the line of secret services and was chairman of a dozen commissions that dealt with issues of defense, security, scientific research, etc.

This assignment placed Cairncross in an extremely important channel of classified information. Hankey received material from the cabinet, intelligence agencies, research organizations, and other important institutions. All of them accumulated at Cairncross.

Correspondence from the Foreign Ministry with embassies, weekly British intelligence reports to the Cabinet, minutes of War Cabinet meetings, reports from the Chief of the General Staff, materials on economic intelligence, and other important secret documents were received from Cairncross.

From January to May 1941, a large number of materials were received from the source, which testified to the preparation of fascist Germany for an attack on the Soviet Union. Among them were: a telegram from British Foreign Minister Eden to the Foreign Office about Hitler's conversation with Crown Prince Paul of Greece about the attack on the USSR; telegram from British Ambassador to the US Halifax to the Foreign Office about a conversation with US Vice President Wallace on the same issue; a telegram from the British ambassador in Sweden to the Foreign Ministry about the imminent German attack on the USSR; summary of British Intelligence Service (SIS) materials on Germany and Finland; a telegram from British Ambassador to the USSR Cripps to the Foreign Ministry about the plans of the Germans; a telegram from the British ambassador to Finland about the number of German troops in Finland; a telegram from the British ambassador to Finland about Finnish-German cooperation; a telegram from the British ambassador to Turkey about the transfer of German ships to the Black Sea; an excerpt from the next review of the SIS from May 4 to 11 on German plans for the USSR; the disposition of the German air force and other materials.

The report of the residence sent to the Center on May 31, 1941 testifies to the intensity of work with the source. In particular, it spoke about sending 60 films with Cairncross materials, medium

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among which, the report noted, in addition to a very large number of incoming and outgoing telegrams from the Foreign Office, photographed minutes of meetings of the military cabinet and reports of various commissions and committees on certain issues discussed by the government, weekly reports of the imperial general staff, weekly reports of the British intelligence, weekly reports of the political intelligence department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, weekly intelligence reports of the Ministry of Economic Warfare, detailed statistics on military-strategic reserves.

At the end of September 1941, Cairncross also handed over a document of extraordinary importance - a report to Prime Minister Churchill on the project to create atomic weapons. The document stated that this weapon could be created within two years. This was the first document received by intelligence about practical steps in the use of atomic energy abroad for military purposes. Along with the documents received later, he played an exceptionally important role in intensifying work on the development of the Soviet atomic industry and, above all, the production of atomic weapons.

Cairncross passed information on other important issues as well. One of them concerned the activities of the British-Soviet Commission to assist the USSR in armament. It was important for the Soviet leadership to know what types of weapons and their volumes could be counted on. Lord Hankey's secretariat had such information, and Cairncross regularly passed it on to the Soviet intelligence officer.

In connection with the transformation of the apparatus of Lord Hankey and his transfer to another job, the question arose about the further employment of Cairncross. The residency advised the source to try to get a job in the radio interception and decryption service.

Cairncross himself sought to get a job in this institution and discussed this issue more than once with his curator. He understood that the deciphered messages of the Germans about the situation on the Eastern Front and their military plans could be of great help to the Soviet command.

Through his acquaintances, Cairncross managed to get a job at a school where personnel were trained for the service, and after it ended, to work in the service apparatus.

The service did not have enough specialists with knowledge of foreign languages, so Cairncross was taken there without much difficulty. Of course, his previous work with secret documents was also taken into account. The level of secrecy was exceptionally high here. The deciphered materials were read by literally a few people: first of all, the prime minister, the minister of war, the head of the SIS, and, possibly, two or three other people from among high-ranking officials.

Among the deciphered materials there was a lot of data concerning the Soviet-German front. There were dispatches of German

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General Staff Commander of Army Groups and Armies on issues of conducting military operations against Soviet troops. However, the British did not report these data to the Soviet leadership, despite the fact that there was a corresponding agreement on this score. Some explain the reason for this approach to the transfer of information by the desire of the British leadership to keep the source of the data in deep secrecy, fearing that if the Germans suspect that their ciphers have been revealed, they can replace them.

However, it is hardly possible to agree with this argument. If the British used this data at home, shared it with the Americans, then some of their share, transferred to the USSR, would hardly have changed the situation, especially since it was not required to report the real source of information here. It was possible to refer to undercover data, data of prisoners, air reconnaissance, etc.

It should be noted that foreign intelligence was lucky in this regard. At his new job, Cairncross gained access to a number of deciphered German documents, which were immediately transferred to Moscow. Philby also had access to a number of such documents - they were sent to him by the head of intelligence. It was possible sometimes to extract some materials and Blunt. Cairncross, on the other hand, had these documents in his safe and could use them as they arrived, i.e. without much delay. He handed over the most important data on the impending German offensive on the Kursk Bulge, indicated the approximate timing of the offensive, the technical parameters of the new German tank "Tiger" and other information.

With his selfless work, he made a serious contribution to our victory at Kursk and on other fronts.

The British deciphered almost all the information that came from the German General Staff, Naval and Aviation Staffs. The Germans used the high-speed Enigma cipher machine to encrypt their telegrams.

Somewhere in the mid-1930s, the French, through their agent, obtained the documentation for Enigma and tried to crack the German cipher. However, their attempts failed. Then they handed over the documents to the British, and they energetically set to work. They created a special unit, placed it in a separate building in Bletchley Park, put at its disposal one of the first computers, and in the middle of 1940 they were successful. Since then, the British have been reading practically all the secret information of the Germans on military matters.

The value of the materials received from Cairncross can be judged from the report of the head of the 3rd department Hovakimyan addressed to the head of intelligence Fitin. The report said: "Intelligence materials received by us from our sources "L" and "T" ("Leaf" - Cairncross and "Tony" - Blunt. -



Note. auth.) on the operational orders of the German command on the Soviet-German front and radiograms are not

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German intelligence about the deployment and movement of units of the Red Army is highly appreciated by the GRU and the General Staff of the Red Army. (A written assessment is attached.) "And then it is proposed to declare gratitude to them for their work.

In addition to materials of a military-operational nature, Cairncross transmitted the data of the German machine cipher "Tuna", which was used by the British to decrypt German radio messages. Based on these data, a similar model of this machine was designed for use in deciphering German radio messages.

In the operational file there is a task of the Center for residency. In particular, it says that the Germans made some changes to the design of the machine and therefore additional information is needed, which may be known to the British and can be obtained by Cairncross. Such data were received from the source and sent to Moscow. There is no information about the further fate of this decryption machine in the file.

At the direction of the Center, the residency actively used the capabilities of Cairncross to collect data related to operations to decipher German radio messages. In one of the tasks of the Center, it is noted that it is desirable to continue to receive intercepts of German radio messages from the source. Of particular interest were the telegrams of such German lines as Berlin-Pskov, Berlin-Helsinki, Berlin-Lisbon, Trebizond-Istanbul, Berlin-Bucharest, Kirkenes-Oslo. The value of these telegrams, the task emphasizes, will increase significantly if Cairncross can transmit them in German, indicating waves, call signs, type of telegram headers and other data.

The materials of the case also show that the source closely followed the work of the British in deciphering Soviet ciphers and reported data on the results of this work, as well as information that the British special services had about similar work on Soviet ciphers by the Germans and Japanese. . For example, the decrypted telegram sent by Cairncross to the Japanese military attache in Berlin indicates that Japanese cipher experts are in constant contact with German experts on the issue of deciphering Soviet telegrams. However, they have not yet succeeded in deciphering the Soviet diplomatic cipher, and now they have begun to work on deciphering Russian military ciphers.

There are many difficulties in the work of a scout. Sometimes it takes a lot of time and effort to clarify just one fact. It was not easy for Cairncross to obtain intelligence materials. However, at Bletchley Park (the service's code name given by its location), the source was lucky. There were quite a lot of deciphering materials. First of all, documents were selected that related directly to England and the actions

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allies. Most of the rest, where there were also materials on the Soviet-German front, as a rule, were destroyed after they were viewed. The destroyed telegrams were not registered. Therefore, there was no need to make any copies. Cairncross collected a stack of originals to be destroyed and handed them over to the station worker. Often he managed to find the most interesting documents in the box for destruction, where unnecessary papers were dumped.

At the end of 1943, Cairncross went to work for the SIS. The transition from the service of radio interception and decryption to the work of the SIS device was associated with a sharp deterioration in vision. Cairncross has not seen with his left eye since childhood. Hard work in Bletchley Park had a negative effect on the condition of the right eye. Vision began to deteriorate. The residency took steps to

to help him with his treatment, but the results were not encouraging. Doctors advised to change the nature of work.

After moving to work in the central office of the SIS, the source was assigned to the Fifth, and then to the First Directorate. In the Fifth Directorate, he was engaged in counterintelligence services for the USSR and the Balkans. The specific duties of Cairncross were: analysis and study of the intercepted telegrams of German intelligence about its activities in the USSR and the Balkans, as well as all intelligence materials in these regions, the study of the personnel and agents of the German residencies in the Balkans, the study of the methods of work of German intelligence. In the First Directorate, his duties included the analysis of political information.

Describing Cairncross' new area of work, the resident wrote to the Center that the source receives all German intelligence intercepts, which, after use, must be personally burned by him. He actually burns a part of these telegrams (no acts are drawn up), and the rest he sends to us. During his duty in the department (once or twice a week), the source looks through the papers received by other employees of the department (diplomatic intercepts, excerpts from the diplomatic mail, weekly reports of intelligence materials, telegrams from residencies, etc.) and regularly transmits us their content.

On one of these tours, Cairncross discovered in his boss's closet a list of British agents in the Balkans. The list was copied and sent to Moscow.

Of great interest was the information contained in the special report of the SIS dated October 28, 1944. This document dealt with Himmler's secret instructions received by secret agents on the creation of an underground army in Germany and some occupied countries in case these territories were occupied by the Allied forces.

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The underground army, according to the instructions, was to consist of three units: reconnaissance groups, sabotage groups, and security groups. Intelligence teams were to be recruited from dedicated Nazi officers, well-trained radio experts, officers from the field radio services of SS units, from employees of district administrations and other categories.

Sabotage groups were formed from engineers of sapper units. Each member of these groups had to take courses in chemistry and explosives in the so-called "academies". Counterintelligence groups were to be directed and organized only by security officers. Women were supposed to be used in these groups as well.

It was planned to train special couriers of the underground as liaison officers. Their duties were to include the appointment of new team leaders to replace those who had retired for various reasons.

The groups of the underground army were planned to be formed according to the principle of fives, and they were to report directly to the main headquarters of the underground army. According to the instructions, the underground army was supposed to have secret armories for storing small arms, explosives, various chemicals and other means of sabotage. It was also planned to create hospitals, chemical laboratories, laboratories for the production of false documents, money, food cards, organize radio and telegraph communications.

Candidates for work in the underground army from among the officers of the SD, SS, police agencies, special army units were asked to change their names and documents. Some of these people were to be sent to concentration camps and prisons for encryption.

The main headquarters of the underground army, in addition to Himmler, included Bormann, Kaltenbrunner and several senior officers of the SD and SS.

Cairncross worked for SIS until the end of the war, then quit and returned to work at the Treasury Department.

For his contribution to the struggle of the Soviet people against the fascist invaders, Cairncross was repeatedly thanked by the leadership of foreign intelligence. In response to this, in October 1944, he wrote: "I am delighted that our friends considered my help worthy of attention, and I am proud that I contributed something to the cause of victory, which led to the almost complete cleansing of Soviet land from invaders".

In March 1945, Cairncross was granted a lifetime pension of £1,000 a year. However, he refused to receive this pension, citing sufficient material security.

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Cairncross was transferred from the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of Supply. Directly at the site where the agent now worked, there were no materials of interest to the Center, and meetings with him were held only sporadically.

At one of these meetings on October 23, 1951, Cairncross reported that in early September he was interrogated by a representative of counterintelligence, who was interested in what kind of relationship he had with McLean (one of the sources of the "Cambridge Five"), as well as his affiliation to communist parties.

Cairncross had already been prepared by the operative in case of such an interrogation. After the escape to the Soviet Union of two sources of the "Cambridge Five" MacLean and Burgess, who worked in the British Foreign Office, who were threatened with arrest, counterintelligence began to check all their connections at the institute and work in the Foreign Ministry. The possibility of checking Cairncross was not ruled out, which is why he was oriented on how to behave in the event of an interrogation.

Cairncross replied to the counterintelligence representative that he simply greeted McLean when he worked at the Foreign Ministry, and he did not hide his membership in the party, but after the institute he did not maintain any connection with it.

The counterintelligence officer was satisfied with Cairncross' answer and no one contacted him again. At work, he continued to lead the same section as before, and there were no suspicious moments.  
noted.

Despite the fact that the source believed that counterintelligence had no evidence against him and that his position was solid, the residency decided for security reasons to temporarily cut off contact with him. An agreement was reached: with the help of appropriate signals, he would report monthly on his situation. The control meeting was scheduled for January 23, 1952

of the year.

In the event of a complication of the situation around Cairncross, the Center developed a special plan of operational measures, which included recommendations for the source to leave England, providing him with other documents, allocating the necessary funds for living abroad, as well as conditions for communication with other countries.

Since the October meeting, no signals have been received from Cairncross. He also did not come to the control meeting. Communication with him was established only in the first decade of March 1952. During the meeting, the source said that he was subjected to a second interrogation by counterintelligence. She was especially interested in the question of his contact with the Communist Party. After this interrogation, Cairncross was again transferred to the Treasury Department, to a work site where no classified materials were received. He himself came to the conclusion that the investigation initiated by counterintelligence would continue. He reacted negatively to the proposal to leave for the USSR in the event of an aggravation of the situation, noting that the counterintelligence had no grounds for his arrest.

Taking into account that the situation around the source became more complicated, the detective agreed on the next meeting only after three months, at the same time stipulating an appearance under the terms of an emergency meeting. However, Cairncross neither on the appointed day nor at the next meeting appeared.

The station organized surveillance of the places where he could appear in order to determine in what position he was and whether he was under surveillance. In case the situation turned out to be calm, it was planned to get in touch with him and set up a meeting in the city. However, the observation did not give positive results. Cairncross didn't show up anywhere.

All attempts by the residency to establish what happened to Kern-Cross were unsuccessful. In this regard, it was decided to ask Philby (a source from the "Cambridge Five". - Approx. Aut.) Carefully make inquiries about this person. Philby reported that during a search of the apartment of Guy Burgess (a source from the "Cambridge Five" who fled to the USSR), among other things, counterintelligence found a handwritten memorandum containing intelligence information. By hand, the investigation led to Cairncross. Serious suspicion fell on him, but he managed to prove that it was just a memorandum from one government official to another and had nothing to do with any foreign state.

The counterintelligence had no serious grounds for arrest, but he was fired from his job at the Ministry of Finance. Philby did not know about the whereabouts of Cairncross.

Circumstances later developed in such a way that our employees no longer had to meet this wonderful person.

Counterintelligence subjected Cairncross to several more interrogations. He, like Blunt, was offered immunity from prosecution on the condition that he disclose his intelligence activities. This was already after 1964. MI5 by this time had a significant amount of information and had an idea of what information Cairncross could transmit to Moscow. In addition, the agent understood that his confession at the moment could no longer hurt anyone.

Judging by the information that appeared in the British and foreign press, Cairncross spoke about working for Soviet intelligence during the war and in this way received immunity from prosecution.

After the counterintelligence finished the proceedings, he was allowed to go abroad. He worked as a teacher in Canada. In 1967 he arrived in Italy and worked there under the auspices of the UN. In 1970 he moved to France and lived in Provence.

In 1981 British Prime Minister Thatcher, answering questions in Parliament, publicly acknowledged that Cairncross was a Soviet spy. She also informed that he had now returned to England with his wife, settled in the west of the country, and began to write his memoirs.

In October 1995, it was reported that Cairncross had died at the age of 82. The press of a number of countries responded to this event. Abroad, his work was evaluated differently. However, for us he remains a heroic personality, an irreconcilable fighter against fascism. He made a significant contribution to the victory in the Great Patriotic War and the preservation of peace in the post-war period.

To this it must be added that Cairncross was an outstanding person - he wrote books, was well versed in music, literature and art, was fluent in French and German, spoke Italian and Spanish, read literature in Swedish and Russian interested in the history of France.

For the successful completion of reconnaissance missions related to obtaining information about the plans and orders of the German military command on the Soviet-German front, Cairncross was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

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#### Queen's Advisor

In the lecture hall of the University of London, students were waiting for the lecturer, who was somewhat delayed. But then a tall, slender military man with the epaulettes of a major entered the hall, apologized for being late and walked confidently to the pulpit. The student, apparently from the beginners, pushed his neighbor and asked: "What, this martinet will give us a lecture on the theory of Italian art?" "This is not a martinet," the neighbor replied. "This is Dr. Blunt, a well-known connoisseur of Italian art and deputy director of the Kurtold Institute!" (In 1947, Blunt was appointed director of this institute).

It was 1943. Blunt was in the military. His main place of work was the English counterintelligence - MI-5. But at the same time, he continued to engage in Italian art in his civilian specialty, gave lectures, and conducted research work.

In addition to the above, he also had another area of activity, perhaps the most important and dangerous: he was a valuable source of Soviet foreign intelligence. He treated this work with no less zeal than the study of Italian painting.

Anthony Blunt was one of the "Cambridge Five", which played an important role in providing real, significant assistance to the Soviet Union in the war against Nazi Germany.

He was born in September 1907 in the family of a priest, in Bournemouth, in the south of England. Blunt's mother came from a wealthy aristocratic family with ties to the East India Company. As a child, he lived for several years in Paris, where his father was transferred to work. In France, he perfectly mastered the French language, later became interested in painting, which later remained for life. He graduated from a privileged school in England and then entered Trinity College, Cambridge. University rendered on Blunt

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a huge impact. In addition to being a prestigious educational institution, it was also free-thinking with strong leftist sentiments.

Blunt studied well and at the same time actively participated in the political life of the university. He became chairman of the Union of Friends of the Soviet Union. Gradually Blunt began to show interest in Marxism. In his autobiography, he writes that after returning to Cambridge he noticed a strong change in the situation. The events taking place in Germany "began to dawn on an isolationist like myself, and I dimly began to realize that my position was not satisfactory." He interacted closely with left-wing students, including members of the Communist Party, whose views differed from Blunt's. Gradually, he began to realize that the Marxist approach to subjects, including art, provided a new direction for understanding the subject from a scientific point of view.

The Marxist approach began to be felt in his lectures and works written during this period. However, he did not join the Communist Party. This was prevented by his further connection with Soviet intelligence: he was recommended to move away from the Communist Party and leftist organizations and lead the life of a "respectable" Englishman. And he began to carefully adhere to this line. Outwardly, Blunt looked like a rather conservative person, but his worldview did not change, and his good attitude towards the Soviet Union became even stronger.

During his college years, he traveled several times to Europe, including Germany, where he saw with his own eyes the growing danger of fascism.

In 1935, together with a group of London students and teachers, Blunt visited the USSR as a tourist. He wanted to personally see what was happening in the country. He visited Leningrad and Moscow, visited art galleries and museums. The trip made a big impression. He was struck by the scale of construction in the country, the education system, the rise of culture and art.

As a result of his trip to the USSR, he firmly decided to take the side of the Soviet Union in order to counter the impending fascist danger.

After graduating from Cambridge, Blunt began to pay serious attention to the study of the history and theory of art. Already in 1940 he published the book *The Theory of Italian Art 1450-1600*. It received good reviews from experts and was reprinted twice more.

Before the war, Blunt worked as an art teacher at the Warburg Institute. The work was well paid and considered very honorable. She also gave a reprieve from being drafted into the army.

However, with the outbreak of war in 1939, Blunt, being a great patriot of his homeland, volunteered for the army. He was sent

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to study at the intelligence courses of the military department, but after a short time was expelled due to a negative reference received from the University of Cambridge. Blunt asked the War Department to explain the reason for his expulsion. The ministry referred to the fact that Anthony's dossier contained two negative points: a trip to the USSR and three articles published during his student years in the *Left Review* magazine. However, Blunt managed to prove that the trip to the USSR was of a scientific nature, and he went not alone, but with a group of English tourists. As for the articles, they have no Marxist underpinnings. He referred to his other publications on the subject, which fully exonerated him.

Blunt was cleared of the charge and re-enlisted. Brilliant training and knowledge of two foreign languages - French and German - allowed him to take the position of a unit commander in the military police. He was sent to France, to the city of Boulogne. The task of his unit was to prevent the penetration of enemy agents into the port area, to observe and develop suspicious people, and other activities. He proved himself well and soon received another title.

The unit was part of the British Expeditionary Force in France. During the German offensive, Blunt showed his best side. Despite great difficulties, he evacuated his unit to England in an orderly manner and without casualties. Subsequently, for the courage and dedication shown in military operations in France, he was awarded the Order of the Legion of Honor by the French government.

In these difficult days for England, its special services also experienced difficulties. There were not enough trained people. Then they decided to recruit the most capable graduates of some prestigious universities into intelligence and counterintelligence. They included other members of the "Cambridge Five" - Guy Burgess and Philby. Blunt was recommended to counterintelligence by Victor Rothschild, a member of a prominent banking family. Blunt was on friendly terms with him, and he was already working in counterintelligence at that time.

The transition to work in counterintelligence was not accidental. Even earlier, he was given the task of infiltrating the special services in order to obtain information of interest to Soviet intelligence.

Blunt's first contacts with Soviet foreign intelligence began after his visit to the USSR In January 1937, Guy Burgess, with whom Blunt was on friendly terms, introduced him to Otto. Under this name, the illegal intelligence officer Arnold Deutsch acted. After several meetings, Deutsch concluded that Blunt was a prospect for intelligence, and brought him to cooperation. We agreed that communication with him would be through Burgess.

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Blunt accepted the offer to work in Soviet intelligence without hesitation and immediately began to carry out the assignments received.

From the moment Blunt was involved in our work and until his departure to France, the residency had no direct connection with him. Materials received from him were transmitted through Burgess. During his stay in France, he had conditions of communication in case a contact was established by an employee of the Paris residency. However, communication with him in France was not established. Upon his return to England, contact was restored by the resident of the "legal" residency in London, Gorsky, and work with Blunt became much more active.

In the fall of 1940, Blunt was enlisted in counterintelligence - MI-5. He was sent to work in the "O" department, which was engaged in ensuring the security of military enterprises, and was also related to counterintelligence work in the army.

Soon Anthony took the position of assistant to the head of the department, and a lot of secret documents began to pass through him. He selected materials that were of interest to Moscow, took some home and made extracts from them, memorized the contents of others. Since Blunt had a phenomenal memory, he remembered many documents by heart. The Center gave a high appraisal of his activity. After some time, he was transferred to department "B" (counterintelligence) as an assistant to the head of the department, and then as an assistant to the deputy head of the department. The resident recommended Blunt to try to get close to Deputy Chief of Counterintelligence Lidell, who highly valued his business qualities and gave him responsible assignments.

Relations with Lidell continued to strengthen and soon grew into a friendship. The head of department "B" began to share secrets of special importance in a confidential form. This was facilitated by the fact that Victor Rothschild moved out of town, where there were fewer dangers from bombing, and rented his house to Blunt and his friends. The house was well appointed and safe, as it was known in London as the respectable "House of Rothschild". Blunt invited some employees to the house for a holiday and in conversations he sometimes received quite interesting information, to which he did not have direct access. Blunt's frequent visitor was Lidell, who liked to spend his free time in this rich mansion.

In addition to Lidell, Blunt established friendly relations with another senior officer - Deputy. Dick White, head of department "B", who later headed British intelligence.

White was fond of literature, showed a keen interest in painting and architecture. This gave Blunt the opportunity to discuss these subjects with him in his free time, and he did it in a highly professional manner, which literally captivated White. During conversations with him, Anthony often received important information.

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Through these top counterintelligence officials, it became known that the British carried out so-called "active measures" against the Soviet Union, transmitting disinformation from time to time through official and unofficial channels.

Through Blunt, the residency received information in advance about planned subversive actions against Soviet institutions in England and their personnel. This made it possible to neutralize the actions of counterintelligence.

Anthony also reported on the subversive actions that were carried out against the Communist Parties of England, as well as other countries. Some of the agents provocateurs introduced there became known, the places where the counterintelligence had listening devices were revealed.

Blunt, along with other members of the "five", made a significant contribution to the disclosure of secret separate negotiations between England and the United States, which they conducted through the Vatican, on Italy's withdrawal from the war. On September 3, 1943, the Anglo-American command secretly signed an armistice agreement with the government of Marshal Badoglio, who was appointed head of government by the king after Mussolini's arrest. With this information in hand, the Soviet leadership turned to the governments of the United States and England for clarification and at the same time proposed the creation of a military-political commission for negotiations with states seeking to get out of the influence of Germany. This step allowed the Soviet Union to join the negotiations and play a significant role in the democratization of the regime that replaced Mussolini's fascist dictatorship that existed in the country. Already in March 1944, the USSR established relations with the Badoglio government, and in October of the same year full diplomatic relations were formalized with it.

The "Cambridge Five", including Blunt, obtained information about other, more dangerous secret negotiations conducted by Himmler's representative, SS Obergruppenführer Wolf, with the Americans. Their goal was to end Germany's hostilities in the west and continue the war in the east.

This information allowed Stalin to demand the cessation of negotiations, no matter who from the German leadership came up with the initiative to conduct them. Correspondence on this issue between the Soviet and Anglo-American leadership followed. In order to avoid publicity and an undesirable reaction of public opinion, the United States and Britain were forced to refuse contacts with specific representatives of the leadership of fascist Germany.

Blunt was repeatedly entrusted with very responsible tasks. One day, the leadership of counterintelligence asked him to analyze the work of the surveillance unit and make suggestions to improve its effectiveness. It took several months. He investigated all aspects of the case and prepared concrete proposals.

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zheniya. The management remained satisfied with Blunt's work. The innovations that were proposed to be introduced significantly increased the level of functioning of outdoor surveillance. He gave a copy of his report to the residency, which played a big role in organizing meetings with agents. Now the employees were well aware of the methods and techniques of conducting outdoor surveillance, which significantly increased safety at work.

On another occasion, Lidell commissioned him to analyze protocols and tape recordings of interrogations of German agents arrested in England and abroad, in particular in the Middle East and Africa. Blunt, as a born analyst, was able to uncover new data, which was directly sent to the Secretary of War, and their copies, of course, were transferred to them in the residency.

Satisfied with the successful work of Blunt, the leaders of counterintelligence gave their talented ward a new task. It dealt with a very delicate topic - to organize covert searches of diplomatic bags of embassies and diplomatic missions of foreign states and governments in exile.

Blunt successfully organized this work. Many foreign diplomatic missions, due to the lack of appropriate opportunities, used regular mail. It was not difficult to get such a bag. But even those states that used diplomatic couriers also became victims of British counterintelligence. For this, situations were created when the bag was left unattended for several hours, and it fell into the hands of Blunt's employees. Usually, under the pretext of a delay in transport or for other reasons, diplomatic couriers were asked to close the bags in a safe at the reception point, and go to rest themselves.



Two or three hours was enough to open the bag, photograph the documents and reseal it so that no traces of the opening were left.

In this way, British counterintelligence obtained materials on the ongoing correspondence of foreign embassies with their governments, as well as governments in exile, who were in London, with their representatives abroad.

At one time, Blunt was entrusted by the SIS with the recruitment of agents among the employees of governments in exile. Among them were people in the rank of ministers, deputy ministers and other senior officials.

Blunt drew interesting information from the radio interception and decryption service, which was engaged in the decryption of German telegrams and to which he had access in his service. The decryption data received by Blunt was overlapped by the materials received from Philby and Cairncross, which made it possible to assess the reliability of the information received with a greater degree of confidence.

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Blunt was able to periodically get acquainted with the dossier on the employees of the Soviet embassy. This made it possible, in the event of the maturation of any undesirable phenomena, to promptly notify the residency worker with whom contact was maintained. He also closely followed the situation around the other members of the "five" and his sub-sources. As is known, the "five" was not a separate structure, but its members knew each other well and most of them were aware of their work for Soviet intelligence. In this regard, Blunt was placed in a position where he was naturally responsible for the safety of his friends. And he successfully coped with this mission, prompting, if necessary, ways out of this or that situation. During his work in Soviet intelligence, Blunt passed on a huge amount of valuable classified material, and also contributed to the expansion of its network of sources.

Among the materials received, the records of the interrogation of a former employee of the Red Army Intelligence Agency in England, a traitor to the Motherland, Krivitsky, who informed the British about information known to him about the Intelligence Agency residencies, operational workers and agents abroad, were of particular value. The reports of British agents in the USSR on the situation in the Soviet Union as of December 1940 transmitted by Blunt, as well as the information from the head of the 9th department of the Intelligence Service on the work of Soviet intelligence in England, were also of great interest.

The materials obtained by the British special services were extremely important, including by deciphering German telegrams about the deployment of the German and Japanese armed forces, operational orders of the German command on the Soviet-German front, deciphered German radio messages about the movement of Red Army units. In addition, materials on the activities of German intelligence in Finland, Sweden, Turkey, the Middle East and other parts of the world were highly appreciated. Thus, for example, a list with reference data for 125 German intelligence officers operating in various cities of this country was transmitted to Sweden.

A number of important materials were also handed over on the Allied operations being prepared, materials on disinformation actions, data on the plans and condition of the Allied armed forces, detailed information on the activities of the British special services, their structure and personnel.

Among the many pieces of information Blunt transmitted at the beginning of August 1943 was one very interesting item, which stated that the famous Swedish industrialist Markus Wallenberg, who led the Swedish delegation at the Anglo-Swedish trade negotiations in June 1943, delivered - statements from the German opposition circles. One of the main

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The points of these proposals were to eliminate Hitler, the proposals were passed on to Churchill's assistant, Major Desmond Morton, who reported them to the Prime Minister. However, Churchill rejected them. He didn't even show them to the military cabinet.

As already noted, simultaneously with his work in counterintelligence, Blunt did a lot of scientific and pedagogical work. In 1943 he began to catalog the drawings of the royal collection at Windsor Palace.

At the end of the war, Blunt was offered the post of curator of the royal paintings of Windsor, Buckingham and other palaces. This post was one of the most important in the palace hierarchy. Blunt informed the residency that such an appointment could take place. Of course, it was more important for foreign intelligence that he continued to work in counterintelligence, but it was also clear that after the end of the war, Anthony would return to his main job and would be engaged in art. Therefore, there were no objections from the Center. At the same time, a fundamental decision was made - in the event of Blunt's transfer to the royal palace, not to give reconnaissance missions related to the royal family.

Even before moving to the royal court, Blunt carried out personal assignments of the king: they concerned the study of the situation with the safety of some works of art on the continent. This circumstance finally made Blunt his man at court.

Blunt's appointment as Curator of the Royal Pictures came at the end of April 1945. The queen granted him a knighthood.

The high position at court brought him even closer to Lidell and other counterintelligence leaders, who openly shared secrets with him. He also obtained important political information from other persons holding high positions in the government and the state apparatus.

Blunt for some time performed the duty of transferring materials from Burgess to the station officer. Burgess was at the time working in the Foreign Office, but for security reasons, direct communication with the residency was temporarily suspended.

The leadership of foreign intelligence highly appreciated the work of Blunt. Archival documents note that the materials received from Blunt are 90% documentary and are of great interest to the Soviet state. For the transfer in May 1943 of materials on the operational orders of the German command on the Soviet-German front and radiograms of the German intelligence on the deployment and movement of Red Army units, which were highly appreciated by the General Staff of the Red Army, Blunt was announced by order of the People's Commissar of State Security Gratitude.

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On October 4, 1944, on the anniversary of the October Revolution, Blunt was again thanked for his long and fruitful work.

In 1945 the decision was made to give Blunt a lifetime pension of £1,200 a year. When he was informed of this decision, Blunt stated that he was sincerely grateful for the care shown, but could not agree to this, since he did not need money. At the direction of the NKGB leadership, Blunt was once again recommended to contact us for help at any time.

In connection with the above, it should be noted that Blunt, like other sources of the "Cambridge Five", did not receive a permanent financial allowance from foreign intelligence. They were provided with occasional material assistance and were given some amounts to cover operational expenses. This was done according to their wishes, since they repeatedly emphasized that they were working not for money, but for an idea.

After the escape to the USSR of two members of the "Cambridge Five" Donald McLean and Guy Burgess, who were threatened with arrest, Blunt's position became noticeably more complicated. The counterintelligence was aware of his contacts with the fugitives, and this should inevitably lead to an investigation. The matter was further complicated by the fact that the traitors — the GRU cipher in Canada Guzenko (1945) and the KGB officer in Australia Petrov (1954) — in their testimony pointed to the presence of KGB agents in the British special services. When analyzing their data, Blunt, along with other employees, fell under suspicion.

The Center advised Blunt to leave England and move to the USSR. However, he noted that, in his opinion, counterintelligence did not have sufficient evidence against him and there would be no complications. In addition, Blunt believed that the government would not go to the persecution of a person close to the queen.

Events connected with Donald McLean and Guy Burgess, and then Kim Philby, did not seriously affect Blunt. He was interviewed by counterintelligence investigators, but no charges were brought against him.

Complications began in 1964, when American citizen Strait, a writer and writer, told Arthur Schlesinger, aide to the president, Kennedy, that he belonged to the Communist Party in the past and that he had been working for the KGB for some time.

He did it out of cowardice. He was asked to join the presidential advisory council on arts. At the same time, they warned that the registration would take some time, since it was necessary to check the candidates, including through the FBI. Fearing that the FBI would reveal his past, he decided to pre-empt events and asked the presidential aide to receive him on urgent business. And the situation with his past looked like this. In the 30s

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Straight studied at Cambridge, at Trinity College. There he met some members of the Cambridge Five. Joined the Communist Party. He developed the closest relationship with Blunt, who then attracted him to cooperate in the interests of the Soviet Union. As Straight himself testified, Blunt gave him the task of leaving the Communist Party, returning to the United States, going into banking, which his parents did, and following the trends in the development of the American economy. Straight moved to the USA. Worked in the State Department. Before the war, as he writes, he held several meetings with a representative from Moscow, to whom he passed on some information. And then he did not maintain any connection either with Blunt or with representatives of Soviet intelligence.

After this message, the FBI came to grips with Strait) of course, he did not get into the arts council, but the counterintelligence machine started working. The information received was reported to British counterintelligence, which immediately began an investigation.

Considering Blunt's position at court, as well as the undesirability of his disclosure during the investigation and in court of information related to the activities of MI5 and the tasks of the king carried out in Europe, the decision was made in the upper echelons of power to refuse to prosecute him. .

Blunt was given a condition: if he confesses to his work for Russian intelligence and testifies accordingly, he will receive complete immunity from prosecution, the case will not be made public, and he will retain all rights and privileges. In addition, immunity also extends to persons who assisted him in obtaining information. This was confirmed by the Attorney General.

Blunt agreed to testify. He named some of his assistants and thereby saved them from prison. When asked who he knew of the agents who were in direct contact with Soviet intelligence officers, he named the names of people whom he could not harm. These people were already in the USSR or they were not alive.

During the investigation, he insistently emphasized that the information he passed on to the Russians was of a military nature and concerned mainly decrypted German messages, which the government had to inform the Soviet leadership anyway, since there were allied obligations for this.

The investigation ended there. Blunt, as before, continued to perform the functions assigned to him at court and to carry out intensive scientific and pedagogical work.

However, relative calm lasted only until 1979. On November 21, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher violated Blunt's immunity and made a statement in Parliament in which she said that Blunt worked for Soviet intelligence. ang

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The Leyan government was forced to do this in view of the fact that by this time Strait and some other journalists had published books and articles where Anthony was exposed as a Soviet agent. In order not to be in the position of making excuses, Thatcher made this statement, emphasizing at the same time that the data on Blunt came back in 1964.

After these events Blunt's position became more complicated. First of all, the queen deprived him of his position. Given the current situation, he refused the knighthood. Trinity College, where he studied and once worked, notified him of the deprivation of his honorary doctorate.

However, no prosecution followed.

Despite a severe moral blow and seriously compromised health, Blunt continued to work vigorously in the field of art. In the 1960s and 1970s he published seven monographs and a number of articles in journals. He was engaged in the work of Picasso, published a book about his painting Guernica, devoted a lot of time to the paintings of his favorite artist Poussin, published a book called Drawings by Nicolas Poussin.

Back in 1959, Blunt prepared and published a book about the famous English poet and artist William Blake, which was warmly received by critics and experts. He published a great work on the art and literature of France (1500-1800). The book was published in France, England, USA, Australia.

In 1978, a solid work entitled "Baroque and Rococo" was published, its authors were four English scientists, including Blunt. Peru Anthony in this work also belongs to a brief essay on Russian art.

In recent years, Blunt has further expanded the scope of his scientific interests. He began to study Sicilian Baroque, Neapolitan Baroque and Rococo. He published a book on the Sicilian Baroque.

This talented art scholar published more than twenty books, not counting journal articles. Many of his works have been reprinted to this day.

Many people abroad ask why Blunt, a talented scientist and researcher, embarked on the path of cooperation with Soviet intelligence. Some attribute this to "mistakes of youth", "accident", etc. However, objective researchers note that his connection with the foreign intelligence of the USSR was not only fully conscious, but was also based on firm ideological convictions.

People who closely associated with Blunt emphasize that he was critical of British social order and believed that the country needed social change. In the Soviet Union he saw

the birth of a new, more just and progressive society. In addition, he perfectly understood the misfortune that fascism brings to the peoples of Europe and the world, and considered it his duty to fight against it. And since he considered the USSR to be the main force that could stop Hitler, he considered all possible assistance to him as his sacred duty.

It should be noted that, despite the persecution of the authorities, his friends did not leave him in trouble. He enjoyed their constant support. At the most difficult moment, when Thatcher made a statement in Parliament, and journalists rushed to Blunt, he was forced to leave his apartment, as a significant part of the press went on a rampage. At this point, he was offered asylum by his friend, a professor at the University of London. And when he was sick and needed treatment and rest, he was invited to his Irish friend, a university professor from Dublin.

Nervous shocks and great physical exertion seriously undermined Blunt's health. He died on March 26, 1983 from a heart attack at the age of 76. The body was cremated and later, in accordance with his will, the ashes were scattered to the wind by his brothers in a field near Marlborough, where he attended school.

Blunt was accompanied on his last journey by about thirty relatives and friends. However, there were many wreaths, and eleven of them were unnamed. Of course, they were from friends who could not come to the funeral, but they could not but honor the memory of this outstanding person.

The Kurtold Institute is part of the University of London and specializes in the study of painting. It is one of the universally recognized authoritative centers that develop the problems of art criticism.

#### V.M. Zarubin: stages of mastery

As intelligence veterans recall, on October 12, 1941, the newly appointed resident of foreign intelligence in the United States V.M. Zarubin was summoned by Stalin. Moscow experienced anxious days. Fierce fighting took place on the outskirts of the capital. Central institutions and the diplomatic corps were being prepared for evacuation to Kuibyshev, state valuables were being taken out. Moscow was bombed almost daily. A week later, a state of siege was introduced.

The invitation to the Kremlin puzzled not only Zarubin, but also intelligence leaders. Even in peacetime, calls from residents to Stalin were rare. Now, in an extremely tense situation, it seemed unbelievable that Stalin would find time to talk with the colonel serving in the USA.

At the appointed time, Zarubin, accompanied by intelligence chief Fitin, was in Stalin's waiting room. Stalin greeted him and inquired about the readiness of the resident to work in America, the route. After listening to assurances that the mood was cheerful, Stalin remarked that much still needed to be done to stop and smash the fascist hordes. Then he got down to business.

Stalin began by saying that the government did not have a clear enough idea of the current situation in America. We must carefully examine the position of the United States, he said, with regard to both the Soviet Union and Germany, as well as Britain and Japan. And not only to understand, but also to take measures to influence the US ruling circles in terms of rapprochement between our two countries. But that's not all. Under no circumstances should the US ruling circles be allowed to reach an agreement with Hitlerite Germany and end the war with a separate peace. There are influential forces in America that oppose the Soviet Union, and they will push the government towards an alliance with Hitler. This should be closely monitored, he stressed, and timely

just to report. At this stage, this is the main direction in the work of intelligence in the United States of America.

The conversation lasted twenty minutes.

A few days later, Zarubin and his wife left for their destination. Vasily Mikhailovich was well acquainted with the country. Before the war, he had to work here from an illegal position for several months. However, the current mission was different from the previous one. Never before had he been given such important state tasks, for the solution of which he had to prepare not only himself, but also the staff of the residency, which he knew so far from papers.

It should be noted that the situation in the United States developed on the whole in a direction favorable to the Soviet Union. This became especially noticeable after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Zarubin restored contact with old connections, met the right people, recruited agents. Along with political tasks, work on atomic problems occupied an important place. The residency managed to acquire sources from among the physicists involved in the development of atomic weapons.

At the end of 1943, Zarubin successfully completed his business trip and arrived in Moscow. Here he was appointed to a leadership position. He was awarded the title of Commissar of State Security.

Zarubin is one of the most prominent foreign intelligence officers. He headed "legal" residencies in two countries and worked as an illegal resident in three countries. In addition, he conducted work on the territory of other states.

Vasily Mikhailovich was born in 1894 in Moscow in a working-class family. At the end of the 2-class school, he was "given to the boys" in a trading company, then he was a worker, a clerk, and studied at the same time. From 1914 to 1917 he served in the tsarist army as a private, during the February Revolution he was wounded, from 1918 to 1920 he served in the Red Army, in 1920 he was accepted into the service of state security agencies.

Zarubin began working in intelligence in 1925. However, the first trip abroad was made to China in 1924 through counterintelligence agencies during the period of his work in Vladivostok. In the future, his activities abroad took place along the lines of the Foreign

department.

In 1926 he was sent as the head of the "legal" residency in Finland. But already in 1927 he left for Denmark as an illegal resident. From this period, his work begins from illegal positions. Here is how he characterizes it: "The work of an illegal Soviet intelligence officer is complex and delicate... At the stage of settling in a capitalist country, he has to spend a lot of effort on reincarnation and "polishing" the role he has taken on.

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under no circumstances should he withdraw, otherwise he will have to deal with the special organs of the enemy.

Vasily Mikhailovich went on a business trip with his wife. Elizaveta Yulievna was a person with an unusual biography. She was already an experienced scout and traveled abroad on reconnaissance missions. She was in her first marriage with Ya.G. Blyumkin, a Left Social Revolutionary who committed a terrorist attack in Moscow in 1918 against the German ambassador Mirbach. For political reasons, she broke with Blumkin.

The role that Vasily Mikhailovich and Elizaveta Yulyevna were to play was not an easy one. They pretended to be immigrants from one of the states of Eastern Europe, businessmen who arrived in this country on business. In order to settle in Denmark, it was necessary to create a reliable cover, that is, to find an occupation that would correspond to their status and justify

stay in the country. The situation was further complicated by the fact that they had fictitious passports in their hands and practically did not know the language of their "motherland". That's the kind of conditions they had to work in.

Great concentration and colossal efforts were required in order to solve this problem. Vasily Mikhailovich, after a long search, finally managed to become a partner of the owner of a small local company for the export of textile goods. The cover turned out to be successful, and the scouts began reconnaissance work.

However, in 1929 there was an instruction from the leadership of foreign intelligence to relocate to France, which was of incomparably greater interest than the country where the Zarubins worked. During that period, the fate of Europe was decided in Paris, London and Berlin, and therefore intelligence coverage of the political processes taking place there was of great importance for our state.

The intelligence officers were faced with the task of organizing an illegal residency in Paris. To do this, it was necessary to establish lines of communication with the Center, select couriers, find safe houses, get in touch with the available sources of information and continue to work on acquiring them.

One of the most important was the issue of creating a cover and obtaining a residence permit in the country. They had the same fictitious passports in their hands, but they had already been "settled in", and the scouts felt more confident.

There was no time to build up, and they began to look for employment opportunities. The matter was further complicated by the fact that the Zarubins entered the country as tourists for a period of two months. In order to obtain a residence permit, it was necessary to find an appropriate occupation during this period, giving the right to a long or permanent stay in the country. Otherwise, after a two-month period, they had to leave the country.

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After a persistent search, the Zarubins finally settled in Paris, set up a firm, rented a small apartment, and set about solving other pressing issues. Engaged in the creation of a cover, the scouts simultaneously carried out intelligence work, met with sources of information, selected safe houses, looked for people who could be used as messengers, keepers of postal addresses, etc. More details about the work of the Zarubins in France are set out in the third volume of the History of Russian Foreign Intelligence. Here we note only two points that contributed to the successful solution of the tasks assigned to them.

First, the favorable development of the situation along the line of cover contributed greatly to the successful deployment of the residency. Zarubin wrote about this: "The good reputation we acquired, both ourselves and the company, did a lot to cover up our intelligence activities and expand our intelligence capabilities. Our solidity helped me to become a member of one of the leading sports clubs in France, to provide the best conditions for intelligence, to conduct a number of recruitments.

The weakness of the documents by which the Zarubins lived in France, and they, as mentioned above, had fictitious passports, was largely compensated by the rather solid social position that they occupied in society. As one of the owners of a prosperous medium-sized company, Zarubin did not arouse suspicion among the local authorities, enjoyed authority in the business circles of his level, and had natural opportunities to contact persons of interest to intelligence.

And secondly, the base created by Zarubin made it possible to acquire sources and conduct work in all the main areas of intelligence activity. He managed to arrange

information from the political circles of the country, concerning both domestic and international problems.

A special place was occupied by intelligence work in Germany. The residency also had sources in the German embassy in Paris. From there came information about Franco-German political and economic relations, secret documents about the negotiations that were conducted between the two countries on various issues, copies of instructions and instructions received by the embassy from Berlin, and other materials.

An important role was played by work on hostile emigrant centers. Organizations such as the ROVS, NTS, OUN!, carried out active subversive work against the USSR, and therefore it was necessary to reveal the plans and intentions of their leaders through agents in these organizations. The residency was able to obtain not only information

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about sabotage and espionage activities against the Soviet Union, but also to create conditions for carrying out measures to disintegrate these organizations, to expose their most odious leaders.

Zarubin's residency also carried out active work in scientific and technical intelligence, obtaining documentation and samples for new types of equipment, including military ones.

At the end of 1933, after a four-year stay in France, the Zarubins left for their homeland. Vasily Mikhailovich describes his departure from Paris as follows: "Courteously and touchingly we said goodbye to the house owners. I explained our departure by the need to return home and join in the enterprise of my father, who is getting old and cannot do without my help. I sold my car. I had to go to the financial inspector and pay the taxes due from me until the day of departure, declare that I had liquidated my business and was leaving for my homeland. We said goodbye to close neutral acquaintances and friends in sports and the club. The maximum possible was done to give our departure a normal look, not to leave the surrounding people and the official authorities with any perplexity and reasons for searching for us.

The Zarubins did not stay long in the Union. As early as 1934, they left for Germany, where, after the Nazis came to power, a dangerous situation began to develop. Vasily Mikhailovich was appointed an illegal resident, and Elizaveta Yulyevna was appointed an operative worker of the residency. They had to create a reliable cover, get in touch with agents and start obtaining the necessary intelligence information. Of particular interest was information about Hitler's domestic and foreign policy, Germany's military preparations, and its plans for the USSR and other European countries.

Upon arrival in Germany, the intelligence officers immediately felt the tension of the general situation, the confusion of the civilian population and the defiant behavior of people in brown and black uniforms worn by members of the fascist party and its paramilitary organizations SA and SS?.

Tension was felt in everything. Many foreigners who lived permanently in Germany left the country. The number of foreign tourists has decreased.

Zarubins entered Germany on fictitious passports of one of the European countries. There was no question of obtaining permission for a long stay in the country according to these documents. At this time, the Center took steps to provide intelligence officers with more reliable real passports. In the meantime, they are forced to be in the position of tourists. However, work on receiving sources for communication was started immediately, since the Center was in dire need of information, especially on domestic political issues.

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Soon, new passports were prepared, the illegals went to the neighboring country to get them, and then they received multiple entry visas at the German embassy and returned to Germany again. There was, of course, a risk that the fact that the same people lived in the country with different documents might be discovered. But the scouts took appropriate measures to prevent this from happening.

A multiple-entry visa greatly facilitated the situation, but it was still not suitable for a long stay in Germany. Therefore, it was necessary to resolve the issue of obtaining a residence permit in the country.

Along with his passport, Zarubin also received from the Center an official letter from one of the American firms stating that he was the representative of this firm in Germany and that he was instructed to conduct business here on its behalf. This played a decisive role in obtaining permission to reside in the country, since relations with the United States during this period were good. Thus, one of the most important issues faced by illegal immigrants at the first stage of their stay abroad was resolved relatively quickly and without much trouble.

Cover work didn't take long. Vasily Mikhailovich regularly wrote reports and reviews for his firm on the situation on the German market in the field of commerce that interested her, carried out individual assignments, and wrote business letters. A regular sending of money was organized from the USA, which came through the bank. Thus, business correspondence, money transfers, preparation of materials on market conditions and other issues gave the German authorities the impression that the foreigner was seriously involved in the affairs of the company.

The residency was formed relatively quickly. It included assistants to the resident, who, like him, came from the Union, six sources of information from among local citizens and foreigners accepted for communication in Germany, several liaisons and keepers of safe houses.

To cover intelligence activities and strengthen his position, Zarubin became a member of the well-known tennis club in Berlin and the oldest skating club in the city. Membership in these clubs provided opportunities for establishing acquaintances in circles of interest and acquiring useful contacts.

After a relatively short period of time, the residency began to send intelligence information to the Center.

A serious source of intelligence information was "Breitenbach", a Gestapo officer who held a respectable post there. Through it, the residency had the opportunity to monitor whether there was a "puncture" somewhere and whether any of its employees fell into the field of view of the special services.

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In addition, he was an informed person and reported important information about the internal political situation in the country, the measures planned by the government related to military preparations, and other important data. The source worked honestly and conscientiously, his cooperation with us began even before Hitler came to power.

Considering its reliability and position, such communication conditions were worked out with it, which made it possible to make an emergency call to a meeting from both sides at any time.

The meetings with Breitenbach were carried out in a particularly secret manner. Calls for emergency meetings were relatively rare and concerned mainly the transfer of any urgent materials for their immediate forwarding to the Center.

One of these urgent calls was connected with the forthcoming serious provocation of the German counterintelligence against the Soviet embassy. After receiving such information, Zarubin took action on the information of a resident of the "legal" residency, and the provocation of the Gestapo did not achieve its goal.

With the help of Breitenbach, another serious failure was prevented, this time by Tim, an employee of the illegal apparatus. He was German. At one time he belonged to left-wing organizations. For some time he worked in China, then moved to the USSR, where he connected his fate with foreign intelligence and, on her instructions, repeatedly traveled abroad. For the past few years, he has been a staff member of INO. Zarubin was personally acquainted with him through his work in Moscow.

Tim arrived in Germany with an independent assignment and had nothing to do with Zarubin's residency. Vasily Mikhailovich found out about his appearance in his homeland by chance from his sister, whose apartment was used as a secret one.

At one of the meetings, Breitenbach reported that the Gestapo began to seriously deal with a German who had recently arrived from China, who was suspected of belonging to the Comintern. Zarubin immediately understood who he was talking about and immediately informed the Center about it. On his instructions, I contacted Tim through my sister and helped him to travel to another country. Later, Tim's sister and her daughter were also sent to Moscow, since there was no certainty that the Gestapo would not take repressive measures against the intelligence officer's relatives.

Zarubin's work with Breitenbach continued until the departure of the scout from Germany. All this time, the source has been active in intelligence work, passing important political and operational information to our intelligence officer.

Another source of political information was "Walter", an employee of the German Foreign Office. He transmitted documentary information, including telegrams and letters from German ambassadors from other countries, copies of notes on various foreign

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non-political issues, prepared for the leadership of the country, and some other documents. To shoot documents, he used a publicly available camera, the presence of which a person usually did not arouse suspicion.

"Walter" was a hardworking and disciplined man. Meetings were held with him once every ten days, and almost always he handed over several films, on which sometimes more than a hundred documents were filmed.

He was a member of the SS, but was critical of National Socialist ideas and did not approve of Hitler's policies. He worked with us mainly for money, but at the same time he sympathized with the Soviet Union. He was cautious and conspiratorial, at the same time bold and resolute, often taking risks in order to get the necessary documents.

"Walter" was one of those of our sources who informed about Hitler's impending attack on the USSR and the exact date of this attack. But that was later - in June 1941.

Another valuable source worked in the Foreign Ministry, "Khanum", with whom work was carried out in France. Communication with her was restored, and the station began to receive information that confirmed the information transmitted by "Walter" and contained other important data.

However, in working with sources, not everything went smoothly. There were unfortunate incidents.

The source "Richter" was associated with the Berlin "legal" residency for many years. He worked in one of the German news agencies, occupied a respectable post and gave interesting information, was considered a valuable agent. Later, when the illegal residency began to function, he joined it. During the transfer, Vasily Mikhailovich was warned that the materials that would come from him should be sent by telegraph, since they were urgent.

When information began to arrive from Richter, Vasily Mikhailovich drew attention to the fact that there was nothing important in this information and there was nothing to send by telegraph.

The information was sent through a liaison.

Vasily Mikhailovich drew attention to the fact that he was already familiar with one of the materials transmitted by Richter, having read it in one of the Swiss newspapers. They got the papers and checked them out. Indeed, the material is completely taken from the newspaper. We analyzed other Richter reports and made sure that they are a compilation of various newspaper materials and are not classified. The conclusion is this: "Richter" conveys "linden".

In agreement with the Center, we decided to have a conversation with the source and find out why, instead of transferring valuable materials, he has recently engaged in deception. At first, the thought arose to stop the meetings and move away from him. However, given that he knew one

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of the employees of the illegal residency, who could be under attack, it became necessary to find out the reasons why the source was engaged in falsifying information. There was also a suspicion that he could do this on the instructions of counterintelligence. All this forced me to have a detailed conversation with him and to understand the true reasons for the change in attitude to us.

Such a meeting was organized. The interview was conducted by an employee of the "legal" residency, with whom he had previously worked. During the conversation it turned out that the information transmitted by "Richter" was taken from various newspapers. It turned out that a year and a half ago he was fired from the said agency. At first, through the connections he had, he got classified information. But in recent months, these opportunities have been exhausted. Being out of work and afraid to lose our remuneration, he was forced to resort to deceit.

This case was a good lesson not only for the operative worker with whom the Richter was in touch, but also for the residency in general. In this regard, measures were taken to carefully analyze the information received from the sources, and most importantly, to improve the work with the sources themselves, verify them and work out the reconnaissance missions in more detail. As for Richter, given his sincere remorse for the misdeed he had committed and taking into account his former impeccable work, it was decided to transfer him to a "legal" residency and use him to perform one-time tasks.

This decision turned out to be correct. "Richter" for a long time conscientiously carried out reconnaissance missions and did a lot of useful things in the area of work entrusted to him.

Characteristic in this regard is another case, which concerned the work of the young intelligence officer Lesha with the source of the 36th. The latter worked with Soviet intelligence for more than a decade. The incentive for his work was money. But he enjoyed our trust and was considered enough reliable agent.

In residency, it was used for individual assignments related to obtaining information and characteristics on certain individuals, setting addresses, and performing other similar tasks. He had contacts in the police, and he skillfully did the work entrusted to him.

By nature, he was somewhat rude, familiar. The first meeting took place by password. Seeing a young, modest and intelligent worker in front of him, he behaved rather cheekily, began to express his comments on the work of the employees who had worked with him before, and in fact took the initiative into his own hands. No matter how Lesha tried to put his ward in his place, he did not succeed.

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Lesha frankly told Vasily Mikhailovich that it was difficult for him to work with such a person, and asked to transfer him to another, more experienced worker for communication. So I had to do it, but Lesha

moved to another area. In the future, there were no problems with the 36th, the new employee arranged work with him in such a way that the agent began to behave more correctly and in a businesslike manner.

Various complications and difficulties arose in work with other sources and assistants. In each individual case, Vasily Mikhailovich had to carefully examine and find solutions acceptable to the case.

Scout Zarubin also had to deal with unforeseen circumstances that threatened serious complications from the point of view of security.

One such incident happened to Vasily Mikhailovich in Sweden, where he arrived to meet with the workers of the Center. He and two representatives from Moscow sat in one of the Stockholm restaurants and discussed the issues raised by the leadership. At this time, Zarubin noticed how a man was walking towards him from the opposite side of the hall, smiling. His face was familiar, but where he saw him, the scout could not remember. But instinct told me that something was amiss here. We need to act. Zarubin got up and went to meet him. Only now did he remember where he had met this man.

In the 1920s, when he worked in the counterintelligence agencies in Vladivostok, they detained a large consignment of weapons and ammunition, which were smuggled by rail from Europe to China. Soon a representative of the German-Chinese trading company, a certain Sh, arrived in Vladivostok. He spoke Russian without an accent and impudently sought the return of the confiscated weapons. Therefore, on occasion, he repeatedly met with Zarubin, who served as head of the economic department of the GPU. Sh.'s efforts were fruitless, and he left with nothing.

And now an unexpected meeting with a person whom our intelligence officer would like to see least of all in the world now. But Vasily Mikhailovich pretended to be glad to meet an old acquaintance.

Zarubin arrived in Sweden on foreign documents, lived in a hotel, and this seriously complicated the situation. Sh., after a warm greeting, asked with a smile what important things had brought the Far Eastern Chekist to Stockholm. Vasily Mikhailovich replied that he had been working in Vneshtorg for a long time and had come for negotiations related to ordering a large batch of bearings. Sh. invited Zarubin to his table and insistently began to seek where he was staying and when he could be met.

Vasily Mikhailovich with difficulty got rid of the importunate arms dealer, promising to call him in three days. And two days later, having completed his business, he safely departed from Sweden.

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Elizaveta Yulievna also got into serious alterations. One day, at the direction of the Center, she went to Vienna to collect mail delivered there by a special courier. On the spot it turned out that there were two passports in the mail: for her and for Vasily Mikhailovich, for other surnames and nationalities, money and new individual ciphers.

At this time Zarubins worked in France. With such a dangerous cargo, two borders had to be crossed. I had to hide some of the items on myself, put something in my purse. The trip went well. But at one of the borders, after customs control and five minutes before the train left, a gendarme ran into the compartment and sharply demanded from Elizaveta Yulyevna: "Why didn't you come to customs to register your weapons?" The scout's heart began to beat - she was carrying too expensive cargo. Is this not a provocation? "I don't have any weapons, there is some kind of mistake here." However, the gendarme insisted that Elizaveta Yulyevna get out of the car. The scout decided to stand to the end. To all the arguments that she cited, the gendarme kept repeating one thing: you need to get out of the car and register a pistol.

One can only guess how the matter could have ended if it were not for one passenger: "Mr. official, you are in vain pestering this lady," he said, "it's not she who is carrying the gun, but the lady over there

from that compartment, I heard the customs officer suggest that she register the gun." It turned out that one passenger was carrying an old dueling pistol, bought in an antique shop, which had to be registered at customs, and which she did not.

Everything ended happily for the scout, but how many unrest she had to endure!

In the middle of 1937, the Zarubins were sent to the United States for several months to perform a specific operational task, after which they were planned to return to [Germany to continue work. The task was to select and recruit agents from among the Americans to work in Germany, especially in case of war. Then it was believed that the impending war might not affect the United States and that the Americans would pursue a policy of equidistance in relation to the conflicting parties. Of particular interest were persons who could be used as liaison couriers. The fact is that the situation in Germany was such that it was practically impossible to use the Germans for these purposes. One or two departures of a German citizen abroad - and the attention of the Gestapo will already be drawn to him. At the same time, the trips of foreigners did not arouse suspicion, and therefore they were more suitable for the role of messengers. The most free at that time felt the Americans, to whom the Germans were quite friendly.

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The trip to the USA proved fruitful. Three assistants were recruited, among them was Agent Elena, an anti-fascist person, who then went to Germany, entered as a graduate student at the university and successfully provided communications work in one of the areas of the residency.

At the end of 1937, the Zarubins were recalled to Moscow in connection with the betrayal of one of the employees who worked abroad, who knew Zarubin and could betray him.

After returning from Germany and until 1941, Vasily Mikhailovich worked at the Center. From January to June 1941, he was on a "legal" business trip in China.

At a meeting on June 9, 1941, a German source who held a responsible diplomatic post told Zarubin that, according to reliable data received from Berlin, Germany would attack the USSR in the coming days; for this, everything was prepared both in military and military terms. and economically. As an influential acquaintance, who had just arrived from Germany, told him, the attack on the USSR was planned for May, but was postponed until June. According to the developed plan of military operations, the war will be fleeting and will last no more than three months. He asked to urgently transfer this information to Moscow.

Zarubin immediately transmitted the received information to the Center. Having received no answer, on June 20, Zarubin again telegraphed to the Center: "The source categorically states that, on the basis of accurate data, Hitler was fully prepared for the war with the USSR. He warns us about this and believes that we need to make the necessary conclusions".

The same kind of information was received from Elizaveta Yulyevna from Germany, where she was sent to meet with Walter, who, as mentioned above, worked in the Foreign Ministry and was aware of the foreign policy plans of the German leadership.

The meeting took place on June 18, it was not possible to contact him earlier. Walter immediately told Elizaveta Yulyevna to urgently leave the country, because in two or three days Germany would attack the USSR. how many weeks of German victory.

This information was immediately reported to the resident.

Upon his return from the United States in 1943, Zarubin continued to work in intelligence in senior positions. In 1945 he was promoted to the rank of major general.

In 1948, Vasily Mikhailovich resigned for health reasons, but he did not lose contact with intelligence, passing on his rich and multifaceted operational experience to young employees. Elizaveta Yulievna worked in intelligence until 1946.

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During his service in intelligence, Vasily Mikhailovich was awarded two Orders of Lenin, two Orders of the Red Banner, the Order of the Red Star and many medals. Elizaveta Yulievna also had awards.

An outstanding intelligence officer died in 1972. In 1987, Elizaveta Yulievna also died.

'ROVS - Russian All-Military Union (the main White émigré formation abroad).

NTS - People's Labor Union (white émigré political organization).

OUN - Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists.

SA - assault squads of the National Socialist Party of Germany. The SS are the guard units of the National Socialist Party of Germany.

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Illegal scout I.A. Akhmerov

Colonel Iskhak Abdulovich Akhmerov is one of the prominent representatives of foreign intelligence. He played a big role in strengthening the defense capability of our state in the most severe time for the country - during the Great Patriotic War.

From 1941 to 1946, Akhmerov headed the illegal residency in the United States. The information that came from the residency was of great importance and was reported directly to senior management. Among the materials sent were information about the assessment by the Americans of the military industrial potential [of Germany, the military and political plans of the US government, draft documents prepared for international meetings, data on the negotiations of the German ambassador to the Vatican, Weizsäcker, who represented the group of Brauchitsch and Keitel, with Roosevelt's representatives - the head of the American episcopate, Archbishop Spellman, and the multimillionaire, president of the United Steel Corporation, Taylor, on the conditions for [Germany's] exit from the war, and others. (The American representatives arrived at the Vatican at the invitation of the pope.)

Akhmerov was not new to the US. Even before the war, from 1934 to 1939, he was a resident of an illegal residency here.

Akhmerov began his activities in intelligence in 1930. Before leaving for work abroad in January 1933, as an illegal immigrant, he had four years of diplomatic work and three years of service in the central intelligence apparatus behind him. It was a regular intelligence officer. He worked accurately, in business he was accurate, disciplined, purposeful.

Akhmerov was born on April 7, 1901 in the city of Troitsk, Chelyabinsk region, his native language was Tatar. His father died when he was a few months old. Until 1912 he lived with his mother with his grandfather, and after his death he went to work. He was an errand boy in a haberdashery shop, then worked as a grinder in a printing house. By

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after the revolution, he studied in Moscow at the courses of accountants, went to work in the People's Commissariat for Food of Tatarstan. In 1920 he was elected to the Kazan City Council.

In 1921, Iskhak Abdulovich was sent to Moscow, to the Communist University of the Peoples of the East, and in 1922 he was transferred to the 1st State University (now Moscow State University) to the Faculty of International Relations.

After graduating from the university, Akhmerov was sent to work in the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and in the same 1925, taking into account Iskhak Abdulovich's ability to languages, as well as knowledge of the East, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs sent him to Termez (the former Bukhara Soviet Socialist Republic) as a diplomatic agent, and in 1926 year - to Turkey as Secretary of the Consulate General of the USSR in Istanbul and Trebizond. When Akhmerov left for Turkey, he was fluent in Turkish. Upon his return in 1930 from Turkey, Akhmerov was transferred from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to intelligence.

So from March 1930, Iskhak Abdulovich Akhmerov began working in the Foreign Department of the OGPU.

In January 1933, Akhmerov was summoned to the head of the INO OGPU Artur Khristianovich Artuzov. On business, he had to be in the office of the head of intelligence before.

This time Artuzov invited Akhmerov for a special occasion. He said that by capturing Manchuria and creating a puppet state there, the Japanese wanted to turn Chinese territory into a springboard for a war against the USSR. The operational situation in this region has become extremely complicated. Artuzov concluded: "We have decided to send you to China as our illegal worker. You will have to go to Peking, legalize yourself there and start acquiring sources that could inform us about the state of affairs in this area and the plans of the Japanese aggressors. This is the decision of the intelligence leadership, but we would like to

consult with you."

Akhmerov replied: "I consider it a great honor to receive such a task. Thanks for the trust. I don't know if I can handle it, but I promise to do my best."

The issue of a document that could be used for work in China was discussed. Iskhak Abdulovich offered to leave for the country with a Turkish passport, under the guise of an orientalist student intending to acquire knowledge on the spot. Fluency in Turkish, along with favorable external data (while working in Turkey, he was often mistaken for a local resident), made it possible to impersonate a Turk. However, in his life he had never had to play the role of another person. It was not easy to overcome this psychological barrier.

The preparation was completed, there was a document in the name of a Turkish citizen. He must travel to China via Europe, where

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I wanted to get a Chinese visa and then go by boat to one of the Chinese ports. His destination is Beijing.

But it so happened that the first steps as an illegal immigrant began with trials.

Akhmerov made his first stop in Vienna. Having solved a number of organizational issues and got acquainted with the sights of the city, he, according to the assignment, left for Rome. Here he had to look around and prepare for his departure to China.

But when Iskhak Abdulovich clarified the details of the trip at the travel agency, it became clear that not everything that was planned was chosen successfully. It turned out that many businessmen and tourists go to China through the Soviet Union. It's faster and cheaper. Therefore, he decided to go through the USSR.

Akhmerov received a Chinese visa without hindrance, but the Embassy warned that he also needed to obtain a Soviet transit visa.

After visiting the Soviet embassy, the first difficulties arose. He received a transit visa quickly, but after entering the embassy, he noticed that he was being followed. Since everything was done officially and there was nothing to hide, the intelligence officer did not make any attempts to break away from observation. A few hours later he was arrested and taken to the police station. In response to persistent demands to explain the reason for the detention, the chief of police said: "You went to the Russian embassy, and we have instructions to check all visitors to this institution. We didn't know who you were or why you were there. Now we have found out that you are a Turkish citizen and you need a visa."

Akhmerov decided that the incident was over and he was free. But it turned out that the conversation was not over. The officer demanded, in addition to the passport, permission to stay in Italy - carte d'identite. "Where can I get this permission?" ~ inquired the scout. The matter turned out to be very simple. The officer himself wrote out a document for him and, having paid the due amount, Akhmerov was released with the wishes of a happy journey.

Unpleasantly started the incident turned in favor of the scout. For the first time, he had a document issued on a legal basis, which subsequently served him well.

In the future, Akhmerov more than once had to deal with surprises, and sometimes very acute situations, but this incident was remembered for a long time.

Another test awaited on the Soviet-Chinese border. The illegal immigrant passed through the territory of the USSR safely. In Moscow, he received additional instructions, his actions were approved.

At the railway station of Manchuria, the first border checkpoint on Chinese territory, Japanese border guard officers entered the car. One of them, having skimmed through the documents, took

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passport with him, and a few minutes later Akhmerov was asked to go to the head of the border guard. "Has there been any puncture?" - flashed through my head. Of the passengers of the entire car, only he was invited to explain. However, the excitement turned out to be in vain. It turned out that one Chinese visa is not enough to enter China. The Japanese, who exercised power in the territory of Northeast China, demanded that visitors also have a visa from the occupying authorities.

Such a visa was put in Akhmerov's passport, but the very conversation with the Japanese gendarme turned out to be a difficult test. It was conducted through a Russian translator, a Tatar emigrant from Russia who spoke Turkish but did not know Japanese. The Japanese understood Russian, and therefore the translation from Turkish was carried out into Russian, and it took great self-control for the illegal immigrant not to show that he understood the whole conversation. In addition, the Tatar interpreter looked closely at Akhmerov, and one could understand that he did not like something in this foreigner, perhaps, by individual signs, he caught the features characteristic of his compatriots. But the "gurok" held on confidently, and everything ended well.

The further journey to Beijing passed without incident. Here, an illegal immigrant, in accordance with the assignment, went to study at an American college, where a large group of foreigners studied.

Even before leaving Moscow, Artuzov warned the intelligence officer that one of the most important tasks was to work in a foreign colony.

Soon Iskhak Abdulovich established good relations with two European students. One of them was an Englishman. He maintained contact with his embassy staff and confidentially communicated the information that he drew from conversations with British diplomats, in



including the plans of the Japanese, and a number of other noteworthy information. A Scandinavian student provided information about the situation in Northeast China.

Using all his connections, the illegal immigrant supplied the Center with information about the political and economic situation in Manchuria, the activities of the Japanese occupation authorities to prepare for aggression against the USSR, the activities of Japanese intelligence in China, etc.

Akhmerov was in China for a relatively short time. By the beginning of 1934, he basically completed the tasks that confronted him in the first period.

Soon the Center received an order to arrive in Moscow for a report and preparation for a new appointment. The management decided to send it to the USA.

After a short preparation, he left for Europe. Arriving in Geneva, he found out that in order to enter the United States, one needs a visa, which can be obtained from the American embassy in Switzerland. However, when he

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appealed to the American Consulate General in Geneva, he was asked for recommendations from local citizens who know him. The illegal immigrant did not have such, which could complicate the situation. Then he decided to take advantage of the fact that in Switzerland he stayed not in a hotel, but in a private apartment, and named the owner of the apartment as an recommender.

Iskhak Abdulovich believed that this question was formal. However, upon returning home, he immediately apologized to the owner for having to name him as a person who knows his tenant well. By this, he wanted to prevent the possible appeal of the Americans to the owner.

The Swiss not only did not object to the use of his name, but on the contrary, laughing, said that he had received a call from the American consulate.

"I didn't have time to remember your last name properly," he said, "but since they asked about the Turk, I immediately decided that it was about you, and confirmed that you live with me."

The next day the visa was issued. The resourcefulness of the illegal immigrant, the good impression he made on the owner of the apartment, helped him painlessly resolve the visa issue. After that, he left for the United States by ship.

The destination was New York. The scout knew English well, but his speech had a foreign accent. To eliminate errors in the language, he got a job at Columbia University. Through the opportunities available to the residency, he soon acquired the documents of a native of the United States.

Akhmerov had to start intelligence activities in the United States in difficult conditions. Circumstances developed in such a way that, having arrived in the country for the first time, without having had enough time to get to know it, he had to basically independently solve organizational and operational issues, and establish relations with the right people. The resident of the illegal residency left for Moscow due to illness, and Iskhak Abdulovich was entrusted with the leadership of the residency. And from that moment until the end of 1939, he was invariably at the helm of this organization.

When the new resident began to get acquainted with the sources that were passed on to him, it turned out that they did not have information capabilities and could not be of great use. New informants were needed. Acquiring them alone is not possible, so the Center sent him several young employees who, under the leadership of Akhmerov, were actively involved in the work of the residency.

By the beginning of 1936, Iskhak Abdulovich completed the acquisition of illegal residency. Under his leadership were now six employees, including two women.

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There was a lot of work. It was necessary to select sources with prospects, to get rid of the ballast, to acquire informants in institutions that were of interest to intelligence.

One of the valuable new acquisitions was the Arkady spring, which was related to the work of military and naval institutions.

At the first stage, there were some difficulties in working with this person. However, gradually he got used to it, began to act more confidently. Arkady was trained in photography, and documentary materials on military and military-technical issues began to come from him.

The Nord source made a great contribution to information work. Contact was made with him when he was studying at one of the prestigious universities. After graduating from an educational institution, on the advice of Akhmerov, he went to work in the US War Department. Some time later, he took a position there, which made it possible to get acquainted with the reports of the American military attaches, the conclusions on these reports and the decisions taken.

Akhmerov's residency received its most valuable political information from "Korda," a senior member of the State Department. The source was an anti-fascist person, he understood that the development of international events was leading to war, that the American policy towards Germany was increasingly giving a free hand to Hitler and fraught with danger to America itself.

The information he passed on was highly appreciated by the Center, and it was reported to the top leadership of the country. Among the materials coming from Kord were copies of secret reports to the government on a number of topical international problems, draft American resolutions at international conferences, reports of American ambassadors, and other important materials.

Among other assistants, Tanya should be especially noted. She provided great assistance: she acquired several safe houses, participated in events to obtain documents for newly arrived illegal immigrants, to carry out secret communications to other countries, and actively contributed to the acquisition of useful sources. In addition, having great connections in the circles of the Washington administration, she herself obtained interesting information. She worked boldly and energetically.

The work of the residency was structured in such a way that the resident himself maintained contact with the most valuable sources. Most of the sources knew that they were working for the Soviet Union and deliberately helped us, considering this their contribution to the joint struggle against the common enemy - fascism. Most of them worked for free.

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By that time, the international situation was becoming more and more aggravated. The ruling circles of England and France made concessions to the demands of fascist Germany. The Munich policy was based on the expectation that it would be possible to turn Germany to the east, against the USSR.

It was a very responsible period in the activity of Iskhak Abdulovich. However, it was not possible to complete the important mission entrusted to him. In the USSR, repressions continued at that time. They also affected intelligence officers. At the direction of Beria, the Center simultaneously withdrew from abroad in 1939 almost all the residents of "legal" and illegal residencies, including Akhmerov.

With a heavy heart and bewilderment, Iskhak Abdulovich accepted the instruction about his recall, when success in work was evident, and the information obtained was especially needed by our state.

In December 1939 Akhmerov left for Moscow. In 1940, his residency was disbanded. Most of the sources were transferred to the "legal" residency.

The recall to the Union ended relatively well for Akhmerov. True, Beria summoned him and tried to accuse him of betrayal. However, this time there were no negative consequences. Iskhak Abdulovich was sent to work in the central intelligence apparatus. But it didn't take long to work. The Great Patriotic War began. Urgent measures were taken to intensify the work of all the intelligence units then available and to create new illegal residencies abroad.

The leadership of foreign intelligence decided to send Iskhak Abdulovich back to illegal work in the United States of America. He was given the task of organizing work to obtain information concerning Germany and its allies, to reveal the true goals of the political and military allies of the USSR and, above all, the United States and England. The intelligence officer was asked to settle in one of the cities near Washington, so that he could meet regularly with the most important sources, most of whom worked in the capital.

This time, Iskhak Abdulovich went to the USA together with his wife Elena, an American by birth, who in 1939 took Soviet citizenship and became an employee of foreign intelligence.

Elena came to New York in 1935 from another American city and worked as a secretary in one of the industrial firms. Adhered to leftist views, took part in the activities of progressive organizations. In 1936, she was recruited to work as a liaison officer in the residency, later she performed other intelligence duties and showed herself to be a courageous and disciplined worker. In 1939, at the suggestion of the resident, she was enrolled as the technical secretary of the residency. She became an asset

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assistant to Iskhak Abdulovich. Later they became husband and wife. Together with her husband, she arrived in 1939 in the Union.

Now they had to return to the United States to continue their work. In September 1941 they were transferred to China and then to Hong Kong. From here they arrived by boat to the United States. For the implementation of this trip, they prepared the relevant documents. In the United States of America, they switched to their reliable old passports.

Having experience of illegal work in the United States of America and well knowing the operational situation in the country, Akhmerov immediately upon arrival at his destination began to carry out tasks.

As a cover, an illegal intelligence officer, with the consent of the Center, used a small commercial firm, the owner of which had assisted him even on his first business trip. He was a reliable person, and therefore they decided to carry out some reorganization of this enterprise, expand it and put its activities on a more solid basis.

Akhmerov became a partner of the firm and at the first stage devoted a lot of time to organizing its work. This made it possible to bring the company to the number of prosperous ones and to seriously consolidate the position of a scout, since in the environment he looked like a quite successful businessman.

Every day at 10 o'clock he came to the office and sat down for financial and various economic affairs. After 2 p.m., and sometimes even later, he returned home, carefully read the press and literature on international issues, prepared for the upcoming meetings with sources. Two or three times a month he traveled from New York to Washington, where he

linger mostly on Saturday and Sunday. Elena traveled to Washington several times a month, she performed mainly communication tasks. After some time, she entered the university, where she began to study pedagogy.

Conditions for work in the United States during this period became seriously complicated. There was a war. The counterintelligence agencies and the police stepped up their surveillance of the bearers of secrets and people who aroused even the slightest suspicion.

The Center wrote to Akhmerov: "We are well aware that the conditions for working in the country have become more difficult than they were in peacetime, especially for illegal immigrants. It is quite natural that the special services are taking precautionary measures. Therefore, it is necessary to reorganize the work in relation to the new, more difficult conditions in the country."

The matter was further complicated by the fact that there was a danger of Iskhak Abdulovich being drafted into the army, since by age and as a US citizen he was subject to mobilization.

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At the beginning of 1942, the intelligence officer passed military registration. He had to fill out questionnaires on 13 pages with a detailed description of his past and present. After the commission members questioned Akhmerov in detail, he was sworn in. Then the chairman of the commission stated that, as a married man, he might be granted some respite from the call, but if necessary, he would be called to the draft board.

Given this perspective, the intelligence officer, at the direction of the Center, began to prepare sources for communication with Elena, while at the same time looking for opportunities for exemption from the draft.

By mid-July 1942, according to documents, Akhmerov was about 40 years old, he was married, had a small commercial firm. Therefore, he was enrolled in category 3-a. Persons of this category were not enlisted in the army at that time. At the same time, he began to look for ways to obtain certificates from doctors he knew in order to be released from military service for health reasons. He managed to get such certificates, and later they came in handy.

Maintaining contact with the most reliable sources, Akhmerov began to receive from them materials on the foreign and domestic policy of the United States, information on international contacts of representatives of the American government, data on military and military-political plans, and other valuable materials.

Residency sources were located in many US government facilities, and secrets especially protected by the Americans began to regularly come to Akhmerov, and then were sent to Moscow.

For example, during the Tehran Conference of the Great Powers, the Soviet delegation received timely information about the plans and intentions of the Americans, their planned steps, and this is a considerable merit of Iskhak Abdulovich, who received information on these issues from his colleagues.

agents.

Akhmerov had sources in the State Department, the Foreign Economic Administration, the War Industries Department, the FBI, the Department of Justice, and other institutions. One of the sources obtained information on nuclear issues (the Manhattan project). Another, who worked in the Office of Strategic Services (foreign intelligence), transmitted documentary materials about the US military infrastructure and preparations for military operations. A large amount of classified material came from other

sources.

In 1943-1945 alone, 2,500 films with information materials were received from Akhmerov (more than 75,000 typewritten sheets).

Taking into account the value of the extracted materials and the exceptionally conscientious and highly qualified work of employees of the illegal residency, the Center noted the illegal immigrant and his wife

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state awards. Akhmerov was awarded the Order of the Red Banner (the first award - the Order of the Badge of Honor - he received in September 1943), and Elena - the Order of the Red Star. Other employees of the residency also received awards. For the successful completion of reconnaissance missions in the post-war period, Akhmerov was awarded the second Order of the Red Banner.

After the defeat of Nazi Germany and Japan, new tasks arose before intelligence. American counterintelligence, having freed itself from the need to develop fascist agents, switched to work against Soviet missions and the possible activities of our intelligence from illegal positions.

Despite this, the flow of information sent to the Center did not decrease. However, in early December 1945, the activity of the residency had to be interrupted due to the threat of failure as a result of the betrayal of the source of the "legal" Mirna residency, which had some connection with one of the links of Akhmerov's residency. The work of the residency was mothballed, and the resident and his wife were transferred to the USSR. The most valuable sources were secured, and they began to operate as part of other illegal links.

Iskhak Abdulovich and his wife Elena returned to the USSR in early 1946. Now they have arrived in Moscow for good. The second stage of the work of resident Akhmerov in the United States of America, which lasted four and a half years, has ended.

In one of his speeches, Iskhak Abdulovich noted that for more than nine years he had been an American and, together with his wife, carried out intelligence work, freely traveling around the country, had a trading enterprise, an apartment in NYU More. supervised reputable sources in Washington who provided important political information during the war, covered the policy not only of the United States, but also of our opponents - Germany and Japan, and when I received a message from the Center that their information was of great state significance - chenie, then I realized that I was of great benefit to the Motherland and felt deep satisfaction.

The final documents on the work of foreign intelligence in 1941-1945 say: "The resident of the illegal residency, the prominent Soviet intelligence officer I.A. Akhmerov..." Rarely any of the scouts managed to earn such a high appraisal.

Upon his return from the United States, Akhmerov was appointed to one of the leading positions in the illegal intelligence unit, but he was drawn to live work. He again, as a foreigner, traveled to different countries on short-term business trips, and provided assistance to novice workers.

Iskhak Abdulovich was an attentive and sympathetic person, one could learn a lot of instructive things from him. However,

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he was also a demanding man towards his young colleagues.

The first thing Akhmerov paid attention to during the meeting was how the illegal was dressed. In a conversation with one of them, he delicately touched on this issue: "You bought clothes at a local store, but dressed in Moscow style." And he drew the interlocutor's attention to some details that distinguish a person in the local environment. The conversation was not only about external elements of appearance

illegal, but also about other professional qualities that a scout needs to develop.

"The scourge of our Soviet people who found themselves abroad is gullibility," said Iskhak Abdulovich. "It's different here. People, as a rule, do not let strangers into their souls and into their apartments. They communicate freely, but gaining trust is not so easy. This must be taken into account in the work."

Akhmerov especially paid attention to accuracy in work. "If you disrupt the order," he noted, "late for meetings, then you will never be able to establish a clear work with your sources and assistants, this will introduce laxity into the work, and the logical consequence will be failure."

Iskhak Abdulovich had great willpower, perseverance, perseverance in achieving the goal. He tried not to indulge himself, even in small things. It seemed to some that he was somewhat dry, overly restrained. But it was worth touching on a topic close to him, as he was transformed, and before us appeared a man of great soul, passionate about the work to which he had served all his conscious life.

This will forever remain in our memory Iskhak Abdulovich Akhmerov, an illegal resident who selflessly served his Fatherland.

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#### Destination - Rome

Marco Giovani (under this pseudonym he appeared in official documents), a native of Italy, came to foreign intelligence during the Great Patriotic War. It was planned to be used in the Italian direction. Italy actively participated in the war on the side of fascist Germany, its troops were at Stalingrad and in other sectors of the Soviet-German front. The leadership of the country and the command of the Red Army needed to receive information about the situation in Italy, the political and military plans of its leadership.

Marco Giovani was born in northern Italy to a working-class family in 1908. Participated in the anti-fascist movement, was a member of the workers' fighting squads. He showed himself to be a brave and resolute person. After the persecution began, he was forced to leave. In the Soviet Union, he found his second home. He studied, worked at a factory, took part in political activities among political emigrants, and started a family. His daughter lives in Moscow.

At the beginning of the war, Marco Giovani asked to be sent to the front. However, given his personal qualities, political reliability, he was asked to go to work in intelligence.

He had to carry out his first assignment outside the USSR in May 1944. At this time, American and British troops were fighting in Italy. The situation at the front remained difficult, and there was much that was unclear in the political situation. Marco was given the task of settling in Rome or in one of the major centers of northern Italy and starting work on collecting information about the situation in the country, the situation at the front, the contacts of the allies with the Germans, obtaining other information and transferring them to the Center.

The route was chosen through Yugoslavia. It was planned to land a scout on the territory of Bosnia, where there were

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of the Yugoslav partisans, and from there, with the help of Soviet representatives who were at Tito's headquarters, to transport him to Italy.

The transfer of scouts to their destination during the war is an extremely complicated and especially dangerous business when it comes to the territory occupied by the enemy. Quite a few scouts died on the route or in the first days and hours after landing on the territory occupied by the enemy.

Marco also had a hard time. Aircraft flew with cargo for the Yugoslav partisans from Kyiv. Along with the cargo, they sometimes took on board the Yugoslav and our military, which were thrown out with parachutes in specified places.

Twice Marco flew with these planes, but he failed to make the jump: either due to the appearance of German aviation, they deviated to the side, or due to weather conditions it was not possible to find the right place. And only on the third time the scout jumped. But, since at the same time there was a release of cargoes, Marco was carried away from the intended target, and, having got into a mountainous area, upon landing, he badly injured his leg. In addition, it turned out that literally a few hundred meters were German positions. At this time, the Nazi offensive began on Tito's headquarters, which was located in the area.

Marco came under fire, he could not move, and the Germans quickly advanced along the flanks, trying to block the area. The partisans began to retreat to the mountains.

In his report, Marco described the situation as follows: "By noon, the Germans were already at the very town of Bravsko. Their mechanized vehicles moved along the road, and the infantry advanced in chains along the valley. The proximity of the enemy caused a strong panic: people fled, shooting anywhere on the go, shells and mines exploded all around. The Germans were already visible in the open field, they were calmly crossing it and should soon be in the town.

Not hoping for help, I set off after the retreating Yugoslavs. The sprained leg was swollen. The unbearable pain made me stop. The partisans ran past without paying any attention to me. Finally, one person stopped and asked what happened to me, why I trailed behind everyone like that. I told him about my situation and showed him my swollen leg. It was the commissioner. Realizing what was the matter, he ran somewhere and returned to me with a horse. Thus, I was not left alone on the road and managed to retreat in time with everyone. In this order, by evening, I reached the town of Tserkvenno, located in the forest, and there I was placed in the infirmary.

Marko was supposed to be met by employees of the Soviet military mission, who were in a partisan formation. But due to the fact that the German offensive began in a given area, it was reported to the Center that the scout probably died or fell into the hands of punishers.

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Only a few days later Marco was reported to Moscow. The center instructed, after the scout recovers, to send him to Italy.

Marco spent about a month in a partisan detachment. Despite his illness, he had to participate in battles. Day or night, he did not part with the gun. And only after the partisans eliminated the threat of encirclement, the scout got the opportunity to rest and undergo a minimal course of treatment.

A few days later he was already at home. Posing as a partisan operating on the Italo-Yugoslav border, emaciated and limping, he did not arouse much suspicion. There were many people like him in Italy at that time.

A few days later he reached Rome. There was a turnout here. Marco reported to the Center about the safe arrival. He was instructed to stop in Rome, to try to get a job in some institution. It was emphasized that one should try to get into an institution where one could receive the necessary information.

Marco began looking for housing and exploring opportunities for a day job. But the life of a scout is full of surprises, and one of them almost cost him prison when he was already at the goal.

"I found myself a room on the western outskirts of Rome," the scout wrote about this case, "and began to draw up a certificate for receiving cards. Then, in order to get a certificate for the bureau of cards, it was enough to declare that you came from such and such a city. So I did. Food cards were supposed to be sent to my house on the third day after the application, but three days have passed, and the cards have not yet been received. On the fourth day I went to the lower floor and knocked on the door of the janitor. The door of her apartment turned out to be open, several rooms were visible through it, in which several wardrobes were visible, clothes lay on the floor. Seeing such a picture, I felt something unkind here, so I did not enter the apartment, but went down to the street. Seeing no one on the street, I again began to rise to my place. But just at that time the owners of my room were coming down to meet me, they were going somewhere about their business. I told them that I wanted to go to the janitor, but no one from her apartment answers my knock and that her apartment is open. Then my master went up to the door of the janitor's apartment and began to knock on it with a stick, but also to no avail. The janitor was not in the apartment, she was in the garden. When we went there and told her about what had happened to her apartment, she quickly went up to her apartment and, convinced of the trouble, began to scream loudly.

This ordinary thing might not concern me, but the fact is that when representatives from the district gendarmerie came and asked the hostess who she suspected of stealing, the janitor pointed to me.

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The gendarmes examined my room and asked if I had rubber shoes. As it turned out later, traces of such shoes were found in a robbed apartment. However, the case ended successfully, the size of the shoes did not match mine, and I did not have rubber shoes either. After the interrogation, the gendarmes released me, and that was the end of what was unpleasant for me. case".

The traces left by the burglar helped to understand the situation, and therefore the gendarmes were interested in shoes. Without them, things could take an unpredictable turn. Some items of operational equipment were kept in Marco's room, and if there had been a search and they had been found, the case could have ended in failure.

After several attempts, Marco managed to get a job in an important government agency. He was accepted into the office as an office worker. At that time, all institutions were restructuring their work, many old officials were dismissed and others came in their place, among whom there were many people with progressive, democratic views, participants in the anti-fascist Resistance.

In the office, he worked in the area of receiving, registering and sending outgoing correspondence, and was also engaged in maintaining a card index of sent correspondence. Among the documents that passed through the hands of the intelligence officer, there were many secret documents related to the analysis of the internal political situation in the country, military, economic and other issues. Often, Marco's hands fell into the correspondence of his department with the main headquarters of the American troops in Italy.

There were two tables in the room. Another woman, "Lucia," worked behind the other, handling incoming mail. Since she had a small child, she sometimes went away, and in her absence Marco did her work, which was of an urgent nature.

"Lucia" was a cheerful and somewhat talkative woman. She developed good, friendly relations with Marco. She talked about her family, the work of her husband, who got a job in an organization engaged in the supply of the American army, about the heads of departments and departments of the department, whom she knew well, since she delivered mail to them for more than three years.



The most interesting documents were rewritten or annotated by Marco, and he memorized the main provisions of others. He knew the contents of many of the incoming documents as well, since "Lucia" freely discussed them with her partner. The scout also managed to look into packages addressed personally to the highest officials of the department. A significant number of such packages were forwarded to lower-ranking employees, and when a scout replaced Lucius, he, after receiving a resolution from some high boss, on the way to the executor, managed to look through the contents of the package. He did

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it's simple. He returned to his room, got acquainted with the contents of the package, and only then called the contractor. There was no strict control over the passage of correspondence. Sometimes packages marked "urgent" lay for hours on the table at "Lucia".

All the materials obtained, Marco regularly handed over to an employee of the "legal" residency, which had already begun to operate in Italy. Meetings were held once every ten days.

Two months later, "Lucia" invited Marco to her birthday party. There he met her husband "Silvio". Already after the first conversation, the intelligence officer realized that Silvio had a negative attitude towards the Nazis, he was critical of the American interference in the internal affairs of Italy, although he did not express certain political views.

Gradually, relations with Silvio acquired a friendly character. At first, Marco met with both spouses from time to time, and then the two of them with "Silvio" went to some bar for a glass of martini.

After some time, the development of relations reached a stage when "Silvio" began to confidentially talk about the secret activities of the Americans in Italy. In particular, he reported data on the connection of Americans with pro-fascist bankers and industrialists, former senior officials of the Mussolini government, and the introduction of his own people into the leadership of the political parties that were being formed.

The Center showed great interest in the information that came from "Silvio" and recommended that Marco continue to strengthen relations with him.

Thus, along with the official channel, from where Marco received the bulk of intelligence information, another channel began to operate - Silvio.

Subsequently, Marco established friendly relations with one of the clerks, who worked in the same department where he did, in the economic department. In conversations with him, the scout received interesting information on economic issues. "Julius," as we call this man, fought against the Nazis in a partisan detachment in northern Italy, was a staunch supporter of the communists, although he was not officially a member of the party. He hid his true views from the environment, otherwise, as he said, they would be expelled from work and there would be nothing to feed his family.

The information received by the intelligence officer concerned acute political and military problems and was highly appreciated at the Center.

Marco's position was strong enough. The only thing that worried the Center was the return of Italian emigrants to their homeland. Marko was well known among them, and his sudden disappearance in 1941 was not ignored, although he was officially listed as being drafted into the active army.

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Marco was advised to try to avoid contacts with this former comrades under various pretexts, including due to the fact that he allegedly became disillusioned with the ideas of socialism. This was necessary because people with pro-communist convictions,

those who arrived from the USSR were under the supervision of both allied and local Italian special services.

With the permission of the Center, after a year's stay in Rome, Marco decided to visit his parents, whom he had not seen for 20 years. Fearing that they would be persecuted, he did not tell them anything about himself earlier. During the fascist regime, his parents and his two brothers officially confirmed to the authorities that their son and brother had died and that they did not share his political beliefs.

Marco understood that he could not appear openly at his parents' house. He was registered with the police as an active communist revolutionary, and besides, he had a passport in his pocket in a different name. The unexpected appearance of a person who was considered dead, of course, could attract the attention of the authorities, and then the special services. To avoid this, Marco decided to see his parents and brothers in secret.

As he later wrote, his appearance in his native town passed without incident. Twenty years have passed since he left him, outwardly during this time Marco has changed a lot, and therefore no one recognized him. Yes, and he hardly recognized the city, most of it lay in ruins.

He came to his native house, which stood on the outskirts. The war spared him. This area was not bombed. In the house I met my father and mother, they were already under eighty. The father did not recognize his son and asked the stranger who he needed. When he introduced himself, his father looked at him intently, and only then did he realize that in front of him was his own son, whom he considered dead. They called a brother who lived in the neighborhood, there was no other brother in the city. When everyone gathered, Marco warned them not to tell anyone about his visit and that he was alive. He explained this by the peculiarities of his party activities.

Despite the conspiratorial conditions, the meeting was warm and joyful. War-ravaged residents of the town lived from hand to mouth. Marco's parents were also in poverty, and therefore the son's financial assistance came in handy. During dinner, the brother said to Marco: "The mayor of the town knows that you were not killed and that you were in Moscow all this time. We ourselves assumed that you did not die, but went abroad, but where does the mayor get such information? Marco realized that the information about the emigrants who were in the USSR had apparently been sent by the police to the places of their former residence in order to control them.

Returning to Rome, the scout continued his work in his office. He did not feel suspicious attitude towards himself from the environment. The information he received became more meaningful, it covered new areas and revealed the behind-the-scenes plans of the Americans, as well as pro-fascist groups aimed at undermining the democratic movement in the country, and other important information.

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In the department where Marko worked, as well as in other institutions, old cadres who worked under the fascist regime began to return. The head of the chancellery where Marco worked, who replaced the supporter of the Social Democrats, turned out to be an old career employee of the ministry, dismissed two years ago for belonging to the fascist party. Now he has been reinstated and immediately began replacing newly hired employees.

At first, he had a normal attitude towards Marco, but then he was called in by the staff of the personnel apparatus and demanded clarifications about his stay in the partisan detachments, his former political activity.

This testing activity was preceded by an incident that happened to him about a month ago. Marco, as usual, walked with a package along the corridor to the expedition to send mail. He met a man who asked him to tell me where the room number he needed was located. Marco showed me where to go. However, the stranger did not leave, he fixed his eyes on the scout and began to rub his forehead with his hand. "Where did we meet? - he asked. - Your

the face is very familiar to me. Only now Marco realized that before him was the man he had seen in Moscow. "Tell me, please, sir," continued the stranger, "did you happen to live at the Lux Hotel in Moscow?" "Where where? Marco said as calmly as he could. No, never lived. Is Moscow a beautiful city? Would it be worth visiting?" "Yes, very much," said the stranger. "Strange, you look so much like the man I saw in Moscow." Marco repeated once more: "You are mistaken, you take me for someone else. Thank God, I have never been to Russia, unlike many Italians who got frostbite in the Don steppes, and fought only on the Greek front, where I became an invalid."

The stranger left, shrugging his shoulders and muttering something. Marco already remembered this man. He really saw him before the war at the Lux Hotel, where he went once. But who he was, Marco did not know.

The situation was unfavorable. Marco consulted with his curator, an experienced intelligence officer N.M. Gorshkov, and as a result, it was decided to prepare the ground for a change of job.

But the verification machine, as you can see, has already started spinning. It was necessary to immediately leave this department. We also received permission from the Center for this.

It was decided, under a plausible pretext, to quit his job, switch to other documents and continue working with "Silvio" and "Julius".

The breeder, under the pretext of illness, stopped going to work, and then notified the administration of his dismissal. This whole procedure went in a normal way and outwardly looked natural.

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During this time, Marco worked out the conditions of communication with his assistants, picked up housing in a new area, and on one of the July days of 1946, Marco Giovanni disappeared. In the environment where he lived, there was a rumor that he had gone to work in France.

With documents in the name of another person, Marco continued his hard work. The work continued for another year. From the intelligence officer continued to receive interesting materials on political, economic and military issues.

Marco regularly met "Silvio" and "Julius" on a conspiratorial basis. From "Silvio" he received information not only about the subversive activities of the Americans in Italy, but also some materials from the department where he had previously worked. "Silvio" got them through "Lucia", which, at his request, brought home the documents she had on execution.

For the information he obtained, "Silvio" received certain amounts from Marco and was very pleased with the additional income. He worked carefully and conscientiously. The prevailing motive in their relationship was money, but the friendly relations that had been established between them also played a significant role.

As for "Julius", he behaved quite differently. Despite the fact that the source needed money, he never once accepted it from the intelligence officer, although the latter repeatedly offered him material assistance. At the same time, information came from him regularly.

By that time, the position of the intelligence officer from the point of view of security began to be assessed as not entirely favorable. The very first checks could lead to trouble, and therefore the Center, after a three-year stay of the intelligence officer in the country, decided to return him to the Union.

However, Marco's illegal activities did not end there.

After treatment and rest, he left for illegal work as a resident in another country, where he worked for another 8 years. It must be said that Marco was not in very good health, but he never complained and steadfastly endured relapses of an old disease. The Center showed natural concern and offered the illegal immigrant to return to the Union for treatment. However, Marco was more concerned about his subordinates and tried to help them first, postponing his trip until later.

In September 1964, he died suddenly. It can be said without exaggeration that he "burned out at work." Thus ended the life of a fearless fighter against fascism, a glorious son of the Italian people, a citizen of the USSR, a brave intelligence officer, Lieutenant Colonel Marco Giovani.

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In occupied France

Before the German attack on the USSR, Soviet foreign intelligence worked in France under difficult conditions. The Germans established a strict military-police regime in the northern part of French territory they had captured. The situation in the "free" southern zone was only marginally better, as the authorities in Vichy collaborated with the Germans.

The two "legal" residencies that existed in France since the summer of 1940 - one in Paris and the other in Vichy - were weak. The consequences of the political repressions of 1937-1938, which dealt a heavy blow to intelligence personnel, were acute. At the beginning of 1941, there were only two operational officers in each residency. They did not have sufficient experience in intelligence work abroad, they were in the country recently, they knew little French. It was bad business with agents.

Formally, Soviet intelligence had a fairly large network of agents in this country. But in fact, most of the agents were inactive due to the loss of intelligence capabilities or were mothballed, in particular, due to the appearance of distrust towards them on the part of the Center. There were many auxiliary agents acquired to carry out specific special tasks and turned out to be useless in conditions when it was necessary to urgently solve the extremely difficult task of revealing the further plans of Germany and other direct participants in the outbreak of the world war. As for the able-bodied part of the agents, they were also used very inefficiently.

However, the main difficulty was due to the fact that the political leadership of the country, the intelligence leadership and the residents made serious miscalculations and slowness in organizing intelligence activities from illegal positions in case of war, and especially the departure of Soviet official representatives from France.

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Quite revealing is the letter from the Resident in Vichy to the leadership of the NKGB dated April 1941, which, in particular, reads as follows: "I look forward to the instructions you promised with great impatience. They are necessary, firstly, because now I am completely cut off from K (a Parisian resident. - Approx. Aut.), because there is no possibility for him to go to me, or vice versa. Yes, and telegraph communication (with Paris. - Approx. Aut.) has recently disappeared. Secondly, because in such an international situation it may happen that communication with you will also become irregular.

On June 22, 1941, the Consulate General of the USSR in Paris, under the cover of which the Paris residency worked, was attacked by an SS detachment and was liquidated.

On June 30, 1941, the Petain government severed diplomatic relations with the USSR. All official Soviet representatives were expelled from France.

By this time, an illegal intelligence group, led by an experienced French agent "Rom", united the main part of our agents. The group operated in German-occupied French territory and was based in Paris. It was formed on the basis of an illegal special group of an agent - the Frenchman "Gustav", who worked in France from the end of the 1920s until 1939, when it was reorganized.

Since the summer of 1940, Gustav himself has been in the south of France, where he was forced to leave for reasons of personal security. There, in the "free zone", on the instructions of the Center, he created an independent illegal reconnaissance group of agents who already lived in this region or left there for the same reasons as he did.

In addition, two separate small illegal groups were operating in the south of France, organized in 1940 from agents previously operating in Spain.

Before the closure of the "legal" residencies of Soviet foreign intelligence in Paris and Vichy, our intelligence groups in France operated under their leadership. And they kept in touch with Moscow mainly through these residencies. But after the departure of the Soviet official representations to the Union, and, consequently, of the operatives, it turned out that the methods and conditions for the two-way communication of the Center with reconnaissance groups and lone agents in France were not properly discussed and worked out. Radio communication was also not well established. "Gustav" did not have a walkie-talkie at all, and the radio communication of the "Roma" group stopped after a few sessions for technical reasons. The group's radio technician was unable to quickly fix the problem.

As can be seen from the materials available in the archive, a significant part of the blame for this state of affairs lay with the intelligence leadership. A few days before the German attack on the Soviet Union, the leadership did not have a clear idea of how the

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communication if such a situation arises. It again asked the Parisian resident for a report on the work done to ensure communication between the reconnaissance groups and Moscow in the event of the evacuation of Soviet institutions from France. Alas, the resident reported on this issue after returning to the Union ...

Since the problem of restoring communications became a key one both for Moscow and for the reconnaissance groups, both sides solved it in a situation that was completely unfavorable for this.

In December 1941, the Paris reconnaissance group managed to get the radio working. In the non-occupied zone, a point was also soon deployed in the Marseille region to maintain independent radio communications with the Center. The radio operators of both groups could only "get through" to their Moscow colleagues, which turned out to be no easy task.

At the beginning of 1942, help finally came from Moscow. At the direction of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in June 1941, a special unit was created as part of the First Directorate of the NKGB to maintain constant communication with agent groups located in Germany and on the territory of the states occupied by it. However, the difficult situation in which the Soviet Union found itself in the first period of the Great Patriotic War, and the establishment by the Germans of control over almost all of Europe, made it extremely difficult to send messengers to France.

Such an opportunity presented itself after an agreement was reached in August 1941 between the NKVD of the USSR and the intelligence service of Great Britain on cooperation in conducting work against Germany and its allies. This agreement provided for the provision by the British side of assistance to the Soviet special services in establishing and maintaining contact with residencies and agents in Germany and the countries occupied by it.

Already in November 1941, the first group of our liaison officers arrived in England. Among them was the Hannah, destined for France, where she was supposed to contact

leaders of illegal reconnaissance groups, hand over instructions, money, new codes and communication conditions to them. After a series of unsuccessful attempts by the British to land the Hanna by air, she was delivered on a speedboat to the French coast on the night of January 10, 1942. There was also a guide on the boat, who ferried the messenger ashore and led him through the first line of coast guards.

"Hannah" successfully reached Paris, found "Roma", and through him "Gustav" and the agent "Alex", specially left to work in the non-occupied zone. After that, radio contact was established with the Center, which continued intermittently for some time. Both groups informed about their sabotage actions, reported information of a military nature, including the deployment and movements of some German and French military units.

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Then radio communication was interrupted completely. At first, it stopped with the Roma group. This happened because of a serious failure in Paris: the arrest of Hannah by the police in the summer of 1942 when she tried to commit an act of sabotage (arson of a grain warehouse). According to a police report drawn up on the basis of the interrogation of the arrested woman, "Hannah" herself "showed a desire to work more actively." Therefore, "Rom" included her in one of the sabotage groups, although he did not consider it necessary. During a search by the police and the Gestapo of "Hanna's" apartment, materials were found that provided grounds for the arrest of "Roma" and more than a dozen other members of his group.

Due to the fact that at the time of the arrest of "Roma" his group had radio contact with Moscow, the intelligence leadership was immediately informed of the incident. The members of the organization who remained at large attempted to establish the reasons for the failure and save those arrested by bribing the relevant officials of the French police. But they were not successful, despite the willingness of one policeman to cooperate. Only the Gestapo was involved in the investigation into the case of the Roma group. The French police did not have information on this issue and could not influence the course of events.

During the interrogations, "Rum" tried to do everything to alleviate the fate of the rest of the arrested comrades, and took the main blame upon himself. The available intelligence evidence indicates that the Gestapo was struck by the firmness with which the agent held on and defended the ideals for which he fought against the Germans.

During the investigation and trial, it was established that the Roma group was created by the USSR security agencies and worked for Soviet intelligence. "Hannah" and "Rum" were shot. Others arrested were also executed or sentenced to long terms of imprisonment and deported to Germany. Subsequently, the activities of "Roma" and his group during the period of German occupation were highly appreciated by the Center.

In November 1942, the radio in the southern zone also fell silent. This happened mainly because, with the arrival of the Germans in Marseille, the threat of its discovery increased. The leadership of the southern reconnaissance group considered it expedient to abandon the use of the radio station.

At the beginning of 1943, on the initiative of a number of surviving agents, it was decided to unite the "southern" and "northern" reconnaissance groups into one organization and create a single "leading center" of four experienced agents in Lyon. It was headed by the agent "Alex", who until that time was in the south of the country. In making the decision, in particular, two circumstances were taken into account. First, the demarcation zone, which previously divided the country into "free" and occupied

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zone, in 1942, actually ceased to exist: the whole of France was under the occupation of the Germans. Secondly, the greatly reduced, bloodless Parisian organization needed an influx of fresh forces.

In the summer of 1943, a temporary walkie-talkie was installed in the Lyon region, which resumed calling and listening to Moscow. But the connection did not improve. According to the operator, this could be due to insufficient power and poor location of the transmitter. Failed to establish contact with Moscow and with the help of a walkie-talkie, which was installed in the Paris region in August of the same year.

The lack of communication with Moscow continued to worry the leadership of the joint reconnaissance group.

At the beginning of 1944, "Alex" sent a messenger to Spain with the task of sneaking into Algeria to establish contact with Soviet officials in that country. On February 22, 1944, the messenger arrived in Algeria and handed over to our consul an encrypted note and greetings from "Alex". The messenger said that the Paris intelligence group was waiting for the resumption of bilateral communication with Moscow, in connection with which its radio would go on the air daily.

Without waiting for news from Moscow, "Alex" decides to leave by the same route. In Barcelona, he received a letter from a member of the leadership of the Chaumont group, whom he left in Paris instead of himself, in which he reported that everything was in order. "Alex" received the second letter while already in Algeria. It was sent by the wife of "Caumont" to Spain, and from there forwarded to "Alex" in Algeria. Chaumont's wife wrote that "due to her husband's illness, the office was closed." It was a conditional phrase, meaning that there was a failure in Paris and "Chaumont" was arrested ...

Along with Chaumont, the Gestapo arrested several other members of the organization. Nevertheless, "Chaumont" and his comrades were "lucky" - they were tried only as members of the resistance movement. The Gestapo had no idea that they were dealing with agents of the Soviet intelligence network in France. An important role in this case was played by the fact that the Germans failed to establish the true identity of "Chaumont", as he lived according to other people's documents. (In 1942, he was already arrested by the Germans while crossing the demarcation line: he was returning from the southern zone, where he carried out the task of "Roma", in particular, he met with "Alex". Then he managed to escape, but his original identity card remained. If during the second arrest "Chaumont" had his own, real documents, it would not have been difficult for the investigation to reveal the connection between him and the executed by the Nazis "Roma".)

During interrogations, Chaumont held firm and did not tell the Gestapo anything interesting. Due to the fact that the case was given a "Gaullist coloring", all those arrested escaped the death penalty.

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thief. Chaumont himself was deported to Germany and imprisoned in a concentration camp in Buchenwald. After his release in April 1945, he returned to France with other prisoners.

Since "Alex" was in Algeria and there was no connection with Moscow, the joint intelligence group after the arrest of "Chaumont" was again left without leadership and faced the threat of disintegration. It was necessary to have extraordinary will and courage in order to dare to continue the struggle under these conditions. But there were such people in the organization, which the Germans considered destroyed. They formed a new leadership led by a strong supporter of the revival of the Doroi group.

There were many women among our assistants in France. Together with their husbands, for example, the wives of "Roma", "Gustav", "Alexa" cooperated with the Soviet intelligence. Some of the women worked at sites of primary intelligence interest or had good acquaintances there through whom they obtained important intelligence information.

The new leadership included two more experienced agents. It set itself - as the main one - the task of preserving the group and ensuring its operational life until the restoration of contact with Moscow. Thus, conditions were created for the deployment of active work of the group immediately after the liberation of Paris from the Germans in August 1944.

Arriving on September 10, 1944 in Paris, the "legal" resident of the Soviet foreign intelligence A.A. Guzovsky reported to the Center that the intelligence network we had created before the war in France, despite heavy losses, not only survived, but also "developed in organizational terms.

respect."

Thus, the illegal groups created by Soviet intelligence in France by the beginning of the war existed and operated - with varying degrees of activity - throughout the war years. They worked despite the fact that since the autumn of 1942 there was no connection with Moscow, and the Gestapo and the French police systematically attacked the agent network.

The intelligence work of our agents was intertwined with the fight against the German occupiers and French collaborators, which was waged by the patriots of France during these years. Considering the commonality of goals in the fight against German fascism and the need to keep secret the activities of intelligence groups, their leaders recommended that agents simultaneously participate on a "personal basis" in various organizations of the Resistance movement and groups created by de Gaulle, English, American and Polish intelligence. kami in French territory. Therefore, some of our agents were part of the combat detachments, sections, groups, and even their

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headed. For their active participation in this struggle and the personal courage shown in this, a number of them were awarded (some posthumously) French and English orders.

In their activities, our agents focused on carrying out sabotage and terrorist actions against the Nazis and paid less attention to purely intelligence work, including the extraction of information. The explosives and other means necessary for sabotage and sabotage were produced by them on the spot, and partly came from the British. Explosive devices of various types and sizes, disguised as canned food, fountain pens, soap dishes, etc., were made, for example, in Toulouse and Perigault. The design of explosive devices was simple and safe for the PERSONS who used THEM.

In a number of cities in France, including Paris, Lyon, Toulouse, Marseille, Limoges, Clermont Ferrand, Perigo, Nimes, our agents created "action groups" and "sabotage groups". Usually they consisted of three to five people, but there were lone agents. They committed acts of sabotage on railways, merchant ships carrying German soldiers and goods, in German food warehouses and French enterprises working for Germany. As a result, only in Paris and the Parisian region, a large number of German troops were destroyed by the Roma group.

Of exceptional importance was the participation of our agents in the selection of sites on French territory for the reception of people, weapons and other goods parachuted from British aircraft, and in organizing the safe transportation of these persons and materials.

Work was well organized to transfer people who worked in reconnaissance groups and organizations of the Resistance across the demarcation line, and to manufacture false identity cards, official seals, letterheads, etc. This was done, in particular, by Gustav's group.

In the southern zone, there was also a reception and asylum service for persecuted members of the resistance movement, whatever groups they belonged to. These persons had free food and accommodation for several days, and then received other identity cards and left for a new place. Caches were created in which weapons, ammunition, sabotage equipment, spare radio equipment, equipment and materials necessary for the production of false documents were kept, as well as the documents themselves and

money.



The composition of the participants in the reconnaissance groups was motley. In addition to the French, there were Poles, Czechs, Spaniards, Russians, Germans and representatives of some other nationalities among them. All of them were united by a joint struggle against German fascism. For example, in the group

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"Gustav" only six people knew that they were helping the Soviet Union. The rest believed that they belonged to some kind of "special political section" that worked on instructions from the leadership of either the French Communist Party or the Resistance movement.

Every time Moscow managed to establish contact with intelligence groups in France, it recommended that they first of all focus on obtaining military-political information, avoiding, for the safety of intelligence officers, direct participation in armed actions. Such instructions were, in particular, transmitted to "Roma" and "Gustav" through the messenger "Hannu" at the beginning of 1942 and in the middle of that year were brought to the attention of Alex by radio, who informed both group leaders about this.

"Gustav" and especially "Rom" expressed doubts about the expediency of ending the participation of their reconnaissance groups in carrying out sabotage actions. They believed that their civic duty and conscience did not allow them to remain aloof from such forms of struggle against German fascism, especially since there was no connection with Moscow in the following months.

During periods of resumption of radio communications, the Paris and Southern groups reported to the Center on the results of their activities. As noted in the memo of the head of the Fourth Directorate of the NKGB P.A. Sudoplatov People's Commissar of State Security V.N. Merkulov dated July 18, 1944, "both groups reported on the sabotage work they had done, and also gave a number of valuable materials about the movements of German military units, about French military formations. This informational material received an excellent rating from the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army.

When there was no radio communication with Moscow, the information was realized by reconnaissance groups along the line of the Resistance movement and, consequently, fell into the intelligence of the allies and de Gaulle, the leadership of the French Communist Party.

After the creation of the joint reconnaissance group, all the information obtained by agents in both the northern and southern zones began to flow to its headquarters in Paris. In these materials, information about the whereabouts and movements of German troops, prominent figures of the fascist Reich, the military fortifications created by the Nazis, the warehouses, stations, ports and other military facilities that they used was of the greatest value.

The data received by the agents were sent to the so-called "documentation bureau", located in one of the strictly secret apartments in Paris. The information was reviewed, classified, compared, checked, and agent reports and certificates were prepared on its basis. Due to the lack of communication with Moscow, the recipients of the obtained and processed information were often

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leaders of the resistance movement and the French Communist Party, de Gaulle, British and American intelligence.

Part of the intelligence information materials were accumulated and stored in safe houses in Paris and Marseilles with the aim of transferring them to Moscow as soon as communication with it was restored.

In the summer of 1944, many members of our intelligence network took an active part in the armed uprising that engulfed most of France and in the liberation of Paris from the Nazis.

With the appearance in Paris in September 1944 of the "legal" residency, contact began to be restored with our agents in France. During the meetings, the losses suffered by reconnaissance groups during the war, the availability of opportunities for further work were clarified. In particular, Gustav said that his former southern group survived and retained its combat capability. He and his people are ready to cooperate with us further.

Some archival information materials that had accumulated in reconnaissance groups since the end of 1942 were transferred to Moscow. Among them are important data on German agents in France, the structure and activities of French intelligence and counterintelligence agencies. Fresh intelligence information also began to arrive. Among the first were reports on the political, economic and military problems of France, on the plans of Paris in the development of relations with the Soviet Union and post-war control over Germany, on the Anglo-American armed forces in Europe, on the intentions of the Western allies, especially the Americans, to use recruited Soviet prisoners of war, Russian, Georgian, Ukrainian and other emigration in their work against the USSR, as well as on a number of other topical issues. Information about the work of French intelligence and its employees was especially highly appreciated. The two agents who received these materials were encouraged by the leadership of the NKGB.

With the resumption of "normal" intelligence work in France, both old and new problems have surfaced. First of all, Moscow began to worry again about the reliability of the intelligence apparatus, especially the leadership.

The grounds for doubts were the prolonged lack of control by the Center over the activities of agents; unclear reasons for a number of failures during the war years; participation of some agents in the organizations of the Resistance, created by intelligence agencies of the allies and de Gaulle, or active cooperation with them; the arrival of new people unknown to Moscow in the reconnaissance groups. For example, in February 1945, in the former Paris group of 65 people, agents with pre-war experience accounted for less than 30%. The rest of its members were recruited for cooperation mainly in 1943-1944 without the knowledge of the Center and without sufficient verification. Of all the agents, only from 15

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lovek regularly received information that was of some value.

In November 1944, the Center sent the head of the "legal" residency a preliminary action plan for the deployment of intelligence work in France.

Among the main informational tasks, the Center pointed to the need for in-depth coverage of the domestic and foreign policy of the French government, relations between Paris-Londo-Washington, their positions on post-war settlement in Europe, the activities of American and British intelligence services on French territory. , positions in local circles of Russian, Ukrainian, Georgian and Armenian emigration. Great importance was attached to the organization of scientific and technical intelligence in France. However, before embarking on this work, the residency was first instructed to carefully check all agents, especially new members of the intelligence network.

In the spring of 1945, surviving members of the intelligence network began to return to France from German concentration camps. Former prisoners were given money for treatment, as many were seriously ill and in difficult financial situations.

In a short period of time after the liberation of France, the Parisian residency of the NKGB quickly established intelligence work and achieved positive results. She was able to use the favorable operational situation in France in late 1944 and early 1945, as well as the increased prestige of the Soviet Union throughout the world, to acquire valuable agents and infiltrate reliable agents in the most important objects of the host country. Particular attention was paid to the special services, diplomatic and other representations of the leading Western states.

In June 1945, the Center developed a final plan for the reorganization of the former joint reconnaissance group and the establishment of further intelligence work in France. It was considered expedient to disband this group, since its organizational structure did not meet the requirements of secrecy. Many agents knew each other, were aware of the tasks performed by other members of the organization. The means and methods successfully used under the conditions of the Resistance turned out to be unacceptable in the new situation. Great importance was attached to improving the quality of the information obtained, since, for example, out of more than a thousand intelligence reports on the situation in France received in 1945, the Center used only 16%.

Several independent, independent small reconnaissance groups were created. Their purpose and tasks were clearly formulated. The most valuable agents were singled out separately.

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Soon, data began to arrive in Moscow, indicating that the French counterintelligence was developing some reconnaissance groups. As noted in a memorandum addressed to the head of the First Directorate of the NKGB P.M. Fitin dated September 25, 1945, the goal of the French was:

"1. Disclose the entire composition of the groups, identify the workers of the Soviet residency in Paris, our plans and methods of work in France.

2. To "intertwine" the work of the members of the groups as much as possible with local party organizations and the leadership of the French Communist Party in order not only to strike a blow at our work at a convenient moment, but also to undermine the prestige and discredit the Communist Party, presenting it as an agent. USSR and an appendage of Soviet intelligence".

In order to prevent the French special services from carrying out the planned operation, the leadership of foreign intelligence in Moscow decided to instruct the "legal" residency in Paris to mothball the intelligence groups formed in the summer of 1945 until the end of the year, forbidding their members to carry out any work and especially to have contacts with the French Communist Party.

Could our intelligence in France have done more during the war years? Of course, it could, if its leaders had foreseen in time and, most importantly, before June 1941 carried out the necessary measures to organize intelligence work under special conditions.

Nevertheless, all subsequent researchers will certainly agree with the assessment given by the first "legal" resident of the Soviet foreign intelligence in Paris after the liberation of France, A.A. Guzovsky. He wrote to the Center that during the war years, our agents in France "with honor passed through the difficult period of underground struggle, without communications and funds, they did a lot of work and expanded their ranks." It was the agents from among them who ensured the success of Soviet intelligence in France during the Cold War.

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The collapse of the fascist "Citadel"

On May 7, 1943, a message was sent to the State Defense Committee from the NKGB of the USSR under No. 136/M about intelligence data received by the NKGB resident in London regarding the German plan for the offensive operation "Citadel" and the assessment by the German command of the combat readiness of the Soviet troops on Kursk-Belgorod - direction. It said: "The USSR NKGB Residency in London reports the text of a telegram received by agents, sent on April 25 from the Southern Group of German Forces signed by General Field Marshal von Weichs to the Operations Department of the Army High Command ..."

"The text of the telegram obtained by undercover means." How, then, did the NKGB station in London manage to obtain the encrypted text of the telegram, with the help of which

Wehrmacht command units corresponded? The reader is already aware of the existence in the UK of an undercover group of Soviet intelligence officers under the collective name of the "Cambridge Five", among which was Kim Philby. This group got its name because they were all students at the University of Cambridge at various times. John Cairncross also belonged to the glorious cohort of intelligence officers, who during the war years, as a man who knew German well and had mathematical abilities, became an employee of the Bletchley Park English deciphering service.

There was information in the press that back in 1938, a Polish engineer, who previously worked at a German secret enterprise that produced Enigma encryption machines, assembled an analogue of this machine for the British. The British kept the existence of the Enigma, which made it possible to decipher German radio messages, in the strictest confidence. One of the codebreakers was John Cairncross.

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It was he who periodically transmitted decoded radiograms to our London residence. It was from him and Philby that the residency received a decrypted message about the goals of the planned German offensive, code-named "Citadel".

After the defeat of the German troops at Stalingrad, the leadership of fascist Germany made desperate attempts to regain the strategic initiative. The most combat-ready troops were transferred from the West. The military industry of Germany and its satellites, working 24 hours a day, was in a hurry to produce heavy tanks "tiger" and "panther" with reinforced armor, a powerful self-propelled gun "Ferdinand". The German Air Force received new Focke-Wulf-190-A and Heinkel-129 aircraft.

By mid-April, the Hitlerite command developed a plan for an offensive on the Soviet-German front. For this, the Nazis chose the Kursk ledge, which was formed by the end of March 1943 during the winter-spring offensive of the Soviet troops and went deep into the location of the German armies. The main blows were supposed to be delivered: the first - from the area south of Orel by the forces of the Army Group "Center" under the command of Field Marshal G. Kluge and the second - from the area north of Kharkov by the forces of the Army Group "South" under the command of Field Marshal E. Manstein. The direction of both attacks of the German troops was to Kursk.

Here are excerpts from a document of the German military command, handed over to Moscow by the NKGB resident in London: "The main concentration of enemy forces, which, obviously, were still some time ago on the northern flank of Army Group South, can be clearly defined in the main area future operations: Kursk-Sudzha-Volchansk-Ostrogzhsk...x "To counteract the implementation of the Citadel plan," the German command reported, "the enemy has approximately 90 formations located south of the Belgorod Kursk-Maloarkhangelsk line. The advance of units of Army Group South will meet stubborn resistance in a deeply echeloned and well-prepared defensive zone with numerous tanks buried in the ground, with artillery and local reserves. The main defense efforts will be concentrated in the main Belgorod-Tamarovka sector...

At present, it is difficult to predict whether or not the enemy (Soviet Army. — Author's note) will try to avoid the threat of encirclement by retreating to the east, which will follow the breakthrough of the main sectors on the Kursk-Belgorod-Maloarkhangelsk front line...

It can be assumed that in the event of the transfer of reinforcements in the area north of the front of Army Group South and with the start of the advance

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If strategic reserves are moved to the front line or merged into larger formations, the offensive actions of the enemy will become more real, however, even under this condition, he will not even be able to prevent our implementation of the "Citadel" plan!

Obtaining this information required careful verification. Chief of the General Staff A.M. Vasilevsky took measures to organize reconnaissance of the enemy in the sectors of the Central, Voronezh and Southwestern fronts. Enhanced aviation and military reconnaissance was conducted. The central headquarters of the partisan movement was given the task of finding out the presence and location of reserves in the depths of the enemy troops, the course of regroupings and concentration of troops being transferred from France, Germany and other countries. And the results of this work are not slow to affect.

On May 11, 1943, the SMERSH counterintelligence department of the Bryansk Front, in its note to the Military Council of the front, reported on the data received by the front-line agents on the concentration of German troops in the Orel region. The note, in particular, said: "Our front-line agent, recruited by German intelligence, stationed in the Orel area at the headquarters of the 2nd Panzer Army, and transferred to our side, said that he received a task from the Germans after to settle down in one of the districts of Yelets-Efremovo or Malinovo, where to start collecting data on the movement of Red Army troops.

The same agent reported that the Totenkopf Panzer Division and SS units had recently arrived in Orel. Moreover, tanks and vehicles were carefully camouflaged. On May 4 of the same year, large motorized columns passed through Orel. On this day, residents of the city were forbidden to appear on the streets. In addition, railway trains loaded with ammunition, especially large-caliber shells, have recently arrived in the city of Orel almost daily.

Finally, on June 23, 1943, the following message was received from the Fourth Intelligence and Diversion Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR to the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army: "According to the information received, the Germans intend to launch an offensive on the Eastern Front from the city of Orel in the direction of the city of Yelets and further to the city of Penza. From the cities of Kursk and Kharkov, the offensive should develop to Voronezh, Belgorod and Malo-Arkhangelsk with the task of encircling and destroying the grouping of our troops, which are currently located on this sector of the front.

Nine armies were pulled into the Orel region by the enemy, of which half were tank armies. As part of the tank armies are tanks of the "tiger" type.

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On the sector of the front from the city of Velikiye Luki to the city of Dorogobuzh there are two armies, one of them is a tank army, with headquarters in the city of Vitebsk, allegedly not combat-ready.

The military base of the Eastern Front, according to the same data, is located in the city of Konotop. The source's information was gleaned from the conversations of German front-line intelligence officers.

A particularly important role was played by information from the intelligence officer of the Air Force Headquarters of the Central Front, Karl Krug. With the help of a scout, he was captured and transported to Moscow by a reconnaissance and sabotage detachment of P.G. Lopatin. During interrogations, Krug stated that from April 5, the Germans were concentrating troops in the Orel region, from where a major operation would be carried out. About 1,000 combat aircraft are concentrated on the Central Front. The headquarters of the Air Force of the Central Front is located in Orsha. Krug reported detailed data on 32 German airfields on this front (17 operating and 15 under construction and the number of aircraft on them). Partially, this information was confirmed by intelligence officer P.G. Aleksakhin, specially sent to Orel.

In addition, from the Medvedev detachment from the scout N.I. Kuznetsov received information that the Germans at Kursk were preparing to take revenge for the defeat at Stalingrad.

And on June 13, 1943, information was sent to the State Defense Committee that the Swedish envoy Asserson, in a confidential conversation with the 1st secretary of the British Embassy in Moscow, said: "According to reliable information, it is known that the Germans, with a force of up to 40 divisions, appointed . the offensive on the Oryol front.

On July 2, the Stavka informed the commanders of the Central and Voronezh fronts that the offensive should be expected from July 3 to 6. And finally, prisoners captured during the military reconnaissance operation specified that the offensive was scheduled for 3 o'clock in the morning on July 5. With the whole chain of data at their disposal, the Red Army High Command decided on a deliberate defense in order to wear down the enemy forces and then defeat him.

This time the German command had no doubts about success. Fascist propaganda took measures to raise the morale of the troops, promising an unconditional victory in the upcoming battles. As it turned out from subsequent intelligence reports, not 40, but 50 divisions, including 16 tank and motorized divisions, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars, 2700 tanks, over two thousand aircraft (and not one thousand). Almost 900 thousand soldiers and officers prepared for the battle. Such battles did not know the history of mankind.

By this time, the active army of the USSR had over 6.4 million people, more than 9,500 tanks, 2,200 field combat installations.

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rocket artillery, almost 8300 combat aircraft. A significant part of them were secretly brought to the places of the future battle. In general, quantitatively and qualitatively, the Soviet troops outnumbered the enemy. The Soviet Supreme High Command thus had everything necessary to resolutely and firmly take the strategic initiative into its own hands.

The overall leadership of the Soviet troops at the battle site was entrusted to Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov. He recalled: "While discussing the plan of action for our troops at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, we came to the conclusion that it is necessary to build a strong, in-depth defense in all the most important areas ..."?

According to G.K. Zhukov, it should be added that this time the command no longer doubted the accuracy of the data provided by intelligence. The fact is that earlier not all intelligence information was taken into account by the General Staff to the extent that it deserved it. If the data from the front-line intelligence about the concentration of the Nazi forces for the attack on Moscow (Plan "Typhoon") were taken into account in a timely manner and played a role in the defeat of the Germans near Moscow, then things were different with information about the advances of the enemy in the campaigns of 1942.

In 1941-1942, intelligence repeatedly reported to the High Command that with the collapse of the plans to capture Moscow and Leningrad, the southern one would become the main direction of the Nazi offensive. In one of the last reports of Schulze-Boysen ("Foreman"), transmitted to Moscow, it was said that in the spring of 1942 the enemy would rush to the Caucasus. The goal was to cut off the south from Russia, from the Caucasian oil, and in case of success, turn the front to the north - to Moscow. In order to hide the southern direction of the strike in the summer campaign of 1942, the Germans developed a special disinformation directive "Kremlin" and on its basis issued the "Order to attack Moscow", signed on May 29, 1942 by Field Marshal Kluge, commander of Army Group Center.

Demonstrative aerial photography of Moscow and its environs was carried out, plans of Moscow and cities on the way to the capital were copied and sent to the regiments. It was a very smart and thoughtful action, calculated on the fact that the stereotype of thinking will work, according to which the main thing for the Germans is revenge for the defeat near Moscow and for Hitler the capture of Moscow is seen as the shortest path to victory.

Foreign intelligence did a lot of work to reveal the real intentions of the enemy.

Data from Romania were compared that a path was being cleared through the country for several hundred German military trains heading to the south of Russia. Similar information has been received

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in March 1942 from representatives of Czech intelligence in London, and at the end of March - on the 23rd - from Sofia, from the Japanese military attaché Tatashi, who was informed by his German colleague that the main blow in the coming summer would be inflicted in the south with the task break through to Stalingrad and through Rostov to the North Caucasus, and from there to the Caspian Sea. The Germans were in dire need of oil and at the same time wanted to cut off the path to it from the Soviet Army.

In early April, this information was confirmed by reports from Istanbul and Bulgaria, then from contacts from Polish intelligence in London. At the same time, the London residency warned that the offensive should be expected in the second half of May. The residency from Stockholm specified that the offensive on the Southern Front would begin in the tenth of June.

Despite all this information, the High Command came to the conclusion that the main German offensive would be against Moscow. Marshal of the Soviet Union A. Vasilevsky frankly admitted the mistake, who wrote in his book "The Work of All Life": "Substantiated data from our intelligence about the preparation of the enemy's main attack in the south were not taken into account"<sup>3</sup>.

Underestimation of accurate intelligence data - this can be encountered in the practice of relations between the secret services and the leadership, not only in our country. This time, however, just as with the assessment of reports of the outbreak of war, which were received only at the last moment, the cost of error was very high. And although during the Battle of Stalingrad the Supreme High Command managed to inflict the gravest, historic defeat on the enemy, the losses were great. Breakthroughs to the Volga and the North Caucasus were eliminated with a huge effort. All this was taken into account on the eve of the Kursk-Belgorod battle.

"At this crucial moment," A. Vasilevsky wrote, "the Soviet command made special demands on the intelligence agencies. And I must say, she was on top and helped us well. No matter how hard the enemy tried to keep his offensive plans secret, no matter how much he diverted the attention of Soviet intelligence from the areas of concentration of his main strike groups, our intelligence managed not only to determine the general plan of the enemy for the summer period of 1943, the direction of strikes, the composition of strike groups and reserves, but also to set the time for the start of the fascist offensive."

Based on military intelligence data and on the testimonies of prisoners, our troops, without waiting for artillery preparation, got ahead of the enemy and themselves began counter-artificial preparation at 2 hours and 20 minutes. As G.K. Zhukov: "Everything around spun, spun, there was a terrible roar - the greatest battle began in the Kursk Bulge region. In this hellish "symphony" of sounds, the blows of a heavy

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artillery, explosions of aviation bombs, rockets M-31, "Katyusha" and the continuous rumble of aircraft engines.

The enemy troops were in a straight line no more than 20 km from our headquarters. We heard and felt a hurricane of fire, and involuntarily a terrible picture arose in our imagination at the initial bridgehead of the enemy, who suddenly fell under the hurricane blow of counter-barrage preparations. Taken by surprise, enemy soldiers and officers probably buried their noses in the ground, just to hide from the terrifying force of explosions of bombs, shells and mines...>?

During the unfolding battle, the plan of the Soviet command was successfully implemented. Having bled the enemy's shock groupings in a defensive battle and thus creating favorable conditions, the Red Army went over to a counteroffensive, and then to a general strategic offensive.

The Battle of Kursk in the period from July 5 to August 23, 1943 ended with the complete victory of the Red Army, which defeated 30 selected German divisions, including 7 tank divisions. These divisions

lost more than half of their personnel. An unprecedented tank battle on the Prokhorovka field near Kursk entered the history of world wars like a red line.

The troops of the Central (commander - General of the Army K.K. Rokossovsky) and Voronezh (commander - General of the Army N.F. Vatutin) fronts went on the offensive, and not on the defensive, as the German command expected, thereby breaking the German strategic initiative. Following them, the troops of the Steppe (commander - Colonel General I.S. Konev), Western (commander - Colonel General V.D. Sokolovsky), Bryansk (commander - Colonel General M.M. Popov) and South - Western (commander - General of the Army R.J. Malinovsky) fronts, having liberated the cities of Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov.

The Battle of Kursk marked the completion of a radical change in the course of the Great Patriotic War, which began in the Battle of the Volga. The first victorious salutes sounded in Moscow. The Red Army finally secured the strategic initiative for itself. The German command was forced to abandon the offensive strategy and go on the defensive on all fronts of the Great Patriotic War.

Now you can understand why Kim Philby, who lived in the Soviet Union in recent years and published his book "My Secret War" in 1980, was pleasantly excited when it came to the Battle of Kursk, the victory in which the Red Army meant expected, but those - now the undoubted, final victory of the Soviet Union and its allies over the brown plague, which has engulfed almost half of the globe.

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Information from London, well-coordinated work of foreign intelligence officers and those who participated in the partisan struggle helped win the greatest battle of all time, saved hundreds of thousands of lives of Soviet Warriors.

The text of the telegram about the deployment and redeployment of Soviet troops is given in abbreviated form, from the SVR archive.

Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. - M., 1970. - S. 440. Vasilevsky A.M. The work of a lifetime. - M., 1973. - S. 185.

There. - S. 316.

Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. - S. 458.

I ro sho m

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Messenger Gypsy - "Gypsy"

It is difficult to overestimate the importance of communication in intelligence. There is an opportunity to transfer "to whom it is necessary" with difficulty obtained information - good. No? Lost work done. The ancients knew this. Therefore, over the centuries, thousands of ingenious ways have been invented to deceive or better outwit their not-so-stupid opponents. Secret information was sent with the help of carrier pigeons, transported in the stomachs of special couriers, communicated to the addressee between the lines of an ordinary letter using invisible ink.

But as reconnaissance missions become more complex, the volume and weight of secret information (especially scientific and technical) increase, the help of carrier pigeons became clearly insufficient. "Cache operations" did not always help either, when secret materials or bundles of banknotes for an agent for some time were out of control of the intelligence officer who laid the cache. Radio communication, despite its constant improvement, is also sometimes



was far from ideal, since the broadcast could be tapped, and the transmitter could be taken direction. And deciphering ciphertext messages was not an insurmountable obstacle.

Under these conditions, the most preferred form of secret communication was the use of a messenger-courier. This gave the greatest effect, because only a person with his emotions and talents, courage and self-control, firmness and devotion to the idea is able to do for intelligence what could not be achieved in any other way. Today we will talk about a special intelligence courier that worked for Soviet foreign intelligence, exposing itself to great danger and risk. Her name was Kitty Harris.

She was born in London, in a family of immigrants from Russia. When she was eight years old, they moved to Canada. The shoemaker's father could not support a large family. Not even graduating from elementary school, in thirteen

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For 10 years, Kitty went to work in a tobacco factory. Fighting, bold, quick-tongued, black-eyed, she was a real "factory girl" and reminded her friends of the heroine of the opera "Carmen", also a worker in a tobacco factory. They gave her the nickname Gypsy - a gypsy girl, not suspecting that years later this nickname would become her combat pseudonym and be preserved in the annals of Soviet intelligence.

When news came from distant Russia about the revolution, that the Bolshevik Party had taken power there under the slogans "Factories for the workers, land for the peasants, peace for the peoples," she followed her comrades into the revolutionary movement.

Living in Canada and then moving to the United States, Kitty Harris was actively involved in trade union work, and after becoming a member of the Communist Party, in party work. In 1928-1929, on the instructions of the Comintern, she and her husband, the American communist E. Browder, were in Shanghai as a liaison for the Pacific Trade Union Center.

The trade union movement in the countries of Southeast Asia was just in its infancy, and the colonial authorities persecuted the activists in every possible way, up to and including physical reprisals against them. Kitty put her life in danger more than once by transporting documents, money to support young local unions, and party literature to Hong Kong, Batavia, Manila, and other Pacific Rim cities. Here, meeting with the underground, she received the first skills of illegal activity.

In 1929, Kitty returned to New York, and in 1931, the Soviet intelligence officer Eingorn was involved in intelligence work. By this time, she had already separated from her husband. Her first destination was Germany, where she happened to work with such experienced intelligence officers as Berman, Parparov, Zarubin and others (in total, her file lists over forty operational officers and twenty-four agents with whom she worked for sixteen years).

She was constantly transporting mail from place to place, the entry of which, God forbid, into the wrong hands, inevitably entailed fatal consequences. And such a danger to the "letter carrier" - intelligence officer threatened quite often. Here are some episodes from the troubled everyday life of Kitty Harris.

In the autumn of 1935, Kitty, with an American passport in a false name, crossed from Germany to the French border in Strasbourg. A young border guard, who had just been admiring the slender figure of a youthful American woman, with a polite smile asked the lady for a passport. Kitty calmly handed the document to the customs officer and, placing the suitcase on the table, began to straighten a curl that had slipped out from under her hat. The border guard examined her passport for a suspiciously long time, glancing first at the owner of the document, then at the entries made in it.

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"Is something wrong, sir officer?" asked Kitty, cold from the impending danger. She was carrying from Germany to the Paris residency drawings of a generator for producing synthesized gasoline from coal and a large amount of money in American dollars. From Paris, the materials were to be sent by diplomatic mail to Moscow.

"On the contrary, my dear lady. Everything is the best! But your native Chicago is out of luck. He has clearly lost his way. I still remember from school that it is located in the state of Illinois, but for some reason it is designated in the state of Indiana ...

A fraction of a second passed, and, breaking into a smile, Kitty cooed softly:

"That's right, officer. Your teacher may be proud of you. But even she doesn't have to remember that we have several Chicagos in the States," Kitty answered at random. And one of them is my own. The one in Indiana, by the way.

The trained eye of the customs officer flashed a benevolent cunning:

"It's my birthday today, dear lady, and I'm not going to argue with you. Please take your false passport and return it to those who sold it to you. And let them return your money for sure... Don't forget?

In Moscow, it took a long time to find out why Kitty's "home" city ended up in the wrong place at all.

The situation in Germany and around it in those years was very alarming. Under these conditions, Kitty crossed the borders of neighboring states many times, transporting intelligence information and documents. Courier Kitty used every means of camouflage to disguise her "mail" without arousing the suspicions of the customs officers and the police. Her shabby, nondescript suitcase with a double bottom, pasted over with advertising for cheap hotels, should not have caused any emotions in anyone. And did not call - for the time being.

A few years before the Nazi takeover of Czechoslovakia, Kitty traveled to Prague to meet with a valuable source of Soviet foreign intelligence. The agent lived outside the city, and Kitty had no problems with checking on the route. I traveled by tram for a long time, walked for a while, then by bus and again on foot. And all this time she noticed that someone was accompanying her. The woman quickened her pace and, going into one of the nearest stores, asked the owner:

"A man is following me. I am a decent woman. I am returning from Carlsbad, my husband and children are waiting for me at home, and this suspicious type ... I am afraid of him. Help me get rid of it.

- Frau, you got to me very well. My butcher shop has a second exit on the next street. This door, please. And if this scoundrel comes here, I'll talk to him properly...

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The butcher, apparently, kept his word, and Kitty got rid of the suspicious pursuer. She hailed a taxi and, with frequent transfers, made it safely to her apartment.

agent.

During her work for the Soviet foreign intelligence, Kitty came to Moscow several times to relax at the resort and replenish her knowledge in the intelligence trade. She was taught photography and radio engineering. By the way, Kitty Harris was taught the art of radio communication by a famous Soviet illegal spy, who became famous many years later under the name of Colonel Rudolf Ivanovich Abel. Kitty, of course, knew him then under a completely different name. But objective data for further serious study was not enough. Science was given to her with great difficulty: she could hardly perform mathematical calculations. And even though Kitty

fluent in four European languages, her knowledge of the sciences left much to be desired. Kitty had only the elementary education that the daughter of a simple shoemaker could get in Canada.

In addition to France and Czechoslovakia, she had to travel to Denmark and Sweden, where she met with valuable agents. One of them was Anton Wollweber, a veteran of the German revolutionary movement, a former submariner, one of the leaders of the Kiel uprising of German sailors in November 1918. After Hitler came to power, Wollweber was forced to leave for Scandinavia. He managed to create a network of agents in the countries of the Baltic Sea basin in case of war with Nazi Germany.

Not only the duties of a messenger were performed by Kitty in Germany. She worked with such a source of information in the line of scientific and technical intelligence as Nasledstvo, an employee of the Bamag company. A simple enumeration of the materials received from him at the first stage of the work testifies to their significance: projects of factory installations for the production of various types of saltpeter, fats, etc.

From time to time, the question arose at the Center of how best and more productively to use the personal qualities and characteristics of Kitty's life experience. It won't be her whole life to be a courier and spend time on the road, changing from train to train, from plane to plane, they argued at the Lubyanka.

"Maybe we'll start gradually accustoming our "Gypsy" to a settled way of life? - the head of foreign intelligence reasoned, talking with the head of the department of Anglo-American countries.

Kitty Harris was sent to an illegal Parisian residency, where for some time, along with the well-known intelligence officer Dmitry Bystroletov, she worked under the guidance of Theodor Malley. Then, in connection with the transfer of Mally to London, Kitty Harris also moves there.

Here comes the "finest hour" of her intelligence activities. The well-known intelligence officer Arnold Deutsch became its leader in London.

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Created in the mid-1930s in London, the famous "Cambridge Five" of Soviet foreign intelligence needed reliable communications. "Gypsy Girl" was the kind of person who could successfully combine both the role of the hostess of a secret apartment and the role of a connected traveler.

A little time passed, and the resident of Soviet intelligence in London began to tell each of the members of the "five" the magic three words: "Communication through Gypsy".

Kitty Harris rented a comfortable, "middle-bourgeois" apartment in the city center for a single woman and, without arousing any suspicion from the neighbors and the police, began dating "handsome, respectable young men." More often than others, Donald McLean began to visit Kitty Harris. Donald worked at the British Foreign Office and every time he left work, he took with him secret materials in a voluminous briefcase on the day of their subsequent transfer to Moscow. Donald went to Kitty's apartment, and the two of them photographed the documents they brought on film. In the morning, Donald returned the documents to their place, and Kigty secretly met with the resident and handed him the undeveloped film in a cassette.

It is clear that McLean did not always succeed in getting secret documents out of the ministry without hindrance. Then the procedure for obtaining information changed somewhat. Donald read the required document in his office, memorized its main provisions, and in the evening, coming to Kitty's "for a cup of tea", retelling its content. Soviet morning

the resident could not reproach either Donald or Kitty for anything. They both had excellent memory...

Playing the role of lovers, young people very soon became so carried away by her that the operational legend became a romantic reality.

When the close connection between Donald and Kitty was reported to the head of foreign intelligence, he remarked:

- Why not? And thank God! It won't hurt our business. And what do you think?

As they say, everything has its beginning and, of course, its end. Donald's romance with Kitty ended literally on the eve of World War II. Donald met an American in Paris, whom he married. By this time, the materials transferred by McLean to Soviet foreign intelligence, mainly through "Gypsy", amounted to about 40 boxes in the archive of Soviet intelligence, each of which contained approximately 300-350 pages of highly secret documentation.

June 22, 1941 "Gypsy" met in Moscow. On the same day, she wrote a personal message to the head of intelligence. Here are the lines from this emotional document: "I demand immediate involvement in my work. I can go to the front as a radio operator, I can

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to sew tunics for soldiers, and finally, having extensive experience in illegal work, I am not afraid to go behind enemy lines."

The intelligence leadership immediately considered the application of Kitty Harris, and the verdict was laconic: "People like Gypsy should not be scattered. This is the golden fund of Soviet intelligence ... "

Already in November 1941, a Soviet oil tanker headed from Vladivostok to San Francisco. There was only one woman on board, Kitty Harris. She sailed to Mexico, and it was possible to get to this country only from the USA. Before the Japanese attack on the US naval base at Pearl Harbor, there were literally a few hours left. War was on the doorstep. But the journey went smoothly.

Mexico City greeted Gypsy Girl with 30-degree heat, car fumes, and an exorbitant amount of operational work. A courier, a cryptographer, an operative and dozens of other duties were assigned to her by the resident. There was no other way out. He himself was spinning in business, like a squirrel in a wheel. Kitty worked day and night. It was at night, cool hours, that the Soviet intelligence officer met with a prominent Mexican politician who sympathized with the Soviet Union and its heroic struggle against Nazism. Kitty received political and intelligence information from him and told him about the state of affairs on the Soviet-German front. In the morning, Kitty went back to work, and her nighttime interlocutor asked for the floor in the National Congress and called on the people of Mexico to render all possible assistance to the Soviet Union.

Wear and tear, the harsh tropical climate of the highlands did their job. Kitty began to get sick, and eventually the resident raised the question of her return to the Soviet Union before the Center. The Center agreed, and in July 1946 Moscow greeted the heroic "Gypsy Girl" with bouquets of flowers and hugs from friends and colleagues at work. Her first words in broken Russian were: "How can I arrange for me to become a citizen of the USSR?"

Although by that time Kitty had already been a citizen of the Soviet Union for nine years - since December 1937, the documents about this were lost somewhere, and she had to reapply to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for admission to Soviet citizenship. She became a Soviet citizen again only in June 1947.

She was sent to permanent residence from Moscow to Riga, where she lived for several years. Unfortunately, poor knowledge of Russian (only at the everyday level) and complete ignorance of the Latvian language did not allow her to gain a foothold in teaching (seminars in spoken English). It is possible that the reason for this was also the fact that she did not find a common language with colleagues, neighbors and acquaintances. Some considered her an "undesirable foreign

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Koy", others, especially from among the nationalists, are too pro-Soviet.

Indeed, after many years of a turbulent life full of dangers, having found herself in a quiet bourgeois environment, Kitty had difficulty getting used to a new way of life, in disputes she fiercely defended the socialist system, the policy of the party, demanded that she be allowed to return to active work. otherwise threatened to "apply to the Central Committee".

Apparently, someone did not like her persistence, and at the end of 1951 she was arrested. Unfortunately, the intelligence leadership, which by that time had changed several times, did not come out in its defense. No traditional accusations of either espionage or treason could be brought against Rodineya, and for about two years she was kept first in prison and then in a prison hospital as a "socially dangerous element" under Art. 7-35 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR.

In 1953 this article was repealed. But the release did not follow immediately - only after a direct indication of her account by G.M. Malenkov and N.S. Khrushchev on the letter of the Minister of Internal Affairs Kruglov addressed to them.

Since 1954, Kitty Harris lived in Gorky, where she was provided with an interesting job, a good apartment and a decent pension, annual vouchers to sanatoriums and rest homes.

Years, decades passed. Kitty Harris has been gone for a long time. The path full of difficult trials ended in 1966. A kind and grateful memory of the modest worker of the "front line" remained. During the funeral, an honor guard stood at the coffin of Harris, and the wreath was inscribed: "To the glorious patriot of the Motherland from comrades at work."

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## Behind the Scenes of Operation Overlord

One of the most acute problems during the Second World War was the question of opening a second front in Europe by the allies of the USSR.

What considerations forced Britain and the United States, despite their repeated promises, to postpone the landing of their troops on the European continent? Many spectacular films have been made about Operation Overlord, after watching which the current generations, especially in the West, are almost convinced that the real liberation of Europe from the Nazi occupation became possible only thanks to the landing of the Allies in Normandy on June 6, 1944. But before that, the Red Army, for three years, actually alone waged a titanic struggle against the Nazi invasion. And all this time, the leadership of the country, the General Staff had to soberly assess the situation, no matter how dramatic it may become, and firmly know to what extent and what real and much-needed help from the allies can be counted on for our country.

Answers to these questions were to be given by Soviet foreign intelligence, all of whose work was subordinated to the solution of the main task - to provide the State Defense Committee with reliable information in a timely manner and thereby help to withstand and defeat the aggressor.

The intelligence leadership pinned its main hopes on the London residency, which was weakened by the repressions of 1937-1938. From the autumn of 1938 to March 1940, only one operational worker remained in London - the assistant to the resident Anatoly Veniaminovich Gorsky. In the NKVD, he began working in 1928 in the Special Department of the Economic Administration of the GPU. IN

In 1936 he was transferred to foreign intelligence and sent to operational work in the London residency. Remaining the only representative

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intelligence, A.V. Gorsky kept in touch with 14 valuable agents, including the well-known "Cambridge Five". He had to combine hard work with agents with the work of a translator and analyst, cryptographer, typist and photographer, and a number of other duties.

In February 1940, at the direction of Beria, the residency in London was closed, and A.V. Gorsky was recalled to Moscow. The reason for this was the far-fetched conclusions of some employees of the Center that all agents were known to former intelligence officers exposed as "foreign spies", and therefore the information received from them should be considered as a disinformation action of the British.

Upon arrival in Moscow, A.V. Gorsky was able to convincingly prove the inconsistency of the suspicions regarding the agents who were in touch with him. The reliability of the information received from the agents was confirmed by the development of events in the world, which was drawn into the Second World War.

In November 1940, A.V. Gorsky was sent to London as a resident, having received an agreement to work with agents who were in touch with him. In December 1940, Gorsky re-established contact with Kim Philby, Donald McLean and Anthony Blunt, who had returned from France, as well as with Guy Burgess and John Cairncross. Meetings with these and other agents convinced Gorsky that they were not only reliable people, but that many of them had expanded opportunities for obtaining valuable information, as they say, first-hand.

After Gorsky's arrival in London, the Center began to regularly receive documentary information revealing the contents of the correspondence between the British Foreign Office and its embassies in Moscow, Washington, Canada, Turkey, Iran, Japan and other countries, weekly intelligence digests (SIS), materials from meetings of the military cabinet, information about British actions in the Balkans and the Middle East, about the counterintelligence situation around the Soviet embassy and on other issues.

It is not difficult to imagine the regime in which Gorsky had to work, given that almost daily he had to hold meetings with two or three agents, to have time to process the information received in order to send it to Moscow. Most of the information, in view of its importance, was reported to the GKO to Stalin, Molotov and Beria.

Soon, the Center sent two operatives to help Gorsky: Vladimir Borisovich Barkovsky and Pavel Dmitrievich Yerzin. Barkovsky was initially focused on obtaining information on scientific and technical issues and, above all, on scientific and applied work in the field of creating nuclear

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th weapon. His selfless work was repeatedly marked by state awards of the USSR, and in 1996 he was awarded the high title of Hero of Russia. P.D. Erzin was responsible for ensuring the security of the Soviet embassy.

In September 1941, Boris Mikhailovich Kreshin arrived in London, who, after entering the situation and studying the city, took over part of the agents from Gorsky, including from the summer of 1942 began working with Kim Philby.

On the eve of the German attack on the USSR, on May 10, 1941, Hitler's deputy for the party, Rudolf Hess, flew to England, and on May 14, primary information received from Kim Philby about such an extraordinary "visit" was received from London. At the request of the Philby Center by May 18

obtained additional information that Hess proposed to the British not to interfere with Germany to win a quick victory over the Soviet Union, but to change the government themselves, putting pro-German figures at the helm instead of Churchill. If Hitler's proposals are accepted and, accordingly, Germany's victory in the war with the USSR, England and the USA will take advantage of the fruits of this deal. (It is characteristic that the British still categorically object to the declassification until 2016 of documents relating to contacts with Hess, who was interned by them.) A little over 40 days after Hess's flight, Hitler attacked the USSR. The governments of Britain and the United States came out in support of the struggle of the Soviet people and declared that they would provide our country with all possible assistance.

To develop this position, on July 18, 1941, Stalin, in his letter to Churchill, raised the question of opening a second front in Europe. From that moment on, the question of a second front became one of the most important in inter-allied relations until its opening in 1944.

Stalin was not surprised by Churchill's negative attitude towards his proposal. Such a position of the British government was due to the obvious lack of confidence of the British ruling circles in the ability of the Soviet Union to resist the powerful offensive of the Nazi troops.

Churchill was nervous. The fall of France and Hitler's complete control over most of the European continent could not but shake the British. Hitler threatened Operation Sea Lion, a landing in England. On the other hand, British intelligence predicted a Russian defeat. The thoughts of the London government turned to the prospect of an imminent defeat of the USSR and the measures of England in this regard. Soviet intelligence intercepted and reported to Stalin and Molotov Eden's telegram to his ambassador in Moscow, Cripps, dated June 30, 1941. It recommended that the question of opening British consulates in Baku, Astrakhan, Tbilisi and Novosibirsk be immediately raised with the Soviet government. It was meant

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to organize urgent reconnaissance work there and, if necessary, prepare sabotage at Soviet military facilities so that the Germans do not get them.

On August 23, 1941, intelligence sent Stalin the assessments received from London of the then situation of the former British Prime Minister Lloyd George in 1916-1922. The report of Lloyd George's confidential conversation reads as follows: "By pulling almost the entire German army onto itself, the USSR, like Russia in the last war, again saves England. England is essentially doing nothing to help the USSR. It should have sent as many of its fighters as possible to the USSR and diverted American deliveries to the USSR. He was extremely disappointed with the results of Churchill's meeting with Roosevelt. Their joint declaration is a repetition of all long-known truths. The British are doing nothing to form a western land front on the Continent. Meanwhile, even if the attempts to create a second front were not successful, they would still help to ease the pressure on the Red Army.

In his opinion, the Ukraine will be lost, after which the Germans will launch an offensive through Turkey in the fall to the Caucasus to seize the oil fields. The outcome of the entire war now depends on the USSR."

On September 4, 1941, the British ambassador to the USSR, Cripps, sent a cipher telegram to his Foreign Ministry about Stalin's response to Churchill's message received through the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Vyshinsky, with his comments: "Characterizing the situation created as a result of our inability to do something or to divert the German troops from the eastern front, the document shows that if we do not now, at this last moment, make a superhuman effort, all the value of the Russian front will be lost to us, if not forever, then at least for a long period .

Unfortunately, we obviously regard the Russo-German war as a factor for which we are not responsible. We treat it like a war in which we would like to somehow

be able to Russians without much risk to our positions. I have already tried to draw your attention to how essential it would be to do everything in our power to help Russia if we want to maintain the effectiveness of this front. I'm afraid it's almost too late to help now if we don't do our best to make one last attempt to save the day. From Stalin's answer it will be clear to you how much the situation with the supply of military materials has worsened over the past three weeks. The task of supplying the necessary equipment has now become much more difficult both in terms of volume and difficulties. If we intend to do anything effective at all, then the question of very large and immediate assistance must be considered.

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a third now, because otherwise I will have doubts whether it is worth doing anything at all in this direction.

I think that given the known immediate military assistance and the supply of a large amount of equipment, the war here can still be continued, which will enable our country to avoid the fiercest battles this winter.

On September 5, 1941, Churchill urgently sent a telegram to Kripis, in which he would set out what position he should take regarding the opening of a second front: "... if any successful sabotage on the French, Dutch or Belgian shores, we would go for it even if we had to pay the highest price for it. All our generals are convinced that the only result will be a heavy defeat for us ... Everything that we have done or are doing cannot affect the outcome of the struggle on the eastern front ... Conditions are now much worse ... and our military power is weaker. The situation in the West would be completely different if there were now a French front... Everything that we are doing or could do cannot have any effect on the colossal battle taking place on the Russian front. However, we can still take appropriate measures to prepare for the 1942 campaign.

Cripps' telegrams and Churchill's reply to him were reported by intelligence to Stalin and Molotov.

In October 1941, the London residency informed the Center that Lord Beaverbrook, Minister of Supply, who was at the Moscow Conference in October with Roosevelt's representative Harriman, had, on his return to London, submitted to the War Cabinet a report on the results of the Three-Power Conference in Moscow. In this report, Beaverbrook spoke in favor of the immediate opening of a second front by the British. However, none of the cabinet members was going to support Beaverbrook's proposal, since Churchill categorically objected to this. Referring to a conversation with Lord Hankey, Treasurer General of the British Treasury, our source said that a serious political crisis was brewing in the government, mainly because of Churchill's negative attitude towards the question of opening a second front.

According to the data received, not only the Conservative cabinet objected to the proposals of Beaverbrook, but also the Laborites.

On November 7, 1941, intelligence sent to the State Defense Committee the full text of the Beaverbrook memorandum "Aid to Russia" dated October 19, 1941, sent by the Defense Committee under the War Cabinet to ministers for review: "Since the start of the German campaign against Russia, our military leaders have consistently shown their disinclination to conduct any offensive operations. Our progress in Persia was insignificant

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and a preventive operation, in which four times fewer troops participated on our side than on the Russian side.

The only other actions we took were the bombing of West Germany and the fighter air raids on French territory, which did not bring



no help from Russia and did not have any effect on the position of Germany in the present crisis, although in carrying out these operations we lost many good pilots. Our strategy is still based on the principle of protracted war and completely blind to the demands and possibilities of the moment. So far no attempt has been made to take into account the new factor introduced by the Russian resistance.

Today there is only one problem - how to help Russia. Nevertheless, our Chiefs of Staff are content to argue that nothing can be done on this matter. They only talk about difficulties, but do not make any suggestions to overcome them. The assertion that we can do nothing for Russia is nonsense. Russian resistance gives us new opportunities. It probably stripped Western Europe of German troops and at the moment stopped the aggressive actions of the Axis countries in other theaters of possible military operations. It opened up 2,000 miles of coastline for British landings.

However, the Germans continue to transfer their divisions to the east with impunity. Insurrections in occupied countries are considered premature and even condemned if they break out because we are not prepared to seize the opportunities they present.

If we do not help the Russians now, then Russia may become exhausted in the struggle and Hitler, finally freed from his worries in the east, will concentrate against us in the west.

all your strength.

The Germans will not wait until we are ready. It would be recklessness on our part to wait now, and we must strike before it is too late."

The defeat of the Germans near Moscow followed in December 1941. In the same month, the Japanese attacked the United States. This began to change the situation. On the one hand, Japanese pressure in the Far East was decreasing. The base for coordinating the actions of the allies against Berlin and Tokyo was strengthened. Moreover, on February 4, 1942, the London residency sent a message stating that, according to reliable data received by the British counterintelligence from the German General Staff, the Russian offensive near Moscow was a complete surprise for the Germans and the top generals of the Wehrmacht believe that Russia is not completely defeated. "The invasion of Great Britain has been postponed indefinitely and may not take place at all."

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These changes were caught by the allies themselves. After the defeat of the Germans near Moscow, British Ambassador Cripps, in a conversation with the Swedish envoy, said: "Frankly speaking, Russia alone, without any help, is successfully fighting the Germans. Our help to her is insignificant. They built their industry 10 times faster than we did."

But the war was just unfolding. With great difficulty, part of the Soviet industry was relocated to the Urals and Siberia. It was not necessary to rule out Japanese attacks. The second front was very necessary. And under these conditions, the first swallow appeared.

A delegation headed by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov to negotiate the opening of a second front. As a result of great efforts, it was possible to achieve the signing first of the Soviet-American communiqué, which stated that "a complete agreement was reached regarding the urgent tasks of creating a second front in Europe in 1942." Then the British government was forced to join this statement and repeated exactly this wording in the Soviet-British communiqué.

Foreign intelligence reported to the country's leadership that the actual position of the United States on the issue of opening a second front in Europe differs from Roosevelt's statements at meetings with Soviet representatives. On July 8, 1942, she reported to the USSR State Defense Committee a copy of the secret report of the head of the US Strategic Services Directorate

(later transformed into the CIA) Donovan at a meeting of employees of the American embassy in England, where he spoke with explanations of the US position on the issue of opening a second front in Europe. "Opening a second front on the Continent this summer," said Donovan, "is militarily inexpedient." He justified this by the alleged lack of reserves and insufficient time for their preparation. At the same time, he drew attention to the fact that Japan kept up to 30 divisions on the border with the USSR and, possibly, "a Japanese attack on the USSR will be carried out before the end of summer." It was supposed to see what would happen, and then decide on the provision of military assistance to the USSR.

On July 12, 1942, foreign intelligence reported to the country's leadership data on the results of the negotiations between Churchill and Roosevelt in Washington. The report stated that Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed that the main operations of the United States and Britain against the Axis countries would be carried out in North Africa. "Until the situation here is resolved in favor of the British and Americans, the opening of a second front is out of the question," noted the secret decision taken by the leaders of England and the United States at this meeting. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was engaged in intense fighting in the region of Stalingrad and the Caucasus.

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Given the importance of the issue, the Center instructed the London residency to probe the positions of various political circles and statesmen of Great Britain. On July 23, 1942, a detailed message was received. It was disappointing. It said that lately no one who holds any official post in England has expressed hopes for the opening of a second front in 1942. Even those who had previously spoken in favor of such an intention began to doubt the possibility of its implementation.

Those who previously spoke out against the second front, considering it untimely (the mistress of the political salon Lady Halifax, the Minister of Information Brendan Bracken and others), now declare that the issue has already been resolved and in 1942 the second front will not be opened.

The British, connected with US military circles, believed that the majority of the American commanding staff not only never thought of a second front in 1942, but did not even consider its implementation possible. General Marshall himself never really thought about opening a second front, but simply considered the mention of it as a tactic that would help pin down the largest possible number of German troops in Western Europe.

The acting head of the American section of the British Ministry of Information, Frank Darvell, assured that the opening of a second front this year was "impossible and wrong" and it would not be created until the spring of 1943. Darvell believed that even with the worst outcome for the Russians, for example, a retreat to the Urals, they - the Russians - would still "exist", even with one army group instead of three, which would allow them to pull over a sufficient number of German troops and provide those most successful invasion allies to the continent.

Lord Mountbatten, the head of the British "commandos", spoke out resolutely not only against the opening of a second front before the spring of 1943, but also against the organization of large-scale raids on the coast of the continent during the remaining time.

Many high-ranking British were of the opinion that there was no point in thinking about a second front before at least a million Americans had been transferred to England. While their total number did not exceed 200 thousand people.

On July 24, 1942, an agent of the "Cambridge Five" informed that on July 15 Churchill convened a closed conference of editors of major opposition newspapers, during which he stated: "I know that the Russians would like to see us in France, and we ourselves wanted would be there. However, the mere fact that Russians are suffering does not mean that we should suffer too. We must make our opponent suffer."

The British Ministry of Information sent out a secret circular to the newspaper editors, in which the newspapers were asked to be guided for the future by the fact that the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942 does not oblige Great Britain to open a second front that year.

On the same day, 24 July, the London Station received a report of a conversation between a source and Lord Beaverbrook. Beaverbrook, as already mentioned, was in favor of opening a second front as soon as possible. In particular, he emphasized that although the creation of a second front in Europe was not the "true intention of the British cabinet", some of its members, such as Eden, spoke in favor of opening it and believed that Anglo-Soviet cooperation should be to develop in every possible way. Cranborne, Secretary of State for the Colonies and leader of the House of Lords, was a supporter of the same policy, according to Beaverbrook, although they did not openly express their views. Beaverbrook saw the explanation for the fact that most of the British politicians and members of its government cabinet are opposed to the opening of a second front in the fact that "only a few want to destroy a strong German state on the continent. Most of them are not smart enough to understand their own interest." Beaverbrook himself considered it his task to do everything possible to persuade the British government to open a second front as soon as possible. He therefore rejected Churchill's offer to take the post of Minister in the War Cabinet, setting as a condition of his consent a change in the government's attitude towards the question of opening a second front.

At the same time, foreign intelligence informed the country's leadership that the democratic public in England and the United States, a number of prominent political figures in the West were in favor of opening a second front in Europe and condemned the actions of their governments to delay the adoption of such a decision.

Thus, the Soviet leadership was well informed about the situation around the issue of opening a second front in Europe. This gave him the opportunity to purposefully pursue his foreign policy line. And although he was aware that the leaders of England and the USA had decided in 1942 not to open a second front, he, taking into account public opinion in favor of a second front, continued persistent diplomatic efforts to put pressure on the ruling circles of England and the USA in favor of a decision about the early start of hostilities by the allied armies on the west coast of France.

On July 18, 1942, Churchill sent a message to Stalin informing the Soviet government for the first time of the Allied refusal to open a second front in 1942.

In a reply message to Churchill dated July 23, Stalin noted: "Based on the situation that has arisen on the Soviet-German front

those, I must state in the most categorical manner that the Soviet government cannot reconcile itself to postponing the organization of a second front in Europe until 1943.

The refusal of the governments of England and the United States of their obligations caused a wide wave of protest. Under these conditions, Churchill decided to personally go to Moscow and explain himself to the Soviet government. He was accompanied by A. Harriman, who represented the President of the United States. On August 12, in a conversation with Stalin, Churchill confirmed that he considered it impossible to open a second front in Europe in 1942. He, however, promised to do so in the spring of 1943. This was a deliberately false statement. A few months later, intelligence received information that Churchill and Roosevelt had agreed not to open a second front in Europe in 1943 either. A. Harriman, on behalf of President Roosevelt, fully supported Churchill. Giving an assessment of Churchill's position, Stalin telegraphed the USSR ambassador in London: "We all have the impression in Moscow that Churchill is heading for the defeat of the USSR in order to later come to an agreement with Hitler's or Brunning's Germany at the expense of our country."

In January 1943, the Anglo-American Conference took place in Casablanca. Roosevelt and Churchill took part in it. Behind the backs of the Soviet Union, they agreed that the main task for 1943 was the invasion of Sicily. The question of the landing of allied troops in France was therefore postponed until 1944. The conference participants tried to hide from the Soviet government a new violation of their obligations. Their joint message to Stalin on the results of the conference was written in general terms and did not mention the dates of specific operations. In response to the request of the Soviet government to clarify information about the decisions taken in Casablanca, Churchill, in agreement with Roosevelt, in a message to Stalin dated February 9, 1943, reported deliberately false information about the timing of the invasion of the Anglo-American forces on the European continent - August-September 1943 of the year.

However, this time too, foreign intelligence had accurate data. On April 24, 1943, information was received from New York about the results of negotiations between British Foreign Minister Eden and the US government, which took place in Washington. During these negotiations, Roosevelt informed the British Minister that the Chiefs of Staff objected to the opening of a second front in Europe in 1943. On May 5, the London residency forwarded to the Center the information received from the British Air Ministry about the military strategic plan of England for 1943. It provided for the expulsion of German-Italian troops from Tunisia, the occupation of Sicily, Sardinia, Rhodes and other Mediterranean islands, the landing of allied troops in Italy and, if possible, the creation of a bridgehead in the Cherbourg region (Northern France). Main

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ground operations against Germany were supposed to be deployed in 1944.

Therefore, it was not a surprise for the Soviet leadership when, at the talks between Churchill and Roosevelt held in Washington on May 11-19, 1943, it was decided to postpone the opening of the second front in France until May 1944, of which the Allies officially informed the Soviet Union. Stalin on June 11, 1943, on behalf of the Soviet government, in a message to the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, protested against the new violation by the United States and Britain of their obligations. He declared that the government of the USSR "does not find it possible to join such a decision, which, moreover, was adopted without its participation and without an attempt to jointly discuss this most important issue and which could have grave consequences for the further course of the war."

In September 1943, the country's leadership was informed about the results of the conference of the leaders of England and the United States, held in the second half of August 1943 in the Canadian city of Quebec, at which their military-political plans for the end of 1943-1944 were agreed upon. The report noted that the leaders of the allied countries decided "the main operations on the European continent by invading the islands of Great Britain to begin on May 1, 1944, provided that the Russians do not achieve independent success before that. The code name for Operation Overlord.

And what if the Russians "succeed on their own"? What then? In this case, the report said, the Allies developed a special Rankin plan. It provided for the landing of Anglo-American troops in France, without waiting for the completion of preparations for Operation Overlord. At a conference in Quebec, according to Soviet intelligence, US President Roosevelt said: "The troops of the United Nations must be ready to reach Berlin no later than the Russians."

The question of opening a second front in Europe was sharply discussed at a meeting of the heads of government of the USSR, England and the United States, in Tehran in November 1943. Initially, Churchill did not want to bring this issue up for discussion at the Tehran Conference. He hoped to delay the Allied landings in France and to concentrate Allied military efforts in the Mediterranean, southern and northern Italy and the Balkans in order to cut off Soviet troops from Austria and prevent them from entering the Balkans. At the Tehran Conference, he intended to confine himself to referring to the decision of the Quebec meeting.

The leadership of the country was promptly informed about these plans by Churchill, which allowed the Soviet delegation at the conference to take a tough stance from the very beginning. When Churchill made it clear that he did not consider it necessary to discuss the question of an Allied landing in France, Stalin declared that in such a case a meeting of

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drivers of the three countries does not make sense and the Soviet delegation has nothing to do on it. This caused confusion among the allies. Roosevelt understood the critical nature of the situation and persuaded Churchill to give the Russians an unequivocal answer. As a result, a tripartite agreement was fixed in Tehran that the invasion of France by Anglo-American troops would take place in May 1944.

The British plan for military operations in the eastern Mediterranean was rejected, despite repeated attempts by British diplomacy to push it through in one form or another. At one of the last plenary sessions of the Tehran Conference, in the presence of Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff of Great Britain, General Alan Brooke, read out to the audience the unanimous decision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the launch of Operation Overlord would take place within May 1944 and that it will be supported by an operation in southern France, the extent of which will depend on the availability of landing craft among the Allies.

It was a major victory for Soviet diplomacy. Foreign intelligence played an important role in this.

The governments of England and the United States also assumed obligations regarding the size of the invasion army, defining it at 35 divisions. At the insistence of the Soviet delegation, the leaders of the allied states agreed to a speedy resolution of the issue of the commander-in-chief of Operation Overlord in order to be able to begin its preparations in the near future.

In a declaration issued after the Tehran Conference, the leaders of the three Powers declared that they had agreed on plans for the annihilation of the German armed forces and "come to full agreement as to the scope and timing of the operations to be undertaken from east, west and south".

"... No force in the world," declared the authors of the declaration, "can prevent us from destroying the German armies on land, their submarines at sea, and destroying their military factories from the air."

However, even after the adoption by the heads of the allied states in Tehran of the decision on the timing of the opening of the second front, Churchill did everything possible to frustrate the implementation of this decision. From reliable sources in England, information was received that during the preparations for the landing of the Allies in France, Churchill and the commander-in-chief of the British forces in the Mediterranean basin, General Wilson, persistently tried to convince Roosevelt and the chiefs of staff of the American armed forces to abandon this operation and send troops intended for its implementation, for landing in the Trieste region for further advance into Austria, in order to be there before the Red Army. Roosevelt, however, refused to change the plans agreed at the Tehran Conference.

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rents. Among other things, he knew that Churchill's "Balkan" strategy was not only anti-Soviet, but also anti-American and aimed at establishing British dominance in South-Eastern Europe.

Churchill did not leave his plans even during Operation Overlord, when the fighting was already going on in France. Thus, a secret telegram became known to Soviet intelligence,

Sent by Churchill to Roosevelt at the beginning of October 1944, in which he proposed to amend the plans for sending American military reinforcements to Europe and send them instead of France to Italy.

Roosevelt replied to Churchill that neither he nor the chiefs of staff of the American armed forces could agree to this proposal. He justified his refusal by the fact that in winter conditions it would still not be possible to defeat the German army of Kesselring in Italy, even if additional contingents of troops were sent there. At the same time, as Roosevelt pointed out, Eisenhower had already prepared a breakthrough for the German front and needed

fresh strength.

Roosevelt himself hurried to Europe to establish the American military presence there. Not without irony, he pointed out in a reply telegram to Churchill that the advance of the Russians in the Balkans and towards Austria would militarily have a much greater effect on the Germans in Italy than all the measures of the Allies on the Italian front.

They understood that the United States and Great Britain "overstayed" all the deadlines and were late. The Soviet Union ended the war according to its own scenario. The late opening of the second front had a piquant ending. In December 1944, the Allies, who had previously made good progress from France to Germany, suddenly felt the strength of the German army, which inflicted a serious defeat on them in the Ardennes.

This time, London and Washington, who had been procrastinating all these years, had to ask Stalin to bail them out, because the troops of Montgomery and Eisenhower were in serious danger. Stalin agreed to launch a new offensive by the Soviet troops, noting without irony that "the weather is not very conducive to this" (a favorite excuse of the allies). And in fact, the Soviet Union opened a kind of "third front" to help the "second front" that was so late.

We do not intend to tendentiously highlight the question of the contribution of the Allies. The heroism of the sea convoys that made their way to our North through storms and attacks by German submarines and the German navy is undeniable. Help with arms and food was essential. The fraternal assistance of the Normandie-Niemen squadron will remain in the memory of combat cooperation with Gaullist France. Finally, Operation Overlord itself, repeatedly recorded

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Chatted on film and reproduced on the screen is impressive evidence of what power the United States and Britain had accumulated by June 1944 and finally threw it into the liberation of France.

But it will also be remembered that for the three most important years, decisive for the grandiose world battle, the Soviet Union fought the Nazi armada one on one, and on the side of the Nazis was the military and human machine of Europe they had conquered. At the last moment, realizing that they had lost time and the Soviet Union was sweeping away the bastions of fascist resistance, the allies tried to intercept the fruits of victory. They planned to cut off the Soviet army from the center of Europe with new cordons, to be the first to capture Berlin. This did not happen. A great, heroic and bitter price, but the victory was rightfully ours for all time.

This is evidenced by historical facts and secret documents of Soviet intelligence.

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Problems of inter-allied relations

During the Second World War, Soviet foreign intelligence had to do a lot of work on the allied countries - England and the USA. This was demanded by the interests of the soonest achievement of the defeat of Nazi Germany and its allies and the creation of such a post-war world order that would exclude the possibility of a repetition of aggression against the Soviet state.

The reader may have a legitimate question: "Why did the Soviet Union need to conduct intelligence work against its own allies for this?" The fact is that, although they were united by a common desire to stop Hitler's claims to establish his world domination, the means to achieve this goal, approaches to organizing the organization of the world after the war were different.

When you leaf through the archival materials of Soviet foreign intelligence during the war years, the thought involuntarily arises that in those years the Soviet Union had to reveal the plans of not only the German armies, but also vigilantly monitor the behavior of its own allies - England and the United States, whose practical affairs strongly diverged from the allied obligations they had given. This is clearly seen from the information that foreign intelligence received during all the years of the war.

In his speech on the radio on the evening of June 22, 1941, Winston Churchill declared that the attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union was another act of aggression and treachery on the part of the Nazis and represented one of the turning points of the entire world war. He spoke quite definitely in favor of supporting the Soviet Union in the war against Nazi Germany.

The US leadership has taken a similar position. Acting Secretary of State S. Welles spoke about the attack

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Germany on the USSR a statement in which he qualified it as a treacherous act of aggression on the part of Hitler, directly affecting the interests of the defense and security of the United States. This assessment was also confirmed by President Roosevelt, who also declared that the United States would provide the Soviet Union with all possible assistance.

To what extent were the official statements of the leaders of England and the United States sincere? To what extent could one rely on the military and material assistance of the allies, their joint participation in hostilities against Nazi Germany and its satellites?

It was very important for the Soviet leadership to have reliable information to get answers to these difficult questions.

The resolution on the tasks of foreign intelligence during the war, adopted by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on July 18, 1941, stated: "To reveal the true plans and intentions of our allies, especially the United States and - military device.

This general provision was developed and specified in the instructions sent by the Center to the respective residencies. Thus, in a directive letter from the Center dated November 27, 1941, to the American residencies, it was said: "The United States currently plays a leading role in the world politics of the capitalist countries. Therefore, it is very important for us to reveal in a timely manner the political and diplomatic plans and activities of the United States both in relation to the USSR and in relation to England, Japan, Germany and other countries. Before leaving for the United States, receiving foreign intelligence resident V.M. Zarubin, Stalin stressed that his main task was to carefully observe the position of the ruling circles of the United States and the likelihood of their agreement with Hitler [Germany in order to end the war with a separate peace.

From the residency in England, the Center demanded, taking into account the well-informed and reliable intelligence apparatus at its disposal, to obtain intelligence data on Germany and the countries occupied by it, to be aware of subversive plans and combinations of pro-German elements in England, to reveal the plans of the British the Lean government against the USSR and the subversive activities of British intelligence against our country. The residency was obliged to monitor the development of relations between England and the governments in exile.

Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and other countries, for Anglo-American relations, to identify the contradictions between Britain and the United States on major international issues.

Already in the first months of the war, the information obtained indicated that the political leaders of England and the United States were persecuted in this

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war purposes other than the Soviet Union. They thought not so much of the swiftest defeat of fascism as of the weakening of Germany as an imperialist rival. As a result of the war, they would like to see Germany and the Soviet Union drained of blood, which would allow them to achieve such a post-war structure that would make it possible to impose their will on other countries, and above all on the Soviet Union.

So, already on July 15, 1941, intelligence sent the following message to the State Defense Committee (GKO) of the USSR: "Although the British government is fully aware of the scope of the danger threatening England in the event of the defeat of the USSR and intends to assist the Soviet government in accordance with Churchill's declaration, nevertheless less than all the calculations of the British are based on the inevitability of the defeat of the Red Army in the very near future. At the beginning of the war, the Joint Intelligence Committee of the War Cabinet, consisting of representatives of military, naval, air and political intelligence, came to the conclusion that Moscow would be captured by the Germans in three weeks, but now they are increasing this period to five and a half weeks, counting from the first campaign day.

Foreign intelligence received similar information from its sources in the United States. Thus, the foreign intelligence station in Washington, in its report dated August 19, 1941, informed the Center about the hostile tone of the American press towards the USSR. As soon as the war began, Senator Truman declared: "If we see that Germany is winning, then we Russia, and if Russia wins, then we should help Germany and thus let them kill as many as possible."

On the basis of information received in England and the USA, intelligence concluded that an internal struggle was going on in these countries over the attitude of the Soviet Union to the war with Nazi Germany.

Especially alarming information was received by foreign intelligence in relation to the behavior of the British ally of the USSR. The war was still going on for just over half a year, and the main battles were ahead, and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill wrote on January 8, 1942 to his Foreign Minister Eden: "No one can foresee what the balance of forces will be and where the victorious armies will be. At the end of the war. It seems probable, however, that the United States and the British Empire will be far from being exhausted and will be the most economically and armamentally powerful bloc the world has ever seen, that the Soviet Union will need our help in rebuilding the country more than we do. We will need his help."

The duality of England's policy towards the USSR was thus clear to the Soviet leadership already in the first days of the war. Churchill publicly delivered pathetic speeches about the need

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the need to provide assistance to the Soviet Union, and at that time, as intelligence information showed, the British military circles and special services took a number of actions that were clearly unfriendly towards their ally. So, foreign intelligence received information that on June 23, 1941, the day after the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR, Sir Charles Portal, Chief of Staff of the British Air Force, based on the assumption that a number of regions of the USSR, which, in his opinion, had strategic importance for the war between England and Germany, will be occupied by German troops, suggested sending a telegram to the commander of the troops in India and the Middle East with a request when



preparations for the bombardment of oil fields in Baku by British aircraft were completed. The Committee of Chiefs of Staff decided to accept this proposal and ask the War Department to send such a telegram. (To the history of this issue. The decision to bombard Baku was taken by the British back in 1939 as a response to the military operations of the Soviet troops in Finland, but was never carried out. And so the German attack on the Soviet Union again returned the British generals to this question.)

The command of the British air forces in the Middle East was instructed to study in detail the upcoming bombing targets in the Caucasus. Thus, secretly from the Soviet government, the British allies intended to "help" Russia fight the Germans. This encryption became the property of foreign intelligence, and its content was reported to the country's leadership.

Foreign intelligence and internal counterintelligence agencies received data on the increased activity of the British intelligence services in Arkhangelsk, Vladivostok and Sevastopol, in the Pacific, Northern and Black Sea military fleets. For these purposes, British naval missions were used, which arrived in the Soviet Union at the beginning of the war to coordinate efforts in the war with Germany. The composition of these missions was saturated with scouts of various specialties.

Foreign intelligence also received information about the increased interest of British intelligence services in the activities of Ukrainian nationalists and anti-Soviet emigre organizations. This information was of particular concern against the background of information received by intelligence and counterintelligence about the intensification of subversive activities of nationalist forces in the Baltic states, the western regions of Ukraine, Belarus, and especially in view of irrefutable data on the facts of cooperation between a number of nationalist organizations and the Nazis.

At the same time, the Soviet state bore the brunt of the fascist aggressor and rightfully insisted on

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conscientious and timely fulfillment by allies of their obligations. However, the information received by foreign intelligence indicated that this could not be counted on.

During the war years, Soviet foreign intelligence had strong undercover positions in England and the USA, thanks to which it could receive secret information of interest to it from the main state, military and political institutions of these countries.

The London residence worked especially fruitfully during the war years. This time was the high point of Kim Philby, Donald McLean, Guy Burgess, Anthony Blunt, John Cairncross and other Soviet intelligence aides, whose names cannot be made public yet. Their contribution to the final victory over fascism turned out to be unique and rightfully entered the history of not only the intelligence services of the world, but also the history of the Second World War.

Donald McLean held a senior post in the British Foreign Office. He had the opportunity to get acquainted with the most important documents of his ministry and a number of other government agencies of Great Britain, which were related to the development and implementation of the country's foreign and defense policy.

Thanks to McLean's selfless work, Soviet intelligence had the opportunity to get acquainted with some documents of Churchill's correspondence with Roosevelt and other heads of state and government, the correspondence of British Foreign Secretary Eden with his ambassadors.

Exceptionally important information was received by intelligence from Anthony Blunt, who during the war years worked in the British counterintelligence - MI-5.

Blunt had access to the work of the MI5 spy network in several foreign countries, including Germany. As a result, Soviet intelligence had important information about the economic, political and military situation of these countries.

But, perhaps, Blunt's most significant achievement during the war years was the organization of the transfer of materials from the British decryption service to Soviet intelligence.

The British managed to unravel the secrets of the German Enigma cipher machine, which was used to encode correspondence between headquarters. English cryptographers did brilliant analytical work and learned how to decipher the telegrams of the German military command, creating a decryption system they called "Ultra".

The plans of military operations developed by the German command and transmitted by radio to military headquarters were deciphered by the Ultra system and became the property of  
English.

The British secret services carefully guarded the secret of "Ultra". It is known that, having deciphered the message of the German aviation headquarters

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about the upcoming raid on Coventry, the British, fearing the decoding of the source of information, did not warn their air defense systems and sacrificed this city and its inhabitants as a conspiracy. The British did not pass on the information received with the help of "Ultra" to their ally - the Soviet Union, which it primarily concerned.

Anthony Blunt, by virtue of his position in British counterintelligence, was familiar with some of the Ultra materials.

In 1942, D. Cairncross, an expert in the German language, was transferred by the British from the Ministry of Finance, where he had previously served, to the deciphering service, located in the London suburb of Bletchley Park. This is how another Soviet intelligence agent got access to the Ultra materials. For three years, every week, either personally or through Blunt, he transmitted to the London residency the plans of the German command on the Eastern Front deciphered by the British.

For the Soviet Union, these were invaluable materials. The ciphers of German aviation call signs transmitted by D. Cairncross allowed the Soviet command to carry out a number of operations to destroy German aircraft at the moment of their concentration on the eve of the decisive battles.

Important information was received from E. Blunt and D. Cairncross about the German offensive plans in the summer of 1943 in the area of Kursk and Orel.

Foreign intelligence information helped the Soviet command to prepare a counterattack and win the Battle of Oryol-Kursk.

Most of the information obtained by Soviet foreign intelligence through undercover means in England and the USA, by virtue of their allied duty, should have been voluntarily transferred by these countries to the Soviet Union in the interests of the common struggle against the fascist aggressor. This primarily concerns information about the plans of Britain and the United States to wage war and prepare joint military operations. But the British and Americans did not always do this. Even the information received by the intelligence services of these states about Germany and its allies, about their plans for conducting military operations, they sometimes did not transfer to the Soviet Union or withheld. During the war years, Soviet foreign intelligence had official contacts with British and American intelligence, which made it possible to constantly exchange information, although Soviet foreign intelligence had to obtain such information in the interests of the security of its state and a more successful fight against the German armies. manipulation by operational means.

When, after the war, English counterintelligence became aware of E. Blunt's cooperation with Soviet intelligence, he, motivating his behavior, stated at one of the interrogations that he considered it his duty as a patriot and anti-fascist to help the USSR, an ally of England

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and transmit to him that information which, by virtue of allied obligations, the British government should have transmitted, but did not do so. It is no coincidence that the British government did not dare to bring Anthony Blunt to justice.

In total, during the war years, foreign intelligence received in England (excluding scientific and technical intelligence materials) 19,709 intelligence materials, of which 90% were documents. 7136 information materials covered the situation in Germany, the USA and other countries.

Foreign intelligence had good intelligence positions during the war and in the United States. She regularly received important political and military information from the President's immediate circle, the State Department, the congressional staff, military departments, propaganda, intelligence and counterintelligence agencies.

Strong agent positions in the main allied countries - England and the USA gave a unique opportunity to Soviet foreign intelligence to follow the policies of these countries, to be aware of their political and military plans, to record their attempts to evade the fulfillment of allied obligations, to pursue a policy to the detriment of intelligence. - Resam of the Soviet Union.

The highly experienced American intelligence officer Allen Dulles called the information obtained by Soviet foreign intelligence during the war years the ultimate dream of any intelligence service in the world.

Indeed, when you get acquainted in the archives of foreign intelligence with the secrets stored there of what it mined during the war years, you involuntarily get the feeling that there were no limits for it to reveal the secret plans hatched against the USSR by its allies. Here, for example, is a cipher telegram from Churchill to Roosevelt about how best to get around Stalin at the Yalta Conference. A few days later, a copy of it was already lying on Stalin's desk. Here is the exchange of opinions between Churchill and Roosevelt on the question of the post-war fate of Germany, and here are documents testifying to the joint intention of England and the USA to support the Polish government in exile. And many many others.

Particularly striking is the completeness of information support for the preparations for the Big Three meetings in Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam. Thanks to its foreign intelligence, the Soviet government was fully aware of the position of its allies. Foreign intelligence information allowed the Soviet delegation to take a firm and at the same time flexible position.

The work of foreign intelligence on allied countries had another very important aspect. Our intelligence has repeatedly received information that the relations between the countries - members of the anti-Hitler coalition were very interested in German intelligence, which

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closely followed the tendencies of their development, revealed the existing contradictions in the positions of its individual members and, first of all, the USSR, Britain, and the USA on the most acute issues related to the conduct of the war and the post-war settlement. The Germans were especially interested in the attitude of the allied countries to the post-war fate of Germany. Until the very end of the war, Hitler and his inner circle counted on the aggravation of contradictions between the allies, the collapse of the anti-Hitler coalition and the conclusion of a separate peace with the Western powers.

The intelligence information received on this issue made it possible to be aware of the steps that the fascist leadership was taking to split the anti-Hitler coalition.

An important place in the work of foreign intelligence on the allies during the war years was occupied by the question of post-war settlement. What will the world be like after the war? The politicians of England and the United States were thinking about this question already at the very beginning of the war. They believed that, whatever the outcome of the war, both Germany and the USSR would emerge from it weakened and it would be possible to impose their will on them when resolving issues of post-war settlement in accordance with the interests of England and the United States.

Among the issues of the future world order was the question of the borders of the USSR. Already in the first months of the war, Soviet foreign intelligence received information that Britain and the United States did not intend to recognize the western borders of the USSR in the form in which they existed before the start of the war. They wanted to challenge the legitimacy of the territorial changes that took place in 1939-1940.

To clarify this issue, the Soviet government proposed to include an article on the recognition of the pre-war borders of the USSR as of June 22, 1941 in the Soviet-British treaty being prepared. However, British Foreign Secretary Eden, who arrived in Moscow in December 1941 to sign the treaty, refused to include this article, citing lack of authority.

Returning to London, he detailed the point of view of the British Foreign Office in a lengthy memorandum addressed to members of the British government. In January 1942, intelligence received through its agents the full text of this important document.

In the memorandum, Eden analyzed in detail "the best actions in connection with Stalin's demand to recognize the 1941 borders of the Soviet Union." At the same time, he considered two options: both the defeat of Germany in the war, and a sharp weakening of the economic and military power of the USSR. In both cases, Eden considered it possible to achieve a revision of the western borders of the USSR, acting in close cooperation with the United States. Eden also envisaged the option of such a strengthening of the positions of the USSR as a result of the successful completion of the war,

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in which it will be difficult to achieve a significant revision of the western borders of the USSR. In this case, Eden proposed a number of compromise options, in particular, "the establishment by the Soviet government of control over foreign policy and defense in the Baltic states" and the creation of military bases on their territories while maintaining their independence.

At the same time, being a realist, Eden emphasized in his memorandum that neither England nor America could force the USSR to withdraw from the territory it had occupied at the end of the war, and considered the possibility of satisfying Stalin's demands for the recognition of pre-war borders. USSR, subject to the presentation of a number of requirements to the Soviet Union, a detailed list of which was contained in the annex to the memorandum. Among them were the Polish question, and Czechoslovakia, and the creation of federations of small countries in Europe and the Balkans.

Of great interest to the Soviet leadership was that part of Eden's memorandum in which he analyzed the strengths of the Soviet position. Eden stated: "True, Stalin may object that:

1. He demands the return only of what was already Russian territory before the war and what is now occupied by the Germans;
2. The Baltic states themselves voted for joining the USSR in accordance with the principles set forth in the Atlantic Charter;
3. The Finnish and Romanian territories were granted to the USSR under agreements legally concluded with Finland and Romania."

It was these strong arguments that Soviet diplomacy used in defending the territorial integrity of its country. In the final analysis, Eden's prediction came true. The victorious offensive of the Soviet armies resolved this issue. Nor was the Allies in need of Eden's list of "Demands to present to the Soviet Union" in exchange for its own territory.

At the end of 1942, foreign intelligence reported to the leadership of the country another document of the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs, intended for members of the government, which made it possible to more soberly assess the policy of the allies towards the USSR and the problems of the post-war settlement. "Any assessment of the possible course of the policy of the USSR," said this document, "must depend on the state in which the Soviet Union will emerge from the war, and on the circumstances under which the war will end. If the defeat of the German armies takes place mainly due to the action of the Soviet troops and before the power of Great Britain and the USA is fully developed, then the position of Russia on the European continent will be impregnable. As a result, the Soviet Union may become completely independent of the help it seeks under other circumstances.

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governments would be forced to turn to us and America, and will no longer want to adapt to the policy that England and America wish to pursue.

The foreign intelligence residencies in the USA and England were also able to obtain many other documents from the American and British ruling circles on questions of the post-war system. The leadership of the USSR was able to get acquainted with the content of the main documents of the British and Americans, prepared by them for the Tehran, Crimean and Potsdam conferences of the heads of governments of the three states, where these issues were discussed.

The materials handed over by the agents also covered the results of two meetings between Churchill and Roosevelt in Quebec. Intelligence was aware of the results of the negotiations between Churchill and Eden with the US government in Washington, Roosevelt with the President of Czechoslovakia, Benes, and the Prime Minister of the Polish government in exile, General Sikorsky, at which the problems of the post-war structure were also discussed.

Foreign intelligence managed to obtain documents of correspondence between the British Foreign Office and its ambassador in Moscow Kerr on Polish, Greek and Yugoslav issues, which greatly facilitated the actions of Soviet diplomacy to protect the interests of the USSR in these countries.

A special place in inter-allied relations during the war was occupied by the question of the post-war structure of Germany. The position of the Soviet Union on it was widely known: to defeat fascism, punish war criminals and create conditions to prevent the possibility of a new aggression from Germany. The USSR did not raise the issue of dismembering the German state or limiting its sovereignty.

Intelligence data said that the positions of England and the United States were different. They sought above all to destroy Germany as their competitor in the international markets and were in no hurry to carry out democratic reforms in the country. Dependent on England and the USA, Germany - a barrier on the borders of the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe - that's what our allies wanted. However, there were serious differences between them in the methods of implementing this program. Each of these countries sought already during the war years to lay the foundations for its dominant position in defeated Germany and Europe as a whole.

Foreign intelligence closely followed the various phases of the elaboration by the governments of the United States and England of their policies regarding the post-war structure of Germany, it managed to obtain, as shown by the recently published archival materials of the British Foreign Office and the US State Department, all the most important plans and decisions on this matter.

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Thus, foreign intelligence reported on Roosevelt's intentions to dismember Germany already at the beginning of 1943. During the mentioned visit of Beneš to the USA, Roosevelt, outlining his plans for the post-war structure in a conversation with him, spoke in favor of dividing Germany into five or six separate states.

England saw in this plan the United States as a threat of losing its influence on post-war Germany and put forward the idea of creating a federation of individual German states.

In March 1943, British Foreign Secretary Eden flew to the United States, where he negotiated a post-war settlement with Roosevelt. He reported the results of these negotiations to Churchill by telegram, which was received by our intelligence. The fourth paragraph of this telegram stated: "Roosevelt again insisted on the dismemberment of Germany into several states."

In March 1943, the foreign intelligence station in London obtained a top secret memorandum from one of the departments of the British Foreign Office on possible policy options regarding post-war Germany. The document was intended for discussion of the issue by the diplomatic and military departments in order to develop an agreed decision. In it, in a cautious form, it was proposed to support Roosevelt's initiative on the dismemberment of Germany, but on the basis of the principle of federalism. "It will be necessary in every possible way to encourage in Germany any desire for a transition to a federal basis," the document said.

In 1944, foreign intelligence received a number of important documents from the US and British governments relating to the post-war structure of Germany and other countries. Churchill's correspondence with Roosevelt on the occupation of Europe was of particular value. It reflected the differences in their opinions as to who should occupy the northwestern regions of Germany, outlined the plans of England to send its troops to Greece, Trieste, Austria, Bulgaria, Albania, Hungary and other countries, emphasized the need to develop a unified Anglo-American document regarding post-war Germany.

From the British Foreign Office, intelligence received a summary document on the main problems outlined by the British government for negotiations with US Secretary of State Stettinius during his visit to London in March 1944 (UN, Europe, Middle East, Far East, Latin America).

The materials received from the second Quebec conference of Roosevelt and Churchill in September 1944 revealed their plans for creating zones of occupation of Germany by US and British troops and the content of the "Morgenthau Memorandum" on turning Germany into an agricultural country like Denmark.

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Intelligence received a memorandum from the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee of the Committee of the British Chiefs of Staff "On the conditions that may arise after the military defeat of Germany" and the minutes of the meeting of the Committee, which approved the number of British troops required for the occupation of various areas of the world, as well as Report of the "Committee of Three" - Morgenthau, Hull, Stimson - to Roosevelt on US policy towards Germany, containing proposals for the elimination of Germany as an economic power in Europe.

In one of the letters to the British ambassador to the United States, Halifax, received by intelligence, Eden wrote: "The American government proposes that we, behind the backs of the Russians, begin informal negotiations with them in Washington on a document that will determine the main provisions of American and British policy in such matters. which, according to the agreement between the three governments at the Moscow Conference, were submitted for study by the representatives of all three countries in the European Consultative Commission, namely: on the question of our attitude towards Germany in the political, economic, financial and other fields in the period after its occupation; that, after such informal negotiations, we openly hand over

corresponding document to the headquarters of the Allied Command as a directive statement on the policy of the American and British governments.

Eden further wrote to Halifax: "We will join the American delegation in pressuring the Soviet delegation to obtain its consent to an urgent discussion of the Commission's American draft. If the Russians do not agree, then it will be possible to draw up an Anglo-American project and give appropriate explanations regarding the position of the USSR."

On January 28, 1945, foreign policy intelligence reported to the leadership of the country the main documents of the US and British governments, prepared by them for the Crimean Conference of the Heads of Government of the three Allied Powers. They addressed issues such as the dismemberment and decentralization of Germany, the size of German territorial concessions in the east, the future of the Rhine-Westphalian and Kiel regions, the transfer of German populations, economic security measures and repatriation, the treatment of major war criminals, voting in the UN, the rights of the sixteen republics of the USSR in the UN, the Italian-Yugoslav border, the regime of the Black Sea straits, the borders of Poland and the creation of a provisional Polish government, an agreement with Italy and other issues.

The documents received helped the Soviet government to get the United States and England to adopt decisions in Yalta that take into account the interests of the USSR on the main cardinal problems of the post-war system in Europe.

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The questions touched upon are far from exhausting those problems in the relations of the Soviet Union with its allies, on which foreign intelligence had to obtain secret information. The range of questions of the policy of England and the United States towards the USSR, waging war against Germany and its allies, and the post-war order of the world was very wide. On all these issues there was a tense diplomatic struggle, on the outcome of which both the outcome of the war and the post-war security of the borders of the Soviet Union largely depended. Intelligence did not remain aloof from her. The information it obtained played by no means the last role in the development and implementation by the Soviet government of foreign policy measures in relation to England, the USA and other countries.

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De Gaulle or Giraud?

The name of General de Gaulle is well known. A prominent statesman of France, he headed the French Committee of National Liberation during the Nazi occupation, was the head of the first provisional government of the country after its liberation.

On the contrary, the name of General Giraud is preserved, perhaps, rather in the memory of historians. Meanwhile, during the Second World War, this general was known no less widely than de Gaulle, and he could well take his place. The fact is that Giraud was persistently supported by the Americans, while the Soviet Union pursued a policy of recognizing and supporting de Gaulle as the sole leader of the "Free France" - that was the name from May 1942 of the organization he created back in 1940, uniting all patriots in order to fight for the liberation of the country.

The confrontation on this issue between the USSR and the USA continued throughout almost all the years of the war and ended, as is well known, in de Gaulle's favor. At the same time, foreign policy intelligence played a certain role, providing the country's leadership with the intelligence information necessary for decision-making and establishing contact with de Gaulle at the most crucial moment of his confrontation with the Americans.

After the capitulation of France in the summer of 1940, de Gaulle ended up in London. On June 18, he made an address on English radio, in which he called on the French, wherever they were,

to continue the struggle against Germany and, in order to organize this struggle, establish contact with him. It was a historic action.

The London Foreign Intelligence Station was charged with monitoring the activities of de Gaulle's organization and especially the attitude of the British towards it.

Foreign intelligence at that time had good intelligence positions in London and could receive reliable information about

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Churchill's reaction to de Gaulle and his organization. From the information received by intelligence, it was clear that Churchill really had far-reaching plans for de Gaulle. He persistently tried to subjugate him and force him to follow in the wake of English politics. In terms of its status, de Gaulle's organization was not a government in exile and was deprived of the legal basis that the exile governments of the countries occupied by Germany had in London. This made it possible for British diplomacy to put pressure on de Gaulle, limiting his activity when, in the opinion of the British, it did not meet their interests. In their policy, the British proceeded from the fact that after a military defeat and capitulation to Germany, France would not be able to maintain its former position as a great power, and sought to press it in the colonies. De Gaulle seemed to Churchill a convenient political figure for implementing plans for penetrating territories dependent on France, since he planned to deploy his activities primarily in the colonial possessions of the French empire.

However, the very first information received by the London residency on de Gaulle showed that Churchill's plans to use this then still little-known French general and politician in the interests of Great Britain ran into his stubborn resistance.

Supporting de Gaulle, the British government did not break ties with the Vichy regime either. Intelligence learned that England had concluded a secret agreement with this regime on the preservation of the situation existing at the time of signing in the French colonies. Formally, the agreement was intended to prevent the transfer of the colonies to the Germans. In fact, it meant the recognition of Vichy power in the colonial possessions of France and made it difficult for de Gaulle's "Free France" to develop there.

Intelligence noted the growth of de Gaulle's authority among the French, who were ready to continue the struggle for the liberation of the country, strengthening his positions in Syria, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Madagascar and a number of other colonies and dependent territories of France.

At the same time, intelligence also received information that de Gaulle had very weak ties with the French Resistance forces on the territory of France itself. He did not trust their leaders, many of whom belonged to the Communist Party. De Gaulle understood that he was not yet ready to take over the leadership of the resistance movement in the metropolis, and he intended to transfer the main burden of the armed struggle against Germany and its allies to the colonies, thereby solving the problem of keeping them for France in view of the encroachments of England and the United States. .

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Thus, on the eve of the war, the Soviet leadership was sufficiently informed by foreign intelligence about de Gaulle and his organization.

After the attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union, de Gaulle, as a far-sighted and sober politician, immediately appreciated the full significance of this fact for the cause of the liberation of France. He made the decision to establish political and military cooperation with the Soviet Union shortly after the start of the aggression. On June 24, 1941, he sent a telegram from Jerusalem to London, addressed to the representative of the Free French, instructing him to apply personally



to the Plenipotentiary Representative of the USSR in Great Britain Maisky and "in a restrained but clear form" to declare that "the French people support the Russian people in the struggle against Germany and that in this regard we would like to establish military cooperation with Moscow".

For de Gaulle, this was not an easy decision. Many years later, in his memoirs, he writes: <... The fact that Russia was drawn into the war opened up new great hopes for the defeated France. ... Of course, I had no doubt that if the Soviets made the main contribution to achieving victory over the enemy, then new dangers would arise in the world as a result. It was necessary to constantly keep this in mind, even fighting the Russians side by side. But I believed that before philosophizing, one must win the right to life, that is, to win, and Russia's participation created opportunities for victory. In addition, her presence in the camp of the Allies meant, from the point of view of the Free French, a certain counterbalance in relation to the Anglo-Saxon countries, and I meant to take advantage of this circumstance.

Thanks to the information obtained by foreign intelligence, the Soviet leadership knew well what de Gaulle and his organization were, and was ready to take a decision on cooperation with him. When, on de Gaulle's instructions, his representatives turned to the Soviet ambassadors in Britain and Turkey with official requests to establish political and military ties with the Soviet Union, the answer was not long in coming. On September 26, 1941, the Soviet government, in an official letter addressed to de Gaulle, recognized him as the leader of "all free French", decided "to provide the free French with all-round assistance and assistance in the common struggle against Nazi Germany and its allies" and expressed its firm determination after "victory over a common enemy to ensure the full restoration of the independence and greatness of France.

Going to establish relations with de Gaulle and his organization, the Soviet leadership proceeded from the need to expand and strengthen the anti-Hitler coalition, to involve in it all the forces, regardless of their ideological and political affiliation, that could make one or another contribution to the common cause of the defeat of Germany

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and her allies. This set the task for foreign intelligence not only to inform about de Gaulle and his activities, but also to obtain, first of all, such information that would help the country's leadership to pursue a policy of supporting the Free France. It was primarily about the attitude towards de Gaulle of England and the USA.

From the moment de Gaulle created his organization, the United States and President Roosevelt personally treated him negatively. Roosevelt came to the conclusion that it could not be used in the interests of the United States. Moreover, Roosevelt saw in de Gaulle an obstacle to the implementation of plans for the establishment of US dominance in post-war France and its colonies.

Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull regarded the Vichy government as the legitimate government of France. Until November 1942, the United States maintained diplomatic relations with him. In 1940, an agreement on neutrality was concluded between the USA and Vichy. According to Soviet foreign intelligence, the Americans planned, as the French territories were liberated, to establish an occupation regime on them under the control of their military administration, and then gradually transfer power to representatives of the "legitimate" Vichy government, counting on their complete loyalty to the United States.

It was precisely because of these plans that the Americans for a long time did not recognize the resistance movement inside France. Foreign intelligence received a report from its source that the commander of the armed forces in Europe, General Eisenhower, spoke out against the "organization of a partisan movement and the use of resistance forces in France because of the fear of developing a popular liberation movement and complicating the tasks of the Allies in establishing on the liberated territories of democratic orders".

De Gaulle approached this issue differently. He believed that local power, as France and its overseas possessions were liberated, should be transferred to representatives of the Free France, which should act as the country's provisional government, and the Vichy regime, collaborators should be brought to justice. This was a position fundamentally different from the American one, and it clearly did not suit Roosevelt.

American intelligence at that time considered de Gaulle to be an English protege and expressed concern that his coming to power could contribute to the strengthening of British influence in post-war France. In his messages to Roosevelt, the head of the US Office of Strategic Services, General Donovan, characterized de Gaulle as a man with dictatorial habits, intoxicated with power and in complete political isolation. He did not promise him a successful future and did not recommend betting on him. Amery

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Kanese intelligence was intensively looking for a suitable candidate for the role of his protege among the leaders of the Vichy regime.

In the British leadership, according to foreign intelligence, at first there was no complete unity regarding de Gaulle. Churchill, who had to have direct contacts with de Gaulle, understood that it would hardly be possible to subdue this stubborn Frenchman to his will. On his initiative, the British secret services tried twice to replace de Gaulle, first with the former governor-general of French Indochina, General of the Army Catru, and then with the ambitious vice-admiral Muselier. Both attempts failed. De Gaulle was increasingly asserting himself as a national leader.

Eden and the Foreign Office headed by him approached de Gaulle somewhat differently. They predicted his political future and recommended that Churchill seek ways of rapprochement with him. This was clearly seen from the information obtained by foreign intelligence directly from Eden's entourage, who convinced Churchill that it was in the interests of Great Britain to preserve de Gaulle as a barrier to American penetration into the French colonies and post-war France.

In the final analysis, Eden's point of view triumphed. It is clear from Churchill's correspondence with Roosevelt that Roosevelt insisted on renouncing, allegedly in the interests of the Allies, the use of de Gaulle and his organization and proposed replacing him with another political figure. Churchill tried to convince Roosevelt of the opportunity to work with de Gaulle and offered his services to bring him under the will of England and the United States. Acute contradictions on this issue between the leaders of Britain and the USA persisted until mid-1943, when, under the pressure of the real situation, the USA was eventually forced to accept the recognition of the French National Liberation Committee headed by de Gaulle.

While defending de Gaulle before Roosevelt, Churchill did not stop trying to force him to follow in the wake of British politics. Soviet intelligence regularly reported this to the country's leadership, which, in order to neutralize the efforts of the British to "bridle" de Gaulle, took a number of diplomatic steps. Quite characteristic in this regard is the instruction sent by Molotov to the USSR Ambassador to Great Britain in May 1942, which, in particular, stated: "We are well aware of the features of de Gaulle and his entourage. However, one must first of all reckon with the fact that de Gaulle's name has become, in a certain sense, a symbol of the struggle of that France which does not want to come to terms with the domination of the Hitlerite invaders, the oppressors of the French people. When evaluating de Gaulle's relations with the British, one must take into account that his desire to protect his independence and not be completely dependent on

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bridge and subordination to a foreign government is, from our point of view, a positive feature of de Gaulle.

What about Giro? All this time, while de Gaulle was creating his "Free France", strengthening his positions in the overseas possessions of the French empire, establishing relations with the allies, this general remained in obscurity, being in German captivity. But in April 1942, the name of Giraud sounded throughout France. The 63-year-old general made a daring escape from the Königstein fortress on the Elbe, where he was imprisoned, by descending a rope from a 40-meter fortress wall. It was a personal feat. The escape, however, was not accomplished without the help of Vichy intelligence. Through Alsace, Giraud was illegally transported to Switzerland, and from there he moved to Vichy, where he swore allegiance to the head of the Vichy regime, Marshal Petain.

American intelligence recommended General Giraud to Roosevelt as a convenient candidate to oppose de Gaulle. His name became widely known after his escape from captivity, and the rank of general gave authority to his figure among politicians and military circles.

At that time, the Americans, together with the British, were preparing an operation to land allied troops in North Africa. Intelligence received information that, at the insistence of Roosevelt, de Gaulle was completely excluded from participation in it. He was not even informed about the plans for its preparation. The Americans hoped to place their proteges at the head of the administration of the North African territories occupied by the Allied forces. General Giraud and Admiral Darlan, commander-in-chief of the Vichy forces in North Africa, were considered. The American intelligence officer Robert Murphy worked with Darlan in Algeria, acting under diplomatic cover. Giraud was courted by American intelligence officers from the US embassy in Vichy. With their help, he was secretly taken out of the unoccupied zone of France and taken by submarine to Gibraltar, where at that time the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Anglo-American forces, General Eisenhower, was located.

The British were not aware of these American plans to establish their order in North Africa. The resident of Soviet foreign intelligence in London reported in one of his messages: "The combination with the appearance of Giraud and Admiral Darlan was prepared without the participation of the British and came as a complete surprise to them. Secret negotiations between the Americans and Darlan took place for more than three months, the British did not know anything about them and were presented with a fait accompli."

From Churchill's correspondence with Roosevelt, as well as information from Eden's entourage, it was clear that Churchill understood the danger to England of the American plans and did not agree with the removal of de Gaulle and his replacement by Giraud or Darlan. Losing de Gaulle, England of the floor

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gala that was deprived of the opportunity to influence the course of events in North Africa.

The foreign intelligence resident in London reported to the Center that Eden had instructed his ambassador to the United States, Halifax, to urgently meet with Secretary of State Hull and "raise in a decisive manner the question of the great danger connected with the coming to power of Darlan and stop all negotiations with him." At the same time, Halifax was asked to tell the Americans that "Anglo-Soviet relations, which have improved somewhat of late, may worsen again because of Darlan, and de Gaulle, with whom the British government is connected by a number of agreements, will never agree collaborate with Darlan."

The importance of this demarche is evidenced by the fact that after the meeting with Hull, Halifax was received by Roosevelt, who, although he did not refuse to cooperate with Giraud and Darlan in favor of de Gaulle, agreed with the proposal of the British to send a group of high-ranking British diplomats to North Africa and United States to study the situation on the ground and prepare proposals. With regard to de Gaulle, Roosevelt went so far as to agree to inform him of the results of the work of this group.

The Soviet Union continued to consistently support de Gaulle. Being well informed by his intelligence about the Anglo-American contradictions on this issue, he skillfully used them to carry out his policy in favor of de Gaulle. August 12, 1942 during

During his meeting with Churchill and Harriman, Stalin specifically inquired about the preparations for the Allied landing operation in North Africa and asked if de Gaulle had been informed about it. Having received a negative answer, Stalin expressed his bewilderment, declaring that this important operation was not sufficiently prepared politically and that, in his opinion, it would be useful to carry it out with the participation of de Gaulle.

After the Allied troops landed in North Africa, Admiral Darlan was appointed by Eisenhower as head of the French administration, and General Giraud as commander-in-chief of French troops in the region. Formally, he was subordinate to Darlan. Both were dissatisfied, both claimed the role of head of the French state. Such rivalry suited the Americans quite well. Playing on the ambitions of the two highest military officials of the Vichy regime, they very quickly began to take over North Africa.

A month after the landing operation was carried out by the allies, foreign intelligence reported to Stalin and Molotov: "Events in North Africa show that not only most of the territories of the French empire, but also all command heights in Algeria, Morocco and Equatorial Africa. The Americans control territory, ports, and productive forces;

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they supply the population with food and "master" the acquired economic resources, as evidenced by the arrival of economic missions and representative offices of the largest American firms there. The Americans retained the French apparatus of government, army and navy, which they inherited thanks to Darlan. ... The British turned out to be only symbolic co-owners, while the true masters of the situation are the Americans ... "<... The Americans openly pushed de Gaulle out of participating in the North African events." <... The American stake on Darlan and Giraud makes the British very cautious about de Gaulle. In order not to irritate the Americans, Churchill banned him from speaking on the radio. The task of de Gaulle's representative in Washington, Philip, is now to somehow soften Roosevelt's position in relation to him and leave for de Gaulle at least

a place under the sun".

A brief, but very vivid and accurate description of the events, reported to the leadership of the country by foreign intelligence.

However, the Americans failed to play out their carefully crafted scenario to the end. On December 24, 1942, an anti-Vishist student of twenty, Fernand Bonnier de la Chapelle, shot Darlan in Algiers. The next day, after a hasty meeting of the military tribunal, he was shot by order of Giraud.

At that time, foreign intelligence failed to obtain reliable information on whose orders he acted, whose will he carried out. Maybe your own? Historians still do not have a firm opinion on this matter. On December 21, 1945, the Algerian Court of Appeal annulled the sentence handed down on Bonnier de la Chapelle, reasoning that the act that resulted in the death sentence "was actually committed in the interests of the liberation of France."

The removal of Darlan opened the way for Giraud into big politics. Now all the attention of the Americans was riveted on him. In Giraud, they saw a convenient political figure for the introduction of the United States into the liberated French territories, with his help they hoped to finally eliminate de Gaulle. Already on December 26, Eisenhower secured the election of Giraud as head of the French administration in North Africa, while retaining his post as commander-in-chief of the French troops.

The British were clearly not happy with this course of events. In the transfer of all power into the hands of an American protege, as Giraud seemed to them, they saw a threat to their interests. Foreign intelligence received information that, through diplomatic channels, the British put before

Roosevelt the question of the need for a joint search for ways of "rapprochement between Generals Giraud and de Gaulle."

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As a possible solution to the issue, they put forward the idea of creating a single body under the joint leadership of Giraud and de Gaulle, similar to a provisional government, with which it would be possible to resolve all issues related to the liberation and administration of French territories. At the same time, in their démarches to the Americans, the British referred, among other things, to the position of the Soviet Union, emphasizing its interest in supporting de Gaulle.

Eden traveled to Washington for talks with Hull and Roosevelt to discuss the "French Question". Ultimately, the Americans agreed to the creation of a joint body, but with Giraud in the leading position in it. The intelligence report from Washington, received in Moscow, emphasized that, in meeting the British halfway in creating a joint body headed by Giraud and de Gaulle, the Americans hoped that with the help of their support Giraud would be able to maintain his positions, and de Gaulle they would finally succeed in - squeeze.

The Americans and the British agreed to organize a meeting of two French generals in January 1943 in the Moroccan city of Casablanca, where it was planned to hold talks between Roosevelt and Churchill to discuss plans for the further conduct of the war. Foreign intelligence received comprehensive information about the course of the discussion of issues, the positions of the parties and the decisions taken.

The most acute was the French question. Giraud arrived at the conference and was ready to sign a decision to create, on the basis of his administration and de Gaulle's Free French organization, a united French Committee of National Liberation. De Gaulle understood the maneuvers of Anglo-American diplomacy, which left him in the background. He refused to go to Casablanca, responding to Churchill's invitation that he was ready to meet "a French general, but on French territory and among the French."

Churchill had to make great efforts to force de Gaulle to come to Casablanca.

The meeting of the two generals in Casablanca did not bring the desired results to the Anglo-American allies. The "wedding", as the American and British diplomats dubbed this operation to reconcile Giraud and de Gaulle, did not take place. De Gaulle refused to accept the conditions developed by the Anglo-American allies for his unification with Giraud. He insisted that the administration created by Zhirov Algeria join the Free French Committee, which, as he emphasized, had been in existence for two years and actually played the role of the government of France.

For the Americans, this was an unacceptable decision. It deprived them of the opportunity to infiltrate the liberated French territories. All Roosevelt's efforts to influence de Gaulle, using his personal charm and position as the head of the world's leading power, turned out to be

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futile. De Gaulle perfectly understood the intentions of the Americans. Later, in his memoirs of the war years, he will write about his impressions of meetings with Roosevelt in Casablanca: "Since America entered the war, Roosevelt decided that the world would be the American world, that it was he who had the right to dictate the terms of the organization of this world - he wanted the countries, crushed by the trials of war, to recognize his right to judge, and it is considered that, in particular, he will become the savior of France and the arbiter of her destinies.

Thus, the Casablanca conference ended on the French question with virtually no results. The only thing that could be achieved after lengthy negotiations was an agreement on the exchange between de Gaulle's Free French and Giraud's administration of permanent liaison missions, which gave de Gaulle more advantages than Giraud. He received

an excellent opportunity to develop political and propaganda work in Algeria in favor of the Free French, while for Giraud the presence of his mission in London did little.

Nevertheless, the Americans interpreted the results of Casablanca in their own way. In April, foreign intelligence reported to Stalin and Molotov that, at the direction of Roosevelt, Hull sent an instruction to the American ambassadors stating: "As a result of the conference in Casablanca, the president decided that the French commander-in-chief, General Giraud, is a proxy for the military, economic and financial interests of France, which are connected with the liberation movement in Africa, and offered to assist him. This decision was approved by Churchill."

Being well aware of the Anglo-American plans regarding de Gaulle, the Soviet government also decided to take a stand on this issue. In June 1943, Molotov sent the following instruction to the USSR Ambassador to the allied governments in London: "We inform you for orientation and guidance that in your attitude towards de Gaulle and Giraud you should adhere to the following guidelines.

First. We give preference to de Gaulle, as he is intransigent towards the Vichy government and Hitler Germany, while General Giraud lacks such intransigence.

Second. We prefer to support de Gaulle, as he firmly defends the policy of restoring republican France with its democratic traditions, while General Giraud is hostile to the republican-democratic traditions of France and is afraid of having close contact with the popular masses of France.

However, it became increasingly difficult for the Americans to continue to ignore de Gaulle and his organization. His authority among the fighting

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the growing French increased. The position of the Soviet Union also contributed to this. Positive changes began to take place in the actions of the United States and England in relation to de Gaulle.

De Gaulle and his Free French organization were allowed to move to Algiers. His supporters, who had previously been arrested in the territories of North and Equatorial Africa, were released from prisons. Officials of the Vichy administration began to be removed from their posts, and the most odious collaborators were put on trial. The removal of the Vichy was a firm demand of de Gaulle. Only after its execution did he agree to negotiations with Giraud on unification. On July 3, 1943, the association was proclaimed. The document signed by de Gaulle and Giraud officially announced the creation of the French Committee of National Liberation (FCNL). The Committee declared itself the central French authority, exercised in all territories not occupied by the enemy, the defender of the sovereignty and interests of France throughout the world. The Committee was headed on an equal footing by two co-chairmen — de Gaulle and Giraud. This was the essence of the compromise. The Americans were forced to give up Giraud's autocracy in the Committee. The post of Commander-in-Chief of the French Armed Forces was retained by Giraud, and the Americans apparently hoped that, relying on the army, he would soon be able to push back de [Olles] and take a dominant position in the Committee.

A period of complex political struggle and intrigue within the FKNO began. Giraud enjoyed the full support of the Americans, his actions were practically directed by the American intelligence officer Murphy. It was more difficult for de Gaulle. The British representative in Algiers, Macmillan, did not act in favor of de Gaulle as decisively as Murphy did in favor of Giraud. Soviet foreign intelligence obtained a message from Eden to Macmillan, in which the British Foreign Secretary informed him that the supporters of de Gaulle, Catrou and Massiglia, considered his activity insufficient and asked him to provide great assistance to de Gaulle in resolving sensitive issues.

British diplomacy was cautious. She did not openly oppose the attempts of the Americans to establish Giraud as the sole head of the FKNO and was ready to be content with the fact that de Gaulle would play secondary roles in it.

The Soviet leadership needed information from the scene about what was happening in Algeria, they needed direct access to de Gaulle. In London, contact with him was maintained by the USSR Ambassador to the allied governments A.E. Bogomolov. With the move to Algeria, this connection was interrupted. Therefore, the Soviet leadership, through diplomatic channels, asked the US government to give Bogomolov permission to travel to Algeria. The fact is that North Africa is

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It was treated by the Allies as a war zone and was under the control of the Allied command, which was headed by Eisenhower.

The Americans immediately understood what significance Bogomolov's visit to Algiers would have for de Gaulle. They refused the request of the Soviet government. They did not hide their motives. In a conversation with the Charge d'Affaires of the USSR in the USA A.A. Gromyko, Secretary of State Hull stated that, in the opinion of the American leadership, Bogomolov's trip would intensify the agitation of the de Gaulle people against Giraud and would provoke even greater attacks on him. "The transfer of power to de Gaulle," he said, "would mean, from a military point of view, a great threat to communications in North Africa. The Americans do not want to have foreign generals in their rear.

The Americans and the British had their diplomatic representatives in Algeria - Murphy and Macmillan, but the Soviet Union was denied this.

Under these conditions, it was decided to entrust the maintenance of direct contacts with de Gaulle and the organization of obtaining information not only from London, but also from the scene of events to foreign intelligence. As a cover, it was decided to use the Repatriation Commission, of which the Soviet Union was a member. There were a large number of "displaced persons" in North Africa, including citizens of the USSR. The Allies had no reason to refuse to send Soviet representatives to the Repatriation Commission to Algeria. The same Hull, in a conversation with Gromyko, was forced to agree to such a trip.

The mission to establish contact with de Gaulle was entrusted to a young, but at that time already experienced intelligence agent, I.I. Agayants. Under the surname Avalov, in August 1943, he flew to Algeria from Tehran, where he headed the foreign intelligence station.

The choice was not random. I.I. Agayants was a talented foreign intelligence officer. A man of great charm, wide erudition, genuine intelligence, he himself knew how and taught others to work actively and at the same time thoughtfully, inventively, with imagination and inspiration. In 1943, he was only 32 years old, but he already had more than a decade of experience in intelligence behind him, before the war he was a deputy resident in Paris. In November 1941, he was entrusted with the responsible post of head of foreign intelligence in Iran.

It was in Tehran that Agayants met de Gaulle when the general was visiting there on Free French business. Agayants managed to establish a relationship of trust and mutual understanding with de Gaulle, which played a decisive role in choosing a candidate to establish contact with him in Algeria. Of course, before de Gaulle, Agayants acted not as a scout, but as a diplomat, an employee of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and a member of the Avalov Repatriation Commission.

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The archived records of conversations between Agayants and de Gaulle leave no doubt that the head of the FKNO perceived Avalov as a representative of the Soviet government specially sent to him for communication and used this contact not only to inform about the state of affairs, but also to put official issues concerning the relations of the FKNO with the Soviet Union and its Anglo-American allies.

The range of questions discussed by Agayants with de Gaulle was very wide. It was through Agayants that de Gaulle officially raised the question of his visit to Moscow and meeting with Stalin. At a time when there was a sharp struggle between de Gaulle and Giraud for dominance in the FKNO, each of the contenders for power sought to enlist external support, and de Gaulle's visit to the Soviet Union could be of decisive importance.

In his conversations with Agayants, de Gaulle devoted much time to the struggle within the FKNO. He informed about the actions of Giraud and his support for the United States, talked about the Americans' attempts to remove de Gaulle's troops from participating in hostilities against the Germans and Italians.

In conversations with Agayants, de Gaulle devoted much attention to the issues of Soviet-French relations both during the war and in the post-war world. He outlined the whole concept of his views on the post-war structure, the role and importance of France and the Soviet Union in it, their close cooperation, and made it clear that he would like to discuss all these issues with Stalin during a future visit to Moscow.

Through Agayants during this period, de Gaulle resolved many issues of the current relations of the FKNO with the allied powers. The Anglo-American allies sought to push de Gaulle out of participation in the work of inter-allied bodies, from the development and adoption of political and military decisions concerning the further conduct of the war. This was especially true for operations in the Mediterranean, Italy, and the Balkans. They did not want to see the FKNO headed by de Gaulle as an equal participant at the negotiating table of the allied powers, the countries participating in the anti-Hitler coalition. Using contact with Agayants, de Gaulle informed the Soviet government about all these maneuvers of the Anglo-American allies and asked for diplomatic support, which he received. In particular, the Soviet Union insisted before Britain and the USA that the FKNO be admitted on an equal footing to the work of the Inter-Allied Commission on the Mediterranean Sea and Italy.

Diplomatic isolation of de Gaulle failed. The Americans soon became convinced of this. The important political mission entrusted to foreign intelligence was successfully completed.

Of great importance for the strengthening of de Gaulle's position was the diplomatic recognition of the FKNO by the great powers, especially after he managed to take the dominant position in it.

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Foreign intelligence received information that Britain and the United States decided to use the issue of recognizing the FKNO as an additional means of putting pressure on de Gaulle. It was clear from Churchill's correspondence with Roosevelt that they decided to drag out recognition in every possible way, to seek the same from the Soviet Union and prevent it from recognizing the FKNO unilaterally. This information served as a good basis for the struggle of our diplomacy for recognition of the FKNO°.

Ultimately, taking into account the position of the Soviet Union and the growing authority of de Gaulle, the Allies agreed to recognize the FKNO°. It was announced simultaneously by the three powers on August 26, 1943. But it was done differently. Subsequently, de Gaulle himself gave the following assessment of this recognition: "To tell the truth, the formulas for recognition chosen by the three great powers were profoundly different from each other. Washington considered it necessary to confine itself to the most restrained statement: "The Committee is recognized as the governing body of those French overseas territories which recognize its authority." London resorted to the same expressions, but added: "In the eyes of Great Britain, the Committee is the body capable of providing leadership for the French effort in the war." Moscow has shown real latitude. For Soviet Russia, the Committee was the representative of the "state interests of the French Republic." He was also the only "leader of all French patriots fighting against Hitler's tyranny."

Bogomolov, as the plenipotentiary ambassador of the USSR to the FKNO, was able to arrive in Algeria only in October 1943, when the outcome of the struggle between Giraud and de Gaulle was actually a foregone conclusion. By this time, de Gaulle had secured a dominant position in the FKNO. Led by the most



important commissariats of the FKNO, which played the role of ministries of the future government, were supported by de Gaulle. He managed to achieve the decision of the FKNO to separate the functions of the commander-in-chief and the chairman of the Committee, which put Giraud in a very difficult position. De Gaulle's position was greatly strengthened as a result of his campaign to eliminate the Vichy order and to purge the administrative apparatus of collaborators. The ban on the Communist Party and the law "On the Suppression of the Activities of Anarchists and Communists" were repealed. This brought de Gaulle the support of the Communist Party and the resistance movement within the metropolis. Finally, in November 1943, Giraud and his main supporters were forced to leave the leadership of the FKNO, de Gaulle became its sole chairman.

Having lost the opportunity to influence the policy of the Committee, Giraud tried to keep some positions in the army. His most important support in it was the intelligence and counterintelligence agencies, which were headed by his faithful supporter, General Rolin. But de Gaulle achieved a merger

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Giraud's army and the Free French forces. At the head of the joint army secret services, he put his supporter Jacques Soustelle. Giraud finally lost all his positions and, despite the active support of the Americans, was removed from the path to power in liberated France.

The struggle between de Gaulle and Giraud was not only a struggle for power between two generals. Behind it, the political context was clearly visible. De Gaulle was backed by national forces who stood up not only for the liberation of their country, but also for its further freedom and independence from any foreign influence, for the greatness of France and a worthy place in the post-war world.

Giraud saw in his American friends a force which, in the post-war world alone, would be capable of reviving his country. Willingly or unwittingly, he did not notice the dangers that threatened France in the process of losing its independence.

! Charles de Gaulle. Military memoirs. Call. 1940-1942 years. - M., 1960. - S. 651-652.

2 Ibid. - S. 252.

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1941-1945 Documents and materials. - T. 1. 1941-1943. - M., 1959. - S. 87.

4 Ibid. - S. 18.

5 Ibid. - S. 93.

6 Correspondence of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with the Presidents of the United States and Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. - T. 1. - M., 1957. - S. 134-135.

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Birth of INFO

The year 1943 was coming to an end, the year of a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War. It began with the victorious end of the Battle of Stalingrad, continued with a grandiose operation on the Kursk Bulge. Things were moving towards the complete liberation of the Soviet land seized by the enemy and fighting on the territory of the enemy, the liberation of the European countries. No one had any doubts about the outcome of the war.

On December 7, the newspapers carried a summary of the documents of the recently concluded Big Three conference in Tehran, which finally agreed on plans for the opening of the British

and the United States of the second front, outlined the prospects for a post-war structure, the idea of creating a future UN. On the same day, I. Stalin received a message from the American President, in which F. Roosevelt announced that he was appointing General Eisenhower to be responsible for the Allied operation to cross the English Channel. The war was essentially entering its final phase. The beginning of a new chapter in human history was approaching.

On the same day, an important event took place in Soviet intelligence, which, of course, was not reported in the newspapers. It was caused by new tasks that clearly loomed ahead of exploration for the future. On December 7, 1943, order No. 00360 was signed on the creation of an information department within the First Directorate of the NKGB (foreign intelligence). For brevity, it was called INFO. The new department was headed by M. Allahverdov.

Mikhail Andreevich Allahverdov was born in Stepanakert (Nagorno-Karabakh), joined the Red Army in 1918, was admitted to the OGPU in 1919, and participated in the establishment of Soviet power in Tajikistan. Graduated from the Military Academy. Frunze, after which he was sent to Iran, where he headed the residency until 1930. In 1933-1934 he was an illegal immigrant in Vienna, Zurich and Paris. During the war, he headed the residency in Afghanistan, from where he was called to Moscow,

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to lead INFO. Before the war, he worked in the German Foreign Intelligence Department, dealing with information, and this job profile, therefore, was to a large extent

sign.

A modest, responsible, balanced person with excellent practical experience in the countries of the West and the East, he was the best fit for the team, which had the task of highlighting the most important world problems for the Soviet leadership.

Evidence of the recognition of the role of INFO and the merits of its chief was the assignment to Allahverdov in 1945 of the military rank of major general, which was then rare for foreign intelligence officers. He headed INFO until 1947, after which he was one of the leaders of the higher intelligence school.

Elena Dmitrievna Modrzhinskaya became M. Allahverdov's deputy. A native Muscovite, an economist by profession, before joining the state security agencies, she worked in the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations, was the Deputy Director of the All-Union Chamber of Commerce. In 1940-1941, together with her husband, she worked in German-occupied Warsaw, reporting to the Center about Germany's preparations for a war with the USSR, about the concentration of Nazi troops near our borders. For this work she was awarded the Order of the Red Star. She was fluent in a number of European languages, distinguished by her exuberant energy, analytical skills, and organizational gift. (Later she became a Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, headed a sector of the Institute of Philosophy of the USSR Academy of Sciences)

It was Modrzyńska who was entrusted with the development of the regulation on INFO and the recruitment of personnel for the information and analytical department. The level of work of the INFO largely depended on this.

INFO consisted of five departments (directions). Four of them were determined geographically. The fifth had reference functions. A translation agency was created, where only seven employees worked. A group of special messages was formed. If INFO initially had 41 employees, then by the end of the war the Information Department already had nine branches and totaled 126 people.

Thus, the information-analytical core of the foreign intelligence of the USSR was formed, and a qualitatively new stage began in its work. A workable apparatus appeared that helped to organize the extraction and processing of information, to filter out misinformation and dubious information, to switch from covering individual episodes and events to systematic monitoring of the international situation, to give reasonable forecasts for the near future, and then for a more distant one. future.

If earlier the operational intelligence units took over the entire cycle of extraction, processing and sending information to the country's leadership on the most important military and political problems, without having

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sometimes enough trained translators, editors, analysts, so to speak, manually processing what they managed to get, now systematic information and analytical work has become possible, aimed at providing the leaders of the USSR with verified and reliable information on a wide range of international problems.

Of course, intelligence is unthinkable without talented people who have tenacious analytical thinking and the ability to reveal the true state of affairs in the tangle of circumstances. But even the most capable specialists are not able to quickly compare the newly obtained information with what was obtained earlier, moreover, from completely different sources, to critically evaluate it, and compare it with official data. It is impossible to be universal in all regions and problems.

And the more crucial the moment, the more necessary is a careful selection of information, their timely generalization, the more necessary is a competently organized division of labor. This is what INFO was created for.

The timing of the creation of INFO was not accidental: after the victories that changed the course of the war in favor of the Soviet Union, there came a moment of rapid change in the international situation. It was necessary to look further, to prepare reliable and reliable material for the leadership of the state for the diplomatic and political battles that determined the post-war structure of Europe and the world as a whole.

All the experience of the pre-war and war years showed that it was naive to hope for a harmonious and conflict-free development of the world community. The range of problems that arose, the needs of our diplomacy covered a wide range of topics: from the German question, reparations, the development of peace treaties with countries that fought on the side of Germany, to the creation of international organizations dealing with security and cooperation problems.

It was not easy to complete the information and analytical link of intelligence in the conditions of the ongoing war. We had to rely mainly on our own personnel. I had to rely, in particular, on the experience of the most important German department, which was led by P. Zhuravlev. Having headed the first (German) intelligence department at the end of 1939, by the spring of 1940 Zhuravlev began to systematize materials relating to Germany's plans for an attack on the Soviet Union. He singled them out from the case "Foreign Policy of Germany", which was led by Z. Rybkina, and concentrated in the unofficial file "Facts", which he personally conducted.

Pavel Matveyevich Zhuravlev had previously worked for many years in responsible positions in intelligence, was a resident in Prague, worked under diplomatic cover in Rome, where he also headed the residency, then in Istanbul, spoke French and Italian. He was one of the first to understand the need to create a special

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ny information unit in intelligence. This issue was raised at a secret meeting of the intelligence leadership on February 21, 1941, at which it was decided to form such a service "for studying, analyzing, summarizing materials on the most important issues and compiling documents for policymakers" and staffing it with "qualified Chekists, quick-thinking and wielding a pen."

In the spring of 1941, P. Zhuravlev created an information department in the department headed by M. Allahverdov. 3. Rybkina was appointed as Allahverdov's deputy. Multiple employees

prepared summaries on German problems, on the basis of which many messages were issued to Stalin and other Soviet leaders. These were reports about the arming of Germany, Hitler's "Ostpolitik", preparations for aggression against the Soviet Union. As the time for the attack on the USSR approached, the work in this information department, which was the forerunner of the future information and analytical service, became more and more intense. In a number of cases, the intelligence officers of the department managed to divert disinformation materials from the report to Stalin, which were supplied to the Center from Berlin by resident Kobulov, who trusted the agent-double Lyceum student, and at the same time persistently promoted information about the approaching day of the war.

An analytical review for the country's leadership stated: "Additional verification of intelligence information reported to you about the plans for a German attack on the Soviet Union, which are now being discussed in leading German authorities, and about specific military and economic preparations against the USSR undertaken in the implementation of these plans, in part confirms that: 1) plans for an attack on the Soviet Union are indeed being developed in the highest military and economic bodies of Germany; 2) according to these plans, it is supposed to wrest from the Soviet Union the territory to the west of the Leningrad-Black Sea line; 3) a move against the Soviet Union is not yet a firm decision, but its tentative dates (April-May) indicate that it will be taken before a decisive offensive against England. Further on four pages were given specific intelligence data confirming this. However, the theses cited above, as well as the line from Schulze-Boysen's message about "extremely intensive and accelerated development of German aviation plans against the USSR" were blacked out in red pencil, and then, apparently, upon returning to the department, they were carefully restored. On May 25, Zhuravlev marked the document to Allahverdov and wrote in the upper corner: "By order of Comrade Sudoplatov, no special message was sent," emphasizing the last two words.

On the very eve of the attack, the department compiled a summary of reports from Germany. From it it was clear that the war in

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next time is inevitable. This summary was preserved in the archives as a silent reproach to those who did not want to believe the truth about impending events in time.

Plans for the formation of an information service had to be postponed with the start of the war, although the expediency of such a service became obvious to both intelligence officers and their leaders. Shortly before the decision was formalized by order, namely in May 1943, the information unit was already created on a secret basis and at the end of the month prepared an analytical review for the leadership of the NKGB, which covered Germany's military plans on the Soviet front. , in particular, the implementation of Operation Citadel on the Kursk Bulge, as well as the immediate military plans of the Anglo-American allies (the capture of islands in the Mediterranean and the invasion of Italy).

Actually, the skill with which this work was performed served as an example of what the creation of an information service can give. Such a "visiting card" accelerated the decision on the issue of its creation.

We add that P.M. Zhuravlev headed INFO from 1947 to 1950.

Among those who joined INFO activities were the future First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs G. Kornienko, A. Kovalev (later he headed the department of Western European countries in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, one of the main developers of the concept of European security), a graduate of the history department Moscow State University, future ambassador at large and head of the department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs L. Mendelevich, lieutenant general V. Pavlov, V. Kuchin, who acted as an interpreter at the Nuremberg trials of war criminals, O. Basova, head of the translation agency

fluent in more than a dozen foreign languages, and many other talented people whose names are widely known among colleagues and outside of foreign intelligence.

The order of the People's Commissariat of State Security determined the directions of the department's work as follows:

- analytical processing and implementation of undercover materials on political and economic issues;
- determination of the reliability and evaluation of the received intelligence materials based on a systematic study, comparison and comparative analysis of reports from various sources;
- assistance in improving the quality of information coming from residencies;
- in-depth study of the domestic and foreign policy of foreign states;
- preparation and issuance of documents on the activities, structure and methods of work of foreign intelligence agencies.

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INFO twice a month was ordered to issue intelligence reports for the leadership of the NKTB, to prepare information assignments for residencies.

Among those who came to INFO at the beginning of 1944 was Nikolai Antonovich Kosov, who had worked in intelligence for 50 years and is now a retired major general.

"I was 22 years old when I was admitted to INFO and appointed as an assistant to the group of special messages led by Elizaveta Yulyevna Zarubina," says N. Kosov. — Our task was to implement the most urgent materials, helping to sort out the created blockages of information. We were struck by the range and relevance of the information coming to us: reports on the meetings of Churchill's cabinet and the decisions of the US leadership were on our desk literally two or three days later. The INFO service prepared analytical reports on the Balkans and Eastern Europe, Germany and Japan, and China. I remember one of the telegrams of an American diplomat from China, in which he gave recipes for how best to slow down the revolutionary process in that country, and recommended urgent land reform there. But the main place was occupied by military-political issues. The defeat of Germany was approaching, and we were preparing materials for leadership for the upcoming Yalta Conference. I had a chance to visit there myself, in a group of translators.

I had to work from morning until late at night, with a short lunch break. Each of the workers connected to the materials where his abilities were most suitable. Modrzhinskaya and Rybkina were strong in analysis and knew German subjects well. Others processed information on the East, China, Japan.

All employees soon felt the benefit of INFO, including those who felt a kind of jealousy for the new service, because before the operatives themselves decided what and how to send "up". Such attempts were made to bypass the service. And they often returned these materials to us with instructions to bring them to the required CONDITION."

The significance of INFO was that it employed those employees who, by their abilities and inclinations, were most suitable for the analysis and processing of intelligence information.

For those who left INFO for practical work, the understanding of what the end product of exploration serves was an undoubted gain and saved many months of getting used to the specifics of work "in the field".

Of course, the information service was not immune from errors, which is explained by both subjective and objective reasons. The work of its employees is an extremely complex type of activity, within which intertwined and complement each other.

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rational and intuitive knowledge. It is similar to the task in which it is necessary to put together a complete image from individual fragments, provided that the analyst never has before him the full appearance of the desired picture and the whole complex of its constituent parts. In addition, it should be taken into account that the results of the study largely depend on the direction given to it, and the latter is often outside the competence of foreign intelligence.

The quality of government decisions often depended on the maturity of the intelligence recommendations, its awareness and, moreover, on the ability to comprehend the most important information obtained by its apparatus, to foresee the trends that would prevail in a conflict and unstable world. That is why generalized information on the main problems, analytical notes, have been occupying an increasing place in the general flow of intelligence information since that time.

Already from the first steps of its activity, the information and analytical unit was engaged in preparing for the report to the country's leadership the important pre-emptive reliable information obtained by intelligence, which not least helped to maintain the unity of actions of the USSR with its allies in completing the defeat of German fascism, to successfully carry out conferences in Yalta and Potsdam, to provide favorable conditions for the development of international cooperation in the post-war period.

It should be emphasized that already in the initial period, participation in the preparation of fundamental analytical materials became an important activity of INFO. So, in 1944, on the instructions of the State Defense Committee, information workers participated in the development of a joint report of the Soviet intelligence agencies "The Current Situation of Nazi Germany and Its Possibilities for Further Warfare."

The report, we note, excluded the possibility of organized resistance in the occupied territory in the form of partisan formations, sabotage and terrorist groups and other underground activities after the entry of Soviet troops into Germany, which was confirmed later. The importance of such conclusions is obvious.

INFO had to endure later difficult periods. Not always "at the top" listened to the considerations of this "think tank" of intelligence. International tensions gave way to "thaws", but the commitment of the employees of the information apparatus of foreign intelligence to their professional duty and vocation remained unchanged - to impartially evaluate incoming information, giving preference to facts, rather than declared intentions, to analyze phenomena and processes from the point of view of - the national interests of the country, rather than abstract ideas and opportunistic voluntaristic demands.

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Comintern and intelligence

On June 23, 1941, a day after the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR, an emergency meeting was held in Moscow between Georgy Dimitrov, General Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, and a group of Bulgarian émigré revolutionaries who worked in the Soviet Union.

"Do you know why we invited you, comrades? - began Dimitrov. - Times are tough. The Soviet Union is in mortal danger. All our political emigrants must immediately join the fight against the fascist aggressor..."

Dimitrov was excited.

— I thought over some urgent measures and proposed to the Soviet government to form a special brigade, including in it political emigrants - Spaniards, French, British, Germans, Poles, Italians and others who found a second home in the USSR. The brigade that we intend to organize, continued Georgy Dimitrov, will unite, according to our calculations, about a thousand people. It should be formed, as it seems to me, in Moscow or its suburbs. Part of the comrades, I think, should be included in the international brigade for direct participation in military operations at the front, the other should be used in the rear of the Nazi troops as fighters of the so-called "quiet" front. Any objections? No? Then let's get down to business.

It is difficult to remember the name of another socio-political organization of the first half of the 20th century, which, like the Comintern, was not associated with the activities of Soviet foreign intelligence as often as the Comintern. Many documents of the Communist International ~ an organization created on the initiative of V.I. Lenin in 1919 and then united the communist parties to fight "for the victory of the world revolution", objectively gave grounds for such assertions. In a resolution on the world-historical significance of the battle

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The principles of socialism in the USSR, adopted in 1935 by the UP Congress of the Comintern, stated that "... assistance to the USSR, its defense and assistance in victory over all its enemies must determine the actions of every revolutionary organization of the proletariat, every socialist, communist, non-party worker, working peasant, every honest intellectual and democrat.

Reading these lines from a certain angle made it possible to very freely interpret the provisions of the cited resolution in relation to the activities of those bodies of Soviet power that were precisely called upon to strengthen and in every possible way protect the gains of the Soviet state.

The threat of fascism, the need for active action to create a system of collective security, the strengthening of the "People's Front" to fight German fascism and Japanese militarism prompted the Comintern and the secret services of the USSR to determine the general directions, as well as the forms and methods of their work. And although I.V. Stalin rejected the idea of a world "permanent" revolution, which, following Trotsky and his like-minded people, was carried away at that time by some leading figures of the Comintern, he nevertheless considered it good to use the proven personnel and experience of the anti-imperialist struggle of this international organization of the proletariat. The danger of Hitler coming to power pushed the Soviet leader to cooperate with the Comintern and objectively contributed to the prolongation of his life and influence. Hence the Stalinist attitude to the independence of the decisions of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, including in the field of intelligence operations.

In the Comintern, contacts with Soviet intelligence (political and military) were carried out by the Special Subsection of the Organizing Bureau, created in 1922. Subsequently, this subsection was transformed into the Department of International Relations of the Executive Committee of the Comintern (OMS). The department was engaged in the organization of illegal work abroad. The OMS served as a link between the Executive Committee of the Comintern and its regional branches and was a secret apparatus that sent special agents abroad to transfer money and instructions to the leaders of foreign organizations of the Communist Party, as well as to obtain from them information on the state of affairs in foreign world. The usual practice of that time was to recruit foreign citizens – communists from Germany, France, Austria, England and other countries – to work in the CHI. One of the foreign volunteers changed his party card as a member of the German Communist Party to a Soviet one and in March 1925 became a full member of the RCP(b). The Khamovniki district committee of the Moscow party organization issued him, "a member of the trade union of workers in education of the USSR", a party card under No. 0049927. This German communist was called Richard Sorge...

A significant part of the personnel of the "legal" and illegal employees of the Comintern were internationalists, Jews by nationality, who had extensive business and family ties abroad.

The head of the International Relations Department of the Comintern was Joseph (Osip) Aronovich Pyatnitsky (Tarshis), a professional revolutionary. He began his political career by smuggling literature published by Lenin's group from Switzerland to Russia on the eve of the first Russian revolution in 1905.

Osip Pyatnitsky was called an "old man" behind his back, although he was not even fifty. Pyatnitsky looked much older than his years. He was taciturn, unsmiling and even stern, and often seemed rude and unapproachable. But those who communicated with him every day at work felt in him a completely different, sincere person and spoke about him, usually citing the German proverb about "a golden guy under a rough skin."

It was difficult to suspect Osip Pyatnitsky of insincerity or opportunism. It is no coincidence that he gained a reputation "and once did not lie." He believed in the world communist idea and put a lot of effort into making the work of the Comintern and its foreign apparatus as efficient as possible. He considered the personal letter of his wife V.I. to be the most valuable gift for his birthday. Lenin - N.K. Krupskaya, who wished him to live until the moment when the "storm of the world revolution" rises. It didn't happen. Osip Pyatnitsky was shot in Moscow as a "German spy" in 1938 during the mass "purges" of the Leninist SCHOOL revolutionaries.

Osip Pyatnitsky was known to all the leaders of the international communist movement. He regularly met with them during the work of the congresses of the Comintern and in his office in the House of the Comintern.

Osip Pyatnitsky was far from thinking of deciding the fate of the world revolution exclusively by the forces and secret means of the Soviet special services. The Comintern had not only an independent infrastructure for making fundamental political decisions, but also its own intelligence service within the framework of the MLA. Its main purpose was to obtain reliable information from countries with which the USSR did not maintain diplomatic relations. The local sections of the Comintern to some extent made up for this deficiency. The head of the OMS viewed Soviet foreign intelligence rather as one of the tools for protecting the Comintern from the infiltration of spies and provocateurs.

The case of Pyatnitsky, seemingly "closed" with his death, suddenly "opened" again at the end of the war. Soviet counterintelligence interrogated a Gestapo officer, a certain Heinz Pannwitz, who at one time led the case of the Red Chapel. It became known from him that

Even before the German attack on the USSR, the Gestapo used false documents more than once to discredit prominent Soviet military leaders and politicians. He admitted that he personally took part in the preparation of such documents, in particular against Pyatnitsky.

The Nazis intended in this way to use the spy mania reigning in the Soviet Union in order to create a "German agent" who allegedly made his way into the leading party elite. But why did they choose Pyatnitsky? For a very simple reason: the Germans knew that through Pyatnitsky they would strike at the entire personnel administration of the Comintern, which would certainly be destroyed. This action of the Gestapo was somewhat reminiscent of a bowling alley game: if a launched ball touches one figure, then all the others will fall down ...

Our story about the interaction of Soviet foreign intelligence and the Intelligence Department of the General Staff of the Red Army with the Comintern would be far from complete if we limited ourselves to only general



information and comments and did not use the information gleaned from the documents.

There are not so many documents that have survived to this day, but they give an idea of the framework for cooperation between organizations that were called upon at one time to wage a constant and stubborn struggle against the impending fascist threat. These documents – decisions of the political leadership of the USSR and the secretariat of the ECCI, official interdepartmental notes, information reports from “own sources” – testify to a wide range of cooperation between these organizations operating within the established procedure.

One of the documents is devoted to the sacramental question: what can and cannot be done by collaborating organizations? This document, adopted by the Comintern, strictly outlined the framework for such interaction. In order not to sin against the truth, we will quote it in full, as it was signed at one time by G. Zinoviev and O. Pyatnitsky and strictly accepted for execution by all divisions of the Comintern.

"Departments of the Comintern abroad and the Cheka

1. A representative of the Comintern cannot at the same time be authorized by the Cheka and the Intelligence Department and, conversely, representatives of the Intelligence Department and the Cheka cannot act as a representative of the Comintern as a whole and its departments.
2. Representatives of the Intelligence Agency and the Cheka in no case have the right to finance parties or groups abroad. This right belongs exclusively to the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

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Note: representatives of the Cheka and the Intelligence Department cannot apply to foreign parties and groups with a proposal for their cooperation for the Intelligence Department and the Cheka.

3. The intelligence department and the VChK can apply for help to the communist parties only through a representative of the Comintern.
4. The representative of the Comintern is obliged to provide the Cheka, the Intelligence Agency and its representatives with all possible assistance.

Years have passed, some people have a certain stereotype that the Comintern and the secret services of the USSR are “twin brothers”.

There was no single answer to this question. On the one hand, many contemporaries of the Comintern era were quite prepared to simply accept the poetic metaphor about “twin brothers” on faith, on the other hand, somewhere latently, in the depths of consciousness, a worm of doubt stirred : But are we exaggerating the role of the Moscow “hand” in organizing “total espionage” today?

...The “special folder” of Stalin's personal archive made it possible to look at this problem from a different angle.

On November 19, 1925, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution “On the inadmissibility of “mixing” the functions of intelligence agencies and the corresponding party organizations.” All heads of Soviet foreign missions were sent a directive “On the strictest implementation of the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of the respective countries.” It was even announced that a certain Begovoi would be fined “for interfering in the internal affairs of another country”, and the USSR trade representative in Italy was even ordered “not to engage in intelligence work” at all.

And yet, dozens of documents marked “secret” and “owls. secretly sent by the Soviet special services to the Executive Committee of the Comintern, and the replies addressed to the Cheka, the NKVD and the GRU, undoubtedly testify to the multilateral cooperation of these organizations.

The beginning of this correspondence dates back to the 1920s. First of all, this was done, of course, for the sake of protection against possible "imperialist aggression against the world's first socialist state of workers and peasants."

All documentation and correspondence of the Executive Committee of the Comintern with Soviet political and military intelligence can be conditionally divided into several groups: confidential operational information, information about checks of suspicious individuals and agents of special services, interdepartmental problems, memos like "Our number to your number", the content of which was limited only to purely questionnaire phrases: "was not", "was not a member", "did not participate". All correspondence between the Comintern and the Soviet intelligence services, even if it concerned minor issues, was endorsed and necessarily signed at a "high level". archive saved for

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autographs of Dimitrov and Beria, Pyatnitsky and Berzin, Manuilsky and Fitin, as well as veterans of Soviet intelligence such as Korotkov, Shpigelglas, Artuzov, and many others.

Perhaps the most interesting for history was the first group of documents, which often explained to researchers the background of certain events, revealed their meaning hidden from the general public. An example of this kind of documentation is a cipher telegram from London about the reasons for the British police raid on the Soviet trade mission in England in May 1927. The document addressed to Stalin, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Pyatnitsky and Litvinov, in particular, said with reference to information "from the circles of the Foreign Office" that one of the reasons for the search in the trade mission was the hope of finding financial documents establishing the connection of the trade mission with the workers' leaders. in England.

In another cipher telegram, but this time from Berlin, Soviet intelligence reported: "According to intelligence data, an agreement was reached between England and France on common actions against the USSR. Following the raid on Arcos in London, a similar raid is planned in Paris, and there a search is supposed to take place in a Soviet institution in which a person works as an employee who, on behalf of Moscow, is engaged in the work of local trade unions. And in this case, foreign intelligence "did not forget" to indicate among the recipients of this information the name of Pyatnitsky, the head of the International Relations Department of the Comintern.

The information messages of the Comintern to colleagues in the anti-fascist struggle, judging by the documents of the archive, were mainly devoted to the same issue. Curious, in particular, is the information of the ECCI, which at one time lay on the table of Dzerzhinsky, Chicherin, Menzhinsky and Pilyar about the state of affairs in Latvia at the beginning of 1924: "The network of the Latvian nationalist country. An organizational meeting of the Mitavian organization of the Vanags was held in Mitava, which was attended by 120 people, mostly students of the upper classes of the gymnasium. The leader of the local fascists is the captain of the Latvian army Edmund Shtark, a highly suspicious and dangerous person. At the meeting, Stark spoke quite frankly about the goals of the Vanag organization - to become fascist organizations to fight the communists.

In order to protect friends from the Comintern and prevent their possible "exit" to a suspicious "object", the intelligence officers from the OGPU, on their own, identified the agents of the special services and informed the Comintern about it. A telegram from Geneva shows the nature of this work: "Director of the translation service of the League of Nations, Dr.

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school mission" in Switzerland. Before the last action of the Young Egyptians in 1920, using the confidence of some Egyptian students in Geneva, he learned about their involvement in the forthcoming action and helped to go to Egypt. Upon arrival, they were captured and

executed. There were 6-8 of them. Parodi boasted of this to one of his staff in Geneva. Parodi is generally a British political police agent."

Attention is drawn to the fact that the foreign intelligence of the OGPU, and the Intelligence Agency, and the Executive Committee of the Comintern, from the first years of cooperation, did not at all seek to give their relationship a "spy character", as some figures of Western intelligence services and propaganda wished to present to the public. Rather, on the contrary, these organizations feared even the "spying" of their relations. In this regard, the document prepared by Ya. Berzin addressed to the ECCI is of interest.

"Owls. secret

IKKI, com. Pyatnitsky

The Swedish communist Lindsson, a member of the Workers' Union of Esperantists, sent a letter to the International Sector of the Communications Commission of the Tver Kavshkola, in which he informs, on his own initiative, of the deployment of units of the Swedish army, etc. intelligence information.

Considering this kind of correspondence completely unacceptable in order to avoid accusations of espionage, I ask you to give appropriate instructions to the International Organization of Esperanto Workers, as well as to other similar organizations, to avoid questions of the organization of the Red Army and foreign bourgeois armies in their correspondence.

With communist greetings, Berzin

July 21, 1927 No. 040061/SS"

Nevertheless, the struggle for the "purity of the ranks" of the Comintern, the desire to keep spies and provocateurs out of this worldwide communist organization, set before the Soviet political and military intelligence the task of defending this international proletarian organization with their own specific methods.

The content of three (out of several surviving) documents on this issue gives an idea of the nature of such protection and assistance: "According to a secret police report," writes the resident of Soviet intelligence in Berlin in July 1922, "one of the leaders of the Leipzig branch of the communist party, some

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Dornheim, is in constant contact with an informer of the German police. Dornheim, not knowing about the police functions of the aforementioned informant, informs him about the life of the party and its political plans.

Literally a few days later, the head of INO Trilisser reported this fact to Pyatnitsky, and the ECCI took appropriate security measures in time. In turn, intelligence also sought to get rid of obsessive supporters of the "struggle against world capital", who, at the instigation of the police, tried to infiltrate the ranks of foreign agents of the GPU, posing as "representatives of the Comintern". Therefore, it is not surprising if the OMS of the Comintern followed this kind of request:

"To the Comintern, comrade. Pyatnitsky

INO GPU asks urgently to inform whether a certain anarchist under the surname Baron was sent abroad for illegal work with the knowledge of the Comintern.

In case of confirmation of the Baron's sending abroad, please let us know what instructions were given to him and for what work he was intended.

## Beginning INO GPU Trilisser"

The mutual and purely confidential nature of the exchange of operational information between Soviet foreign intelligence and the leadership of the Comintern made it possible to avoid complications for the world communist organization in cases where a provocateur or agent of special services penetrated the leadership of the Communist Party of a particular country. It was about such a deeply embedded agent of the British special services in the leadership of the British Communists that G.M. urgently reported. Dimitrov, the head of the INO Fitin, only three days after the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR on June 25, 1941.

## "ECCI, Dimitrov - Fitin

The London organization has a secret member of the British Communist Party, Tom Dreiberg, who works in the editorial office of the Daily Express newspaper under the pseudonym William Hickay. Dreiberg enjoys a good reputation with the party leadership. It has been established that Dreiberg is a provocateur and an agent of British intelligence."

On the above document, the resolution of G.M. Dimitrova: "Reported to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of England."

Having sources in the British secret services, the foreign intelligence of the USSR informed the British communists about other dangers threatening them.

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"Fitin to Dimitrov Top secret. Only personally.

According to the completely reliable data we received, British counterintelligence installed microphones in the premises belonging to the British Communist Party.

As a result of this event, counterintelligence received records of conversations conducted in these premises by leading officials of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of England.

In October 1997, British counterintelligence declassified and made public documents more than half a century old, confirming the fact that the British secret services were spying on the leaders of the local Communist Party. The declassified documents, in particular, spoke of the recruitment of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) as a secret informant for the personal secretary of the Secretary General of the Communist Party of Great Britain, Harry Pollit, who supplied the British secret services with current party materials passing through her hands.

If eavesdropping and spying on the British communists was unlikely to threaten their lives in the literal sense, then such actions against the Bulgarian communists by the Gestapo during the war years led to inevitable death. This was reported by the head of the INO Fitin to the General Secretary of the Comintern G. Dimitrov in November 1942: "We have received a message that the Gestapo branch in Sofia has established the location of a secret radio station associated with one of the illegal organizations of the Bulgarian Communist Party.

It can be seen from the report that one of the Gestapo agents 13A managed to join the ranks of the organization, so that the members of the organization are on the eve of their arrest.

Unfortunately, this message came too late. Here is the text of the message from the NKVD of the USSR about the fate of the Bulgarian anti-fascists: "We received a message from Sofia that the death sentence against 18 people of Soviet paratroopers - Bulgarians and those who helped them - was carried out. The names of those who were shot are not known. The colonel who carried out this death sentence stated that he was greatly impressed by the courage with which the condemned went to the execution. Proudly raising their heads, they died shouting "Long live free Bulgaria!", "Long live the Soviet Union and victory over fascism!"

With a trembling hand, G.M. Dimitrov left his initials on Fitin's letter. What can you say?

The victory over fascism required incredible efforts not only from the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, but also from those seemingly purely polar political forces within the country that traditionally opposed each other in peacetime. On June 1, 1942, the head of Soviet foreign intelligence, Pavel Fitin, was satisfied

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informed Georgy Dimitrov by word of mouth that the American Cominternites were taking an active part in the work to expose the Nazi agents operating in the United States. The head of the Soviet intelligence service wrote, in particular, that the party secretary in Chicago and Detroit had given the Federal Bureau of Investigation information about Nazi agents and their activities. The letter expressed the positive point of view of the American Communist Party on the need to transfer information to the federal authorities and government organizations about the activities of the fascist "fifth column" in the United States.

With the outbreak of World War II, when many European states were occupied, the flow of information to Moscow about the state of affairs in the communist parties and organizations of these countries was noticeably reduced. During this period, the Cominternists of the United States of America filled in the information gap, significantly increasing the volume of information of interest to Moscow. The Comintern archive has preserved a large selection of "accompaniment messages" about the sending of special cipher materials from the headquarters of the Soviet foreign intelligence to the ECCI. Here is one of those documents:

"ECCI, comrade Dimitrov.

At the same time, we are sending two cipher telegrams received for you from New York. The telegram text consists of 179 groups. Fitin".

Correspondence between the Executive Committee of the Comintern and the intelligence "community" of the USSR did not always contain major and fundamental problems. It is not difficult to imagine what a dead end the request from the NKVD put to the ECCI to send, if possible, a kilogram of seeds ... of a rubber tree "for testing". The author of the request, Assistant Head of INO Loginov, wrote in all seriousness in a cover letter to the Comintern: "At the same time, it would be desirable to know the exact name of the plant to which the seeds belong, the time and place of their collection. In view of the sensitivity of these seeds to low temperatures, pom. early INO, - it is necessary to protect them from the cold.

The secret of such a message turned out to be quite simple: at one of the regular meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, among other things, the question of the possibility of growing rubber plants in the Soviet Union was discussed.

In dealing with the leaders of the USSR special services, the ECCI often showed a "fighting character". In his letter to Pavel Sudoplatov on September 6, 1941, Georgy Dimitrov without further ado demanded, for example, that the members of the Austrian Communist Party "mobilized by you" be immediately sent back to the ECCI. analo

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In August 1942, G. Dimitrov sent a logical request, however, this time with explanations and in a softer tone, to the leadership of the NKVD.

"Comrade Hans Iloganovich Mayer, a member of the Communist Party of Germany since 1931, a former volunteer of the International Brigades in Spain, who worked at the Fraser plant in Tomsk together with his wife P.I. Mayer, was mobilized for work. In connection with the fact that he is a reserve of the Communist Party of Germany and is scheduled for use by the party, I ask for your order to demobilize him together with his wife and return to his former place of work.

The interaction between the Comintern and the Soviet secret services, judging by the documents of the Archive, brought tangible results in practical work against the special services of the Axis countries. Characteristic in this regard is the story of the Comintern receiving Japanese military ciphers:

"Dimitrov - Beria

Arriving Chinese comrade. Chou En-lai brought with him three types of cipher used by the Japanese army. These ciphers were captured by the 8th Army in battles with the Japanese.

Believing that these ciphers may be of interest to you, I am sending them to you with an attachment to this letter.

With comradely greetings 15.[X.39 G. Dimitrov»

After the start of the Great Patriotic War, sabotage schools were created in summer cottages near Moscow, where they were trained before a group of Comintern soldiers were sent behind enemy lines. In ordinary, unremarkable village huts, where "partisans" lived, as the all-knowing local boys called them, there was a "national life" of its own. Czechs, Poles, Austrians, and Germans had the opportunity, of course, separately from each other for the purpose of secrecy, to speak their native language, read literature, and in the evenings, having gathered all together, sing their favorite melodies and folk songs. Sometimes young people (and they were the majority) went outside to throw snowballs in winter or do their exercises and wander around the forest edge under the rays of the spring sun. All these "partisans" were registered with the Comintern, and if the NKVD needed help in organizing a special detachment of foreigners to prepare for being thrown into the rear of the Nazis, the leadership of Soviet intelligence, in particular Pavel Fitin, invariably turned to the ECCI for this kind of assistance:

"Fitin - Dimitrov (personally only)

In the near future, we urgently need to train 2-3 people to carry out a very important task in the territory of Ger

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mania on our line. These comrades are destined for an independent leading role, therefore, in addition to knowing the language and the country, they must have a sufficient cultural level, be politically prepared, and it is desirable that they go willingly to work specifically along our line.

Fitin"

Successful work of intelligence agents abroad required not only political and linguistic training and the desire of the Comintern to help Soviet foreign intelligence. Appropriate documentation was also needed. Therefore, it is no coincidence that one of the typical letters on this issue has been preserved in the Archives of the Comintern:

"IKKI, comrade. Pyatnitsky

INO OGPU needs to send one of its employees abroad, for which it is required to provide this comrade with foreign documents. The surname for which the passport will be issued is indifferent, but it is necessary that the passport matches the age of the employee (35 years).

This comrade is fluent in English, French and German.

Since we ourselves are not able to provide the comrade with the relevant documents, we turn to you with this request, hoping that you are able to fulfill it.

Beginning INO OGPU July 11, 1924 Trilisser "

..Documents, documents, documents... And each of them, even though insignificant at first glance in content and written in the clerical language of its time, is a kind of colored stone in a large-scale mosaic of relations between Soviet intelligence and the Comintern. It was an alliance of like-minded people, if you like, fellow soldiers, in the fight against fascism, where faith in the ideals of social justice was combined with heroic everyday life and selfless courage.

Many young employees who entered Soviet intelligence in the late 1920s and early 1930s wrote in their questionnaires: "I worked in the foreign apparatus of the Comintern." One of these "recruits" was Arnold Deutsch.

The name of Arnold Deutsch, the son of a Slovak teacher, disappeared from the party lists of the Austrian Comintern members at the very beginning of the 1930s. No, he did not break with the revolutionary movement, he did not stop believing in the socialist idea, he was not repressed. It's just that he, a graduate of the University of Vienna with a Ph.D.

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sciences, came to the "Mecca of world communism" - Moscow, where, on the recommendation of party comrades, he was invited under the name of Stefan Lang to work in Soviet intelligence.

Stefan Lang, perhaps like no one else, was suitable for this role. Excellently educated, with an excellent knowledge of several European languages, from his youth he took part in the revolutionary youth movement in Vienna, and when he joined the Communist Party in 1924 at the age of twenty, the Austrian illegal section of the Comintern attracted him as a courier and a liaison for secret contacts with communist organizations in Syria, Romania, Palestine, Greece. It was during trips to these countries that Lang learned in practice what turnout, a password, avoiding surveillance by special services, and other wisdom of intelligence skills ...

The personnel practice of the Comintern was by no means a one-way street towards the Soviet secret services. The people of the Comintern successfully worked in the Soviet party and state bodies both in the country and abroad. Teachers of higher educational institutions, scientists of academic institutions, employees of the planning bodies of the country and, of course, many Soviet diplomats of the old school considered the school of the Comintern to be their "alma mater". Cases of movement in the other direction are also known. Personnel officers of the Foreign Department of the Cheka-OGPU left operational work "for civilian life". One of these international and completely civil institutions was the ECCI - the Executive Committee of the Communist International.

In May 1943, the Soviet newspapers announced the dissolution of the Comintern. This was a big surprise. Immediately there was talk: Stalin no longer needed the Communist International. But the decision to dissolve itself, judging by the documents of the Archive of the Comintern, belonged not only to Stalin. A draft of a preliminary, pre-prepared telegram by G.M. Dimitrov, addressed to foreign organizations that were members of the Communist International. Here is its text: "The Presidium of the ECCI will publish on May 22 (1943—author's note) proposals to the sections on the dissolution of the Comintern as the leading center of the international workers' movement. The proposal is mainly motivated by the fact that this centralized organizational form of international association has ceased to meet the needs of the further development of the communist parties of individual countries, as well as national workers' parties, and is even an obstacle to this. Please urgently discuss this proposal in the Central Committee and communicate your decision. Dimitrov.

This was done two years before the end of the war, when the help of the Comintern in the struggle of the allies against fascism seemed difficult.

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was overrated. But, obviously, the Soviet leadership and the leadership of the Comintern began to look at the upcoming development of events in the world with the same eyes and, having weighed all the pros and cons, made their decision. Moreover, the question of a world "permanent" revolution is no longer rose.

More than seventy years separate us today from the events of 1943. Comintern names have almost disappeared from the streets of cities, enterprises and construction sites. And only in the recesses of the archives and the imperishable memory of people - of that Comintern generation - are the memories of the soldiers of the Cheka, intelligence and the Comintern, who selflessly, hand in hand fought with a common enemy, still stored.

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### Confrontation with fascist agents in Iran

During the Second World War, Iran played a key role in the Near and Middle East, and therefore intelligence work in this country was given paramount attention. On September 22, 1941 and March 5, 1942, the leadership of the NKVD of the USSR specifically considered the proposals of foreign intelligence "On strengthening the operational-Chekist work on the territory of Iran". Appropriate decisions were made. And in the subsequent war years, this issue was repeatedly discussed at the level of the leadership of the department and reported to the State Defense Committee of the USSR, as evidenced by the archives of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service.

In Tehran, the main residency was created, headed by the famous intelligence officer I.I. Agayants. It subordinated peripheral residencies and intelligence posts, the number of which fluctuated in different years from 35 to 41, they employed 120 operational officers. Intelligence tasks were defined specifically and clearly. The priority task was to create "a network of agents in order to identify foreign intelligence agents, organizations hostile to the USSR, to prevent possible sabotage and other subversive work aimed at disrupting the military and economic measures carried out by the USSR in Iran."

And this problem was solved: in a numerous network of agents (the archival files of the SVR called the figure - up to 400 agents) consisted of influential and well-informed persons from different strata of Iranian society, capable of solving intelligence tasks. At the same time, there were also quite a few random people involved in cooperation to perform one-time tasks under the conditions of the military control of the Red Army over the northern provinces of Iran. This predetermined the need for periodic "cleansing" of the agent network and the conservation of dozens

agents.

In the decisions taken by the leadership of the NKVD of the USSR, the requirement of "timely detection of German and Japanese

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intelligence officers and their agents", re-recruitment of some of them and the creation of combat groups from experienced NKVD workers. They were entrusted with "the selection of agents from the local population capable of performing special tasks" - to identify and prevent the penetration of spies, saboteurs, terrorists and emissaries of hostile organizations into the USSR. The task was also set of "collecting political, economic and military information", active work "to consolidate by all possible means the social and official position of people oriented towards the USSR". Other areas of activity of foreign intelligence in Iran were also identified. All the most significant operations were to be carried out only with the sanction of the NKVD. In May 1942, foreign intelligence proposals were approved on "contacting our work in Iran with the British."

During the years of the war, the residencies in Iran managed to obtain a large amount of important military and political information, including documentary information, and thanks to their efforts, the country's leadership was informed on the main issues affecting the interests and security of the USSR.



The intrigues and activities of the German intelligence services in Iran as a whole were thwarted, and this, undoubtedly, is a great merit of the operational staff of the residencies. In those years, experienced and capable scouts P.I. Zhuravlev, N.P. Lysenkov, V.I. Vertiporoh, R.I. Inoyatov, G.I. Akzhigitov, N.P. Pekelnik, A.P. Mangasarov, G.I. Olifirenko and others.

Iran was given an important role in Hitler's plans. Iran is primarily oil and strategic communications. The way to Afghanistan and further to India lay through this country, where the Nazis intended to move the Wehrmacht troops after the defeat of the USSR.

The participation of Finland in the war on the side of Germany, the capture of Norway and Spitsbergen by the Germans greatly complicated the possibility of using the sea roads leading to the northern ports of the USSR. Iran with its non-freezing Persian Gulf and the railway that crossed its entire territory from south to north could and has become a strategic route for the supply of arms, ammunition, food, medicines, raw materials, fuel and other Lend-Lease goods to the Soviet Union necessary for waging war. This circumstance, of course, was taken into account by Hitler and the command of the Wehrmacht.

The closer the Second World War was, the stronger Reza Shah Pahlavi, the dictator of Iran, gravitated towards Berlin, rapprochement with Germany in all areas, and especially in the military. In April-June 1940 alone, more than 3,000 machine guns and artillery pieces were delivered from Germany to Iran. Deliveries of weapons and ammunition continued into 1941. At the military enterprises of the country then

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56 German specialists were employed, dozens of German advisers and instructors worked in the Iranian army, gendarmerie and police. On the eve of World War II, more than 6,500 German citizens entered Iran. In 1940-1941, Germany accounted for 45.5% of Iran's total trade turnover, while the USSR - 11%, and Britain - 4%. More than half of the machinery and equipment at the country's largest enterprises and three-quarters of all steam locomotives, almost all the staff of the Iranian Central Railway Administration were German. On the trans-Iranian railway, the Germans worked at all levels, up to the locomotive brigades. Leading posts in 50 state institutions of Iran were occupied by pro-fascist elements and agents of the Nazi secret services.

In the pre-war years, Iran essentially turned into a springboard for hostile actions against the USSR, which was largely facilitated by the pro-German sentiments of the aged Reza Shah. Chargé d'affaires a.i. in Iran, Engert, wrote to Washington in September 1940: "Fear of Communism led the Shah to hope that only Hitler could now defend Iran from a Bolshevik invasion." Through a network of agents created in advance and numerous agents of influence, the Nazis influenced the top of Iran, the command of the armed forces, the gendarmerie and the police. The Iranian author D. Amini claims that "fascist agents were among the ministers, deputies of the Majlis, generals, government officials, merchants and industrialists." The territory of Iran was used for conducting espionage and subversive work against the USSR and disorganization of the most important areas of the Soviet rear. The Tehran residency reported to the Center in 1941: "The Germans from Iran are in charge of intelligence working in the USSR; the Germans 'fly' from Iran to the USSR and back like locusts." The German ambassador von Ettel himself held an SS officer rank.

On September 4, 1939, with the outbreak of the Second World War, the Iranian government declared its neutrality, but in fact openly continued to follow the pro-German course. The British envoy in Tehran, Bullard, assessed the Iranian policy of that time as follows: "Iran was officially neutral, but nothing could make the Iranians truly neutral."

Even before the invasion of German troops into the Soviet Union, the Tehran residency sent several important messages to Moscow about the preparation of the Nazis for an attack on the USSR. This information was based on the facts of the activation of the German special services and their agents in

areas bordering the Soviet Union, where, with their direct participation, armed detachments were formed to act against our state. One of the messages was based on information received by our agent from a British intelligence officer in Tehran,

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who told him in detail about the "Hess mission" and his negotiations with the British leadership. The Englishman emphasized that Hitler planned an attack on the USSR in the spring of 1941, and this was discussed in negotiations with Hess. Unfortunately, these and other messages were ignored. After the start of the war, the residency wrote bitterly to the Center: "We informed you about German activity in a timely manner and, to our surprise, received the answer: "The material is of no interest."

Iran moved further and further away from its declared neutrality. On June 25, 1941, Berlin demanded by note that the Iranian government would enter the war on the side of Germany. Reza Shah hesitated, but the supreme military council he convened rejected this demand - 24 votes against and 16 in favor. On August 17, Ambassador von Ettel offered Reza Shah military assistance, but the Nazis simultaneously launched a conspiracy to overthrow the Iranian dictator, who did not dare to enter the war. In early August 1941, the chief of military intelligence (Abwehr), Admiral Canaris, secretly came to Tehran to prepare a coup. The operation was scheduled for August 22, and then was postponed to August 28. On August 23, Hitler addressed a personal message to Reza Shah, in which he urged him "not to give in to pressure from the USSR and England, since Germany will soon occupy the southern regions of the Soviet Union."

The Soviet government could not remain indifferent to the developments in Iran. It warned the Iranian government three times - on June 26, July 19 and August 16 (moreover, on July 19 and August 16 together with England) about the threat of involving Iran in the war and drew its attention to the danger posed by espionage and sabotage work. fascist agents on its territory. Since our demarches were ignored and the situation continued to deteriorate, Moscow, in agreement with London and Washington, decided to send Red Army units to Iran in strict accordance with Article 6 of the 1921 Treaty, of which it notified the Iranian government with a note dated August 25, 1941 of the year.

The note stated: "German agents in the most rude and shameless manner ... have turned the territory of Iran into a preparation for a military attack on the Soviet Union ... This requires the Soviet government to immediately implement all those measures that it does not only has the right, but also the obligation to accept in self-defence. The note named fascist agents engaged in subversive work against the USSR: von Radanovich, Gamota, Mayer, Sapov, Bor, Kellinger, Tryappe and others.

Von Ettel handed Hitler's message to Reza Shah on the morning of August 25, but it was too late, and the Iranian dictator directly told the German diplomat about this: "The situation has changed radically." The fact is that in the very early morning, a couple of hours before the visit of von Et

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tel, Reza Shah was visited by the Ambassador of the USSR A.A. Smirnov and British envoy Bullard and handed him notes from their governments on the entry of Soviet and British troops into Iran.

By September 1941, a Soviet strike force consisting of two armies occupied the northern provinces of Iran, while units of British troops entered the southwestern provinces. Soviet and British units united in the Qazvin region, south of Tehran, and on September 17 entered the Iranian capital. Despite the order of Reza Shah to provide armed resistance to the Russians, the soldiers of the Iranian army scattered at the first meetings with the Red Army, and its entry into Iran passed without losses. At the end of 1942, without any contractual formalization, under the pretext of ensuring the security of the delivery of military cargo for the USSR, units of American troops entered Iran, occupying the ports of Bandar Shahpur and Khorramshahr.

In accordance with the agreement concluded between the representatives of the USSR, Great Britain and Iran on September 8, 1941, the Iranian government was to expel the military and diplomatic missions of the states of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis from the country, as well as transfer to the disposal of the allied powers for the internment of members of the German colony in Iran. Tehran undertook to do everything possible to facilitate the transportation of Anglo-American goods for the USSR through Iranian territory and to prevent any actions that would harm the interests of the USSR and England during the war. In January 1942, the Treaty of Alliance between the USSR, Great Britain and Iran was concluded, according to which Iran was to "assist the USSR and Great Britain in the fight against fascist Germany by all available means and in all possible ways."

Thus, as a result of the active policy of the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition, the contribution of Iran, which, without a single shot being fired, became a participant in the war against Germany and acquired rights and advantages as an ally of the victorious states, was quite significant.

Although the Soviet-British military action turned the tide in Iran, the entry of troops, the treaties and agreements concluded by themselves could not yet ensure the defeat of the positions that the Nazi special services and their Iranian accomplices had acquired in this country. A tough confrontation with the Abwehr of Canaris and the political intelligence of Schellenberg (SD) in Iran continued almost until the end of the WAR.

Franz Mayer (real name Richard August), according to some sources, the SS Sturmbannführer, was the main representative of the UI Directorate of the SS Imperial Security Main Office (RSHA), the political intelligence of the SD, in Tehran during the war years. In the archives

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The SVR has no information about under what cover Mayer arrived in Iran along with another SS man, Roman Gamota, in October 1940. It is possible that he, like Gamota, used the "roof" of the transport office "Iran-Express". By the time Mayer arrived, he was 37 years old. He was a tall man with a round face, blue eyes, long slicked back hair, a scar stretching from the left eye to the ear, a short ring finger on his left hand, burn marks on his chest - the result of a wound received in Poland. Such was the verbal portrait of a German intelligence officer, preserved in the archives of foreign intelligence, compiled by the residency when he was put on the wanted list in Iran.

In September 1939-February 1940 Mayer was in Moscow as an expert for the Reichsgruppe Industrie. Returning to Berlin, he presented a report on the political, military and economic potential of the USSR, which was sent to the main ministries of the Third Reich and German foreign missions. He criticized the assertions of the Russian white emigration that an anti-Bolshevik uprising was brewing in the USSR, emphasizing that there were no prerequisites for this. Mayer argued that the Soviet Army was strong and the economy of the USSR was on the rise. The report was not liked by the Nazi elite, but was met with approval in the German missions abroad.

As follows from the archival materials of the SVR, the British who arrested Mayer in 1943 characterized him as "a young, energetic, hysterical, courageous man, a typical SS man, a fanatic of National Socialism, posing as a superman." The German Geier, who knew Mayer well and was arrested by the NKVD, said of him: "One of the smartest people I have ever met." He was fluent in Persian, loved the game of backgammon, which is popular in Iran. Mayer was a skilled conspirator, professionally detecting the surveillance established for him and deftly evading surveillance. He often used camouflage, changed his appearance, and often wore the uniform of an officer of the Iranian General Staff.

Mayer and Gamota arrived in Iran without receiving specific assignments in Berlin; they had to familiarize themselves with the situation and receive the corresponding instructions later. After the introduction of allied troops into Iran in September 1941, which was unexpected for the Germans, Mayer remained

no connection to Berlin. For three months he hid in the Armenian cemetery in Tehran under the guise of a gravedigger, and then, with the help of pro-fascist elements, he managed to find refuge in the city and began active work in the underground. Mayer was convinced that 1942 would bring a final victory to the German arms, and decided by all means available to him "to help his comrades on the Eastern Front and raise his ak

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tions in Berlin. He managed to establish radio contact with Berlin, and he began to work energetically on the formation of pro-fascist Iranian nationalist organizations, hostile to both England and Russia.

In Tehran and other cities of Iran, pro-German nationalist parties and groups soon arose and began to rapidly gain strength and influence, after some time their number reached 20. The main among them were the Blue Party and the "e-Kabut" and "Melliyun-e-Iran"). The first was headed by the deputy of the Majlis Noubakht, who studied in Germany in his youth and translated Hitler's book *Mein Kampf* into Persian in the 1930s. He was a tall, imposing, already elderly man, domineering, ambitious and distrustful of people. Nowubakht was a fanatical nationalist who hated the British. In the country he was known as a public figure, a writer and a wealthy man. He soon managed to gather up to three thousand supporters under his banner and put together a clandestine, strictly centralized party. Organizationally, it consisted of fives, the highest governing body was the Central Section (CS), with which only the older fives were connected. Each member of the CA supervised the activities of 50 "quintuples", i.e. 250 party members. In addition to the CA, there were also military, civil, and tribal affairs sections. Each party member took an oath of allegiance and received a blue registration card.

Nowubakht defined the goals of the party as follows: "To seize power in their hands from the government, which is powerless to resist the harassment of the allies and becomes a toy in their hands." The residency reported to the Center in 1942: "The "Blue Party" aims to expel the Anglo-Soviet troops from Iran, organize the nationalist forces of Iran to fight the Anglo-Soviet occupation, prepare the soil in Iran for the seizure of power, jointly with the German army a blow to the rear of the allies, the fight against the government, powerless to counteract the Anglo-Soviet pressure and interference in the internal affairs of Iran. The well-known Iranian generals Zahedi, Yazdanpanakh, Razmara, Arfa, Hedayat and others fell into the orbit of the party's influence. The young Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi sympathized in his heart with the Blue Party, which was formally part of the pro-fascist Iranian nationalist block Melliyun-e-Iran. This gave grounds to our residency on August 15, 1942, assessing the situation in the country, to state: "Officers can become the most dangerous part of the "fifth column" in Iran."

Mayer was most directly involved in the formation of these organizations, he personally prepared a program for "Melliyun-e-Iran" based on the principles of National Socialism, came up with an emblem that looks like a fascist swastika, developed

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military uniform - boots, black breeches, blue shirt. He prudently outlined a detailed action plan for these organizations on an all-Iranian scale. Mayer received such messages from the localities, for example: "We have hidden 30,000 rifles and 2 million rounds of ammunition for Tehran. Send money and weapons, and we guarantee the presence of 150 thousand people - half from the tribes, half from the military. Or: "In Tehran, the head of the central arsenal, Colonel Bagai, upon an agreed signal, will open access to the arsenal to representatives of pro-German units and organizations and issue them 30,000 rifles and 20 million rounds of ammunition."

In the middle of 1943, the residency informed the Center that as a result of operational measures, including through the introduction of reliable agents into the pro-fascist organizations, "more than 200 of the most significant members of the Blue Party were identified, its main

branches in Tehran, Rezaya, Mian, Tabriz, Kerman Shah, Ardabil. Concrete assistance in this matter, along with others, was provided by an Iranian colonel, a future general, our agent Khan, who, on instructions from the residency, infiltrated the Blue Party and in many ways contributed to identifying its members and exposing their activities. In August of the same year, 167 activists of these organizations were arrested, but until the end of 1943 the "Blue Party" and "Melliyun-e-Iran" remained a powerful force hostile to the anti-Hitler coalition and allied policy in Iran. In the fight against pro-fascist formations, our intelligence interacted with the British and exchanged information with it.

Another active German intelligence officer was Abwehr Major Berthold Schulze-Holthus, an expert on the USSR who spoke Russian. He showed up in Iran in early 1941 under the name of Bruno Schulze as an expert on school and religion, and a few months later he was already working under the cover of the German Consulate General in Tabriz. The Abwehr's resident in Tehran was Shpekt under the "roof" of the commercial attaché of the German embassy. After his expulsion from Iran, Schulze-Holthus, having gone underground, in agreement with Mayer, took over the leadership of the Abwehr intelligence network in the south of the country. After the introduction of allied troops into Iran, he was temporarily interned at the Swedish embassy, from where, however, he soon fled and took refuge in the province of Fars with the Qashqai tribes hostile to Tehran. Before the closure of the Japanese embassy in Tehran, Japanese intelligence managed to render him concrete assistance, supplying him with five radio stations, with the help of which he established contact with Berlin. The Blue Party provided assistance to both Mayer and Schulze-Holthus.

The lack of logistics, financial resources, the disruption of established communications with agents - all this seriously affected the work of the Nazi secret services. Hostile, and sometimes hostile relations that existed between departments

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Schellenberg and Canaris, further complicated the matter. Schulze-Holthus had an extremely negative attitude towards Mayer, who paid him the same coin.

Having escaped from the Swedish embassy, Schulze-Holthus changed into Iranian national clothes, grew a beard, dyed it with henna, and under the guise of a mullah appeared at the residence of the leader of the Qashqai tribes, Nasyr Khan. Later, a group of saboteurs led by SS Obersturmführer Martin Kurmis was parachuted to him, whose task was sabotage and sabotage in southern Iran. Prior to his arrival in Iran, Kurmis "distinguished himself" by taking part in the extermination of Jews in the Kaunas ghetto. In 1944, when the defeat of fascist Germany in the war became irreversible, Nasyr Khan betrayed the "guests" to the British. Kurmis, knowing that there would be no mercy for him, committed suicide, and Schulze-Holthus, after serving his sentence, wrote thick memoirs.

A prominent figure in German intelligence was SD officer Roman Gamota, who worked in Iran under the "roof" of the Iran-Express office. He was about 40 years old, he had a reputation as an organizer of underground movements and an expert in partisan struggle, spoke Russian, and traveled a lot around Iran. Gamota was personally known to the leaders of the Third Reich. In May 1943, Himmler wrote to Hitler: "Although the enemies have put a high price on Gamota's head and his life has been repeatedly endangered, after recovering from malaria, he intends to return to Iran." It was about his participation in Operation Long Jump – that was the name of the plan to assassinate the leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition during the Tehran Conference. In August 1943, Gamota landed by parachute in the Tehran region, contacted Mayer and joined in the preparation of a terrorist act. Following him, a group of saboteur paratroopers from the team of Hitler's favorite Otto Skorzeny, who personally organized the assassination, was dropped near Kuma Lake. After the failure of Operation Long Jump, Gamota fled Iran and was arrested in Austria after the war.

SS-Sturmbannführer Ulrich von Ortel also worked in Iran, the same one who, in Rovno, let slip to our intelligence agent Nikolai Kuznetsov about the impending assassination attempt on the Big Three in Tehran.

SD officers Paul Veyzatsek and Francek Emerik Istvan, who were arrested by the Soviet security forces after the entry of troops into Iran, carried out spies and spies in Baku, Tbilisi, Ashgabat. In addition to them, until September 1941, dozens of other Abwehr and SD intelligence officers operated in Iran under the cover of various German firms and offices: for example, von Radanovich was the head of the Siemens representative office, his deputy Kevkin, just like him, worked for exploration, the heads of the Iran-Express office in the port of Pahlavi (Anzeli) Wolf and Rutenberg were responsible for exploration work on the Caspian coast.

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There is also an opportunity to tell about several episodes of the selfless activities of a group of young people, almost teenagers, who voluntarily, disinterestedly and enthusiastically helped the Tehran residency in the fight against the fascist special services and their wide network of agents. A group of seven people was led by the future Hero of the Soviet Union, a major intelligence officer, Amir, who at that time was only 17 years old.

He devoted his life to intelligence from his youth, carried out its tasks for many years in difficult conditions, and to this day continues his noble service. His operational biography is rich and instructive, but in this essay we will touch only on its first pages.

Amir found himself in Iran at the age of six, when his parents arrived in Tabriz from Rostov-on-Don. His father was an Iranian citizen and left the USSR on the instructions of foreign intelligence. Over time, he firmly settled in Iran and became a successful businessman, acquired an effective network of agents and with its help provided significant assistance to illegal Soviet intelligence officers, solved many important operational tasks. He almost never used the financial resources of the Center, managed with the money that he earned

myself.

True, there were exceptions: on suspicion of being connected with Soviet intelligence, he was arrested several times, was imprisoned, but each time he was released after two or three months, since the Iranian authorities could not prove the charges against him. During such periods, the family experienced financial difficulties, and the Center came to the rescue. Employees of our residency transferred some amounts of money to Amir's mother.

The son recalls that his father was a true patriot of Soviet Russia, and he raised his children in this spirit. It was under the influence of his father that Amir became a scout, and the fact that he achieved great success in the field of intelligence is, no doubt, a considerable merit of his father. All his children provided assistance to Soviet intelligence, but only Amir became a professional intelligence officer.

He connected his fate with intelligence in February 1940, when he voluntarily established direct contact with the Tehran residency. I.I., who headed foreign intelligence in Iran during the war, played a big role in his life. Agayants. Ivan Ivanovich left a deep mark on the history of Soviet intelligence not only by his deeds, but also by his remarkable personal qualities. He was a charming man. Everyone who had a chance to work or communicate with him remembers his eyes - intelligent, soft, even affectionate, attentive, but immediately becoming cold, impenetrable and aloof if he encountered dishonesty, meanness or dishonesty. He had a rare intuition and insight in working with people who paid him respect and love.

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It is to Ivan Ivanovich that Amir owes the fact that the hard and dangerous work in intelligence was painted for him in those harsh years in the tones of heroic romanticism, and he realized once and for all that it can bring deep satisfaction if it benefits the Fatherland and serves noble people. goals. At first, the young man was instructed to select several reliable comrades, his peers, and organize a group to assist senior colleagues from the residency.

in identifying numerous fascist collaborators in Tehran and other cities.

Soon he managed to attract to this cause seven friends and like-minded people who were ready to fight against fascism. As is customary in intelligence, everyone received pseudonyms. They were young, courageous and willingly engaged in work, often associated with risk. A lot of time and attention was paid to the formation and training of the group in the residency, and once it was jokingly dubbed the "light cavalry". This name was firmly attached to it, and perhaps the reason was that the "seven" moved around the city on bicycles, it had no other means of transport, and only in 1942 did it have a captured German motorbike. Gradually, the group turned into an outdoor surveillance brigade and at the same time, in modern terms, into a rapid reaction detachment, composed of "combat agents capable of performing special tasks." For a good ten years, the group actively worked against the German secret services in Iran, against anti-Soviet nationalist organizations and Iranian pro-fascist formations.

Archival files of foreign intelligence impartially testify to the effectiveness of the work of the "seven": in a couple of years, with its help, at least 400 persons were identified, one way or another connected with the German intelligence services. It is clear that the "cavalrymen" acted on tips from the residency, but sometimes they independently contacted German accomplices and reported them to their curators from the residency.

The primitive equipment and the young age of the group members did a good job: the objects of observation, as a rule, did not pay attention to the cyclists, and they certainly could not assume that some boys were watching them. In the meantime, that's exactly what happened. Wartime, among other things, dictated its own, sometimes cruel requirements, and the "cavalrymen" more than once had to take risks and participate in sharp actions.

After the Allied troops entered Iran, the identified German agents were arrested, some of them were deported to the USSR, and some were handed over to the British. Thus, 3 generals of the Iranian army, 10 colonels, 27 officers of other ranks, 62 railway employees, 48 civilians were arrested in the case of the "Melliyun-e Iran" organization. Many, however, managed to escape. Separate at

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Nazi servants were recruited and began to work under the control of our intelligence. The British did the same. It can be said that the paralysis of the activities of the underground pro-fascist organizations operating throughout the country was a crushing blow to the German intelligence services in Iran: they could not fully reveal their potential to solve the tasks assigned to them, including to carry out the assassination attempt. meeting with the "Big Three" in Tehran in late November - early December 1943. Young scouts from Amir's group also contributed to the achievement of this goal.

It was they who eventually tracked down Mayer, who was hiding in Tehran. However, our intelligence failed to capture it. This figure was not only of interest to us, the British were also hunting for Mayer, who turned out to be more agile and arrested him right in front of the residency capture group. The British ferried him to India, where the traces of the German intelligence officer were lost. At the same time, two of his radio operators were arrested - SS Oberscharführer Holzapfel and SS Unterscharführer Rokstrok. The work of the "cavalrymen" was not in vain: during the search for Mayer, his accomplices from among the Iranians were identified, who provided him with shelter. Among them were Kodsi, a well-known dentist in Tehran, Keihani, a former teacher of Persian at the German embassy, and Ramazani, director of the Ibn Sina public library. With the help of the Seven, Mayer's chief assistant, his "right hand", Ogto Engelke, was discovered and arrested. Having lost leadership and radio communications, by the end of 1943, German intelligence sharply weakened its activities.

Even before these arrests, the residency received information that a certain German businessman, who received the code name "Pharmacist", was active in intelligence activities and secretly met with high-ranking Iranians. However, to obtain evidence

this was not possible: shadowing him did not give the desired results. The German liked to walk around the city, went to cafes, visited cinemas, wandered around the famous Tehran bazaar, but did not meet with anyone, speaking professionally, "did not give connections." There was something to break the head of the members of Amir's group watching the "Pharmacist".

There was something mysterious in this story, and the guys from the "seven" decided that it makes sense to find out what the German does when he is at home. Carefully examining everything around his mansion, they found suitable places from where they could see the garden and pool in the courtyard, entrances and exits. All this was clearly visible from the roofs of neighboring houses, where the observers climbed. Imagine their amazement when they saw that there was another tenant in the mansion, similar to the "Pharmacist", like two drops of water. It turned out that they were twin brothers, and German intelligence took advantage of

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this circumstance: one of the brothers went to the city and led the surveillance team behind him, and the other, seizing the moment, disappeared from the house and calmly held meetings with the right people. The activities of the intelligence twins, of course, were stopped.

Hans Walter, the owner of a second-hand bookshop, who had settled in Iran for a long time and was fluent in Persian, came to the attention of the residency. Operational data testified that he was a fascist agent and was participating in intelligence operations of the German residency. In particular, attention was drawn to the fact that his store is regularly visited by officers of the Iranian General Staff, who were located nearby. They often visited Walter, dug into books, bought something or sold rare publications to the German. Suspicions arose that Walther's shop served as a "post box" for communication with Mayer's residency. All this needed to be checked.

Amir's group has the store under surveillance. Soon, the "seven" recorded six officers who regularly visited Walter. They did not linger in the shop for long and hardly entered into conversations with the German. The members of the group began to enter the store themselves and quickly became friends with Walter. Sociable Hans turned out to be a talkative person, a lover of drinking and chatting over a glass of beer. Friendship with him allowed the guys to easily come to his store and watch the visitors on the spot.

As a result, it turned out that the second-hand bookshop really served as a transfer point for German agents. Spy materials were placed in books during their viewing and then returned to Walter, and he, in turn, transmitted the information received to the destination. In the same way, the German residency assigned tasks to its agents. Outwardly, all this looked natural and did not arouse suspicion.

Under the influence of alcohol, sociable Hans often indulged in lengthy discussions; his new friends did not cause fear in him. He frankly told them that he did not believe in the victory of Germany and that Hitler's attack on Russia was a fatal mistake of the Fuhrer, which would end in disaster. It is clear that these moods of Hans were reported to the residency. Walter was taken into "development", was soon recruited and began to actively help the Soviet intelligence in exposing the fascist agents.

In the summer of 1943, on the eve of the Tehran Conference of the Heads of the Allied Powers, the "cavalrymen" were the first to obtain important information about the landing of the advanced group of six German "commandos" dropped by parachute in the area of the city of Qom, which is 70 km from the Iranian capital, where they went to communicate with Mayer and Gamota. From the diary of SS-Unterscharführer Rockstrok, who served as the group's radio operator, which was captured during his arrest and has been preserved

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In the archives of the SVR, it is clear that the saboteurs traveled to Tehran for more than two weeks, they had a lot of equipment and weapons: ten camels were heavily loaded. near their capital



met with a truck, on which they placed luggage. The members of the group dressed in Iranian clothes, dyed their hair and quietly settled into a safe house. These tricks, however, did not help: all members of the group were arrested after the work of their radio stations was located and their messages to Berlin were deciphered. The actions of the saboteurs were "under the hood" of the Soviet and British intelligence services, which worked in close coordination in this matter. The German secret services, however, became aware of the failure of the advanced group, and in Berlin they decided to refuse to send the main executors of the Long Jump operation to Tehran. In an interview in 1966, Otto Skorzeny confirmed that he had been instructed by Hitler to organize an assassination attempt on the Big Three in Tehran. The exceptional security measures taken during the conference by the relevant services of the Allies were well founded.

On December 17, 1943, returning to Washington, President Roosevelt made the following statement at a press conference: "Marshal Stalin announced that a conspiracy might be organized to attempt the life of all participants in the conference. He asked me to stay at the Soviet embassy in order to avoid the need to travel around the city ... It would be quite profitable for the Germans if they could deal with Marshal Stalin, Churchill and me while we would drive through the streets of Tehran, since the Soviet and American embassies are separated from each other by a distance of one and a half kilometers. Thanks to the successful work of the intelligence services of the allied powers, including the Amir group, "a rather profitable business for the Germans" failed.

During the war, Great Britain was an ally of the USSR, and its special services cooperated with our intelligence, but this did not prevent them from simultaneously conducting hostile work against us. Thus, in Tehran, the British created an intelligence school in the form of an amateur radio club, in which they organized the education and training of spies and spies to be sent to the territory of the Soviet republics of Central Asia and Transcaucasia. The prudent English gave preference to people who knew Russian when recruiting for school, so as not to waste time and money on studying it by cadets. But you can't hide an awl in a bag, and our residency became aware of the intelligence school. Amir was given the task of infiltrating her, and he succeeded: he was accepted into the audience. Immediately, work began on installing a contingent of school cadets, to which the entire "cavalry brigade" joined. Within two to three weeks, detailed information about the school itself and about its cadets was collected.

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The British took serious measures of secrecy and precautions to hide the existence of the school. The cadets did not know each other, they were divided into pairs, and the class schedule was drawn up so that they did not meet each other. The training period was exactly six months, after which the graduates of the school were usually sent to India, where they continued to improve in espionage and practice skydiving skills. Then they were sent to the USSR to carry out British intelligence assignments. The information collected by Amir was transferred to the residency.

As a result, the British agents - cadets of the school became known to the Center, and the necessary measures were taken to arrest them after they were secretly thrown into the territory of the USSR. Some of the arrested paratroopers were re-recruited, and they began to act under our dictation. In a word, the reconnaissance school began to idle. The British, needless to say, soon became suspicious and realized that something was wrong with their school. They could move the school to some other Iranian city, and it was necessary, without delay, to forestall their possible countermeasures. The Soviet representative met with the official representative of British intelligence in Iran, Colonel Spencer, and in a tactful manner made a presentation to him about the obviously non-allied behavior. Spencer tried to deny everything and said: "Obviously, this is a German school. They are completely insolent, they are acting under our very nose! However, the school soon ceased to exist.

By that time, Amir had already completed his course of study, but, of course, he did not go to India. At school, he received solid operational training, which was useful to him later. He was taught there many tricks of the intelligence trade: two-way radio communications, cryptography, secret operations, the use of ciphers, methods of recruiting agents. To this day, he is grateful to his English teachers: the school was thoroughly organized, and the cadets acquired solid knowledge and skills.

In 1942, Amir attracted a young girl to work in the group, who later became his wife and fighting girlfriend, who went a long way with him in intelligence. They had a chance to work for many years in extreme conditions and difficult conditions in different countries of the world, both were awarded orders and medals. Amir and his wife recently celebrated their golden wedding.

The girl was distinguished by her resourcefulness and observation, she boldly took risks, achieving the precise fulfillment of certain tasks that were entrusted to her. Thanks to her, many fascist agents, as well as traitors, were identified. She was only 16 years old when she managed to prevent two Soviet pilots who had flown on their planes to Iran from Baku to go over to the side of the enemy. Fascist

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Sky agents tried to hide them safely, and the Germans were preparing to secretly smuggle the pilots to Germany, but their shelter was discovered, the deserters were arrested and suffered

punishment.

Once she drew attention to the unusual behavior of two unfamiliar men who periodically appeared in the courtyard of her house in Tehran, brought with them a ladder, some wires, threw them on the roof, and then left somewhere. The strangers seemed suspicious to the girl, and she hurried to report them to the residency. The information was treated with attention and it was decided to establish the place of residence of these men, to conduct a secret search in their apartment. They made the keys and, in the absence of the owners, entered the living quarters, where they found a radio receiver, a radio transmitter, headphones and other accessories for radio communication. It was clear that the strangers were related to intelligence work. They asked Moscow with a proposal to arrest a suspicious couple and find out what was what. The answer was unexpected: these people are known to the Center, and no action should be taken against them. In general, an incident came out of the series "you can't imagine it on purpose!"

The activities of the Amir group, of course, were under the daily control and guardianship of senior comrades from the residency.

The group operated successfully until April 1949. In February of the same year, an unsuccessful attempt was made on the life of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, in which the religious terrorist organization Fedayan-e-Islam (Sacrificing themselves for Islam) was involved. The situation in the country worsened. The residency received signals about the interest of the Iranian counterintelligence and to some members of the "seven". The center instructed to mothball the group.

The last operations of the "light cavalry" date back to the end of the 40s. Iranian-Soviet relations became more and more cool. Numerous consular offices of the USSR in different cities of Iran were closed, interstate and trade relations between the two countries were curtailed.

A noisy anti-Soviet campaign was launched in the Iranian media, and spy mania was fomented. In 1949, a series of articles under the general heading "I was a Soviet spy" appeared in the Tehran-e-Mosavvar magazine in the capital, which, no doubt, was inspired by the special services. Lut, a former agent of the residency, said that he had decided to break with Soviet intelligence and give the Iranian authorities all the information he knew about its activities.

value.

The traitor's revelations, of course, caused some damage to the Tehran residency and made their work even more difficult. It was decided to install Lut, secretly detain him and then illegally transfer him to the Soviet Union. In those years, such methods of intelligence work, including the Soviet one, were still practiced.

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Amir's group was connected to the search for Loot. The "cavalrymen" knew their business perfectly, had a lot of experience, and, despite the fact that the traitor behaved very carefully, often changed his place of residence, was checked when moving around Tehran, used camouflage, he was found quite quickly. His usual routes around the city, the apartments where he lived, the places he liked to visit were established. In general, everything was ready for his capture, and the only thing was the sanction of the Center.

However, the consent of the Center for the operation did not follow, and Moscow offered to leave Lut alone: times have changed, and the Center did not want to aggravate relations with a neighboring country.

Moscow highly appreciated the work of foreign intelligence in Iran during the Second World War, noting that the Tehran residency made a great contribution to the timely identification and disruption of Germany's military strategic plans for Iran, ensuring the security of supplies to the USSR of weapons and food through lend-lease through Iranian territory, to suppress the hostile activities of fascist agents and underground organizations led by them, as well as to block the actions and liquidate anti-Soviet nationalist formations that carried out subversive work against the USSR under German control. A third of the staff of the Tehran residency - more than 30 people - was awarded government awards.

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#### Defeat of the Marauders

On May 9, 1945, immediately after the capitulation of fascist Germany, the Afghan authorities, on the recommendation of the ambassadors of the USSR, Great Britain and the USA, sealed the safes, the archive and the cash desk of the German mission in Kabul. 344 folders of documents in nine boxes and large sums of money were sent to Moscow and further to Berlin at the disposal of the Allied Control Council for Germany.

In Moscow, where the German ambassador Pilger, the deputy trade attache, also known as the Abwehr cipher clerk, Zugenbüller, the second cipher clerk Seger, and other members of the German mission, were brought from Kabul, an investigation began into the activities of the Nazi secret services against the Allied Powers on the territory of Neutral Afghanistan during the Second World War. They willingly answered the questions of the investigators, and their testimonies fully confirmed the information available in the materials of Soviet intelligence about the subversive work of the Abwehr and intelligence agencies of the Axis countries in Afghanistan in 1941-1945.

These events, however, were preceded by years of hard work by foreign intelligence in contact with the British intelligence services in Afghanistan and India. The Kabul residency during the war years was headed by the outstanding Soviet intelligence officer Mikhail Andreevich Allakhverdov (1900-1968). It was under his leadership and with his personal participation that the "Marauders" were defeated - this is how the extensive German intelligence network operating in Afghanistan during the war years was called in operational correspondence.

M.A. Allahverdov devoted 50 of his 68 years to intelligence. His name is associated with a number of masterfully carried out intelligence operations in different countries. He was a true connoisseur of the East. In Afghanistan, during the harsh war years, his intelligence talent was revealed especially brightly: the efforts of the special services of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis to turn the territory of a neutral Afghan state

into the springboard of aggression against the USSR and the Wehrmacht invasion of India were paralyzed.

In the quest for world domination, Hitler hatched far-reaching plans in which Afghanistan was given an important place. Werner-Otto von Hentig, a veteran of German diplomacy, who was considered an expert on Middle Eastern affairs, after the war, answering questions from a Soviet journalist, admitted: "Afghanistan in those years occupied a special Asia. Much could have been done from Afghanistan against the Soviet republics. Afghanistan is not far from India. For the leaders of the Third Reich, India was one of the important goals. Chief of the General Staff F. Halder gave the order to prepare an operation against India as early as February 17, 1941!

At the same time, Hitler ordered to begin preparations for an operation to seize Afghanistan. In April 1941, the development of the plan for this operation was roughly completed, and the General Staff reported to the Fuhrer that 17 divisions would be needed for its implementation, including six mountain rifle, four infantry, four motorized and three other Wehrmacht mobile formations. Directive No. 32 of the High Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW) and the High Command of the Ground Forces (OKH) dated June 11, 1941 stated: "After the objectives of Operation Barbarossa have been achieved, the Wehrmacht divisions will have to fight against the British positions on Mediterranean Sea and Asia Minor through a concentric attack from Libya through Egypt, from Bulgaria through Turkey, and also, depending on the situation, from Transcaucasia through Iran. It was planned to capture the North Caucasus in November 1941, cross the Main Caucasian Range by May 1942, and take positions in the Tabriz region (Iran) in June. According to the German historian Andreas Hilgruber, by the autumn of 1941, a base for operations in Afghanistan was to be created, "from where it would be possible to threaten India, the heart of the British Empire."

With German pedantry, a plan was developed under the code name "Amanullah", which provided for measures to ensure the march of German troops to Afghanistan and further to India. The Germans expected that with the appearance of Wehrmacht units near the borders of India, a powerful anti-English uprising would break out there, and they staked on this. In Greece, a special shock unit of the German army was formed - the "F formation", trained for operations in tropical and subtropical regions. The 17 divisions mentioned above were to be joined by the "Turkic division", formed from Soviet Muslim prisoners of war, residents of Central Asia. "Military mullahs" were prepared to work with the Muslim population of the countries of the Near and Middle East. 4,000 paratroopers were supposed to capture Kabul and change the regime.

The world war that was raging outside of neutral Afghanistan seemed about to drag this distant state into its whirlpool.

However, the defeat of the Germans near Moscow and then the course of hostilities in the Caucasus, according to the German historian Schroeder, confused the cards. True, Schroeder emphasizes, bases have already been created in Afghanistan that could be used by the Wehrmacht in the event of an advance from Iran to India.

In December 1941, when the battle of Moscow was still in full swing, the Soviet leadership decided to actively oppose the Abwehr and intelligence agencies of the Axis countries in Afghanistan in order to prevent it from deviating from neutrality in the war and to stop the flywheel of the implementation of German plans in regarding India. The fact that they were not destined to come true, a considerable merit rightfully belongs to the Soviet intelligence, which, in cooperation with the British special services, largely predetermined the outcome of the struggle against Germany in Afghanistan and India, favorable for the USSR and the allied powers.

The Kabul residency during the war years consisted of only five people, two of whom performed technical functions. The undercover apparatus was also small - 15 agents, seven of them were considered valuable. The national composition of the agents is interesting: there are seven Afghans, including Tajiks and Uzbeks, two Indians, two Poles, one French, one Swiss, and two Russians. Three agents worked directly against the Germans, two on foreign colonies in Kabul, four on Central Asian emigration, and six agents obtained information about the policy of the Afghan leadership. Of course, there were still trusting ties, close acquaintances of our intelligence officers and just well-wishers who sympathized with the USSR,

The German secret services on the eve of the Second World War and after it began, when fascist Germany was accompanied by successes in various theaters of military operations, accelerated the creation and strengthening of their positions in Afghanistan. They were actively assisted by the secret services of the countries - allies of Germany. They paid their main attention to the acquisition of agents, especially agents of influence, in the upper echelon of the Afghan leadership, as well as among representatives of the Central Asian emigration hostile to the USSR and former Basmachi who had taken refuge in Afghanistan. The military intelligence of Germany - the Abwehr, we must give it its due, managed to create a numerous and extensive network of agents, which included (according to February 1, 1942), for example, the chief of staff of the Afghan army Mustafa Khan, the commander of the cavalry brigade Sultan Ahmed Khan, the head of the intelligence department under the Ministry of War, Mohammed Anwar Khan, and other military and civilians. The Minister of War Shah Mahmud Khan, the commander of the central army corps Daud Khan, many members of the Afghan government, and dignitaries of the royal court were also closely connected with the Germans.

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The German colony in Afghanistan before the war was the largest of the European ones - more than 300 people. German advisers worked in almost all Afghan ministries, German instructors were in the Afghan army and police. Under a trade agreement signed in 1939, Germany secured the monopoly right to send specialists to Afghanistan to work on various industrial and construction sites. In 1938, the Afghans were granted an interest-free loan for the purchase of weapons and ammunition in Germany. German intelligence, of course, used this situation to their advantage.

The Germans felt at ease in Afghanistan and were in a privileged position compared to other foreigners. For example, they were allowed to keep and carry firearms, they could freely communicate with Afghans, who were not prosecuted for contact with the Germans, while for contacts with other foreigners, local residents could be imprisoned. The Germans practiced with might and main bribery of Afghans and with the help of generous (by Afghan standards) payment for services, they attracted supporters among the general population. They did not miss a chance to emphasize that this is the concern of the Fuhrer, who is fighting against the age-old enemies of Islam - England and Russia.

The German mission in Kabul carried out extensive propaganda and intensively created the image of a "prosperous Germany". Fictions spread about the plight of Muslims in the Soviet republics of Central Asia, which are experiencing "unbearable oppression of the godless Bolsheviks." The true center of German influence was the Nejat Lyceum in Kabul, where teaching was conducted in German, and textbooks and notebooks were distributed free of charge to students, on the covers of which there was a portrait of Hitler and the slogan: "Germany will conquer the whole world!" Ambassador Pilger during interrogations in Moscow said: "The German mission, with the permission of the Afghan government, carried out active propaganda against the allies. This propaganda was intensified after the German military attack on the Soviet Union."

The Soviet government, concerned about the growing activity of Germany in neutral Afghanistan, was forced to make an inquiry to the Afghan government about this. In response, they received an assurance that German activities would not affect territories closer than 30 km from the Soviet border.

On July 11, 1941, the German ambassador in Kabul, at the direction of Ribbentrop, offered King Zahir Shah cooperation with Germany, which, naturally, meant a rejection of traditional neutrality. The king, however, preferred to evade this proposal. And on November 1, 1941, 100 of the most authoritative leaders of the Afghan tribes, the highest spiritual hierarchs and government representatives, gathered at the Loya Jirga (Afghan Supreme Council), decided: "No one

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no foreign state shall be allowed in any form to occupy all or part of Afghan territory, or to use our dear homeland for military operations, or to receive from us any privileges in time of war." The neutrality of the state was thus confirmed and, in principle, observed during the war years, but in 1941-1943 it was subjected to serious tests. There was a real threat that traditional neutrality might be replaced by a one-sided orientation towards Germany.

Ambassador Pilger testified in Moscow: "At first, the Afghan government strictly adhered to neutrality, but in view of the military successes of the German army in Europe, it began to treat us most favorably and on a number of issues shared the point of view of the aggressive policy of the German government, wished for victory German army." According to him, Prime Minister Hashim Khan and his deputy Naim Khan were "exceptionally loyal to the Hitlerite government, and hence to the German mission." During the fierce battles for Stalingrad, Pilger was invited to Naim Khan, who told the ambassador that "the Afghan government fully shares the policy of Germany and expresses its readiness to provide assistance to the German government in the form of armed force." In Berlin, however, they did not trust the Afghan leadership and believed that King Zahir Shah and the entire Nadir dynasty were proteges of the British, and therefore, after the invasion of Afghanistan, according to foreign intelligence, the Germans planned to bring their puppet to power in Kabul.

History judged otherwise. Hitler's plans for a campaign against India collapsed after the crushing defeat of the Germans on the Volga, and especially after the defeat of their armies on the Kursk salient. Now Berlin was no longer up to the invasion of the Middle East. In turn, the Afghan government, after the Battle of Stalingrad, stopped playing behind-the-scenes games with Germany.

The Soviet Union had many friends in Afghanistan. Even during the war years, they did everything possible to help the USSR in the fight against Nazi Germany. Relying on them, the Kabul residency, despite its small number, worked purposefully and efficiently. Intelligence officers and their agents timely obtained reliable information, thanks to which the leadership of the USSR was aware of the military-strategic and political plans of the Third Reich in relation to Afghanistan.

As in the 1930s, Maryam, the wife of a high-ranking Afghan dignitary, and a member of the royal family, fruitfully cooperated with the Soviet intelligence. A beautiful and intelligent woman, she regularly provided the residency with useful information about the situation and on the buildings of the Afghan "top".

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Among the agents of the Kabul residency were ordinary Afghans, who, under the guise of beggars begging for alms, could watch the secret apartments of German intelligence officers for hours and record their contacts with representatives of the Afghan elite. No one paid attention to them, but it was they who made it possible to identify dozens of German accomplices, to establish their identity, places of work and residence.

Important information came to the residency from other sources, in particular, from agents from among the representatives of the anti-Soviet emigration, among whom were many former leaders of the Basmachi movement. Fascist intelligence drew from this category of persons saboteurs and

terrorists to be thrown into the USSR. The pre-emptive information obtained made it possible to take timely measures to neutralize the infiltrators.

However, a special place in the intelligence network of the Kabul residency was undoubtedly occupied by a young Indian who had the pseudonym "Rum". He was a swarthy, agile man of medium height with expressive lively eyes. He became a reliable assistant to M.A. Allahverdov in the fight against German intelligence. Rum explained his credo and desire to cooperate with Soviet intelligence briefly and clearly: "I am devoted to the revolution in India, its liberation and the Soviet Union. I know that the freedom of India depends on your victory, that Hitlerite Germany and her allies are your enemies and ours. I know it's hard for you right now. I want to help you."

"Roma" came from a wealthy family, received a good upbringing and education, could make an excellent career, but under the influence of the October Revolution in Russia, he began to live the dream of a free India. In 1924, he became a member of the Indian National Congress, or rather, its left wing, but soon became disillusioned with its work. He explained it this way: "The Congress was too passive and sluggish in its struggle with the British colonialists, looking for compromises when it was necessary to fight." In 1938 Rum joined the left-wing Kirti Kissan, also calling itself the Communist Party of Lahore, and quickly became an active and influential functionary. He was put on the wanted list by the British and went underground. On party business, he often had to go to Afghanistan, where he could get illegally only through the zone of free Pashtun tribes hostile to England. There he made friends and like-minded people among the authorities of the tribes, enjoyed their patronage and material support. In Kabul, he also had many acquaintances in the Indian colony, among the Afghan merchants and government officials. "Rum" said M.A. Allahverdov: "We have a certain influence and supporters here in Afghanistan, especially in the zone of free tribes and in the northwestern border province of

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tions of India. All this you can dispose of in the name of your victory and our freedom.

"Rom" managed to win the trust of the Germans, was held in high esteem by the German ambassador Pilger, through the intelligence line, the resident of the Abwehr Rasmus himself and his assistants Witzel and Willert maintained contact with him. Abwehr gave "Roma" the pseudonym "Rahmat Khan". Zugenbüller, a cipher clerk of the German residency in Kabul, testified during interrogations in Moscow: "German intelligence agencies and the government believed that the main thing in the work of German intelligence in Afghanistan was to deepen work with Rahmat Khan. And further: "Rahmat Khan was tasked with covering the internal political situation in India, collecting espionage information about the British military efforts and conducting subversive work against them in India with the help of underground organizations. For these purposes, "Rahmat Khan" was given large sums of money by us and two radio stations were handed over. The materials handed over to us by Rahmat Khan were highly appreciated in Berlin." Until 1943, "Rom", on the instructions of the Germans, constantly visited the zone of free tribes, where they allegedly prepared an anti-English uprising and created an underground.

Resident Rasmus told Roma more than once: "Berlin is very pleased with you, dear friend. Your work has received the most flattering reviews. The Fuhrer himself knows about you..." In February 1942, during a meeting in Kabul, Rasmus was in high spirits and solemnly declared to "Roma": "Congratulations. You have been awarded the high order of the Third Reich. And I, thanks to you, was awarded the same. But first of all, let me read out the Fuhrer's telegram addressed to you personally. You see, the Fuhrer thanks you for your good work. And now I am presenting you with an order on his behalf. Rasmus handed him the case with the order and the certificate for it. However, having expressed the gratitude due in such cases, "Rum" did not take the order with him and left it with the German resident. To the question of M.A. Allahverdov, what kind of order it was, "Rum" coldly replied that he did not remember and did not even want to touch him.

Given the personality of "Roma", his connections in Afghanistan and in the Pashtun tribes, the Center formulated the tasks that were to be solved by the residency with his help: "“Roma”

should become a German resident in Afghanistan, reveal German connections there and, if possible, penetrate German work from Afghanistan to the Soviet Union, and also to India. It must be said that this problem was solved: "Roma" did so much for the Soviet intelligence that virtually all the activities of the Abwehr in the region were "under the hood". He provided timely and reliable information about the intrigues of German intelligence in Afghanistan and the instructions it received from Berlin. With the help of Roma, the entire composition of the German residency in Kabul was established.

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Abwehr supplied "Roma" - "Rahmat Khan" with two radios, power supplies for them, operating instructions, codes and ciphers, a work schedule indicating bands and frequencies. Needless to say, the work of the Berlin radio stations for Afghanistan and India was under our constant control.

German intelligence did not stint, and Rasmus repeatedly transferred large sums of money to Roma, but each time he handed them over to our intelligence officers and asked them to be transferred to the USSR defense fund. One of these contributions amounted, for example, to 700 pounds sterling in gold, 10 US dollars, 50 thousand Afghanis and 5 thousand Indian rupees. At the time, that was a lot of money. M.A. Allahverdov repeatedly urged "Roma" to keep part of the money for himself and spend it on the tasks of the Abwehr, but "Roma" almost never agreed, stating that he had enough funds thanks to connections in the zone of free Pashtun tribes, as well as de - neg party.

In February 1942, fascist intelligence set an important task for "Roma": to start forming in all port cities of India - from Chittagong to Karachi - special sabotage groups to carry out sabotage actions and, in addition, start preparing anti-English speeches which should be linked with the landing of Japanese landings from the sea, intended to disrupt communications and block the British garrisons. Rasmus and Witzel instructed "Roma" on how to disable industrial facilities when German and Japanese troops approached the borders of India. He was taught how to prepare explosives on site.

Information about this assignment was immediately reported to Moscow, and it was considered so important that it immediately fell on the table to Stalin, Molotov and Beria. The plans of the Third Reich with regard to India and the planned actions naturally demanded retaliatory measures from the Allied Powers. The question of joint actions and cooperation between Soviet and British intelligence services was put on the agenda. It was also important to ensure the safety of "Roma", who was still wanted in India and could be arrested by the British at any moment. He himself asked to inform the British secret services about his work for Soviet intelligence. In Moscow, this was considered expedient, and from April 1942 in London they were aware of the identity of "Roma". The information he obtained began to come to the leadership of British intelligence. This made it possible to unite the efforts of the special services and to counteract the subversive work of the Abwehr of India.

On behalf of Rasmus, Roma was to create an underground network in India, and for this purpose to engage in the selection, study and recruitment of pro-German elements. Along with that, he had to

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show active opponents of fascist Germany, draw up lists of such persons with addresses, so that at X hour they can be easily found and arrested. It was also necessary to look for people to seize power in the localities and, with their help, then form government bodies in the provinces, and before that, to decompose the existing state apparatus. Finally, through reliable members of the underground, "Roma" had to find and clear areas for receiving aircraft and



paratroopers-saboteurs. The Germans prepared for the march on India with their usual punctuality and pedantry, developing covert operations in advance.

The Abwehr was unaware of the double game between Rahmat Khan and Roma: he was so thoughtful and skillful in his line, and besides, German intelligence did not have other serious sources in the zone of free tribes, and she could not carry out a deep check. your agent." Special disinformation materials about the situation in India were being prepared in Moscow and London, and Rum supplied Rasmus with them. The interaction of the two intelligence agencies made it possible to successfully block many of the plans of Germany and Japan in the region.

On the initiative of the British and on our instructions, "Rom" found a reliable person to work against the Abwehr in Iran, contact with him was maintained by Soviet and British intelligence officers. Cooperation with British intelligence made it possible to ensure the security of the strategic transport artery, along which during the war years the Lend-Lease deliveries of military cargo went to the USSR through Iranian territory. The route ran through hard-to-reach terrain, and armed detachments operating under the control of the German special services launched sudden attacks on transport columns, causing them significant damage. Thus, Rom's capabilities were useful not only in Afghanistan and India.

The confidence of the Germans in "Roma" extended so far that they decided to instruct him to maintain contact with Japanese intelligence as well. In September 1943, Rasmus introduced him to the Japanese military attaché, Inui, at his home. This meant that he became a "triple" agent. Moscow authorized him to work for the Japanese, who wanted to use Roma to guarantee the safety of their saboteurs at submarine landing points on the Indian coast. However, as a rule, they were ambushed, neutralized, and then judged according to the laws of war, some of them disappeared without a trace. This alarmed both the Japanese and the Germans. "Roma" had to get out and explain the reasons for the failures of agents with the help of disinformation specially prepared by the British.

Despite these setbacks, it was believed in Tokyo and Berlin that Roma had succeeded in creating a new anti-British organization in India called the Indian National Revolutionary Committee"

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(INRC), which became the "leading force in the underground bloc", which included the parties "Forward Bloc", "Bengal Volunteers", "Congressional Socialist Party" and "Kirti Kisan". On the basis of his reports, they believed that a broad underground had formed and was operating in India, a kind of parallel structure, ready at the right time to legalize itself and take power into its own hands. Rasmus was pleased to send dispatches to Berlin to the effect that the anti-English front that had been set up in India, where Rum plays an important role, was gaining strength and strength. The German resident did not suspect that he had fallen into a trap set by Soviet intelligence in cooperation with the British special services. In May 1944, German intelligence, still trusting Roma, planned to use it to illegally send Rasmus' former deputy Witzel, who had been expelled from Afghanistan and was in Berlin, to Delhi on a special assignment. However, the Abwehr did not succeed in realizing this plan: the defeat of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front and the arrests of participants in the assassination attempt on Hitler, including Admiral Canaris, the chief of German military intelligence, prevented it.

In the middle of 1943 there was a radical change in the Great Patriotic War, the inexorable collapse of Nazi Germany was approaching. As evidenced by documents from the archives of the SVR, a new variant of using the accumulated materials on the activities of the Abwehr in Afghanistan and India arose at the Center. The idea arose to try to recruit the resident Rasmus in Kabul, "using indisputable evidence of the failure of his work for India and Central Asia."

Head of Foreign Intelligence P.M. Fitin offered the People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR V.N. Merkulov to take advantage of the operational interests of the fact that German intelligence in Afghanistan,

without knowing it, she began to essentially "serve Soviet intelligence with her information, agents and money, and Rasmus unwittingly found herself in the position of a source of the Kabul residency."

When planning a recruiting conversation with Rasmus, the Center proceeded from the fact that in Berlin they would never forgive such a grandiose and shameful failure if it became known. As indisputable evidence of the fiasco of his work, they decided to show Rasmus instructions for radio communication with Kabul, Berlin and Delhi, received from Roma, assignments from the German General Staff to organize subversive work in India, recipes for making explosives, undercover radios and other evidence materials. The proposal of the head of intelligence was accepted, the plan of the operation was drawn up and approved, in which the Soviet intelligence officer A.M. Korotkov, German specialist.

It follows from the archive operational file "Marauders" that on October 24, 1943, a meeting of M.A. Allahverdov and A.M. Co.

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Rotkov, who acted as Colonel Mikhailov, with the German resident Rasmus.

"First of all, get acquainted with these evidences, ~ having introduced himself, "colonel Mikhailov" began the conversation. - Think about it. Calmly and seriously assess the situation and your position. You see: here are the documents for the money, which, thanks to your negligence and mistakes, entered the USSR Defense Fund. Here are the radios. Here are the ciphers and codes, thanks to which all your radio communications with Berlin and Delhi are deciphered. This is also the result of your miscalculations. Realize that anyone can make mistakes. But if, due to your mistakes and miscalculations, all your work turned out to be used in our interests, then this is already worse than a mistake. This is actually cheating. This is direct assistance to the enemies of Germany. And we have regularly received this help from you all this time. We can expose you in front of Berlin, send the original documents there. Your leadership will never forgive you for this."

Without letting Rasmus come to his senses, he was told that Germany would soon inevitably lose the war, and he, the Abwehr resident, even if he was "pardoned" in Berlin, would stand trial for espionage against the Allied Powers. "Think about all this," continued "Colonel Mikhailov." "Based on what you have seen and heard, we offer you the only way out. Cooperate with us. In return, we guarantee our sincere friendship and a place of honor in post-war Germany."

The usually cold-blooded and self-assured Rasmus, who was known in Nazi circles as a "man-automaton", a campaigner and a fanatic, was stunned, lost his tongue and went into shock. After a while, somehow pulling himself together, he began to beg the Soviet intelligence officers to give him the opportunity to think over the proposal made to him, because now he is simply not able to decide anything and give an intelligible answer. He promised to inform about his decision in writing, passing the message through the owner of the house where he lived in Kabul.

"No, Rasmus, no. Absolutely not. You will give the answer yourself. Personally. Here!" - "Colonel Mikhailov" said firmly and harshly. "Good," the German barely said. - I will do it. I will come. I promise. Day after tomorrow".

But Rasmus did not keep his promise and secretly left Kabul a few days later. He managed to get to Berlin, from where he sent a radiogram to "Roma", in which he warned the agent against betrayal, of which he himself became a victim. The further fate of Rasmus is not known. SMERSH after the war did everything possible to find him in Germany and Austria, but to no avail: neither among the dead and wounded, nor among prisoners of war and internees, nor among civilians could he be found. Who knows, maybe the Gestapo

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managed to take revenge on the failed Abwehr scout. However, it cannot be ruled out that British intelligence helped Rasmus cover his tracks and "disappear" somewhere in Europe or South America. After all, the only way for him from Kabul to Berlin at that time was through India.

In 1943, one by one, employees of the German residency in Kabul were expelled from Afghanistan - Witzel, Willert, Galien and others. After the flight of Rasmus, the young cipher clerk Zugenbüller, who had just graduated from the special school of the Abwehr, remained behind the resident, who was clearly not up to the task of directing intelligence work, and it was curtailed. This was the result of the confrontation between Soviet intelligence and the Abwehr in Afghanistan. The Marauders were finished. The activities of our foreign intelligence in Afghanistan objectively coincided with the fundamental state interests of this country, it was positive for the allied powers of the USSR and did not undermine, but strengthened the sovereignty of the Afghan state, contributed to the normalization of Soviet-Afghan good neighborly relations.

Curiously, after the fall of the Mussolini regime, the former Italian ambassador in Kabul, Quaroni, was appointed to the post of ambassador to Moscow, and he was given an agreement, given that he was not a fanatical fascist and, working in Afghanistan, limited himself to purely official duties. Functions, active work against the USSR did not carry out. Records of his conversations with M.A. have been preserved in the archives of the SVR. Allahverdov on the eve of his departure to Moscow in 1944. Kvaroni argued, for example, that the Germans did not have a "serious base" in Afghanistan, and their game on the anti-English sentiments of the Afghans, especially the Pashtun tribes, was dictated by their own selfish interests. The Afghans, Kvaroni said, understood this, as well as the fact that the advance of the German troops through the territory of their country did not bode well for them.

To the question of M.A. Allahverdov that he knew about the activities of Soviet intelligence in Afghanistan during the war years, Kvaroni told the following. In the winter of 1941/42, he and the German ambassador Pilger were instructed by Rome and Berlin to draw up a joint report on the activities of the embassy and intelligence of the USSR in Kabul. "But, to our shame," Kvaroni said, "neither we nor the Germans had essentially any material about the agents of the Soviet embassy. Our entire report turned out to be general and non-specific, based more on conjectures and assumptions." These confessions speak eloquently of the fact that the work of Soviet intelligence in Afghanistan during the war years was at a high professional level.

Of course, not only "Rum" effectively helped the Soviet intelligence at that time. It is impossible, for example, to pass over in silence another major agent of ours, Yazuchi. It belongs to him

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Pavel Mikhailovich Fitin, head of foreign intelligence in 1939-1946.

V.A. Molodtsov with his contacts Tamara Mezhygurskaya and Tamara Shestakova  
before execution (Odessa)

Photo taken by the executioner

V.A. Molodtsov, commander of a partisan detachment in Odessa

Arvid Harnak, one of the leaders of the Berlin group of anti-fascists "Red Chapel"

Photo from the Gestapo archive

Harro Schulze-Boysen, one

from the leaders of the Berlin group of anti-fascists "Red Chapel" with their closest friend

and assistant Kurt Schumacher (right)

Photo from the 1930s

Horst Heilmann, member of the Berlin group of anti-fascists, radio operator of the headquarters of the High Command of the German Armed Forces

Photo from the Gestapo archive

Johannes Graudenz, member of the Berlin anti-fascist group Photo from the Gestapo archive

Oda Schottmüller, member of the Red Capella. Photo from the 1930s.

Karl Behrens, member of the Red Chapel, soldier Photo from the Gestapo archive

Albert Hessler.

In August 1942, he was abandoned from Moscow to Berlin to restore contact with the Red Capella group.

D.N. Medvedev, commander

partisan detachment "Winners", Hero of the Soviet Union

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TO THE HERO OF THE SOVIET UNION

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Guerrilla camp

detachment D.N. Medvedev near Rovno

Award certificate D.N. Medvedev

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N.I. Kuznetsov, scout, Hero of the Soviet Union (in the form of a German officer)

V.A. Lyagin, scout, | Hero of the Soviet Union

I.D. Kudrya, scout, Hero of the Soviet Union

Evgenia Bremer, member of the I.D. curls

Raisa Okipnaya, member of the I.D. curls

S.A. Vaupshasov, commander of a partisan formation in Belarus, Hero of the Soviet Union

TO THE HERO OF THE SOVIET UNION Comrade R Ag tuk A

AND YOUR HEROIC FEAT ukiefayunh An ame ae o ima j putan

Award certificate S.A. Vaupshasova

THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPERIOR SOVIET OF THE USSR BY ITS DECREE OF L. 49% + ASSIGNING YOU THE  
TITLE OF HERO OF THE SOVIET UNION

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Radio operator from S.A. Vaupshasova

A group of partisans in the Pinsk swamps

(Western Belarus)

Partisans of the "Sergo" detachment, dressed in German uniforms. From left to right:

Jose Garcia Granada, Bicente Blas,

Jose Perra Moyo, Sebastian Pierra Lloverra, Jose Del Campo, Rafael Pelayo

Partisans before being thrown into the rear of the Nazis (Belarus)

S.I. Volokitin (Major Sergo)

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Diploma of awarding B.A. Rybkina

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EDIT: SSPU arrival No. 18 dated 12 disarl 1931. -

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A.M. Korotkov, famous spy

I.A. Chichayev (center), representative in London for cooperation with the British intelligence services

I.A. Chichayev Photo 1970

Kim Philby, member of the Cambridge Five

John Cairncross, member of the Cambridge Five

Anthony Frederick Blythe, member of the "Cambridge Five" Photo 1980

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V.M. Zarubin,

famous scout

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Kitty Harris ("Gypsy"), liaison for intelligence officer Donald McLean

A.V. Gorsky, resident in London in 1941-1943.

K.M. Cookin, resident in London in 1943-1947.

D.G. Fedichkin, resident in Bulgaria in 1943-1944.

A.V. Tishkov, liaison officer at the General Staff of the Yugoslav People's

liberation army in 1944-1946.

I.I. Agayants, famous intelligence officer

A.S. Panyushkin, chief resident in China in 1939-1944.

A.S. Titov, obtained information about Japan's actions against North China

MM. Baturin, resident in Istanbul during the war

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V.V. Gridnev (second from right) with a group of comrades

Service order V.V. Gridnev

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MRL

and CONFIGURATION INSTRUCTION PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT

assigned to the commander of a separate motorized rifle brigade

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g. NObKVA /

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Ferenc Pataky, head of the reconnaissance group

E.T. Sinitsyn, resident in Finland during the war

honey OI Saa.

Presentation of the order and medals to F.K. Verzhbitsky (standing) March 13, 1968

L.R. Kvasnikov, organizer of the extraction of intelligence information

about the US nuclear program

A.A. Yatskov, scout, 1940s

Scout Semyonov after graduating from Massachusetts

Institute of Technology, 1940

A.S. Feklisov, scout

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V.B. Barkovsky, intelligence officer, attaché of the USSR Embassy in London

The signing of the act of unconditional surrender of Japan. USS Missouri, September 2, 1945

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Letter from Academician I.V. Kurchatov, in which he gives a positive opinion on intelligence materials

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USSR

INTERNATIONAL KOJISSARIAT Z AD DEL STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE

"- \_ \_ March 1942. No. m- ru" to Comrade STALIN

In a number of captalistic reflections from the connection with pro-chemical work on the fission of the atomic nucleus, with the goal of obtaining a new source of energy, the study of the question of using atomic echo of uranium for other purposes was launched.

In 1939 in France, Ajglich, SPA and Germsh-xxx carried out a kitemsaria scientific and research-and-development work on the development of a ketode primemekium urpna for explo- sive substances. These works are carried out under conditions of great secrecy.

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e) Aigliysky Voezlish Kabkiet, taking into account the volmohmost of the successful solution of this problem by Germany,

"Oh, uranium energy for military purposes. M ° 6) The Ural Committee of the Military Cabinet, headed by the well-known Aiglia physicist G.P. TOYSONOM,

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merit in that. that a powerful ramified network of fascist agents in the north of Afghanistan, which had the code name "Union", was paralyzed and neutralized. According to Ambassador Pilger, after the collapse of the Union, the subversive work of the Abwehr against the USSR in northern Afghanistan was essentially reduced to zero.

"Yazuchi" enjoyed a stable reputation in Afghanistan as an ardent anti-Soviet, had great weight in the eyes of emigration hostile to the USSR as an active participant in the Basmachi movement in Central Asia in the past. Even before the war, he collaborated with the Abwehr, but he did it under our control. Fluent in German, "Yazuchi" kept in touch with the German Major Schenk, who was connected with German military intelligence. "Yazuchi" knew a lot about his work, contacts, and was also aware of the "windows" on the Afghan-Soviet border through which spies and saboteurs were thrown into the USSR.

"Yazuchi" was a rich man and knew his own worth, walked with dignity and sedateness, behaved with great dignity, spoke in a low voice, but in such a way that the interlocutors listened to him obsequiously. The Germans gave him emphasized attention and trust. Rasmus instructed him to lead all the work among the Central Asian emigration hostile to the USSR in the interests of the Abwehr. The main task of Yazuchi was to establish channels of communication with pro-German elements in the republics of Central Asia. In addition, with the help of German agents deployed across the border, he was supposed to identify anti-Soviet individuals and involve them in spreading panic rumors and defeatist talk about the imminent capture of the Caucasus by the Germans and their invasion of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. He was also instructed to collect information about the Soviet troops in the Turkestan military district.

It is clear that the residency knew about the tasks given by "Yazuchi" Rasmus. It is not surprising that sabotage groups, individual scouts and spies sent to the USSR from Afghanistan were identified and arrested. Based on the information received from Yazuchi, the Soviet embassy in Kabul exposed the active accomplices of German intelligence to the Afghan authorities - Colonel Yakub Khan Sokut, former governor of Logar province Mamad Hasan Khan, owner of the knitting factory Haji Abdu Subhan Khan. Khan and others. In 1943, the entire leadership of the pro-fascist "Union of Young Turkestan" - more than 40 people - fell into the dock.

Kurshirmat, an Uzbek who served as a resident of German intelligence in the northern regions of Afghanistan, also ended up behind bars. The Abwehr assigned him the pseudonym "Hanza" and highly appreciated his work: he achieved impressive results, significantly expanded and strengthened the agent network in the provinces bordering the USSR. Germans

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dro paid for his services. The network he created was called "Union", its task was to ensure the safe exit of German troops to Turkestan after the invasion of Afghanistan. Hanza was in close contact with the former emir of Bukhara, who led the secret anti-Soviet organization League, which aimed to return the emir to power in Bukhara.

"Khanza" directed the work of the heads of intelligence groups in the cities of Kunduz, Andkhoy, Mazar Sherif, Meymen and others, and also maintained contact with the leaders of the Turkestan emigration outside of Afghanistan - in Turkey and even in Tokyo. The exposure and arrest of Hansa, the expulsion of Witzel, who worked with him, from Afghanistan, the liquidation of the agent network in the north of the country were a heavy blow for German intelligence, and it was no longer able to make up for these losses. Yazuchi took an active part in these Soviet intelligence operations.

This is how Soviet foreign intelligence in Afghanistan during the war years opposed the intrigues and subversive actions of the Abwehr and intelligence agencies of the Axis countries and outplayed them entirely. And me

managed to use the territory of Afghanistan under the cover of neutrality as a springboard for aggression against the USSR and India. The defeat of the "Marauders" was a contribution to the cause of the Victory.

Bezymensky Lev. Unraveled mysteries of the Third Reich. - M.: APN Publishing House, 1984. - P. 39.

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Big concerns of resident A.S. Panyushkin

World War II approached the Soviet Union from the east. The Japanese intervention in the Far East in the early 1920s was the beginning of this process. The occupation of Manchuria and the formation of the puppet state of Manchukuo on its territory in the early 1930s created a most dangerous hotbed that revealed that the Japanese militarists had begun to implement the Tanaka memorandum, the text of which was obtained by Soviet foreign intelligence in Seoul. and Harbin in the late 1920s. It provided for the capture, first, of the most important regions of China, and then of its entire territory, and the start of actions from there to annex the Soviet Far East, in other words, a war against the USSR.

On July 7, 1937, Japanese troops invaded North China. In a short time, they captured the then capital of China, Nanjing, as well as the largest centers of the eastern neighbor of the USSR, such as Peking, Tianjin, Shanghai and others. Fights followed with Soviet troops in the area of Lake Khasan (1938), and then at Khalkhin Gol (1939) on the border with Mongolia. Rebuff to the interventionists, especially their defeat at Khalkhin Gol, which was a military operation, where G.K. Zhukov, slowed down the pace of Japan's expansion to the northeast, but did not stop its advance to the west and south of China. The largest state in Asia faced the threat of its complete absorption. In addition, disagreements were added between the main forces of resistance to Japanese aggression - the Kuomintang National Party, headed by Chiang Kai-shek, and the Communists. They turned into a civil war. The communists were forced out into the hinterland. Chiang Kai-shek and his generals, fighting the communists, showed less desire to fight the Japanese militarists. The capital of China was moved to Chongqing, where the entire diplomatic corps also moved.

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Here in July 1939, the representative of the Council of People's Commissars for the implementation of the trade agreement with China, A.S. Panyushkin. In the same month, he was appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the USSR. He also became the chief resident of the NKVD, taking over the leadership of residencies in China.

The combination of posts was caused by the critical situation in China and the need to concentrate all efforts to counteract the eastern center of aggression, frustrate Japan's plans to split China and create puppet administrative structures here.

I.V. Stalin wanted to receive verified, unambiguous assessments of the situation in the Far Eastern theater, allowing him to quickly make strategically correct political decisions in the face of the growing threat of war with Germany.

None of the major Western states provided assistance to China. The British, who had the strongest positions in China, were busy "appeasing" the aggressor, caring for the most part only about protecting their own economic interests. The threat to the Soviet borders suited them, and they were counting on concessions to the Japanese militarists at the expense of China. This course was called "Far East Munich" and the Arita-Craigie talks in Tokyo between the Japanese Foreign Minister and the British representative were an expression of this.

Only the Soviet Union came to the aid of the Chinese people in their fight against aggression, providing great material, military and technical assistance. The amount of loans from the USSR to China from 1938 to 1939 amounted to 250 million US dollars. About a thousand aircraft, a large number of tanks and artillery, and ammunition were sent to China. Soviet volunteers,

especially the pilots fought on the side of China. Alexander Semyonovich Panyushkin led the great work of coordinating military and political efforts to contain the aggressor.

In the pre-war period, especially after the signing of the tripartite alliance by Germany, Italy and Japan, and even more so with the outbreak of World War II, the Soviet government was worried about the question of whether Japan would enter the war against the Soviet Union and whether the USSR would have to fight on two fronts - in the West and in the East.

Intelligence was given the task of constantly monitoring the intrigues of the Japanese military in relation to China, Mongolia and the USSR. It was also necessary at all costs to keep the central government of China in positions of active resistance to Japanese aggression.

Alexander Semenovich Panyushkin was born on August 2, 1905 in Samara in a working-class family. In 1920 he volunteered for the Red Army and fought on the fronts of the Civil War. March 1921

his year

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was sent to cavalry courses, and then to study at the Leningrad Cavalry School of the Red Army. After graduation, Panyushkin served in the border troops in the Far East, with which a significant part of his life will be connected. From September 1927 to September 1934, he was the head of the frontier post, and then the commandant of the frontier station in the 59th Primorsky Cavalry Detachment of the OGPU.

In May 1935 A.S. Panyushkin entered the Frunze Military Academy of the Red Army, from which he successfully graduated in October 1938. At 34, he received the rank of brigade commander and in the same year was sent to work in the NKVD. He was appointed assistant head of the department, and in December 1938 year as head of department.

It is the eight-year work experience of A.S. Panyushkin in the Far Eastern Border District, obviously, was taken into account by I.V. Stalin, inviting him to prove himself first in the diplomatic field as an authorized representative of the Council of People's Commissars for the implementation of the Soviet-Chinese trade agreement, and then as the Soviet ambassador and chief resident of foreign intelligence in Chongqing. It is characteristic that when A.S. Panyushkin said that he could not imagine himself in such a difficult and responsible position, he remarked jokingly: as it seems to him, the border service is not so far from diplomatic and intelligence ...!

To the "literacy program" in China A.S. Panyushkin started at once. He began to absorb the experience of professional sinologists - N.T. Fedorenko, S.L. Tikhvinsky, B.S. Isaenko and others. His first venerable mentor in Chinese affairs was M.S. Sladkovsky. People's Commissar for Foreign Trade A.I. Mikoyan asked him, as a sinologist, to help A.S. Panyushkin to master China. And Sladkovsky spent weeks passing on his knowledge and observations to the student, telling about the history of China's treaties with the Western powers, about the treaties renegotiated by the Kuomintang government and retaining the main unequal conditions of the old treaties (extraterritoriality of foreigners, concessions, large foreign property in China) , about the Chinese Communist Party and other facts and events.

As a result, A.S. Panyushkin turned out to be aware of the main aspects of the situation in China.

With the same energy with which his elders helped him, he undertook to organize the training of both the fledgling "clean" employees of the embassy in Chongqing and the operational staff. Initially, he succeeded in establishing Chinese language courses at the embassy in Chongqing.

The personnel department of the NKID, at the request of A.S. Panyushkin was selected from various universities of the humanities, evacuated during the war years to the republics of Central Asia, 15 graduate students

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courses and sent them to Chongqing to study Chinese and have a diplomatic internship at the embassy. Among them, in particular, was A.S. Titov?, later a well-established operative sinologist. Later, the Chinese authorities granted the request of Alexander Semyonovich to accept a group of employees of our embassy to study at a Chinese university for a deep and serious study of the Chinese language, philosophy, literature, and cultural history of the country. Deep knowledge of the subject of discussion, coupled with a brilliant memory, allowed A.S. Panyushkin to distinguish "a fish eye from a pearl" – semi-official, pompous declarations of "well-wishers" and sincere search by our partners for ways to mutually beneficial cooperation in the face of a common enemy, to catch falsehood and the desire to mislead. In the same vein, the employees of all foreign intelligence stations in China, headed by Alexander Semenovich, strove to work.

The chief resident was characterized by attention to colleagues at work. It is important to emphasize that the residency and the embassy in Chongqing as a whole were in an extremely difficult situation. Due to martial law in China, employees lived without families. In addition to the sweltering heat, stuffiness (Chongqing, as you know, the Chinese call one of the "cauldrons"), tropical showers, mosquitoes, mosquitoes, rats, employees experienced a number of elementary inconveniences. As a result of Japanese air raids (bombs fell literally next to the embassy), there was often no water or electricity. In the spring of 1942 A.S. Panyushkin asked Deputy Foreign Minister Fu Bingchan to assist in finding the necessary buildings for the embassy, and when he referred to the difficulties with premises in the city, he delicately reminded him of the free life of German citizens in mansions and villas (behind them, unlike us, no external surveillance was carried out) contrary to the promises of the Chiang Kai-shek government to create special camps for citizens of states hostile to China, to which the Germans then belonged. In the end, we managed to solve both these and other domestic difficulties.

Another touch to the portrait of Panyushkin. In his absence, the deputy resident reported to the Center about the changed behavior of one operational officer who, after defending his Ph.D. thesis in the USSR as part of his vacation and returning to Chongqing, allegedly "became arrogant, began to shy away from rough work, became arrogant with his comrades, etc. P.". It would seem that the end of the intelligence career. But no, Alexander Semyonovich explained to the Center that the aforementioned security officer is still able to work, treats his colleagues with respect, there are no grounds to suspect him of anything, and that the conflict between him and the deputy resident lies "purely in a personal field." ". Thus, the incident was over.

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Naturally, the chief resident was not limited to organizing the study of languages and regional education of the operational staff, although even here there were more than enough problems - dialects, ethno-psychological characteristics, way of life, customs, traditions of various segments of the population. Having experience of operational work in the border troops, on the border with Manchukuo, where Soviet intelligence had an undercover apparatus made up of Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese, he paid great attention to teaching young employees how to establish agent and trust relationships with sources of interest to intelligence. , in which L.M. actively helped him. Miklashevsky, did the "roof" of the dragoman open wide opportunities for him?

At the same time, Alexander Semenovich introduced his colleagues to the art of information and analytical work. Avoiding high-profile phrases, with his characteristic humor, he corrected the young operational officers, who sometimes expressed their assessments of the situation that were not thought through to the end. Conciseness, clarity of wording - that's what he demanded from his subordinates.

Eyewitnesses familiar with some of his information messages to the Center claim that their author carefully weighed every conclusion, every recommendation. He invariably concentrated his main attention on key problems and situations requiring urgent solutions.

The presentation of credentials by Ambassador Panyushkin to Chinese President Lin Sen coincided with the day of Nazi Germany's attack on Poland and, therefore, with the outbreak of war in Europe.

In accordance with the task of keeping China in a state of active resistance to Japanese aggression, Panyushkin, as ambassador, needed a wide range of contacts among state, political and public figures of the country of accreditation. There was not a day when he did not meet with any of the authoritative figures of the Kuomintang and the ruling circles of China.

As it appears from the records of the conversations of A.S. Panyushkin with influential figures in the ruling circles of China, he, on the one hand, explained to them the policy of the USSR towards China, exposing misinformation and rumors, and on the other hand, he clarified the issues of interest to the Center, and above all the position of the Chinese leadership in relation to the Soviet Union. Union and other powers.

The USSR Foreign Intelligence Stations closely followed the course of hostilities between China and Japan and the attitude of various groups in the top Chinese leadership towards this war. The pro-Japanese group headed by Wang Jingwei, leader of the puppet government in Nanjing, took advantage of the setbacks at the front and advocated making peace with Japan on any terms. The group led by Chiang Kai-shek, who was aware that the shame

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A negotiated peace with Tokyo would lead to the collapse of the government's policy and its inevitable displacement.

Due to these considerations, Chiang Kai-shek rejected Japan's "peace" proposals and continued the struggle relying on the army. He explained his position by the fact that in a permanently difficult situation, China objectively needed the USSR in the fight against Japan, and therefore called the Soviet Union "the only ally in the fight against Japan, when all China's hopes for England and America burst."

A.S. Panyushkin constantly emphasized in conversations with Chinese leaders that the Soviet Union was supplying weapons to China to fight the Japanese aggressors, and not to unleash an internecine civil war. Otherwise, the USSR will be forced to stop

your help.

The Ambassador and the Chief Resident managed to establish trusting relations with a number of progressive and liberal-minded people who stood in the position of strengthening friendship with the USSR and continuing the anti-Japanese war. These people were aware of what was happening in the highest echelons of power and what decisions were made on various aspects of domestic and foreign policy, and to a certain extent could influence the adoption of a particular decision. These included Deputy Chiang Kai-shek Marshal Feng Yuxiang, Chairman of the Legislative Assembly Sun Fo, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Chinese Army Bai Chongxi, Chief of the Military Chancellery He Yaozu, prominent scholar Guo Moruo and many others.

With the help of Panyushkin's direct participation, our military advisers succeeded in persuading Chiang Kai-shek and other military leaders to resist the advance of Japanese troops on the city of Changsha and develop a plan for its defense. As a result of this operation, which lasted about 20 days, the Japanese lost 30,000 soldiers and officers. The losses of the Chinese army were

significantly less.

Another task of the Soviet ambassador and residencies in China was the need to monitor the state of relations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China and prevent the possibility of a civil war. A.S. Panyushkin met with representatives of the CPC and the leadership of the Eighth People's Liberation Army of China, Bo Gu and Ye Jianying. All this helped him to keep abreast of the events taking place in China and to inform the leadership of the Soviet Union about them.

When in 1941 relations between the Kuomintang and the CCP became tense again, the station in Chongqing, headed by Panyushkin, sharply intensified its efforts to promote the creation of a United Front against the Japanese militarists. As a result, a confrontation between the Kuomintang and the CPC was prevented and a civil war in China was prevented.

Guided by A.S. Panyushkin, the residency not only informed the Center in a timely manner about the main problems of external and

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internal policy of China, the plans of Japan and other countries, but a month and a half before the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR, she obtained and sent to Moscow information about the plans of the German military command, in particular, about the main directions for the advancement of the fascist troops, received undercover from the military attaché Berlin in Chongqing.

Germany's attack on the Soviet Union translated the issue of Japan's attack on the USSR into a practical plane. According to the Kantokuen plan, developed by the Japanese General Staff, the number of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria by January 1942 reached 700,000 people. There is a new group in Korea. The operational plan, which was an integral part of the Kantokuen plan, proceeded from the fact that the USSR would be forced to withdraw its troops from the Far East to the Western Front, after which the seizure of Primorsky and Khabarovsk Territories would not cause any special problems.

In this regard, the behavior of the Chinese leadership became more and more insidious and dangerous. Its main goal was to push the USSR against Japan. At the end of 1941, the station in Chongqing reported to the Center: "Chiang Kai-shek is trying by all means to provoke Japan to act against us. His apparatus in this regard works in all directions. Such a policy of Chiang Kai-shek was recorded in the secret directive of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang on special work for 1943, obtained, as can be seen from the analysis of archival materials, by the Chongqing residency. In particular, it said: "Based on the current diplomatic relations, we need to advertise sympathy for the USSR and sympathy for the fact that it has been subjected to aggression, pushing it to ensure that the USSR devotes all its forces to the war. As for Soviet-Japanese relations, we need to push the USSR to go to war with Japan in order to get a breather until a favorable moment comes for a counter-offensive against the Japanese.

Based on this premise, Chiang Kai-shek pressed Moscow to conclude a secret agreement on a military alliance against Japan with the express purpose of torpedoing the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact concluded in 1941.

The period of stay of A.S. Panyushkin in Beijing coincided with the fulfillment of the main task - not to overlook the possibility of a Japanese attack on our country and the creation of a second front against us in the east. Information about Japan's plans came from a variety of sources - from representatives of official authorities, communists, and diplomats from third countries. Contacts among the Russian emigration in China also brought a certain benefit. Important information, according to the memoirs of A.S. Panyushkin, on a purely confidential basis, they also sometimes received in residency from their brother Ya.M. Sverdlov -

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Zinovy, adopted by A.M. Gorky under the name of Peshkov, who at that time was the French ambassador to Chongqing.

Here is a brief description of the work on intelligence tracking Japan's intentions towards the USSR On June 23, 1941, Marshal Feng Yuxiang informs A.S. Panyushkin that Japan is preparing to oppose our state within a month. On June 27, General Bai Chongxi tells the chief resident not only the number of Japanese divisions, but also the number of troops of the puppet state of Manchukuo in case of an attack on the USSR. Then the timing of the attack

changed several times: in the fall, according to the data received by the Chongqing residency, in Chinese political circles, the time of Japan's attack on the USSR was associated with the possible capture of Leningrad by fascist Germany, and later Moscow. At the end of 1941 A.S. Panyushkin reported on the desire of the Japanese special services to prevent normal navigation in the Pacific Ocean at the beginning of 1942 - with reference to a conversation with the representative of Xinjiang at the central government of China in Chongqing Zhang Yuan-fu ~ about the intention of the Japanese to capture Vladivostok, which, according to their opinion, was "a sharp knife brought over their backs." The Chief of the General Staff of the Chinese Army, Bai Chongxi, in a confidential conversation, informed the Resident that the conclusion of a military agreement between Germany and Japan provided for the synchronization of military operations against the USSR between Japan and Germany. Later, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kuomintang government, Fu Bingchang, called May 1942 the time of the attack on the USSR, linking this date with the demands of Berlin. Finally, in July 1942, both Minister of War Chiang Kai-shek He Yingqin and CPC representative Zhou Enlai simultaneously told us about the concentration of Japanese troops in Manchuria, alluding to the favorable situation for Tokyo on the Soviet-German front, which was approaching the Volga.

It is worth mentioning the reception of A.S. Panyushkina I.V. Stalin on December 5, 1942, after the completion of the encirclement of the Nazi troops near Stalingrad, during which the resident ambassador gave a description of the situation on the fronts of the struggle in China against the Japanese aggressors. According to the memoirs of Alexander Semenovitch, Stalin asked how he was doing with the English language, and recommended to improve knowledge in this area. He received the same advice on July 9, 1939, at the first meeting with Stalin, although Panyushkin learned about the plans to send him first to the east and then to the west only later ...?

Be that as it may, monitoring the threat of a Japanese attack on the USSR was not removed from the agenda until the middle of 1943 ~ until the defeat of the Nazi troops on the Kursk Bulge.

Led by A.S. Panyushkin, intelligence teams in China successfully coped with the task. For fruitfulness

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for work in China, Alexander Semenovitch Panyushkin was awarded the Order of Lenin.

In 1944 A.S. Panyushkin returned to Moscow and was appointed deputy head of the international information department of the Party Central Committee. He worked in this position until May 1947, and then returned to foreign intelligence again, becoming the chief secretary of the Information Committee under the USSR Council of Ministers.

In October 1947, he was again sent to work abroad. This time - Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Soviet Union to the United States of America. As in China, he was the chief resident of the KGB in that country.

In the difficult conditions of intelligence work in America, A.S. Panyushkin took measures to provide the Center with intelligence information uninterruptedly.

In July 1952 A.S. Panyushkin returned to Moscow and was again appointed to the post of USSR ambassador to the PRC. But this time he no longer combined a diplomatic post with intelligence work, which was terminated immediately after the proclamation of the PRC on October 1, 1949. He remained in China until May 1953.

In July of the same year, he was elected to the Central Committee of the CPSU and sent to work in intelligence as the head of the PGU KGB. On June 23, 1955, he completed his service in foreign intelligence in connection with the transition to party work as chairman of the commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU for travel abroad.

In 1973 A.S. Panyushkin retired at the age of 68.



For fruitful work to ensure the state security of our country, Major General Panyushkin was awarded three Orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, two Orders of the Red Banner, the Order of the Red Star, many medals and the sign "Honorary security officer".

A.S. died. Panyushkin in 1974.

'Ambassador's Notes. China: 1939-1944 - M., 1981. - Far East Institute

Stock of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR - S. 3-4.

A.S. Titov in 1939-1942 - employee of the foreign intelligence station

in Chongqing, in 1945-1947. - residency worker in Beijing, and in 1948-

1950s - in Tianjin. In the late 40s, he played a significant role in the

denial of General Fu Zuoyi to the side of the Chinese Communists, which allowed

to avoid a bloody battle near Beijing.

3 At the beginning of the 1950s, he headed one of the departments in the central apparatus of foreign intelligence.

"Ambassador's Notes. China: 1939-1944 - M., 1981. - S. 290.

5 Ibid. - S. 231.

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Chekist Gridnev, friend of the Mongolian people

Lively and diverse work on the organization and practical implementation of the interaction of Soviet border guards with their colleagues from a number of countries in the Far East region absorbed the attention and strength of Vyacheslav Vasilyevich Gridnev. He led the relevant subdivision of the headquarters of the USSR border troops energetically and confidently, relying on his extensive professional experience. But from the very first days of the Great Patriotic War, he, like many employees of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR, had to deal with other matters that were more important and relevant in military conditions. V.V. Gridnev was appointed commander of the regiment of the Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade of Special Purpose (OMSBON) of the NKVD troops, and then became the commander of the entire brigade. Now his main concern was the selection, training and withdrawal of Chekists behind the front line to organize a partisan movement on the territory of the USSR temporarily occupied by the Nazis and conduct reconnaissance and sabotage operations there. The overwhelming majority of the personnel of the brigade were youth. Volunteers from the Higher Border School, the Higher School of the NKVD, students of Moscow universities, and workers were enrolled in it. There were many athletes, including record-breaking runners, the Znamensky brothers, famous boxers Korolev and Ivanov, skier Rostovtsev and others. Many foreign anti-fascist citizens joined the brigade: Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, Germans, Italians, Spaniards.

November 7, 1941 V.V. Gridnev and his subordinates took part in the historic parade on Red Square. With great attention they listened to the speech of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin. Directly related to them were his words about the need to create unbearable conditions for the fascist invaders in the occupied territory. Military units went straight from the parade to the front line, and OMSBON fighters went to the enemy rear.